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Abstract 
This thesis examines the deep bilateral tensions surrounding the East China Sea (ECS) 
disagreements between Japan and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the period 
from August 19th 2003 to June 18th 2008 from an actor-centred constructivist liberal 
viewpoint. The East China Sea disputes could be described as a conflicting difference of 
opinion over a) the demarcation of maritime territory and Exclusive Economic Zones 
(EEZ) in which potentially significant energy deposits exist and b) the ownership of the 
strategically important and historically sensitive Pinnacle (Senkaku/Diaoyu) Islands. This 
research addresses the question of why, given the fact that China and Japan have a strong 
interest in co-operation and stable relations with each other, small incidents in the ECS 
blow up into larger problems, cause approaches to the East China Sea to wax and wane, 
and move the relationship in a direction that goes against preferred national objectives? 
In attempting to unravel this puzzle, this work argues that domestic politics and popular 
negative sentiment have been the major issues that have greatly amplified and politicised 
the ECS problems and have significantly affected positive progress in negotiations aimed 
at managing and stabilising these disputes. By examining these, the thesis addresses the 
question of why China and Japan have been so constrained in their attempts to find a 
workable bilateral agreement over disputed energy resources and demarcation in the East 
China Sea. It also indirectly deals with the question of why the conflicting legal 
complexities surrounding these disagreements contributed to both states so fervently 
maintaining and defending their claims. 
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Chapter 1  
 Background to the Resurgence of the East China Sea Disputes, 
August 2003 - June 2008 
 
Research Question 
This thesis examines the deep bilateral tensions surrounding the East China Sea (ECS) 
disagreements between Japan and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the period 
from August 19th 2003 to June 18th 20081 from an actor-centred constructivist liberal 
viewpoint. The East China Sea disputes could be described as a conflicting difference of 
opinion over a) the demarcation of maritime territory and Exclusive Economic Zones 
(EEZ) in which potentially significant energy deposits exist and b) the ownership of the 
strategically important and historically sensitive Pinnacle Islands. Both the islands and 
the demarcation disputes are seen as interlinked by the majority of observers, a fact 
which serves to further complicate any possible solution to these disputes (Drifte, 
2008a:3). The islands component of these disputes is largely a legacy of the two 
countries’ histories. The maritime delimitation component however is relatively new with 
disagreements arising out of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
                                                          
1 These dates were chosen because August 19th 2003 represented the date in which a new dimension to the 
decades-long ECS disputes re-surfaced with China’s decision to commence production at the Chunxiao gas 
field in an area disputed by Japan. June 18th 2008 was chosen because it marked the symbolic signing of the 
‘principled consensus’ bilateral agreement on the ECS which represented the improvement made in the 
relationship after the low point of 2005 when ties were marked the worst period in bilateral relations since 
the normalization of ties in 1972.  The years 2003 to 2006 are thus viewed as years in which the post-2002 
tensions reached their worst point. The years from 2006 to 2008 were years in which repairs to damaged 
bilateral ties were made leading to the June 18th 2008 ECS agreement.  
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(UNCLOS), coming into force in November 1994 and ratified by both China and Japan 
in June 1996 (Pan, 2009:136).  Ever since, Japan has used the Pinnacle Islands as a 
baseline from which to legally lay claim to a sizeable area of maritime territory as its 
EEZ. China protests this and thus both the islands and delimitation issues are seen to be 
closely related.2 This research addresses the question of why, given the fact that China 
and Japan have a strong interest in co-operation and stable relations with each other, do 
small incidents in the ECS blow up into larger problems, cause approaches to the East 
China Sea to wax and wane, and move the relationship in a direction that goes against 
preferred national objectives? In attempting to unravel this puzzle, this work tackles the 
question of how domestic politics and popular negative sentiment greatly amplified and 
politicised these disputes. It also addresses the question of why the conflicting legal 
complexities surrounding these disagreements contributed to both states so fervently 
maintaining and defending their claims.  
The East China Sea is one of the few areas where the security interests of Japan and 
China intersect in close physical proximity to each other on a day to day basis. It is also 
one of the last unexplored high-potential resource areas located near large markets. As 
expressed by one Japanese scholar, ‘If there is a flash point to ignite a third Sino-
Japanese War, it will be the ownership of the Diaoyu Islands in the ECS’ (Suganuma, 
2000:11). Given that their shared sea is such a potential flashpoint between two of Asia’s 
two powerful states, it is interesting to note that although the ECS has been discussed in 
                                                          
2 These islands are known as the Senkaku Shoto in Japanese and the Diaoyu in Chinese. For the purposes of 
neutrality, the disputed islands in the East China Sea will be referred to by their nineteenth century English 
name, the Pinnacle Islands. 
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numerous publications, very little so far has been written on the inter-relationship 
between the resurgence of the ECS problems after 2002 and domestic politics and 
negative popular sentiment. As such, and as argued in this thesis, more deserves to be 
said about how they relate to each other, and about those issues that significantly 
exacerbate these maritime frictions.  
 
Contexts 
In appreciating the role of the ECS in the bilateral relationship, there are several 
important considerations which are all contained within the inter-related security, legal, 
geographical, and political contexts of the East China Sea disagreements.  These are: a) 
security factors such as the bilateral security structure, the potential energy, mineral, and 
natural resources in the ECS, and the strategic value of the Sea Lines of Communication 
(SLOCs); b) the important geographical location of the East China Sea; c) conflicting 
interpretations of the ambiguous UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and 
d) the considerable influence of domestic politics and popular negative sentiment on 
approaches to these disputes. 
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Security Context 
 
In the first place, there is the issue of the security structure and the lack of an adequate 
security management regime in North-East Asia.3 This weak structure remains closely 
related to one suited to a Cold War environment, where Beijing remains cautious of any 
real or imagined US-Japanese attempts to contain a rising China and its growing military 
capabilities, a fact that inhibits China’s ability to engage in regional security activities. 
China thus views the security implications of the ECS disputes through both a traditional 
and non-traditional lens, where issues such as maritime piracy and terrorism provide both 
states with opportunities and challenges for co-operation (Cai, 2007: 57). The East China 
Sea is also at the end of one of the world’s most vital SLOCs that connects the Middle 
East to North-east Asia. As such, the sea represents a choke point where both China and 
Japan need to jointly co-operate to ensure safe and reliable access for their ships for the 
benefit of both economies (Hideaki Kaneda, 13/12/2007). Japan and China’s security 
concerns in the area are also fed by the actual and potential value of energy, mineral and 
other natural resources in the East China Sea and also by the importance of the Sea Lines  
of Communication (SLOCs) for the security and prosperity of both states. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3 The Japanese and Chinese names used in this thesis are formatted according to how they normally appear 
in English language publications (and name cards, conference proceedings etc.).  
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Geographical Context 
The second factor is the the important geographical location of the East China Sea.  In a 
case like this where geography is such an important component, it is necessary to briefly 
describe to the reader the geographical features of the East China Sea, along with its oil 
and gas potential. 
 
 
Map highlighting the extent of Japan’s claimed Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Note how the 
uninhabited Pinnacle (Senkaku/Diaoyu) Islands permit Japan to claim an EEZ that pushes deeper into the 
East China Sea. Source: http://ishingen.wordpress.com/2007/03/27/desired-ground-part-three/  Accessed on 
28/06/2009.   
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Topographical and Bathymetrical Map of the East China Sea with the continental shelf highlighted in 
cream colour. Two of the contentious gas fields are also shown with their Chinese names. The PRC’s 
claimed maritime territory extends as far as the axis of Okinawan (Liuqiu) Trough shown in the green area. 
Source: http://sun-bin.blogspot.com/2005/11/chinas-bargaining-power-on-east-china.html.              
Accessed on 28/06/2009.     
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The East China Sea lies virtually surrounded on all sides by China, Japan, Taiwan and the 
Korean peninsula. Looking at the above map, one can see that the ECS is located 
between the Chinese mainland and the Japanese Okinawan islands (Liuqiu in Chinese). 
Connected to the Yellow Sea to the north and the South China Sea to its south, the ECS’ 
northern perimeter stretches from the north of the Yangtze River estuary across to South 
Korea’s Jeju Island. On its southern perimeter, the sea connects with the South China Sea 
extending from mainland China’s Guangdong Province’s Nan’ao Island and the south of 
Taiwan Island and then eastward where it is fenced off from the Pacific Ocean by Japan’s 
southern Kyushu Island, the Japanese Okinawan Archipelago and the island of Taiwan.  
Located between mainland China’s eastern shores and the Pacific Ocean, the exact size of 
the ECS varies according to the source. According to one Chinese scholar, this semi-
closed sea covers an area of close to 770,000 square kilometers (or 415,766 square 
nautical miles (nm)) of which the continental shelf area takes up approximately 460,000 
square kilometers (Zhao, 2004:29).  
 
Western sources however tend to agree that the sea’s total area consists of about 300,000 
square kilometers (or roughly 162,000 square nm). At its widest point between Japan and 
China, the ECS spans approximately 360 nm and only 167 nm between the two nearest 
points (Kien-hong Yu, 2005:106). The sea’s basin is shallow and is thus conducive to 
resource exploration with water depths of less than 200 meters (an average depth of 72 
meters) in virtually all areas with the exception of the Okinawa Trough (termed the Sino-
Ryukyu Trough by the Chinese) which straddles the Japanese coast. The seabed descends 
very gradually from the Chinese coast until it drops sharply into this Okinawa Trough 
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descending to a maximum depth of almost 2,300 meters.  Much interest, particularly from 
China, surrounds the energy prospects of a 940-square-mile area known as the Xihu 
Trough (80% of which is inside the Chinese side of the median line (explained below)), 
an area of seabed about two-thirds the size of Taiwan and potentially endowed with 
natural gas deposits estimated at 300 billion cubic feet (Hsiung, 2005:5;7-8). Estimates 
for the Chunxiao field reserves (located in the Xihu Trough area, and central to the 
resurgent ECS disputes) stand at 1.8 trillion cubic feet with a projected annually 
production rate of 70 billion cubic feet of gas increasing to 350 billion by 2010 (Harrison, 
2005:6).  As explained later however, it is difficult to find a consensus on the quantity of 
potential resources in the East China Sea with explorations over the years often yielding 
results that are far from optimal, and less than the required amount to justify the expenses 
involved in further exploration and production. 
 
Legal Context 
The third issue relates to differing interpretations of the 1982 United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), a factor that is closely linked to access to energy and 
other resources as well as security concerns in the ECS (Cai, 2007: 57). For the benefit of 
the reader, it is crucial to outline the details of the legal disagreements between Japan and 
China in the East China Sea. This section divides into a number of sub-sections which 
discuss the two central legal disagreements in the ECS. These are a) the Pinnacle Islands 
sovereignty dispute and b) differences of opinion regarding the application of the theory 
of the median line or the extended continental shelf for the demarcation of the EEZ. This 
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section also aims to highlight to the reader the limited likelihood of a legal resolution to 
these disputes under international maritime law, and explains the reasons why China and 
Japan are unlikely to use bodies such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to find an 
agreement on behalf of the two neighbours.  
 
 
Illustration Source: (Manicom, 2008b:389).   
The Pinnacle (Senkaku/Diaoyu) Islands 
These islands are made up of five uninhabited islets and three barren rocks that comprise 
of less than seven square kilometers, and are located approximately one hundred and 
twenty nautical miles south-west of Okinawa at the edge of the ECS’continental shelf 
30 
 
(Drifte, 2008a:3). Under Japanese ownership since 1895, the islands are referred to as the 
Senkaku Shoto by Japan and the Diaoyu by China. Ownership of the islands permits 
Japan to claim a large EEZ around them and also a territorial sea of up to twelve nms. 
The presence of Chinese vessels in proximity to these islands has been a constant source 
of tensions between the two neighbors. According to UNCLOS, the state which controls 
a territorial sea area has full sovereignty over the seabed, water surface, water column, 
and airspace but must allow the ‘innocent passage’ of another state’s ships and vessels 
(UNCLOS, Articles 2-4; 17-33).  While China and Taiwan have made respective claims 
to the territory in the last forty years, the Japanese government maintains that the islands 
are an indisputable part of Japanese sovereign territory and deny any existence of a 
territorial dispute (MOFA spokesperson, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
23/07/1996).   
 
Map of the Pinnacle (Senkaku/Diaoyu) Islands.                                                                                      
Source:  http://two--plus--two.blogspot.com/2008_12_01_archive.html. Accessed on 28/06/2009.    
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Photograph of some of the Pinnacle (Senkaku/Diaoyu) Islands. Administered by Japan but claimed by 
China and Taiwan. Source: http://ishingen.wordpress.com/2007/03/27/desired-ground-part-three/   
Accessed on 28/06/2009.  
 
The PRC’s Claims vis-à-vis the Pinnacle Islands 
China’s claim to the Pinnacle Islands rests on three legal arguments. Firstly, China asserts 
that Japan agreed to return the islands to Taiwan along with all other ‘occupied’ 
territories under the terms of surrender following Japan’s defeat in the Second World 
War. Japan however disputes the claim that the islands were included in any post-war 
agreement. Secondly, Beijing maintains that the islands are historically Chinese by virtue 
of the acts of prior discovery, use and ownership of the Diaoyu. Historical evidence of 
imperial China’s utilization and discovery of the territories thus gives China the ‘moral 
ground’ in which to claim legal ownership. Finally, the Chinese highlight Tokyo’s       
pre-1885 prior acknowledgement of Chinese ownership of the Diaoyu as evidence of 
Japan’s alleged illegal control of the islands.  
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Despite this, the relatively recent Chinese claim to the islands in the late 1960s after over 
seventy years under uncontested Japanese control since 1895 is taken as an indication of 
the strength of Tokyo’s claim (Wei Su, 2005:47). As Ramos-Mrosovsky observes, the 
reality is that from the end of the First Sino-Japanese War in 1895 until 1931 when Japan 
invaded China and from 1945 until 1971, periods which total some sixty-two years, 
‘there is no record of any Chinese government advancing the slightest claim to the 
islands’ (Ramos-Mrosovsky, 2008:929). In particular, the first two decades after 1945, in 
which Beijing did very little to protest Japan’s ownership of the islands, is often cited as 
evidence of the ‘weakness’ of the territorial claims made by the Chinese in the ECS. 
Beijing and Taipei however have challenged this view by asserting that mainland China 
and Taiwan’s claims to the islands coincided with the reversion of the post-war US 
administered Okinawa and its adjoining territories to Japan in 1972 (Wei Su, 2005:47).  
 
Japan’s Claims vis-à-vis the Pinnacle Islands 
The Japanese on the other hand continue to counter Beijing’s claims with three 
arguments of their own. In the first place, Japan has legal possession over islands which 
Tokyo views as sovereign national territory. From the Japanese standpoint, they argue 
that the islands were ‘terra nullius’ (vacant and unclaimed territory) before Japan 
formally annexed them in 1895. Secondly, the Japanese have continuously and peacefully 
held control and sovereignty over the ‘Senkaku Islands’ for over one hundred years 
(Heflin, 2000:3-9). International law also tends to look more favorably upon claims based 
on demonstrated ‘effective’ and continuous occupation (Ramos-Mrosovsky, 2008:914). 
Lastly, by virtue of the fact that China remained almost completely silent about Tokyo’s 
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occupation for the best part of seventy years, the Japanese maintain that China acquiesced 
in Japan’s sovereignty over the islands (Heflin, 2000:3-9). 
 
The Median Line and EEZs issues 
The resurgent oil and gas dimension of the ECS disputes are directly related to 
developments in international maritime law in the 1990s, Japan and China’s official 
declaration of conflicting claims in 1996, and subsequent bilateral disagreements over the 
median line and each state’s rightful EEZ. Viewing the PRC’s continental shelf natural 
prolongation stance as outmoded, and citing contemporaneous legal trends that seemed to 
favor the median line approach, Tokyo decided in 1996 to unilaterally draw a median line 
which it was hoped, would ‘equitably’ divide the overlapping EEZs (Drifte, 2008a:5).  
Japan protests Chinese exploration activities near the controversial median line for a 
number of reasons. These include the fact that Japan fears that the Chinese might be 
siphoning what is considered by Tokyo to be Japanese resources from under the Japanese 
drawn median line and from fields that straddle the median line. China totally rejects 
these accusations of siphoning, citing them, amongst other reasons, as physically 
impossible.  The median line is seen as inequitable by China and is not officially 
recognised by the PRC. Tokyo also uses the tiny and uninhabited Pinnacle Islands to 
push the median line further westward toward China.  Article 121 (3) of UNCLOS for 
example, states: ‘Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their 
own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf’ (United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, (UNCLOS), Article 121 (3)).  
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The ambiguous 1982 UNCLOS asks that states involved in a maritime territorial dispute 
refrain from any exploration activities in a disputed area until delimitation and EEZs are 
agreed. It also stipulates however that any hypothetical, temporary, or permanent median 
line should be based on an equitable solution that factors in issues such as length of 
coastline and human habitation.  Under the same law, Tokyo has the right, in the absence 
of a mutually agreed border line, to claim ‘potential authority’ over an EEZ stretching up 
to 200 nautical miles from its coast, therefore encompassing areas beyond the median line 
where, since 2003, China has been very active. For Japan, the legal ‘potential authority’ 
issue means that the Tokyo government continues to argue that Chinese oil and gas fields 
within the overlapping area (between 200 nm from Japan’s coastline and the median line) 
are within a contested area for as long as no final agreement exists (Drifte, 2008a:10). 
The Japanese also fear that the Chinese are trying to create facts on the grounds that 
favour the PRC in advance of a final and mutually agreed settlement. The Chinese for 
their part worry that Tokyo is surreptitiously attempting to make the Japanese and 
unilaterally drawn median line a permanent reality.  
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A Japanese map highlighting the issues at the center of the East China Sea disputes. Interestingly, 
Professor Liu Nanlai of CASS (Beijing), when shown this map during an interview (with an interpreter), 
argued that this map does not give a complete picture of the disputes because the continental shelf is not 
highlighted (Liu Nanlai , 16/09/2008).  Japan argues that this trough does not mark the end of the 
continental shelf but is in fact a depression in a considerably larger continental shelf that includes the 
Okinawan (Liuqiu) Islands. Source: The author wishes to thank Professor Yasuji Ishigaki of Tokai 
University, Japan for this map (Yasuji Ishigaki , 03/10/2007).   
 
According to UNCLOS there are two approaches to demarcate a sea boundary between 
two states, a median line solution or else a solution that recognizes a coastal state’s rights 
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to its continental shelf (to a maximum of 350 nm). The continental shelf element of the 
1982 convention states that a coastal country can have its continental shelf claim 
extended beyond the EEZ (normally up to 200 nm) to a maximum of 350 nm, provided it 
can prove with scientific data the geographical and geological continuity of the seabed 
with the state's established EEZ (Drifte, 2008b: 9). The median line element of the 1982 
UNCLOS outlined in Article 76 grants to states the right to claim an EEZ of 200 nm 
beyond a state’s baseline. In the event however that two states’ potential claims overlap 
(i.e. their 200 nm claims), the UNCLOS solution to such a scenario is incorporated in 
Article 74(1). This article reads as follows: ‘The delimitation of the exclusive economic 
zone between States with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement on 
the basis of international law …, in order to achieve an equitable solution’ (UNCLOS), 
Articles 74 (1), 76)).  
 
In order to be clear then for the reader regarding Japan`s adoption and the PRC’s 
rejection of the median line, this is the middle line of the overlapping area of the 200 nm 
EEZ of both Japan and China and is not an overlap between Japan's 200nm EEZ stance 
and China's 350nm continental shelf stance. Under more straight-forward circumstances, 
each country has a right under UNCLOS to an EEZ that extends to a maximum of 
200nm. The ECS however is less than 400 nm wide so there is an overlap between 
possible EEZ claims. In any case, this aspect is made redundant by the fact that China 
rejects a 200 nm claim. Based on the extended continental shelf theory, China claims an 
EEZ of more than 200 nm, i.e. as far as the axis of the Okinawa Trough which it 
considers the natural ending of its continental shelf where the maximum width that a state 
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is allowed to claim is 350 nm. It is apparent then that a significant problem is that 
UNCLOS is not clear about which approach, the median line or extended continental 
shelf, is the correct or appropriate one. The fact that South Korea has its own EEZ claim 
in the north of the ECS based on the extended continental shelf theory serves to further 
complicate any final resolution under UNCLOS’ guidelines (Sakamoto, 2008:2).  Under 
these circumstances, the PRC continues to emphasize the continental shelf argument over 
the 200 nm EEZ argument espoused by Japan until a mutually agreed compromise is 
found. Despite these lingering legal arguments however, Beijing has always kept its 
exploration activities to within its own side of the median line, even though it doesn’t 
officially recognize it, out of consideration for the fact that no maritime boundary 
agreement exists between the two neighbors (Pan, 2009:151). 
 
Domestic Politics and Popular Sentiment 
This research contends that domestic politics and popular sentiment were among the 
major factors that contributed to the amplification and politicization of these disputes. In 
the PRC, popular sentiment, the domestic political interests of the communist regime, and 
competition between top-level elites and constituencies played a major contributory role 
in constraining the leadership’s ability to make more positive and constructive 
approaches vis-à-vis the East China Sea. In Japan, the emergence of China-related and 
nationalistic issues as a much more salient electoral card and sensitive issue amid 
unprecedented internal and external structural changes placed the ECS disputes on a 
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higher and more public political plain and contributed to more assertive public stand by 
Japanese politicians with regards to these disagreements.  
This was in a context where exceptionally high levels of negative public and political 
sentiment, domestic politicking, and serious bilateral distrust dramatically politicized and 
amplified these disputes, significantly affected constructive and positive bilateral 
approaches to these disagreements, and influenced the ways in which the disputes 
manifested themselves in the 2003 to 2008 period. Signs of positive bilateral 
advancements in the East China Sea would include the building and enhancement of 
regimes aimed at conflict prevention and confidence building and even symbolic signs of 
progress such as the June 18th 2008 bilateral agreement, the ‘Principled Consensus on the 
East China Sea Issue’.4  This links into the question of why the maritime frictions were so 
tense and why no substantial movement in confidence building could be seen in the 
period from 2003 to 2006.  
 
These factors arguably owe more to the amplification and politicization of the ECS 
disputes from their worst period from August 2003 until the thaw in icy relations in 
October 2006 after the controversial Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi left 
office than to the actual material value of the contested islands and resources in this 
theatre. Noting the negative impact of such factors on bilateral relations, Katzenstein for 
example argues that ‘domestic politics creates political incentives in both countries to 
                                                          
4 The June 2008 ‘Principled Consensus on the East China Sea’ will hereafter be referred to using a 
shortened name, ‘Principled Consensus.’ For more information on this principled consensus, go to the 
following website http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/fyrth/t466632.htm. Accessed on 20/09/2010. 
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magnify and exploit popular sentiments, driven by factional infighting in China and 
electoral strategizing in Japan’. The danger of this characteristic of the relationship is that 
the two neighbors run the risk of ‘deepening suspicion and enmity’ that could cause 
Tokyo and Beijing to be trapped in a negative scenario that is contrary to their stated 
goals of joint gains and strengthening economic interdependence (Katzenstein, 2008:23). 
The thesis thus stresses how the above issues negatively influenced the political 
atmosphere surrounding the ECS disputes, and consequently the progress of the ECS 
negotiations in the 2003 to 2008 period.  
 
Domestic Politics and Popular Sentiment in Japan 
There has been an appreciable decline in feelings of good-will in Japan towards the PRC 
since Beijing’s ruthless crushing of student protests in Tiananmen Square in 1989. This 
was arguably the first of many high-profile incidents and developments that have 
negatively affected and tapped into latent historical Japanese attitudes towards the 
Chinese. Public opinion polls commissioned by the Japanese government for example 
have highlighted a drop in warm feelings toward China by ordinary Japanese from a high 
of 79% in 1980 to a low of 46% in 1997 (Austin and Harris, 2001:104). Alongside 
negative popular sentiment, growing fears about China’s rising power developed at a 
time when unfortunately for Japan, its own economic strength and prowess was 
weakened in relation to China. Tokyo’s main leverage in terms of its economic power, 
Official Development Assistance (ODA), although still considerable, has also been 
gradually decreased due to budget cuts. In 2001, Japan was replaced by the US as the 
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world’s top ODA donor and has since 1997 seen funds set aside for ODA slashed by as 
much as 30% (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 18/04/2004).  A product of such economic changes 
is that it has affected Japan’s ability to lever concessions out of the Chinese while also 
undermining Japanese confidence in the power of economics in persuading Beijing to 
behave in ways favorable to Japan’s interests.  
 
From the Japanese perspective, the rise of China in every field has occurred alongside ‘a 
psychological tendency in Japan to subscribe to a balance of power policy vis-à-vis 
China’ (Matsuda, 2008:78). Situated alongside Japan’s economic malaise in the 1990s 
and a rise of negative popular sentiment towards China, is a palpable unease about the 
PRC’s military modernization and its exponential and non-transparent defense spending, 
particularly in terms of its nuclear and naval capabilities. It should be noted that anti-
Chinese sentiment in Japan, though significant, is not as strong as anti-Japanese 
sentiment in China. Nevertheless, the behaviour of nationalistic groups and individuals 
has been a fundamental component in how the ECS disputes have manifested themselves 
over the years (Deans, 2000:124-125).  In particular, the value of intensified anti-China 
sentiment in Japan since 1989 as an electoral and political tool has not been lost by 
Japan’s political parties, politicians, and right-wing organisations. Seismic changes to the 
Japanese political and diplomatic structure vis-à-vis China in the 1990s also bestowed a 
much more powerful value upon public opinion and popular sentiment for Japan’s 
political elite particularly in debates surrounding issues such as the East China Sea.  
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Domestic Politics and Popular Sentiment in China 
In China, the development of a more intense form of Chinese nationalism since the 1990s 
has given sovereignty and territorial integrity related issues such as the ECS 
disagreements ‘intense symbolic value’ (Downs and Saunders, 1998-1999: 118). Latent 
anti-Japanese feelings stemming largely from Japan’s occupation of parts of China from 
1931 to 1945 were also magnified in the 1990s as a result of the communist regime’s 
increased use of nationalism from the top down to cement its legitimacy. The greater 
openness in China since the 1990s and the greater plurality of interests in Chinese society 
have also added more pronounced bottom up pressures that the CCP leadership must 
consider.   
Even though the PRC’s leaders still utilise socialist rhetoric to defend policies, it is clear 
that the post-Cold War CCP has placed an even greater emphasis on two ‘potentially 
incompatible’ objectives to legitimate its rule. The first objective focuses on presenting 
the CCP as the best protector of China’s national interests against foreign intervention, 
and as the most effective means by which China will return to its historical mantle as a 
great economic, political, and military power. The second objective focuses in on 
economic goals and prosperity and asserts that CCP rule is a necessity in order to ensure 
political stability and a rise in living standards for all Chinese citizens. Both these 
nationalistic and economic objectives appeal to the interests and emotions of the Chinese 
populace where the CCP’s power and legitimacy heavily depend on its success in 
attaining these goals rather than on sticking steadfastly to the CCP’s more traditional 
ideological principles (Downs and Saunders, 1998-1999: 118).   
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Not only does the CCP have to contend with increased public pressure from below to 
defend the nation’s interests vis-à-vis Japan over the ECS disagreements but the 
government must also remain wary of attempts by political opponents and groups from 
within to use such disputes to undermine and weaken their power and their standing 
within the party. The tensions surrounding the ECS in 19785 and 1996 arguably provide 
the most glaring example of this before the resurgence of serious ECS problems in 2003. 
Noting the 1996 ECS tensions over the Pinnacle Islands for example, Deans indicated 
that the 1996 frictions provided an insight into policymaking constraints within China 
with divisions among the Chinese decision-making elite about how to deal with the 
dispute. It also exhibited the ways in which the East China Sea serves as a type of 
‘shadow play’ through which other conflicts within the Chinese elite are played out 
(Deans, 2000:122).   
Briefly over-viewing the nature of bilateral ties since 1989, it is apparent that the 
interlinking of popular sentiment and domestic politics has played a more pronounced 
role in the considerations that both Japanese and Chinese decision-makers must make. In 
the ECS, this witnessed top-level elites responding to maritime incidents in a more 
publicly assertive and strident way in order to fend off political opponents or to 
strengthen their own political standing. These dynamics within the domestic political 
spheres of the two countries can have adverse destabilising consequences for these 
disputes. This research and the time period examined provide compelling examples of 
                                                          
5 It is not within the scope of this thesis to provide a comprehensive account of the 1978 Pinnacle Islands 
incident. However, for more information please see the next chapter as well as the chronology in the 
appendices. Also see Daniel Tretiak ‘The Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1978: The Senkaku Incident Prelude’ 
(1978). 
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this. Given this line of argument, this thesis does not treat the Chinese or Japanese states 
as monolithic blocks but rather appreciates the various tensions from within these 
countries that influence and constrain foreign policy outcomes towards issues such as the 
East China Sea disputes. In examining how domestic politics and popular sentiment are 
related to domestic politics in each state, the nexus between the two are examined, 
including the inter-linkage, rather than the exclusive ‘either or’ of both top-down and 
bottom-up influences, on how approaches to the 2003 to 2008 ECS disputes manifested 
themselves. 
 
A Survey of the Literature 
 
This section reviews the overarching debates within the published literature written 
specifically about the East China Sea disputes. Given that the central hypothesis of this 
research is that negative popular sentiment and animosity between the two states, and 
domestic political considerations were among the major factors that led to the 
politicization and amplification of these disputes, it is necessary to review the available 
ECS related literature in order to denote how this research makes an added contribution. 
In this regard, the focus is particularly on the years leading up to and including the 2003 
to 2008 period. It also shows how factors such as domestic politicking (such as rivalry 
between political elites in China, and the rise of China as an electoral issue in Japan), 
negative political sentiment, and history and security related controversies colored and 
defined the ECS disputes in this period.  
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Reviewing the published literature, it is apparent that the overarching debates tend to 
grant differing levels of attention to the following themes. These are: a) the legal and 
sovereignty-related complexities of the Pinnacle Islands dispute and maritime 
delimitation in the ECS; b) security and strategic issues in the ECS; c) domestic political 
factors that have affected approaches to the ECS disputes since the late 1960s; and d) the 
post-2002 resurgence in the ECS disputes. As might be expected, there is often an 
overlap in these themes in the various publications with some authors discussing a variety 
of the above. The available literature also tends to grant an inordinate level of attention to 
legal, strategic, and empirical details with more needing to be said in particular about the 
post-2002 frictions and their relationship to popular sentiment and domestic politics.  
However, all four areas should be reviewed separately.  
 
Legal and Sovereignty-related complexities of the ECS disputes 
Reviewing the numerous publications that deal specifically with the legal complexities of 
East China Sea issues, it is apparent that the ambiguity of current international law 
provides no real solution for the settlement of these issues, and in fact can complicate the 
peaceful approach to these disputes that both governments aspire to follow. The legal 
obstacles to forward movement are tackled in detail by Ramos-Mrosovsky who notes that 
even though commercial interactions across the ECS are vast, the legal stand-off over the 
islands’ status and its relation to maritime delimitation remains a thorn in the side of 
Sino-Japanese relations and hinders attempts to agree on a final demarcation of EEZs in 
the East China Sea (Ramos-Mrosovsky, 2008:904).   
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In this regard, current international law has in fact served to impede a final legal 
settlement for three key reasons. These are (a) that laws such as UNCLOS work on the 
basis of a ‘one-size fits all’ that does not make the necessary considerations for an area 
with a ‘unique political geography’ such as the ECS. For example, the generality of 
UNCLOS grants ‘otherwise worthless islands with immense economic value’ and 
maritime jurisdiction for the owner state over a disproportionate area. The next key 
reason,  (b) is that UNCLOS also effectively promotes the display of sovereignty by 
claimant states and punishes countries that appear to acquiesce in a rival state’s claim to a 
disputed area, and c) the ambiguity of current international law also encourages states to 
be extremely selective in choosing aspects of the law which serve their own interests 
while simultaneously discouraging them from resolving disputes via prescribed third 
party legal processes (Ramos-Mrosovsky, 2008:906-908).6 
Alongside these legal difficulties, the inability to accurately predict an outcome if a third 
party legal route was adopted, and the effect on the domestic legitimacy of a government 
if an unfavourable outcome was the result also act as disincentives for parties to resolve 
their disputes through international litigation. This is particularly a factor for the PRC and 
Japan in the East China Sea where ‘deep-seated historical and cultural antagonisms 
exacerbate the dispute.’  The depth of feeling amongst the Chinese with regards to 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, especially when it comes to Japan, means that, 
                                                          
6 It should be noted here that the PRC has opted out of third party arbitration in all its disputes with various 
neighbours, and not just Japan. 
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amongst other reasons, the CCP leadership shun international litigation on the islands’ 
disputes because the prospect of possibly losing could have dire consequences for the 
leadership’s standing as ‘the guardian of China’s rights and prestige.’ Even if the 
outcome of an international judgement on ownership of the Pinnacle Islands was positive 
for China, there is also no guarantee that the Japanese would easily hand over the islands 
without a fight or a struggle (Ramos-Mrosovsky, 2008:905;907;938). 
 
Valencia also expands on the reasons why the road to a final legal resolution of the ECS 
disputes is filled with obstacles. The key challenges to a legal resolution, he states, center 
on three issues. These are: a) using the Pinnacle Islands as a basis for an EEZ; b) agreeing 
on a ‘unified boundary’ that incorporates both EEZ and continental shelf stances; and c) 
ultimately that regardless of a boundary, that joint development in fisheries, minerals, and 
hydrocarbon resources should proceed (note for example the 1997 Fisheries agreement). 
Also central are the differing interpretations of what exactly joint development entails 
where Japan views it as meaning that China will cease any ongoing exploration activities 
in areas contested by Japan and where the Chinese would share the fruits of explorations 
within the overlapping area. The Chinese however see it as meaning that they would be 
left alone to extract resources within their side of the median line but would be open to 
joint development in the area between the median line and the end of the continental shelf 
boundary (a disputed area claimed by both Japan and China) (Valencia, 2006:1). 
Wei Su points to the early 1990s as the starting point of the deterioration in approaches to 
the islands issue after the three disputants (Japan, China, and Taiwan) began to intensify 
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their claims. Wei Su’s legal perspective on these disagreements provides a very detailed 
account of the historical legal background to the islands debate, the key questions 
pertaining to the validity of each side’s claims, and notes the contrasting legal position 
adopted by China and Japan. Here Wei Su argues that the PRC’s 1992 Law of the 
Territorial Sea and then the 1996 ratification of UNCLOS by both Japan and China laid 
out in formal terms each side’s perceived maritime territory and thus set the framework 
for the heightened tensions over EEZs, ship movements, and actions and reactions by 
nationalistic groups in both states (2005:45-47).  
 
Security and Strategic Issues in the East China Sea 
Alongside the key legal issues that are central to these disputes, in terms of strategy and 
security, Harrison contends that both states had for the most part successfully avoided 
clashes over the ECS from 1968 until the mid-1990s. However ‘multiplying energy 
needs’ and the discovery of ‘promising gas deposits’, in the middle of the East China Sea 
(in the Xihu Trough area), pushed Beijing more assertively towards Japan’s unilaterally 
drawn median line. Noting that three gas fields overlap the median line, Harrison 
observes how Japanese anxieties over China were exacerbated by the increasing number 
of surveys for energy resources carried out on the Japanese side of the median line. These 
surveys were ‘sporadic’ from 1995 to 1997 but by the late 1990s had risen dramatically 
with the Japanese demanding a suspension of production and geological data from 
Beijing amid concerns that the Chinese could be possibly sucking gas surreptitiously 
from the Japanese side. Beijing has also intentionally been ambiguous about where 
exactly its claims begin and end, and continues to push the natural prolongation 
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argument, thus making joint development ‘difficult if not impossible.’ On a positive note 
however Harrison cites the findings of Masahiro Miyoshi and Keun-Gwan Lee who in 
their own respective papers stated that ‘China and Japan did give priority to their 
immediate economic needs when they concluded the Sino-Japanese Fisheries Agreement 
of November 11, 1997’ (Harrison, 2005:3-4;9). 
 
In a 2005 conference paper, Hsiung sets out to position the ECS disputes in the context of 
the increased importance and strategic value being attached to maritime areas and their 
potential resources where international legal guidelines such as UNCLOS provide ‘no 
panacea for resolving international maritime delimitation disputes.’ Hsiung’s paper 
argues that the essential elements in these disputes are access to energy resources and ‘the 
latent competition for sea power dominance in the region.’ He also contends that ‘the 
mainland-Taiwan rivalry further complicates the PRC-Japan boundary disputes in the 
East China Sea, only making solutions more difficult’ (Hsiung, 2005:2;5;14). 
 
Liao tries to position the resurgent ECS disputes in the context of wider changes and 
shifts between the two neighbors. In this regard, Liao seeks to attribute the fundamental 
cause of the disputes to ‘power politics and political distrust, which are deemed to have 
played the key role in preventing the two governments from finding a solution’ where 
‘the commonly held opinion is that such competition is a prelude to an all out energy 
struggle between China and Japan in the international arena.’ The forces between this 
energy competition and the obstacles to a resolution (after eleven rounds of negotiations 
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in three years since 2004 without result) were political distrust and power politics. Briefly 
commenting on the influence of historical controversies such as the Yasukuni shrine7 
issue in the ECS disputes, Liao is somewhat dismissive of their impact, noting that once 
Koizumi left office in 2006 the tensions attached to the history issue subsided but that 
‘the deadlock of the (ECS) negotiations remained the same because of the continued 
political mistrust’ (Liao, 2008:57-8;71). 
 
On the theme of possible conflict, Blanchard dedicates an entire chapter to the question 
of whether or not the East China Sea disagreements could result in conflict between the 
two neighbors. Based on his research, Blanchard asserts that militarized conflict over the 
ECS is unlikely in the short to medium term because China still depends on Japan 
economically and politically, and because of the deterrent effect of the US-Japan alliance. 
He is more pessimistic about the long term however because the PRC’s military strength 
and its interests in the ECS will have increased dramatically, while the dependency on 
Japan will have lessened. Reviewing China’s behaviour vis-à-vis the East China Sea at 
different stages in the last thirty years for example, Blanchard’s analysis argues a strong 
link between the level of aggression displayed by the Chinese, and the political and 
                                                          
7 The Yasukuni Shrine is a Shinto shrine in Tokyo that was founded in 1869 during Japan’s Meiji era 
(1868-1912). The shrine honours and worships the souls of about 2.5 million Japanese who died in Japan’s 
wars and who are venerated as deities. Controversy surrounds the shrine because enshrined within it are the 
souls of fourteen convicted Class A war criminals, including the notorious war-time Prime Minister Hideki 
Tojo. For Japanese nationalists, the shrine is an important symbol of Japanese patriotism. For Japan’s 
neighbors however, the shrine is viewed as a shrine to Japanese militarism, and as reflective of a Japanese 
‘unwillingness’ to apologise for its past. Japan’s relations with neighbors such as China and South Korea 
experienced a deep freeze as a result of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s persistent visits to the shrine 
during his tenure (2001-06) (BBC News, 15/08/2006). 
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economic context which tempered China’s ability or tendency to threaten the use of force 
(Blanchard, 2006: 212;225). 
 
To date, China and Japan have succeeded in avoiding conflict over the ECS but the 
persistence of these disputes continues to act as a source of instability between the two. 
Fravel examines this problem when he focuses in on the islands issue, their strategic 
value and their geo-political context within the US-Japan-China relationship, their 
history, and why Japan (identified as the ‘defender’) and China (identified as the 
‘challenger’) have been able to avoid conflict over the islands. Despite their value, the 
actual use of force over the ECS islands has not been a hallmark of bilateral approaches 
over the decades even though displays of resolve to use force, as seen in 1978 by China, 
have occasionally served to raise tensions. Applying such views more directly to this 
thesis, in strategic and security terms, the ECS situation is arguably one in which both 
states are striving to maintain a stable approach to their disputes. Both however are also 
following strategies in which their own claims are preserved or even strengthened, or at 
the very least, where the other side will not be allowed to gain the upper hand in terms of 
claim strength without protest (Fravel, 2010:144-45;149). 
Strategic and security interests also provide insights into why both countries have not 
resolved the disputes but similarly why they have taken care to avoid military 
confrontation in spite of frictions in the East China Sea. These are noteworthy for this 
thesis because they outline the desire by both states to maintain stable relations vis-à-vis 
the East China Sea while simultaneously holding firm to their territorial claims. Reasons 
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for this scenario of peace and balancing in the ECS include effective deterrence, Japan’s 
de facto control of the Pinnacle Islands, the competition for regional leadership between 
the two states, and the success to date in peacefully managing the ECS problems. Despite 
the ‘fragile’ stability created by the above outlined factors, ‘the presence of the dispute 
allows the opportunity for armed conflict to persist, especially if management of the 
dispute atrophies’ (Fravel, 2010:145;150-51;160). Examining those issues that can 
complicate and stall attempts at dispute management is thus an important objective that 
deserves to be pursued.  
 
Maritime Regimes and Conflict Prevention in the East China Sea 
Perhaps the most detailed examination of the various regimes of co-operation over a 
whole raft of issues in the ECS that exist (and did not exist) between Tokyo and Beijing 
up to 2003 is provided by Valencia and Amae. Both scholars evaluate the progress made 
in bilateral conflict prevention agreements such as the 1997 Fisheries agreement 
(involving joint regulation and fishing zones) and the 2001 prior notification agreement 
in relation to scientific research activities. They also see the Japan-China axis as 
imperative in terms of pushing regime building forward not just for the two states but for 
the East Asian region as a whole where positive progress by the Japanese and the Chinese 
would compel neighbors such as South Korea and Taiwan to change their behavior 
accordingly and follow suit. Both also describe the growing significance of maritime 
boundaries since the 1990s because of their symbolism for national pride and integrity 
where, during that time, ‘the widespread depletion of fishery resources, the expansion of 
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national fleets, alleged poaching by non-littoral countries, the growing thirst for oil and 
gas, and intelligence gathering in the East China Sea’ began to test the tacit conflict 
prevention system between coastal states such as Japan and China. This reality, they 
warn, amid often hostile and fragile relations between countries in Northeast Asia means 
that maritime disagreements such as those in the East China Sea ‘could become the tail 
that wags the dog of international relations’ in the region. Positive approaches to 
maritime disputes however are complicated by the fact that economic and political issues 
are predominantly dealt with bilaterally and by the fact that the wider multi-state 
institutions in that region are relatively weak in comparison with other regions of the 
world (Valencia and Amae, 2003:189-90;192-94). 
 
Changing developments in the ECS since the 1990s such as those outlined above, when 
considered alongside the limitations of legal and institutional frameworks in the region 
thus press the need for both states to go beyond earlier agreements on Fisheries and 
Scientific Research activities. This is a most urgent need in the areas of military and 
intelligence-gathering activities in the ECS. As both scholars argue, events such as 2001 
USAF EP3 incident over China and the 2001 North Korean spy ship incident have served 
to emphasize the urgency of an agreement in order to prevent skirmishes and to enhance 
communications to resolve problems. As a guideline, both scholars cite the 1972 
Incidents at Sea Agreement (INCSEA) between the USA and the USSR as a proven 
method to regulate the interaction of ships and vessels in contested waters. In the East 
China Sea, this might involve a number of confidence-building measures such as limiting 
the frequency and size of naval exercises, prohibiting activities and tests in certain areas, 
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and creating so-called ‘peace zones’ where no military activity would be allowed 
(Valencia and Amae, 2003:199;204). 
 
Domestic Politics and their Influence on Approaches to the ECS 
 
In looking at how domestic politics have influenced approaches to the ECS disputes, it is 
clear that internal dynamics and influences have resulted in a pattern over the years of 
symbolic and potentially escalatory gestures used by individuals and groups in both states 
to emphasize their country’s claims, and to promote or protect their image in front of elite 
competitors and home audiences. In China, public outrage manifesting itself in protests 
and calls for stronger actions are often the result of high-profile incidents in the ECS. The 
CCP permits and even publicly supports these protests for legitimacy purposes and as a 
type of social pressure valve but then tends to quietly clamp down on them before they 
turn into larger anti-government protests that would affect domestic political stability or 
before they threaten essential economic ties.  Once the tide of initial outrage has 
retreated, the two governments make more concerted diplomatic efforts to de-escalate a 
crisis or incident and strive to restore stable relations.  
According to Ramos-Mrosovsky, each of the various tense incidents in the ECS since the 
late 1960s saw each government respond to domestic pressure to maintain their legal 
claims and also their political legitimacy by engaging in actions that triggered a response 
from the other side for similar reasons. These arguments on the interplay of domestic 
politics and disputes over the ECS would suggest that there is an interaction of top level 
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as well as bottom-up considerations at the domestic political level that Beijing and Tokyo 
have to contend with in official and public approaches to territorial disputes. Both 
governments often find themselves trying to cool the fires of nationalism even though 
this task is becoming increasingly more difficult and even though the nationalist card can 
prove at times to be a useful card to exploit (Ramos-Mrosovsky, 2008:935-36).   
 
While looking at the ongoing maritime disputes involving Japan and three of its regional 
neighbors (the PRC, Russia and South Korea), Valencia asserts that these are more than 
just squabbles over economic resources but have great weight in terms of inter-state 
relations because the disputed territories involved have become powerful symbols which 
strongly impact upon nationalist sentiment and domestic politics in all the states 
involved. Unresolved historical grievances and the politics of national identity are thus 
seen to be the fundamental barriers to a resolution of these disputes. These have had the 
negative effect of perpetuating the levels of tensions between the disputants, where as a 
result of greater openness and democratization in the region, that more than previously, 
politicians are responding to their publics’ demands for the steadfast protection of 
national territory as they see it, and where political figures and factions exploit disputes 
such as those in the ECS for their own ends.  This has resulted in the creation of an 
atmosphere that makes such territorial disputes more dangerous than they should be. 
According to Valencia, popular nationalistic sentiment fed by historical memory and 
negative perceptions of the other side alongside a belief that considerable hydrocarbon 
resources exist in the disputed areas, are the principal factors at the center of these 
disputes (Valencia, 2000:1-2).   
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The strength of nationalism in each country has also experienced a resurgence since the 
1990s and this has seen nationalists within all the disputant states push their own agendas 
onto the domestic political agenda with sometimes negative consequences for foreign 
policy (Valencia, 2000:4). Downs and Saunders for example examine the delicate 
balance between economic performance, nationalist pride, and legitimacy that top elites 
in the CCP had to find during the 1990s when disputes over the Pinnacles Islands arose. 
This balance often sees the CCP target its nationalist rhetoric on the Pinnacle Islands at a 
domestic audience for the purposes of regime legitimacy (Downs and Saunders, 1998-
1999:116-117;123) while balancing this against China’s need for stable economic 
relations with Japan.  
 
This concern for domestic stability and legitimacy runs alongside domestic constituencies 
and public sentiment which are increasingly influential considerations, even in a non-
democratic state like the PRC. The political use of nationalistic issues by central 
government in the post-reform era is likewise tied to the need by China’s conservatives to 
use issues such as the Spratly Islands and the Pinnacle Islands to reassert their power and 
influence (Valencia, 2000:5). By examining the 1996 frictions over the Pinnacle Islands, 
Deans illustrated the divisions within the Chinese leadership in terms of how the disputes 
should be dealt with and how the East China Sea serves as a type of ‘shadow play’ for 
other contests within the CCP elite. Such views suggest that the main factors driving the 
disputes are not state-sponsored nationalism nor the governments themselves but the 
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ways in which domestic groups in Japan have used them to embarrass and pressure the 
government, or for their own political ends. In the PRC, the disputes are often driven by 
the ECS being often used as a card through which elites compete for power (Deans, 
2000:119;122). 
 
The post-2002 resurgence in the ECS disputes  
 
In terms of the oil and gas element of the recent post-2002 ECS disputes, Drifte’s two 
2008 working papers arguably provide the most detailed account of the developments 
that led to the resurgence of these disagreements after 2002. The first paper outlines in 
impressive step-by-step detail the developments in the ECS that culminated in the 2003 
decision by Beijing to commence exploration activities at the controversial Chunxiao 
field and then Tokyo’s later decision in mid-2005 to revive once dormant exploration 
rights, allowing Japanese companies to explore for oil and gas in once off-limits areas of 
the ECS. The first paper likewise touches upon shifts and changes within the wider 
relationship that impacted upon how both governments approached the disputed sea. 
Examples given by Drifte include the effect of nationalist politicians ‘riding high in 
Japan’, ‘tit-for-tat reactions’, and tensions being ‘fanned by a general deterioration of the 
bilateral relationship (as a result of China’s military developments, (and) the Japanese 
reaction being to enhance its security links with the US).’ Japan’s defense changes were 
in turn seen as an attempted containment of China with ‘the history conflict, rising 
nationalism, and assertiveness on both sides, and growing political and economic 
competition between the two countries contributing to the rising tensions.’ Other reasons 
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for the downturn in approaches to the ECS cited by Drifte, include the increased number 
of Chinese scientific research and naval vessels inside Japan’s EEZ, and the growing 
media interest toward, and suspicion of, the PRC amid more public scrutiny of China in 
Japan from both left and right-wing elements. In China, a ‘growing pluralism and 
loosening of central control’ hampered Beijing’s ability to deal with the disputes in a 
more favorable way (Drifte, 2008b:5;9;11;22;27). 
 
The second of the Drifte papers also addresses in detail the historical, legal and technical 
aspects of the ECS disputes, for example the median line issue and the Pinnacle Islands 
issue and how they are inter-related. Drifte also presents some interesting points on the 
perception of actions. A notable example includes the view that Japan’s passivity towards 
Chinese developments in the ECS up to 2003 must have been seen by Beijing as an 
acceptance of Chinese actions as long as these actions did not take place beyond the 
unilaterally proposed median line. The paper similarly comments on the importance of 
political good will if negotiations are going to result in a positive conclusion. Drifte for 
example notes how nationalistic pressure groups in both states ‘pushed for a greater 
assertion of their country’s stance’ thus ‘adding to the pressure arising from China’s 
relentless exploration and the worrying military connotations of the territorial disputes’ 
(Drifte, 2008a:2;13).   
 
The second paper stands out from the first in particular because of its evaluation of the 
landmark June 2008 ‘principled consensus’ between Tokyo and Beijing where Drifte 
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asserts that its significance lies in its symbolism of improved bilateral ties rather than its 
substance. As with the first paper, it briefly discusses the domestic political changes that 
contributed to a more negative approach to these disputes leading up to 2003 such as 
bureaucratic swifts in power (for example from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) 
to the Ministry of Economics, Trade and Industry (METI) in Japan) and the issue 
becoming ‘hijacked’ by a wider deterioration in bilateral ties. Noteworthy also is Drifte’s 
argument that the June 2008 agreement witnessed a tacit acknowledgement of the median 
line by the Chinese and that the escalation of the disputes after 2002 were ‘not entirely 
China’s fault since both states have gone ahead at various times with exploration 
activities without the prior consent of the other side’ (Drifte, 2008a:2;13;17-18;20).   
 
Valencia reviews the post-2002 situation in the ECS and places a special emphasis on the 
legalistic complexities of the ECS disagreements and possible ways out of the disputes 
impasse. He focuses in particular on the worst phase of the ECS disputes in 2005 and 
observes that it developed in the context of increased security concerns over the PRC’s 
activities in maritime areas, especially the intrusion of a Chinese submarine in November 
2004 and also numerous PRC exploration ships in what Japan considers to be Japanese 
waters in previous months. Despite these challenges however, Valencia contends that 
conflict is not an inevitable fact of life. A number of factors point to the Japanese and the 
Chinese striving to find ways to lessen the danger of trouble or the use of force. The most 
prominent reason for this is that ‘a positive China-Japan relationship is simply too 
important to be destroyed by these disputes’ and that this realization may be ‘the catalyst 
necessary for wise leaders to forge at least a temporary solution.’ Valencia similarly notes 
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that the exponential increase in bilateral trade as well as growing pressure to proceed with 
oil and gas extraction in the area may further motivate leaders and interest groups to find 
a compromise (Valencia, 2007:127). Despite this, Valencia also sees however that 
domestic politics in both states are still central to how Japan and China approach these 
disputes, and where the alternative to positive political relations has witnessed ‘continued 
mutual suspicion, unstable relations, unmanaged and undeveloped resources, and an 
increasing frequency and intensity of incidents, fueling nationalist sentiments and 
resultant political conflict’ (Valencia, 2006:2). 
 
Cai also looks at the post-2002 energy and demarcation disputes and the question of why 
they have attracted attention in recent years. Divided into three sections, the first 
examines the post-2002 situation and negotiations regarding the ECS, and also Tokyo 
and Beijing’s standpoint and claims in the area. The second section assesses the proposals 
for, and possibilities of, joint-development in the ECS and then the final section discusses 
the implications of the disputes for regional security.  Writing in 2007, Cai observed a 
positive development in terms of some progress being made towards an ‘accident-
preventative initiative’ and joint-development plans. He also outlines four key elements 
of the disputes that directly relate to security implications where domestic politics are one 
aspect because of their strong influence on the formulation of maritime policy. In this 
regard, Cai argues that because both governments have already laid down sometimes 
assertive statements on the ECS, shifting from earlier remarks may make it 
‘embarrassing’ and politically costly in terms of ‘domestic partisan politics’ and public 
reaction.  Assessing the chances of a resolution, Cai contends that each side is unlikely to 
60 
 
make any major concessions in terms of territory. Despite this however he contends that 
the use of force is unlikely and that Japan and China can find ways to co-operate so as to 
ensure stability.  He nonetheless warns that without positive signals and the required 
political will, and without consequent co-operative agreements in the near future, then the 
security situation in the ECS, fed by ‘energy-related tensions’, will not improve. 
Reflecting wider Chinese perspectives on Japan, Cai observes the problems caused by the 
growing strength of both states’ navies where ‘in particular, the Japanese navy has been 
changing its strategy from defending national territorial integrity to engaging in 
international operations’ and where Japan has, through ‘unilateral actions’ used the 
coming into force of the UNCLOS in 1994 to ‘expand its maritime boundaries.’ These 
occurred, he argues, alongside ‘provocative actions’ by Japan with Korea over the 
Liancourt islets (Dokdo in Korean and Takeshima in Japanese) and ‘disturbing acts’ by 
the Japanese with regards to the Pinnacle Islands (Cai, 2007:57-59;64;67;69). 
 
Of all the available literature that deals specifically with the post-2002 East China Sea 
disputes, Manicom’s 2008 article arguably comes closest in terms of examining how 
ideational and domestic political factors affect approaches to, and bilateral 
understandings of, the ECS disagreements. Manicom argues the case for equal respect to 
the material and ideational aspects of these disputes where both are seen as ‘the primary 
driving forces’ because ‘compromise on the material aspects of the dispute has become 
beholden to nationalist prerogatives.’ Viewing the adoption of one aspect over the other 
as an over-simplification, Manicom cautions scholars not to examine the material and 
ideational elements ‘in isolation from each other.’ His article also dedicates 
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comparatively greater attention to how domestic influences relate to these disputes. In 
this regard, the relevant decision-making groups (core, peripheral, popular nationalist 
groups) in China and Japan are outlined and the history of the disputes up until 2003 is 
explained. The inter-relationship between nationalist expression in both states is similarly 
discussed where Manicom contends that the resurgent ECS tensions since 2003 owe a 
great deal to the inclusion of now more significant material factors (i.e. offshore 
hydrocarbon resources, sea-lane security, responding to greater assertiveness in maritime 
areas by the other side etc.) alongside ideational aspects in these disputes. These, he 
argues, ‘broadened the scope’ of the ECS disputes beyond what was once an issue 
centered almost exclusively around the Pinnacle Islands dispute. The nadir of the 2003 to 
2006 disputes from April to September 2005 then were ‘the product of a weaving of 
ideational and material factors’ where this inter-linking was first illustrated in July 1996 
when Japanese nationalists responded to Beijing’s EEZ declaration of the same year by 
erecting a lighthouse on one of the Pinnacle Islands. For these reasons, Manicom asserts 
that the unlikelihood of finding a compromise can be attributed not solely to the 
‘domestic nationalist pressure vis-à-vis the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands’ or to ‘rising energy 
needs in China and Japan’ but rather to ‘the marriage of these two aspects of the dispute’ 
(Manicom, 2008b:375-76;382;385;390). 
 
Summary of Literature      
Reviewing the available literature, the call for an examination of the 2003 to 2008 
disputes from an actor-centered constructivist liberal angle is strengthened by the fact that 
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the literature to date tends to focus exclusively on a limited number of journal articles and 
papers that focus heavily on the empirical, strategic, and legalistic aspects that directly 
caused these disputes, and on a history of key developments and incidents relating to the 
disagreements since the late 1960s. In the majority of these sources, while providing 
useful factual information for foreign policy analysts, the influence of domestic politics 
and popular sentiment in the period from 2003 to 2008 is often only touched upon with 
more deserving to be said. It will be shown in this thesis how important it is not to 
overlook the ‘inside-out’ actor-centered constructivist liberal component in these 2003 to 
2008 disputes and how it complements and adds to possible alternative perspectives on 
why the disputes re-ignited to the extent they did after 2002. The actor-centered 
constructivist liberal approach taken to explaining the amplification of the ECS disputes 
in the period from 2003 to 2008 is thus new ground in terms of its contribution to the 
existing literature.  
 
 
 
Articulation of the Research Question 
 
While all of the four major contexts discussed earlier play a prominent role in 
understanding the resurgence of these disputes, this thesis emphasizes the fourth major 
element, domestic politics and popular sentiment, and how these factors affected and 
constrained approaches to the ECS from 2003 to 2008. To be more precise, this research 
contends that negative popular sentiment fed by history, national identity, and security 
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related issues and controversies, and domestic political considerations such as electoral 
strategizing in Japan and competition between top-level elites and constituencies and 
their challengers in the PRC were among the major factors that contributed to the 
amplification and politicization of these disputes. From this perspective, it is argued that 
the extent of the post-2002 East China Sea tensions over the islands and the sea’s 
delimitation are best understood by emphasizing their symbolism and the instrumental 
utility of these issues for domestic politics in both countries. This links into explaining 
why these disputes are often both potentially combustible and powerful, in that they are 
able to stir up a nationalistic public reaction that is disproportionate to the actual material 
gains to be made in the ECS (Roy, 2003:3).  
 
This problem of popular sentiment and domestic politicking and their influence on the 
ECS disputes is an ongoing problem that can cause bilateral approaches to the disputes to 
wax and wane. This is particularly the case in the PRC and goes a long way in explaining 
the reasons why Chinese reactions to publicized incidents in the ECS can be so dramatic 
and emotive. These domestic factors arguably do more to explain the high level of 
tensions over East China Sea incidents rather than explanations that prioritize the 
competition for natural resources or ‘state-sponsored nationalist irredentism’ (Deans, 
2000:128). The reality so far is that moderates in Tokyo and Beijing have striven to focus 
on the mutual benefits for the wider relationship and to quietly deal with ECS 
disagreements where possible but have, at times, reacted more assertively and 
vociferously to defend their state’s legal claim. These forceful responses are arguably a 
result of political posturing and pressures from a raft of actors at home ranging from 
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political opponents and challengers, to political factions to enraged nationalist groups and 
citizens. In the case of China in particular, the desire of top-decision-makers to maintain 
their nationalist credentials amid pressures from within the elite have resulted in quite 
forceful and sometimes aggressive responses over the years to incidents in the ECS 
(Deans, 2000:119-120; 128-129). 
 
This is not to suggest that domestic politics and popular sentiment are new features that 
influence how the Japanese and Chinese perceived and tackled their 2003 to 2008 
maritime disagreements. Indeed, the chronological history of these disputes since the late 
1960s when they first awoke contains numerous examples of where these factors troubled 
and complicated bilateral approaches. The greatest difference however between earlier 
high profile stand-offs surrounding the ECS (for example in 1978 and 1996) and their 
more recent resurgence after 2002 was: a) the inclusion of the lingering post-1996 
maritime delimitation issue in the disputes; b) the greater plurality in the PRC since the 
1990s and the much more influential role of increasingly anti-Japanese nationalism for 
regime legitimatization in China; and c) unprecedented levels of public and elite fear 
surrounding the rise of China in Japan and the resurgence of new nationalism in Japan as 
a card exploited by Japanese groups and politicians for their own political purposes that 
came at the end of a decade of economic and political malaise in Japan.  
 
While the economic and nationalist pillars of legitimacy, along with elite competition, in 
the PRC provide telling insights into approaches to the ECS from 2003 to 2008, it is also 
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important to examine how popular sentiment and political posturing in Japan impacted 
upon the post-2002 East China Sea disputes. Approaching the 2003 to 2008 East China 
Sea disputes from an actor-centred constructivist liberal perspective provides a useful 
viewpoint in which to examine how the actual and potential exploitation of popular 
sentiment over issues such as the ECS for domestic political purposes by various 
individuals, constituencies, and groups in both countries constrained approaches to these 
maritime disagreements.  
 
 
Why the East China Sea Disputes Matter 
 
 
An examination into the bilateral approaches taken to the ECS disagreements from 2003 
to 2008 provides important insights into how China and Japan deal with each other over 
conflicting issues of strategic and territorial importance. As two states who are dealing 
with similar levels of power for the first time ever, the resurgent post-2002 ECS disputes 
represent uncharted waters in a new era for two neighbors historically accustomed to an 
asymmetrical relationship. As Drifte argues, a case study analysis of the ECS territorial 
disputes also shows how Japan has changed its once passive behavior vis-à-vis the PRC 
in the East China Sea and how the Japanese are ‘attempting to balance a much more 
assertive approach with the relative decline of its power in relation to China.’ Analyzing 
the Chinese side, the re-awakening of these disputes also illustrates ‘a move away from a 
very centralised control of the disputes to a decision-making process where public 
opinion, individual ministries, oil companies, and particularly the navy are increasing 
more influence’ (Drifte, 2008a:19-20). 
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The approaches taken to these disputes have repercussions not just for Japan and China 
but for the whole region and its security, where the intensity of territorial disputes over 
maritime territory and energy reserves have increased considerably since the 1990s. 
Notable alternative examples include disputes between the PRC and her neighbours over 
the Spratly and Paracel Islands in the South China Sea, between Japan and China over the 
Okinotorishima atoll, and between Japan and South Korea over the Liancourt islets 
(Dokdo in Korean and Takeshima in Japanese). Indeed, these numerous other territorial 
disagreements involving either Japan or China may provide another reason as to why 
concessions in the ECS have been such a difficult challenge in that if granted could 
complicate claims and disputes elsewhere (Austin and Harris, 2001:104).  
 
This research is relevant in this regard because a workable and constructive approach by 
East Asia’s two most powerful states to the East China Sea disputes has a potential 
positive spill-over effect for the East Asian region by setting a framework for the 
resolution, or at least stabilizing, of complicated and sensitive territorial disputes.  This is 
echoed by Drifte who asserts that ‘the management of the Japanese-Chinese relationship 
has huge implications for the process of accommodating China’s rise as a political, 
economic and military power, and this process will exert great influence on regional as 
well as international stability’ where bilateral approaches to the ECS problems will have 
ramifications for other similar disputes involving China, most notably in the South China 
Sea. The ECS’ strategic position also implies that approaches to these disputes have a 
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bearing on how Beijing might deal with a Taiwan contingency.8 Furthermore, the pursuit 
of oil and gas deposits in their shared sea can provide a greater comprehension of the 
limits and potential of economic interest-based approaches that might guide China as it 
seeks to promote itself as a peace-loving regional and global power (Drifte, 2008b:1).  
 
The seriousness with which the ECS talks have been addressed over the years also shows 
that regardless of the actuality of the oil and gas reserves in sea areas such as those in 
close proximity to the Pinnacle Islands, the islands’ ownership issue and the control of 
sea areas so close to both states have a significant bearing on long-term security concerns 
and the potential altering of the boundaries of each state’s maritime territory (Hsiung, 
2005: 11). As one journalist argued in 2006, these disagreements aren’t just a wrangle 
over territory or indeed scarce natural resources, but are one part of a much larger jigsaw 
puzzle of problems. At the frontline of these encounters at sea lies the question of how to 
prevent potential conflict between the rising naval aspirations of Beijing and the tightly 
linked forces of Japan and its ally the United States (Caryl, 2006). In relation to the 
Pinnacle Islands disputes, Fravel notes their importance where ‘even in the absence of 
armed conflict over the land being disputed, tensions over the Senkaku Islands are likely 
to limit co-operation in other ways, highlighting mutual concerns about long-term 
intentions and ambitions’ (Fravel, 2010:144). 
 
                                                          
8 It is not within the scope of this thesis to discuss domestic, ideational and security factors regarding 
Taiwan’s approach to the post-2002 ECS disputes.  
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The need for an examination of the possible reasons why these disputes re-surfaced and 
became so tense after 2002 is further strengthened by the significance of the ECS for 
Beijing from a strategic point of view. When viewing a map highlighting the EEZs of 
states that surround China in the East China Sea, one can see the security impact caused 
by what Beijing views as ‘sea denial’ posed by neighboring states such as Japan and 
South Korea in terms of China’s unrestricted access to the open seas. Despite the fact that 
mainland China possesses a coastline of roughly 18,000 kilometers in length, in the ECS, 
China’s exits to the open sea almost exclusively run into maritime territory ‘controlled’ 
by Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and North Korea. The maritime areas claimed by Japan, 
which from the Chinese stand-point far exceeds what is allowed under UNCLOS, not 
only denies China access to much of the seabed’s essential oil and gas deposits of which 
China claims sovereign rights to under the same law, it also places the Chinese 
motherland in a more vulnerable security position (Hsiung, 2005: 4-5). 
 
Despite the apparent material and strategic value of the Pinnacle Islands and untapped 
resources in the East China Sea, both states have tended to successfully manage these 
disputes while holding firm to their claims and taking measures to check and balance 
against the activities of the other side. An examination of the ECS disputes in the period 
from 2003 to 2008 can exhibit the challenges to this normally peaceful management that 
domestic politics and popular sentiment can have on these disagreements. The frictions 
surrounding the Pinnacle Islands and maritime delimitation also provide an insightful 
opportunity to compare the manifestations of nationalism in the North-east Asian region 
since the turn of the new century (Deans, 2000:120).  In this regard, it is apparent that 
69 
 
politicians and political factions in both states exploiting sensitive ideational issues in 
conjunction with territorial disputes for their own purposes is a significant escalatory 
variable.  
 
Outline of Chapters 
Following on from Chapter One, Chapter Two addresses the theoretical underpinnings of 
this work before moving on to a discussion of the applied research methods. More 
specifically, it discusses and reviews alternative international relations theories and then 
debates the benefits of an actor-centered constructivist liberal approach. The latter half of 
Chapter Two outlines the research design of the thesis incorporating issues such as the 
method of inquiry, interview and non-interview data, interview method and interviewees, 
as well as discussing the thesis’ research constraints and limitations. The applicability of 
this methodology to an actor-centered constructivist liberal approach is also argued. 
Chapter Three presents in greater detail the ways in which domestic political 
considerations and popular sentiment in Japan and China in the years leading up to 2003 
contributed to the flammable and volatile atmosphere surrounding the East China Sea 
frictions after August 2003. It also discusses how the ECS disputes were managed over 
the decades since they surfaced as a bilateral issue in the late 1960s. This also includes a 
description of the political and institutional context within which foreign policy is made 
in each state and outlines the important actors, players and domestic considerations in 
both systems that influence how incidents and bilateral approaches relating to the East 
China Sea manifest themselves.  
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Chapter Four examines in closer detail the August 2003 to June 2008 period and the 
effect of domestic politics, popular sentiment, and various actors and incidents on 
approaches to the resurgent East China Sea disagreements. The focus is primarily on the 
sequence of internal events and developments that greatly contributed to the politicization 
and amplification of these disputes in the 2003 to 2008 period. The two major sections of 
the chapter deal with a) 2003 to 2006 – when the disputes broke out, peaked and then 
calmed down and b) 2006 to 2008 – when a noticeable improvement in approaches to the 
disputes resulted in the best bilateral relations in years and the signing of a symbolic 
agreement on the East China Sea in June 2008. Each of the chapter’s two main sections 
on China and Japan conclude with a survey of personal views from elites (from the 
interview list) in the two countries. 
 
The thesis’ concluding Chapter Five provides a brief summary of the thesis, reminds the 
reader of its purpose and methodology, and points out its most important findings. It also 
provides an update on ECS related events since 2008 and discusses possible policy 
implications and some opportunities for future research. This research’s conclusion also 
addresses the question as to how China and Japan might deal with their immediate 
concerns regarding conflict prevention in the ECS, domestic political constraints, 
ideational-related controversies, a weak institutional framework, and how to 
accommodate one another’s energy and territorial concerns. 
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Chapter 2 – Theoretical Perspectives  
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter sets out to review alternative international relations theories and then 
discusses an actor-centered constructivist liberal approach to understanding the frictions 
surrounding the East China Sea disputes from August 19th 2003 to June 18th 2008. This 
theoretical approach is arguably the most effective in illustrating how domestic political 
considerations such as regime legitimacy and competition between top-level elites and 
constituencies in China along with electoral strategizing in the case of Japan, when 
viewed alongside negative popular sentiment were among the major factors that 
contributed to the amplification and politicization of these disputes Given the lack of 
declared theoretical approaches to understanding these specific disputes in the 2003 to 
2008 time frame, the door remains wide open for how one might approach these disputes 
theoretically and conceptually.  
 
In theoretical terms, this thesis aims to illuminate aspects of these maritime disputes 
which do not receive enough in-depth attention under other theoretical approaches such 
as realism. However, the intention here is not to supplant other possible theoretical 
explanations but rather to add to them. It thus seeks to present another angle to the 
various understandings and explanations for the escalation of tensions over the ECS 
where the state-centric angle for example, while noteworthy and important, does not 
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address in sufficient detail the effect of sub-national political and ideational 
considerations on worsening bilateral approaches to these disputes. It aims to show that 
there is a very significant and often over-looked third component to understanding the 
resurgence of these disputes after 2002.  
 
Trying on Realism 
In analyzing the ECS disputes from 2003 to 2008, many people, looking from the 
outside, would naturally be tempted to apply a realist explanation with its prioritizing of 
the international system in which states exist, relative power, security, and material 
capabilities and resources. The East China Sea disagreements after 2002 can seem 
primarily like a dispute best understood by examining the external state versus state level 
of relations. Defensive structural realism or defensive neo-realism, for example, is 
certainly applicable and has merit in explaining some of the most important material and 
strategic components of the 2003 to 2006 frictions but it also leaves a gap and has 
limitations in illustrating in depth the sub-national, social and non-material dimensions of 
these disagreements and why as a result of these factors, the disputes became so tense, 
amplified, and dramatically politicized.  
 
Defining Realism 
Legro and Moravcsik outline a distinct feature of realist assumptions in that realists 
contend that ‘state preferences are fixed and uniformly conflictual’ where relations 
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between states are seen as an ongoing game played over the distribution and 
redistribution of sought after resources. For realists the control of, and the extent of 
material resources and capabilities are a defining characteristic which distinguishes 
realism from other schools such as liberalism (Legro and Moravcsik, 1999:12-18).   
 
Generally speaking, realism divides into two main camps, classical realism with its 
emphasis on the imperfections of human nature, and structural realism or neo-realism 
which argues that the anarchic international system is to blame for inter-state rivalry and 
conflict (Hobson, 2000).  Within the structural or neo-realist camp, significant differences 
exist between the offensive and defensive structural realist schools. Defensive realists 
argue that structural realities place limitations on how much power a state can 
realistically achieve. This serves to lessen security competition between states. Offensive 
realism however is not so sanguine. Offensive realists argue that the structure of the 
international system gives incentives for states to maximize their power vis-à-vis other 
states and even seek hegemony. This results in inevitable inter-state friction. Both these 
strands of state-centric structural realism (neo-realism) see states as being deeply 
concerned about the balance of power and competing with each other to achieve power at 
the expense of other states or at the very least ensure that they do not lose power. States 
behave according to these tenets because the international system’s structure is such that 
to do otherwise could undermine a state’s ability to survive (Mearsheimer, 2007: 71). 
Realists also tend to view internal and cultural considerations as, at best, secondary 
issues. The structure of the international system is thus seen as the main obstacle to co-
operation and the main determinant in the character of inter-state relations. Future 
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uncertainty is another crucial aspect of inter-state relations that realists emphasize in their 
attempts to explain balancing by, and a lack of co-operation between, states (Copeland, 
2000:200).  
 
Realism and the 2003 to 2008 ECS Disputes 
Defensive neo-realist contentions about balancing, structural constraints on offensive 
behavior, relative versus absolute gains, and how these factors both limit and complicate 
security competition arguably supply observers with very telling insights into 
understanding the security and strategic behavior of both China and Japan in the 
contested East China Sea. The constraints on sustained offensive or expansive behavior 
by either Japan or China suggest defensive realism’s suitability to understanding security 
and strategic behaviour in the ECS by Beijing and Tokyo.  
 
Strategic and Security Behavior in the ECS  
From the realist perspective, as observed by McCarthy, the fact that China and Japan 
suffered their worst post-normalization (1972) political relations in the early years of the 
twenty-first century is not surprising. Both countries are after all two of the world’s most 
powerful military and economic states and the largest such states in Asia. The history of 
the relationship has also often been marred by adversarial behavior. For realists therefore, 
it makes sense from a power politics viewpoint that these two rivals would behave in 
ways that maximize or at least balance their power capabilities (McCarthy, 2008: 4).   
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This behavior is evident in volatile and uncertain areas such as the East China Sea. 
Indeed such is the strategic importance of the ECS and the uncertainty surrounding it that 
the possibility of a military skirmish cannot be completely ruled out. Complicating this is 
the fact that the depth of communications between the militaries in the PRC, Japan and 
the US is still relatively poor especially when it comes to judging intent and when it 
comes to the deployment of both air and naval forces (Valencia, 2007: 129-130). Unlike 
other similar disputes in less uncertain circumstances that have been bilaterally resolved 
(for example the 1978 Torres Strait agreement between Australia and Papua New Guinea, 
and the 1984 Gulf of Maine agreement between Canada and the USA), the ECS disputes 
are characterized by lingering uncertainty and instability surrounding the future 
relationship between the disputant states (Dutton, 2007:52-55). 
 
In the case of the post-2002 East China Sea disagreements, defensive neo-realism 
arguably outlines to observers the reasons why these disputes are not just a case of loud 
bickering between Beijing and Tokyo but are an issue where both governments attach 
strategic and material value to this sea, and why they cautiously observe the behavior of 
the other side, particularly in areas in close proximity to the Pinnacle Islands and the 
median line. Appreciating the geo-strategic value of the Pinnacle Islands for Japan and 
China for example, Suganuma states: 
‘Since the Diaoyu Islands are located only 120 miles northeast of Taiwan 
and 250 miles east of mainland China, they constitute a potential strategic 
base from which a hostile power might threaten China. Indeed, Japanese 
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military bases on the Diaoyu Islands could mean Japanese guns under 
China’s nose’ (Suganuma, 2000:11).   
 
In line with defensive neo-realist assumptions, it is evident, that the two core objectives 
for Tokyo and Beijing vis-à-vis the Pinnacle Islands for example are stability and keeping 
a watchful eye on any attempt by the other side to change the status quo in terms of 
territorial possession or strengthening their claim. For the most part, both governments 
have also taken important behind the scenes steps to de-escalate tensions and to heed off 
potential trouble (see the chronology for examples).  
 
That being said, while there is a tendency in some quarters in both states to be alarmist 
about the behavior of the other side in the East China Sea, the reasons for concern at 
arguably not always unwarranted. For example, the evidence since the late 1990s would 
point to a China that has increased the number of PRC warships and advance survey 
vessels test-drilling and exploring for resources in disputed waters in order to stress its 
claims. This trend has, to the consternation of Japanese defense planners, gone in tandem 
with the strengthening of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and China’s 
double-digit military spending (Ramos-Mrosovsky, 2008:921). Since the turn of the new 
century, the Japanese have witnessed a more concerted effort by the Chinese to emphasis 
their claims and to increase their maritime presence in parts of the East China Sea, South 
China Sea9 and elsewhere.  
                                                          
9 It is not within the scope of this thesis to engage in an in-depth discussion of the South China Sea 
disputes. For a concise account, see ‘Q&A: South China Sea dispute’ (BBC News, 19/07/2011). For an 
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Japanese defence analysts had long been used to occasional incursions into what they 
consider to be Japanese waters once or twice a year by Chinese vessels. However, by the 
year 2000 for example, these had risen dramatically to thirty-one. The objective of such 
intrusions included a PLAN intelligence gathering ship carrying out a mapping of the sea 
bed aimed at improving the navigational capabilities of Chinese submarines (Mohan, 
2000).  Such behavior would suggest that the Chinese have been attempting to chart the 
seabed while gauging the likely reaction and capabilities of US and Japanese naval 
vessels in the ECS (Valencia, 2007: 129). From the Japanese perspective, these changes 
alongside the impressive advancement in the PRC’s air and naval capabilities means that 
the Chinese are increasingly collecting the means in which to possibly strangle some of 
Japan’s most important shipping lanes (Self, 2002:86). 
 
Despite this more assertive behaviour by the PRC since the late 1990s, it has not, 
according to Blanchard, ‘pursued its interests with reckless abandon’ even though its 
ability to defend its interests has improved. For example, on the numerous occasions that 
Japanese politicians and nationalists have landed on the Pinnacle Islands since the 1990s, 
the Chinese made no military efforts to prevent such landings even though, under the 
Chinese interpretation of the ambiguous UNCLOS, they could have done so. Some may 
contend that this inaction can be explained by the deterrent effect of the combined power 
of the US-Japan alliance. In this regard however, Blanchard asserts that it would be ‘far-
                                                                                                                                                                             
account of fishing boats being used to assert the PRC’s claims, and of the harassment of US naval vessels 
in the South China Sea and the Yellow Sea, see Bussert (2011). Also see Thompson (2009).  
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fetched’ to believe that it is solely this balance of power consideration that determines 
Chinese behaviour in the East China Sea (Blanchard, 2006: 224-225).  
 
In spite of such evidence of restraint from the two countries, both the Japanese and the 
Chinese have contributed to a riskier scenario in maritime areas by pursuing a strategy of 
strengthening their naval capabilities in order to enhance their ability to control contested 
waters (Pan, 2009:152).In response to China’s military build up and increased presence in 
maritime areas, Japan has, since the 1990s, enhanced its alliance with the US with a 
special emphasis on its naval capabilities. Japan’s defense budget in late 2005 for 
example, when bilateral relations were at their worst in years, incorporated the 
acquisition of twenty-one new ships, seven new fighter jets and a reconditioned fleet, all 
to the tune of some fifty billion yen to be spread out over the course of six years between 
2006 and 2012. A Coast Guard spokesperson at the time made no bones about the reasons 
for one of the key motivations for these upgrades when he stated that they were due in no 
small part to ‘mounting concerns in the East China Sea area, especially near the disputed 
gas field’ (Samuels, 2007: 169). The future outcome of this strategic balancing behaviour 
by both Japan and China remains to be seen but it has already contributed to a far riskier 
military scenario between Chinese and Japanese vessels in the ECS where traditional 
reticence to use force or to physically assert claims has been replaced by greater 
willingness to defend claims and higher levels of insecurity felt on both sides.  
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Realism and the Economic and Material Value of the ECS 
 
Alongside the apparent security and strategic interests that Japan and China have in the 
ECS, the economic and material value of the East China Sea have also caused both states 
to behave in ways presumed by defensive neo-realists to protect and utilize these interests 
while simultaneously trying, where possible, not to allow the defense of these interests to 
seriously trouble the wider and more important political and economic relationship.  
Despite the challenges experienced in the relationship since the 1990s, both recognize 
that the gains to be made from wider political and economic stability and co-operation are 
simply too important to be jeopardized by issues such as the East China Sea disputes. 
China is the top destination for Japanese exports and the most important source of 
Japan’s imports. At the onset of the 2003 to 2006 disputes for example, bilateral trade 
stood at a record 132 billion dollars (Strait Times, 14/08/2004), rising to an expected 150 
billion dollars in 2004 (Roy, 2005:205).  
Even though these wider more important benefits are considered, this thesis nonetheless 
appreciates the material and economic value of the ECS for decision-making elites. As 
Hsiung points out, the East China Sea, particularly the central Xihu Trough area that 
straddles the median line, is possibly the planet’s last remaining richest unexploited 
repository of oil and natural gas (Hsiung, 2005:5). Using the known geological facts as 
evidence, Chinese petroleum experts also hold the opinion that promising reserves 
potentially lie on the eastern side of the continental shelf with an emphasis on the 
Okinawa Trough claimed by Japan (Harrison, 2004:7).  
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The existence of ECS oil and gas deposits in the 1990s resulted in a number of Japanese 
politicians and writers stating that the relatively recent Chinese claims in the East China 
Sea are overwhelmingly motivated by China’s insatiable desire for energy reserves rather 
than irredentism (Suganuma, 2000:12).10 Such irritation was matched by a belief that the 
Chinese only resurrected the islands’ issue for example after a hiatus of some fifteen 
years (since the late 1970s until 1992) as an insincere ploy aimed at accessing resources 
in the ECS. The 1990s also saw numerous Japanese elites concluding that Beijing’s 
claims to the Pinnacle Islands were also related to its blue water naval ambitions. The 
Chinese for their part expressed a sense of frustration that Japan seemingly did not protest 
the PRC’s exploration activities until resources were found in fields such as Chunxiao.  
As a result, Chinese decision-makers felt compelled to balance against any attempt by 
Japanese energy companies to encroach, as the Chinese saw it, upon the PRC’s 
continental shelf.   
 
Given these energy concerns, the appeal of potentially large hydrocarbon resources in the 
East China Sea is apparent. It is not surprising then to see policy makers and business 
groups clamoring to at least protect these resources from the other side. The conundrum 
however for cool-headed and rational policy-makers in Beijing and Tokyo is how best 
and how most efficiently to realistically access and utilize these much sought after goods 
without falling into a confrontation with the other side. They must also find the right 
                                                          
10 For an interesting insight into such views regarding the economic and geo-strategic value of the ECS 
islands and resources, see Suganuma, 2000:11-18.  
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balance between their various interests at home and in the ECS without compromising in 
a bilateral agreement to such an extent that their domestic political position would be 
weakened or their state would be in a more vulnerable position in terms of its security 
and resources than before such an agreement.   
 
Another complicating factor is the fact that there are significant challenges and 
limitations in terms of accessing resources in the disputed areas. The October 2004 
decision of major international oil companies, Unocal and Royal-Dutch Shell to withdraw 
from a joint agreement (drafted in August 2003) with two Chinese companies to extract 
gas from the ECS on the grounds that the venture was not commercially viable seemed to 
exemplify views that the accessible resources in mid-sea areas like the Xihu Trough are 
possibly not as substantive as people might imagine. This is a moot point, given the 
argument that fears over potential Sino-Japanese confrontations in the area, played a 
contributory role in the companies’ decision (Zha, 2008).  
 
In potential resource exploration areas near the Pinnacle Islands, the topographical 
challenges posed to companies have acted as an added disincentive. Downs and Saunders 
for example, writing in the late 1990s, noted that foreign oil companies have been 
reluctant to drill for oil near the islands because of the political uncertainty involved, the 
difficult terrain in the area, the apparent presence of unexploded ordnance from when the 
islands were used by the US as a target range in the 1950s and 1960s, and lingering 
doubts about the commercial viability of reserves near the islands (Downs and Saunders, 
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1998-1999: 124).  Tackling the notion that other areas of the East China Sea such as the 
Chunxiao field possess a large amount of oil and gas resources, Tsutomo Toichi, a senior 
managing director at the Institute of Energy Economics (IEEJ) in Tokyo, airs his own 
views, and those shared by some of his Chinese acquaintances, when stating that the said 
resources are not as extensive as both states would hope. The resources in waters close by 
are nonetheless significant, he claims, because Japan is so dependent on overseas energy 
supplies. The ECS resources however are not a simple matter of China, and particularly 
Japan, extracting them as they please, even within areas far from the controversial 
median line. For example, even if China were willing to permit Japanese companies to 
extract resources within what the Japanese consider to be Japan’s EEZ on the eastern 
continental shelf, the Japanese would still require Chinese assistance to access resources 
in a cost-effective and financially prudent manner. The transportation of oil is not so 
much a problem but access to gas would require a pipeline in which to transport it. A 
Japan-bound pipe-line solution for example would pose serious technical challenges due 
to the topography of the seabed beyond the continental shelf (Tsutomu Toichi, 
29/08/2006).  
 
Realism’s Strengths and Weaknesses  
Having overviewed the strategic, economic and material value of the ECS, defensive neo-
realism’s emphasis on structural power, relative gains, balancing, and capabilities offers 
an attractive set of assumptions that seem to fit comfortably alongside Japan and China’s 
behavior in terms of strategic and military issues in the East China Sea. With regards to 
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the military and strategic dimension, evidence exists to show that both states are 
attempting to balance each other and taking measures to prevent or at least loudly protest 
whenever one side is seen to be strengthening its claims in areas like the Pinnacle Islands 
or in and around oil and gas fields near the median line.  
 
In economic terms, the reasons or potential reasons why Japan and China are eager to 
protect the possible energy resources in the ECS are clear and obvious. It is evident 
however that for Tokyo and Beijing to receive maximum utility from the ECS resources, 
they will more than likely require a bilaterally agreed compromise leading to joint 
development of some sort in order to exploit the full potential of the available resources. 
Defensive realist contentions have a good deal of explanatory power in terms of 
informing observers as to why Tokyo and Beijing have failed (and continue to fail) to 
agree to a definitive modus operandi concerning economic and security interests in the 
area. This is despite the fact that both governments have repeatedly made unspecific 
declarations about the desirability of joint co-operation and development over issues such 
as energy resources.  
 
There is little doubt that the applicability of neo-realist tenets to the material and strategic 
dimensions of these disputes. This aspect of the disputes and realist explanations however 
are only one part of the story. Observers also need to appreciate other contributory 
variables such as domestic politics and popular sentiment in the two countries in 
understanding why the 2003 to 2006 ECS problems became so dramatically politicized 
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and tense, and why constructive approaches to these disagreements were so constrained. 
Structural realism for example relies very heavily on materialism and individualism to the 
detriment of social and ideational influences that when examined alongside domestic 
political considerations played a very significant role in politicizing and amplifying these 
maritime frictions. It is important therefore that a discussion of these maritime disputes 
includes the inter-relationship between domestic politics, popular sentiment, and bilateral 
approaches to the East China Sea. Such issues also provide observers with an 
appreciation of the factors that have served to dangerously escalate and politicize these 
disputes as seen from 2003 to 2006. As Fravel notes about the Pinnacle Islands dispute, 
the re-emergence of China will certainly present challenges for the Tokyo-Beijing 
relationship but the use of force in this dispute is unlikely to be the main destabilizing 
factor (Fravel, 2007-08:83).  
Alongside de-prioritizing internal considerations, structural realist theories also tend to 
ignore cultural and regime differences among states mainly because structural realists 
contend that the realities of the system between states offers the same basic incentives for 
all the world’s powerful states. Under these circumstances, the question of whether a 
state is democratic or autocratic is of little importance in terms of how it behaves towards 
other states. Little regard is also given to the people who are in charge of a state and those 
who conduct its foreign affairs. Structural realists thus see states as ‘black boxes’ in that 
they are all assumed to be the same, with the exception that some states are less powerful 
or more powerful than others (Mearsheimer, 2007:72). For these reasons, realism 
arguably does not shed enough light on what are certainly some of the main destabilizing 
factors in these disputes. 
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Neo-liberalism 
Defining Neo-liberalism 
 
Neo-liberalism (also known as neo-liberal institutionalism) is a theoretical approach that 
emphasizes the importance of organizations and institutions and their relationship to 
contracting and rationality in the international system between states (Martin, 2007: 110). 
For neo-liberal scholars, the real benefits of a sound institutional relationship between 
states can result in co-operation that remains sturdy even in the midst of significant shifts 
in power and interests. One reason for this is the contractual nature of institutions that are 
centered on so-called international regimes or the rules, norms, principles, and decision-
making procedures between states (Krasner, 1982:185-87). Scholars from this ‘third 
image’ neo-liberal school thus emphasize the value of international organizations (IOs) in 
improving and stabilizing relations between states because they serve to help monitor the 
behavior of participant states and to make sure that they are abiding by their 
commitments and  responsibilities (Martin, 2007:111-12).  
 
The Strengths and Weaknesses of a Neo-Liberal Approach 
 
An advantage of this type of theoretical approach is that it helps observers to appreciate 
how weak or strong regimes and institutions between states can impact on how they deal 
with controversies and disputes. A key problem in China and Japan’s overall relationship 
in this unprecedented era where the two countries are both powerful at the same time is 
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the weakness of reliable and tested post Cold War institutional mechanisms to reassure 
each other on disagreements like those in the ECS.  As a result, Tokyo and Beijing are 
further constrained in their ability to co-ordinate their policies or to take the bold steps 
needed to resolve the disputes. The weak security and conflict prevention mechanisms 
and an inadequate institutional framework have arguably been contributory factors in the 
failure of both governments to prevent small yet troublesome incidents which have 
disproportionately shaken the wider relationship. The absence of stronger institutional 
relations, particularly in the security field, also arguably holds back a relationship in 
which the Chinese and the Japanese continue to hold a jaundiced view of the other side 
where both fundamentally distrust their neighbour (Kolodziej, 2005:152). 
It is apparent that the lack of mature and fully developed bilateral and multi-lateral 
security organizations in North-east Asia plays an important role, due to their weakness 
and absence, in understanding why the Chinese and the Japanese have yet to establish a 
comprehensive and effective system of conflict prevention mechanisms, along with a 
modus operandi for dealing with incidents at sea.  The under-developed institutional 
relationship in the political and security fields also has explanatory power in appreciating, 
amongst other reasons, why a poor understanding of the other side remains a shared 
characteristic among elite level and ordinary level figures in both countries.  
 
 
Neo-liberal perspectives are mentioned here in relation to the ECS tensions because of 
the weakness of institutions and regimes that has been a contributory factor in the failure 
of the two states to foresee and prevent potential problems since the mid-1990s. In this 
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regard, the immaturity of the China-Japan institutional relationship is certainly an 
important factor. However, it would be difficult to hypothesize or predict what 
approaches to the ECS would be like if a stronger institutional relationship existed or had 
existed. For this reason, it would be even more questionable to speak counterfactually 
about what Tokyo-Beijing ties might have been like over issues such as the ECS.  
Nonetheless, it would be remiss to provide no mention of the weak institutional 
relationship in appreciating why ECS frictions got as heated as they did.  In this regard, it 
is apparent that institutions such as the Asian Regional Forum (ARF) do not act as a 
sufficient break to prevent the escalation of tensions.  
One could also understandably be drawn to assume that neo-liberal institutionalism is at 
least premature, or over-optimistic in gauging the effectiveness of institutions in their 
current format in discouraging Beijing and Tokyo from ratcheting up bilateral tensions 
over various issues such as the East China Sea (McCarthy, 2008:2). It is likewise 
apparent for example that China’s selective embrace of institutions in the last twenty 
years or so has not resulted in a lessening of uncertainty about its motives, particularly in 
Japan. The post Cold War China has also involved itself in institutions that benefit it 
economically but it has, according to Saich, been ‘less enthusiastic about those regional 
or global frameworks that would place real restrictions on Chinese military capabilities’ 
(Saich, 2004: 309). Issues such as the East China Sea disputes are also not helped by the 
fact that the North-east Asia region is almost bereft of any effective regional systems 
designed to deal with conflict resolution and conflict management (Swanstrom and 
Kokubun, 2008:7). It is likewise evident as discussed in the introductory chapter that 
international arbitration for this dispute is not the preferred option of either Japan or 
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China even though such arbitration would be quite normal between two countries 
involved in a border dispute. China in particular has opted out of this obligation where it 
has been opposed to any such arbitration in its numerous border negotiations. A neo-
liberal analysis might therefore provide insights into how tensions between the two states 
could be reduced. It does not however inform observers as to the factors that dramatically 
politicized and complicated approaches to the ECS disagreements from 2003 to 2006.  
 
 
Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) 
 
Defining Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) 
Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) is a theoretical approach that analyses decision-making 
and especially the important role played by individuals and groups (for example, leaders, 
political groups and factions, military cliques, competing agencies and departments etc.) 
in the decision-making process of a state. FPA also emphasizes the context in which 
decision-makers make choices and define situations, and how this context influences their 
actions and perceptions (Breuning, 2007:ix). FPA’s psychological emphasis contends that 
‘the mind of a foreign policy maker is not a tabula rasa’ but one in which the ‘culture, 
history, geography, economics, political institutions, ideology, demographics, and 
innumerable other factors shape the societal context in which the decision maker 
operates.’ These influences alongside stress, uncertainty, group dynamics, and the 
personal characteristics of the individual decision makers, it is argued, play a crucial role 
in understanding the choices made by persons in power (Hudson, 2005:6-7;10-11).  
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The Strengths and Weaknesses of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) 
There are numerous advantages in utilizing an FPA approach when examining foreign 
policy decisions and the processes behind them in relation to issues such as the East 
China Sea. FPA’s actor-specificity and agent-orientation for example permits observers 
to appreciate how ‘human agency, with its attendant change, creativity, accountability, 
and meaning’ impacts upon the field of International Relations. It also provides insights 
into both the material and ideational components that make up the primary determinants 
of state behavior where the junction between the two is not the state but its human 
decision makers.  FPA thus adds the human dimension to the theoretical mix in a field 
that often tends to speak of inter-state relations in an abstract and general structural sense 
without sufficient respect given to change, creativity, persuasion, and accountability 
(Hudson, 2005:1-5).  
 
As argued by some scholars, FPA has contributed to observers’ understandings about 
leaders’ beliefs, the cognitive process that effect how new developments are understood, 
and how these mostly psychological influences impact upon foreign policy outcomes  
(Garrison et al: 2003:161-2). Hudson for example discusses the significance of the 
‘psychomilieu’ of the individuals and groups central to a state’s foreign policy 
formulation. This refers to the context and environment in which the main decision 
makers interpret and perceive incidents and events where ‘discongruities’ between 
perceptions and realities can result in less than satisfactory outcomes in terms of foreign 
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policy outcomes (Hudson, 2005:6-7;10-11). FPA analyses also have shed more light on 
international relations for observers by presenting some of the numerous and often over-
looked individual, institutional, cultural, and societal factors that overlap to mould 
foreign policy outputs. This emphasis on the social world’s structures, ‘calculating 
agents’, and ‘bureaucratic politics’ is thus a hallmark of FPA analyses and would seem to 
conform in places to constructivism (Garrison et al:2003:155;162). Such a heavy 
constructivist-like focus on individuals and groups and how they perceive and attach 
meaning to policy issues could certainly shed light on some of the social, ideational, and 
psychological aspects of sensitive disputes such as the East China Sea.  
 
It is clear that Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) has a lot to offer scholars attempting to 
understand the processes and reasons why decision-makers make the choices that they 
do. In terms of this thesis’ case study however it is ineffective to a certain extent in 
adequately understanding why, in the 2003 to 2006 period, the East China Sea disputes 
became so magnified and dramatically politicized. To begin with, FPA, as noted, places 
considerable weight on how so-called decision units define a situation and then act and 
respond in accordance with that definition. The attachment of meaning to events and 
incidents such as those that take place intermittently in the East China Sea is certainly a 
significant element in any discussion of the 2003 to 2006 ECS tensions. The definition of 
a situation in the eyes of individual decision-makers, groups, organizations, and 
bureaucracies however only tells observers one part of the wider story.  
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The issue of individual and group psychological considerations that FPA analysts value 
so much is undoubtedly an important component of understanding how elites (and the 
public) in Japan and China perceive the ECS disputes. These are however incomplete on 
their own in providing a more comprehensive explanation. FPA, with its emphasis on 
individuals, groups, their belief systems, and bargaining arguably does not shed enough 
light on how popular sentiment, electoral strategizing, and the exploitation of these by 
elites competing for power can place great pressure on rational and cool-headed decision-
makers. FPA arguably does not grant enough respect to the rational calculations which 
leaders must consider, and the inter-relationship between all of these above factors in 
formulating politically feasible approaches to issues such as the East China Sea.  
 
FPA for example places great weight on how foreign policy elites as individuals and in 
groups define a situation psychologically and emotionally rather than how individuals 
and actors within a state rationally calculate their domestic and external self-interests 
(Ripley, 1993:403). Arguably however, even when political leaders and groups in 
positions of power hold a quietly sanguine and non-alarmist opinion about the behavior 
of the other side, the demands of public sentiment, political factionalism, nationalist 
organizations, and domestic political competition from opposition parties can force the 
hand of governments to behave in assertive and vocal ways that can often run counter to 
their own intuition and interpretations of events. These domestically derived constraints 
and pressures when taken alongside underlying widely shared and often negative 
perceptions of the other side go further than FPA analyses in enlightening the copious 
domestic factors that can shape and mould the timeline of incidents, and the avenues left 
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open to governments, in terms of how they deal publicly with an incident or 
development.  
 
Liberalism 
 
Defining Liberalism 
 
After considering possible realist, neo-liberal, and Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) 
interpretations, this chapter will now proceed to argue the case for an actor-centered 
constructivist liberal understanding of what contributed to the highly politicized and 
dramatic East China Sea tensions of 2003 to 2006.  As the name suggests, actor-centered 
constructivist liberalism is a variant of the liberal theoretical school of thought. The 
liberal model emphasizes the significance of ‘second-image’ state-level domestic actors, 
institutions, practices, and structures on state behaviour on the international stage (Panke 
and Risse, 2007:89-90). This approach has particularly gained traction since the 1990s in 
attempts to explain China’s foreign policy towards neighbours such as Japan. 
 
Before outlining the specific characteristics of the actor-centred constructivist liberal 
branch of classical liberalism, it is necessary to outline more generally the liberal school’s 
take on international relations. In broad terms, a core characteristic of the liberal camp is 
its prioritising of domestic politics and domestic structure in explaining the international 
behaviour of states. Liberals thus see that domestic actors and domestic structures have a 
formidable bearing on a state’s foreign-policy identities and interests and consequently 
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on a state’s behaviour on the international stage. This ‘inside-out’ approach argues the 
over-riding importance of domestic properties such as actors, institutions, and practices 
as critical explanatory variables (Panke and Risse, 2007:90).   
 
Realists assume that citizens hold allegiance to their state above everything else whereas 
liberals do not share this view. Rather, liberals contend that popular support for state 
policies can never be taken for granted. A state’s behavior and consequently the extent of 
international conflict or co-operation are also reflective of the configuration and make-up 
of state preferences (Moravcsik,n.d.:8;10-11). State preferences are shaped and 
influenced by societal ideas, interests, and institutions through which governments 
calculate and formulate their strategies and policies (Moravcsik, 1997:513). As explained 
more precisely by Moravcsik: 
‘In the liberal conception of domestic politics, the state is not an actor but a 
representative institution constantly subject to capture and recapture, 
construction and reconstruction by coalitions of social actors...Government 
policy is therefore constrained by the underlying identities, interests, and 
power of individuals and groups (inside and outside the state apparatus) 
who constantly pressure the central decision makers to pursue policies 
consistent with their preferences’ (Moravcsik, 1997:518).  
 
On an issue as sensitive as the East China Sea, a liberal approach prioritizes the effect of 
internal and domestic pressures and influences in China and Japan on approaches adopted 
by, and left open to, the governments in each state. 
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The Variations within the Liberal School 
 
As one might expect for such a wide school of interpretation, liberalism contains within it 
its fair share of consensus and conflict. Some of the major liberal approaches include a) 
Putnam’s rationalist ‘two-level game’, b) democratic peace theories, c) economic 
liberalism and interdependence theories, d) utilitarian liberalism, e) republican liberalism, 
f) liberal inter-governmentalism, and g) constructivist liberalism11 which is discussed in 
detail below (Panke and Risse, 2007:89-108).  
 
 
The Advantages of Liberal Interpretations 
 
The liberal approach holds a number of advantages over alternative theoretical schools 
such as realism. A major advantage is that liberalism can more effectively account for 
change and variation in the international system when compared to the generally static 
and fixed view of history as perceived by realists. This is all the more pertinent in a post-
Cold War era where developments within and between states have dumbfounded realists. 
Liberalism also provides a more in-depth appreciation of the substantive elements that 
need to be considered in formulating state policies, for example what precise issues will 
merit attention in particular circumstances (Moravcsik, n.d,:36-7). Realism assumes that 
state preferences are fixed or exogenuous, best explained by the vagaries of the external 
                                                          
11 For an in-depth discussion of the different variations within the liberal school, see Panke and Risse, 
2007:89-108. 
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international system and the material capabilities of states (Moravcsik, 1997:536).  
Understanding how issues shift from the plain of so-called ‘low politics’ to ‘high politics’ 
and vice versa is not adequately explained, and is indeed treated as irrelevant by realists. 
Liberalism however accounts for this in detail. As such the liberal approach sheds light 
on how domestic politics and popular sentiment affected the post-2002 ECS disputes.  
 
Digging Deeper: Applying an Actor-Centred Constructivist Liberal 
Approach 
 
Within the domestic realm some scholars prioritise domestic actors or the dynamics of 
the interactions between such actors in the political, economic and social spheres. Other 
observers however emphasize domestic structural issues such as political constitutions, 
dominant ideologies, and economic systems. The ‘inside-out’ approach thus contains 
differing interpretations that contrast in terms of how scholars examine the foreign-policy 
decisions of single states and also the dynamics of interactions between states (Panke and 
Risse, 2007:90-92).   
 
The actor-centred constructivist liberalism utilized in this case study is just one of 
numerous branches within the liberal school. In order to adopt a more specific liberal 
approach, some observers suggest cutting the liberal school in half between ‘actor-
centred’ and ‘structure-centred’ approaches. The actor-centred camp is divided further 
into ‘actor-centred constructivist liberalism’ and ‘actor-centred rationalist liberalism.’ 
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The structure-centred camp also has two approaches, that of ‘structure-centred rationalist 
liberalism’ and ‘structure-centred constructivist liberalism.’ Liberal scholars such as 
Panke and Risse therefore compartmentalise the liberal approach into four areas that can 
overlap depending on one’s perspective. These are a) those who choose to emphasize 
domestic actors, b) those who emphasize domestic structures, and those who lean toward 
c) rationalist or d) constructivist assumptions (Panke and Risse, 2007:89;91-2). Two key 
arenas of debate therefore exist between rationalists and constructivists, and between 
scholars who consider domestic structure and polity as the most important decision-
making influence and those who argue that domestic actors fill this role. In the first arena 
lies rationalism and constructivism. These are, as contended by Wendt, ‘meta-theories’ 
that rest on contrasting assumptions about the nature and constitution of actors (Wendt 
1999).  
Constructivism positions itself on the ontological assumption that inter-subjective 
meaning is constitutive for intentional action and assumes that the actor is not 
ontologically prior but rather that agent and structure are mutually constitutive (Wendt, 
1999). Constructivists assume that both agency and structure are mutually constituted 
where agency refers to the social ability of individuals and states to shape and influence 
the environment they live in. Emphasizing this ‘mutual constitution’ assertion, Fierke 
explains: 
‘the subjects of international politics are not uniformly and universally 
rational egoists, but have distinct identities shaped by the cultural, social, 
and political – as well as material – circumstances in which they are 
embedded. They are not static but ever evolving as they interact with each 
other and their environment’ (Fierke, 2007:170-71).   
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An actor-centered constructivist liberal approach arguably serves best to present both the 
ideational and the rational influences that inform policy makers in their decision-making 
on an issue as politically and historically sensitive as the East China Sea. 
 
While constructivist assumptions are an important element of this research’s theoretical 
approach, constructivist liberalism however needs to be distinguished from so-called 
liberal constructivism and its assumption that values stem from the type of socialization 
between states. Rather, constructivist liberals assert ‘in a liberal vein that ideas and 
communication matter when they are most congruent with existing domestic values and 
institutions’ (Moravcsik, 1997:540). For liberal constructivists, the focus is more on the 
ideas within peoples’ heads, the primacy of norms, ‘cross-cultural communication’, and 
how these affect behavior among individuals and political actors (An Online Exploration 
of Diplomatic History and Foreign Affairs)  rather than on the inter-relationship between 
domestic politics and identities as valued by constructivist liberals.  
 
The symbiosis between the two is arguably best exemplified by looking through a 
constructivist liberal lens. As illustrated by Deans in his appraisal of the Pinnacle Islands 
dispute, nationalist sentiment on its own in both countries should not be taken at face 
value. Rather in this case study, the symbolic relevance of ECS issues for wider domestic 
political conflict, political power, and instability, is seen as the central factor that drives 
these disputes and motivates nationalistic individuals and groups in Japan and China to 
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pressure their top decision-makers to make an assertive stand and consequently raise the 
level of tensions surrounding the East China Sea disagreements (Deans, 2000:128-129).  
 
The Advantages and Disadvantages of Rationalist Liberal Perspectives 
The focus of actor-centred rational liberals is the power of domestic interest groups 
acting rationally in shaping foreign policy outcomes. According to Checkel, ‘rationalists 
emphasize coercion, cost/benefit calculations, and material incentives, whereas 
constructivists emphasize social learning, socialization, and social norms’ (Checkel, 
2001:553). In this regard, a constructivist liberal angle has arguably a greater explanatory 
power in that it presents the material, rational and ideational interests that states hold and 
have to consider.  
 
The rational liberal approach is effective to an extent in explaining for example the 
contrasts between rational and ideational interests at the domestic level between Germany 
and the United States in the lead-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq for example. 
Liberalism’s constructivist variant however sheds more light on how Americans ‘framed 
the war as a war against terrorism and (Saddam) Hussein as enmity.’ In a post-1945 war-
averse Germany however, this framing did not impact as strongly among German voters. 
In these examples, the constructivist strand of liberalism is more effective in explaining 
how historical memories and collective identities strongly influence the creation of so-
called ‘in-and-out groups’, how issues are framed, and how collective identities and 
framings are inter-connected. As a consequence, the constructivist strain, in particular the 
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actor-centred variant enlightens observers as to when and why ideational factors (when 
placed alongside rational interests) can result in foreign policy outcomes. A clear 
weakness of the rationalist variant is that it exaggerates the role and power of rational 
interests such as political, material and economic factors and does not grant enough 
respect to how these factors when combined with normative ideas and identities can 
influence, empower, and constrain decision-makers. Constructivist liberalism therefore 
serves a useful purpose by complementing and adding to its rationalist counterpart (Panke 
and Risse, 2007:105).  
 
In the Sino-Japanese relationship, it is apparent that political and economic relations 
based on strictly rationalist calculations are only one part of the story, and that despite the 
obvious benefits of stronger political and economic ties, China’s relations with Tokyo 
continue to be a mismatch between important interests and deep distrust (Yang, 
2007:250). Rational economic interests for example are just one half of the ‘warm 
economics and chill politics’ that have characterised the relationship since the 1990s, and 
which have presented a real challenge to stabilising relations. As argued by Manicom, in 
the East China Sea, what observers have seen is a ‘marriage’ or interaction of both the 
material and ideational aspects in the disputes where prior to 2003, the nationalist 
element of these disputes was confined largely to the Pinnacle Islands issue. Since 2003 
however, nationalist constituencies in Japan and China have viewed ‘the material wealth 
of the East China Sea in uncompromising ideational terms; this is a development that has 
increased the difficulty for Beijing and Tokyo to agree on a workable joint development 
proposal (Manicom, 2008b:390).  
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The Advantages and Disadvantages of a Structure-Centred Liberal Perspective 
In the second actor versus structure dimension of the liberal debate lies the question of 
which is more relevant to explaining foreign policy outcomes, domestic structures 
(polity) resulting in a structured-centred focus or domestic actors (politics), resulting in 
an actor-centred focus. For structure-centred debates, the central belief is that a state’s 
behaviour vis-à-vis other states is primarily influenced by its domestic structures i.e. its 
social, economic, and political institutions rather than the structure of the international 
system. In this model, states are still viewed as the most important actors  but they are not 
‘black boxes’ in the realist sense of states responding in similar fashion to external shifts 
and developments. Instead states such as the PRC and Japan (as with all states) differ 
from each other by virtue of ‘the properties of their polity which influence state 
behaviour in their interaction with others’ (Panke and Risse, 2007:92-3).  A disadvantage 
however of prioritising structure over actors is that it arguably does not examine in 
enough detail the ways in which the inter-linking of domestic actors such as individual 
politicians, competing agencies and bureaucracies, military figures and cliques, public 
and nationalist pressure groups from the 1990s onwards, media and business 
organizations, political opposition groups, and political factions for example impacted 
upon the East China Sea disputes in the period from 2003 to 2008.    
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The Advantages of an Actor-Centred Liberal Perspective 
In similar fashion to the structure-centred perspective, the actor-centred approach does 
not view states as entities whose interests and conduct are shaped primarily by the 
international system. It differs however from the structure-centred approach in the way it 
views how identities and interests are influenced. According to the actor-centred 
perspective, such interests can shift and change depending on the time and policy issue 
because state interests are primarily influenced by the beliefs, interests, or identities of 
domestic groups. Broadly speaking, the actor-centred liberal approach examines both ‘the 
interest and ideational constellations’ of domestic actors and groups and the ways in 
which they pressure decision-makers and influence policy interests (Panke and Risse, 
2007:92-3).  
 
Applying this to Japan and to an increasingly pluralistic China, the actor-centred liberal 
angle notes the importance of the fact that such states have numerous interest groups and 
constituencies with often conflicting viewpoints to deal with and often appease in both 
their domestic and international policy decisions. These groups, ranging from business 
groups, political factions, grass-root nationalist organisations, left and right wing 
commentators, think-tanks, military cadres in the PLAN or JMSDF for example and so 
forth all compete to influence and pressure their political leaders to behave in ways 
favourable to their interests and inclinations. 
 
102 
 
In China and Japan, a key factor in understanding the extent of the ECS tensions in the 
2003 to 2006 period was arguably the influence of numerous domestic groups and 
domestic considerations, and how they placed constraints and pressures on their 
governments to act according to their preferences.  These domestic pressures which tied 
in with shifts in the traditional diplomatic modus operandi between Beijing and Tokyo 
after the late 1990s, political restructuring that empowered more domestic actors, and a 
dramatic rise in shared negative attitudes towards the other side resulting from numerous 
negative interactions, all served to contribute to a heightened level of tension and the 
dramatic politicisation of the East China Sea disputes. As Manicom observed in 2008, 
‘the result is that the East China Sea dispute has become hostage to developments in 
other aspects of the China-Japan relationship because the number of issues that offend the 
sensibilities of nationalist groups and peripheral policymakers has increased’ (Manicom, 
2008b:391). For these outlined reasons, an actor-centred liberal perspective has arguably 
greater explanatory power than a structure-centred perspective.  
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The Advantages of a Constructivist Liberal Perspective 
One of the main advantages of the constructivist liberal approach over the rational liberal 
approach is the emphasis placed on agency and norm diffusion and its focus on both 
structure and agency (Checkel, 2001:558). For rationalists, interests are driven by power 
and this thesis does not deny this. However, for a more comprehensive analysis of the 
effect of domestic factors on the East China Sea disputes, rational interests should not be 
separated from the context in which they exist and the issue around which they exist.  
Actor-centered constructivist liberalism arguably functions better to illustrate how 
context and rational interests overlap because constructivists do not deny rationality but 
place value on context and how individuals are embedded in an environment where 
issues such as culture, identity, history and meaning matter.  
 
As discussed in Chapter One and later in this work, the utilisation and exploitation of 
these ideational themes in the context of Sino-Japanese relations should not be under-
estimated or sidelined. According to Moravcsik for example, the strength of feeling 
surrounding national identity is frequently exploited by both private groups and policy 
makers, and that this is a feature that marks ideational or constructivist liberalism out 
from alternative theories such as realism (Moravcsik, 1997:526). One of the major ways 
that such ideational issues affect decision-making elites is the assumption of 
constructivist liberalism that social actors within a state play an essential role in 
supporting their government on the proviso that the ruling elite behave in accordance to 
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their own ‘identity-based preferences.’ In doing so, governments are given legitimacy in 
the eyes of social actors (Moravcsik, 1997:525). In China and Japan, the strength of 
feeling toward their neighbor since the 1990s and concerns about who is winning and 
who is losing in the East China Sea ‘game’ has increased even more in strength as an 
issue for elite politics in the PRC, as an electoral card in Japan, and as a controversy that 
can easily rouse the passions of the ordinary Japanese and Chinese publics. The political 
value of these maritime disagreements at all levels of political life in the two states has 
thus compelled their leaders to tread very delicately in their approaches to the ECS and 
arguably has often prevented them from taking more flexible and constructive avenues in 
negotiations.  
 
Constructivist liberalism’s emphasis on how on issue is framed and argued about, along 
with its relationship to social learning is arguably all the more pertinent when debates and 
arguments on certain issues (such as the East China Sea) strongly resonate with 
prevailing ideas, interests, and identities (Panke and Risse, 2007:96). This is not to say 
that the domestic competition for political power or the international competition for 
wealth, capabilities and resources do not matter. Rather, it is argued here that rational 
interests and bargaining alone without due respect to the ideational dimension of 
decision-making considerations leaves any examination incomplete particularly in this 
dyad involving Japan and China where issues such as identity, history and memories still 
cut deep in the psyches of ordinary level and elite level citizens in both states.   
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In this regard, decision-makers and other elites such as political rivals and opponents in 
Japan and China deeply appreciate how negative views of the other state can resonate as 
a sensitive issue among their respective publics and elites. They also understand how the 
framing of the other side as a danger, a threat or an affront to national dignity can benefit 
those in power or those who seek power. This has proven to be politically useful on the 
home front but also acts as a constraint on behaviour out of fear of the electoral and 
political consequences in the case of Japan and an undermining of top elites’ standing 
among other elites and the wider public in the case of the PRC. For this reason, when it 
comes to delicate issues such as the East China Sea, governments have been shown to 
draw upon these sentiments and speak though not always act in ways that resonate well 
with the ideas and identities of their home populations and which fend off possible 
criticism from political challengers and opponents. The nexus of elite and political 
competition in both China and Japan and the intensification of negative popular sentiment 
toward the other state have meant that on controversies like the East China Sea that the 
ability of governments to deal with these disputes in a more moderate way was weakened 
in the period from 2003 to 2006.  
 
China and an Actor-Centred Constructivist Liberal Perspective 
 
In a case like the 2003 to 2008 East China Sea disagreements, the inter-linking of 
domestic politics and popular sentiment is, as shown throughout this thesis, apparent. 
This was in a context where the exploitation of historical and ideational issues by 
numerous domestic actors as a card for elite competition in the PRC, and the enhanced 
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power of these issues to spur popular sentiment had dramatically increased since the 
1990s. In China, bitter collective memories of Japan’s brutal occupation of mainland 
Chinese territories from 1931 to 1945, and the infamous Nanking Massacre in 1937 still 
persist in colouring the Chinese public’s perceptions of Japan where such sentiment 
strongly resonates among both ordinary and elite level Chinese. As discussed in detail in 
Chapter Three, Chinese elites, most notably former General Secretary Jiang Zemin also 
actively encouraged and tapped into these feelings from the early 1990s onwards and 
exploited them to defend and cement their own positions in an uncertain and dynamic 
era. In doing so, China’s leadership arguably fed a monster which by the late 1990s had 
become much more difficult to control and manage. 
 
From the Chinese perspective, the fact that numerous Japanese political elites have failed 
to show sincere contrition for Japan’s war record along with seemingly behaving in ways 
to contain China’s rise since the 1990s and preventing the recovery of Taiwan have also 
served to intensify anti-Japanese sentiment in the PRC (Christiansen, 1999:49; Gries, 
2005:846-47). Lingering memories of the cruelty inflicted upon the Chinese by Japan 
when taken alongside the occasional controversial statements made by Japanese elites has 
meant that it is not difficult for the Chinese to envision attempts by Japan to re-militarise 
and dominate Asia as in the past. As a result of these deeply ingrained impressions, 
negative sentiment and ill-will towards the Japanese still persist in the PRC and have in 
fact worsened since the late 1990s where ordinary and elite level Chinese remain vigilant 
to any behaviour from the Japanese that may re-open old wounds or confirm long-held 
suspicions (Roy, 2005:197;201).  
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The Pinnacle Islands are a sensitive piece in this jigsaw of history and identity-related 
issues and are directly related to Chinese national identity and pride because these 
territories are considered to have been stolen by the Japanese during the era of 
humiliation by foreign powers (1842 to 1948) (Patalano, 2011). In this regard, issues of 
national pride and territorial integrity in the East China Sea involving the distrusted 
Japanese can touch deeply upon the feelings and sensitivities of all Chinese people, a fact 
that both empowers and constrains decision-makers in Beijing. Popular and often 
negative sentiment towards Japan on such issues is not necessarily exclusively top-down 
or bottom-up phenomenon, but rather appears increasingly to have become a 
phenomenon with its origin somewhere in between. Since the 1990s in particular, 
Chinese leaders and elites have both encouraged and responded to increasingly vocal and 
pluralistic Chinese actors and groups demanding a more assertive Chinese response to 
issues such as the ECS in ways that seem appropriate to the new more powerful China. 
 
The bottom-up element of anti-Japanese sentiment in China has strengthened since the 
1990s as a factor that CCP elites must pay greater attention to in their public approaches 
to sensitive issues like the ECS. Looking at the protests over the 1996 Pinnacle Islands 
incident, Downs and Saunders note for example that while some demonstrators may have 
used the protests for ulterior purposes, a large majority seemed to have been sincerely 
angered by Japan’s behaviour at the time and how it affected China’s claim to the islands. 
While Chinese elites have exploited and benefited from nationalistic controversies with 
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Japan, it would be an oversight to neglect the heightened intensity of nationalism in 
China in the 1990s and its existence alongside the state’s utilisation of nationalism for its 
own ends. The 1996 protests for example involved thousands of protesters not just in 
China but also in North America and were clearly indicative of a rising nationalist trend 
amongst all Chinese people, including the Chinese diaspora. Even within the PRC, it is 
clear, based on Downs and Saunders’ evidence and the strength of numbers in the 1996 
protests, that a sizeable number of Chinese including students and even military figures 
were dissatisfied with their government’s approach to the Pinnacle Islands that they were 
willing to risk punishment to express their anger. This upsurge in anti-Japanese sentiment 
has been assisted by the CCP’s aforementioned exploitation of historical and nationalistic 
issues to bolster the regime’s legitimacy after the 1989 Tiananmen Massacre and the 
uncertainties of the early 1990s. The success of the CCP’s exploitation of these issues has 
proven to be a double-edged sword that can assist the regime but also undermine it via 
other elite challengers and popular sentiment. As such, the CCP must grant greater 
respect to popular sentiment when considering its foreign policy options (Downs and 
Saunders, 1998-1999:139-140).  
 
In its dealings with Japan, such is the intensity of negative sentiment and historical 
memory involved that any disagreements involving Japan are highly charged issues at the 
domestic level which top elites must very delicately navigate through. Appreciating the 
depth of this anti-Japanese sentiment among the Chinese public and its possible 
exploitation by political competitors, top decision-making elites in the CCP know that 
they run the risk of undermining their position within the party, their nationalist 
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credentials and the legitimacy of the regime if they do not present an image of ardently 
defending the nation’s dignity and territorial integrity (Ramos-Mrosovsky, 2008:934). 
This is all the more important in a non-democratic state like the PRC where approaches 
taken to such emotionally charged controversies are one of the central ways in which the 
Chinese public can judge and evaluate their leaders’ performance (Townsend, 1996). 
Assertively defending China’s territorial integrity and national pride also conforms with 
the CCP’s view of itself as a party that best serves the people in terms of standing up and 
fighting for the nation unlike earlier pre-1948 regimes in China who compromised and 
capitulated to foreign powers (Downs and Saunders, 1998-1999: 119).  These outlined 
domestic factors have significantly complicated the ways in which the Party leadership 
can deal with the East China Sea problems, and have made them a much more volatile 
issue to deal with. Actor-centred constructivist liberalism is arguably an appropriate 
theoretical lens through which to examine the inter-relationship between the ECS 
disagreements and domestic actors and considerations. 
 
 
Japan and an Actor-Centred Constructivist Liberal Perspective 
 
At the diplomatic and bureaucratic level, successive Japanese governments have 
understood that the optimal approach to China in terms of Japan’s national interests is 
one where tensions are reduced, where a constructive working relationship is maintained, 
and where any controversies that could cause instability in China with negative 
implications for Japan are avoided or at least mitigated. Examples of destabilizing 
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developments in the PRC that would hurt Japan might include the Chinese economy 
crashing, large numbers of Chinese refugees fleeing their homeland for neighboring 
countries, and Chinese elites adopting a more aggressive stance in terms of its foreign 
policy (Roy, 2003:2). Cool-headed diplomats and bureaucrats in Japan understand the 
importance of diplomatic approaches that serve to help prevent these outcomes and to 
pursue Japanese objectives.  
 
The palpable rise in negative sentiment in Japan toward China since Tiananmen and into 
the 1990s however has proven to be a useful card to exploit in electoral strategizing and 
in which to pressure top-level decision makers. Right-wing Japanese elites and groups in 
particular have utilised and benefited from this rise in anti-Chinese sentiment. Of course, 
considerable structural differences between a democratic Japan and a one-party Chinese 
state exist at the domestic political level. The shift in Japanese thinking toward the PRC, 
when compared to generally favourable impressions throughout the 1980s, alongside 
some major political and economic readjustments in the 1990s, has made it more difficult 
and challenging for sensitive issues like the ECS to be dealt with quietly and from behind 
the scenes by experienced figures within the Japanese elite. Since the late 1990s, such 
figures and their endeavours have come under a barrage of public and media scrutiny. 
 
While the depth of anti-Chinese sentiment in Japan is not as intense as anti-Japanese 
sentiment in China, significant insecurities which developed amongst both elites and the 
public about Japan’s relatively diminished role in the world since the 1990s contributed 
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to the Japanese sense of vulnerability vis-à-vis the PRC. The post-Cold War years have 
been years in which the Japanese economy, the source of so much Japanese pride, has 
weakened relative to China, wounding Japanese self-esteem, and intensifying the 
Japanese sense of frustration over their nation’s power and prestige, once unchallenged in 
the region. In addition, fears over the rise of China exemplified by the PRC’s 
unprecedented military spending, media coverage of Beijing-sponsored initiatives such as 
the ‘Patriotic Education Campaign’ of the early to mid-1990s which fed anti-Japanese 
sentiment in the 1990s, and the rise in intrusions into what are considered to be Japanese 
waters heavily influenced how the Japanese looked upon more assertive Chinese 
behaviour in areas such as the East China Sea (Self, 2002:82). 
 
The post-1945 era up until the mid-1990s, was one in which, from the Chinese 
perspective, it seemed that Japan was contrite over its wartime behaviour, and this 
contrition, it seemed, was tacitly acknowledged in its emphasis on economic rather than 
political and military power. This has changed however in the new post-Cold War era 
where many Japanese believed that sufficient time had passed since the Second World 
War and where war guilt is no longer as strong a factor in Japan’s approaches to China 
(Self, 2002:82). The greater assertiveness witnessed in Japan in terms of national 
identity-related issues was assisted by what was considered to be hypocritical behavior on 
the Chinese side since the late 1980s. Since 1989 for example, the Chinese have been 
seen by the Japanese to be continuously moralizing about Japanese misdeeds half a 
century earlier while the communist regime mercilessly crushed the Tiananmen protests 
in June 1989 and stamped out calls for democracy from its own people and in western 
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provinces such as Tibet and Xinjiang. Such hypocrisy, as many Japanese see it, along 
with the persistent calls for greater atonement from Japan caused many Japanese to 
increasingly tire of China’s ‘Japan bashing’ and its stubborn refusal to move on from the 
past (Self, 2002:87). 
 
Many Japanese actors and groups has addressed their sense of frustration by pressuring 
for foreign policy changes that emphasize Japan’s political and military power rather than 
just its decreasing economic power relative to China, and for Japan to stand among other 
world powers as a normal state (Ramos-Mrosovsky, 2008:919). These calls have not 
come without resistance from within Japan, in particular from Japan’s political left wing. 
To counter this, advocates of a stronger Japan less constrained by its post-1945 pacifist 
constitution point to a rising China threatening Japan’s interests in areas like the ECS in 
order to justify the need for such defence changes. A product of such heated debates 
within Japanese domestic politics is that ‘China bashing’ has become ‘a winning formula’ 
for those seeking to push their agendas (Bremmer, 2005). 
 
Japanese defence changes since the 1990s suggest that those calling for a stronger line 
against China have been successful to an extent. As observed by Ramos-Mrosovsky, the 
intensification of ‘Chinese saber rattling’ over the Pinnacle Islands has served to 
embolden those within Japan calling for a more robust approach to such issues and a 
strengthening of Japan’s military capabilities (Ramos-Mrosovsky, 2008:920). It is 
apparent then that the resurgent ECS disputes have significant political currency and 
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weight in Japan and that they can easily arouse the emotions of the Japanese public and 
their political representatives. This often decisive inter-relationship between these 
maritime disagreements and domestic politics and popular sentiment in Japan helped to 
lean this research toward adopting an actor-centred constructivist liberal theoretical 
approach.  
 
Summary 
Given these outlined circumstances in the PRC and Japan and the increased salience of 
inter-linked issues such as domestic politics, nationalism, popular sentiment, and history 
since the 1990s, examining the 2003 to 2008 ECS disagreements from an actor-centred 
constructivist liberal perspective arguably provides an appropriate lens through which to 
examine these maritime problems. In particular, such a theoretical approach gives special 
emphasis to the role of the individuals, nationalist groups and organisations, party 
factions, media outlets and so forth, and how these placed constraints on top-decision 
makers that had a restrictive effect on positive approaches to the East China Sea problems 
in that period.  
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Research Design 
Introduction 
This thesis draws its findings from a rich pool of primary sources that include 
unpublished Track Two conference papers, official government statements and press 
releases, speeches and statements by politicians and organisations in Japan and China, 
newspaper articles, and public opinion polls. These data are reinforced by over eighty 
interviews carried out over a total of approximately eight months over the course of three 
years (2006, 2007, and 2008). The research data used is also directly or indirectly 
relevant to the period from August 19th 2003 to June 18th 2008. These primary source 
materials are in turn supported with secondary source arguments that discuss the impact 
of factors such as historical controversies, national identity, domestic politics, electoral 
strategizing in Japan, elite competition within the PRC, and so forth on approaches to 
bilateral issues such as the East China Sea problems.  
 
Method of Inquiry 
The method of inquiry is a qualitative research design with an emphasis on reliable 
primary and secondary sources reinforced with interview data aimed at addressing the 
‘how’ and ‘why’ reasons for the dramatic politicization and amplification of the resurgent 
ECS disputes from 2003 to 2006. This method of inquiry and the data used, through a 
comprehensive review of the primary and secondary source material along with the 
hitherto unseen interview data, presents the ways in which domestic politics and popular 
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sentiment affected bilateral approaches to the 2003 to 2008 ECS disagreements. This 
research design and method of inquiry within an actor-centered constructivist liberal 
framework also acts as a convenient tool with which a researcher can outline the 
numerous actors and domestic pressures which constrained and influenced the choice of 
options open to top-decision makers in both countries. The interview and non-interview 
data presented also shed light on the events and developments that helped lead to and 
played a contributory role in ratcheting up serious frictions over the East China Sea 
between Tokyo and Beijing from 2003 to 2006.  
 
Non-Interview Data 
Arguments and points of views from the core texts on the East China Sea disputes and the 
wider Sino-Japanese relationship are also incorporated. The broad scope of such non-
interview data permit a utilization of data that is not merely confined to official 
government statements from press secretaries or government ministries that focus in on 
government to government interactions. Official government positions are noteworthy 
but they are also almost always acted upon in a very public world and thus locating the 
influence of these factors in foreign policy approaches to these disputes would be more 
difficult to discern. The wide variety of non-interview data used in this thesis serve to 
shed more light on the relevance of domestic considerations such as party factions, 
nationalistic politicians, lobby groups, competing agencies and bureaucracies, public 
opinion, and media pressure, and how they related to the destabilization in approaches to 
the disputes after 2002. This research plan also provides greater detail about the 
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interaction between domestic actors in Japan and China and how these interactions 
impact upon approaches to the ECS disputes, thus illustrating a range of possible 
outcomes that decision-makers must consider before implementing policy. As with the 
interview data, the non-interview data displays within them themes and commonalities 
that are reflected in both types of interview and non-interview data, and serve to buttress 
each other in terms of this research’s hypothesis. The non-interview data thus also 
pointed toward domestic politics and popular sentiment as major contributory factors in 
how the post-2002 East China Sea disagreements were perceived and dealt with. 
 
Interview Data 
The interview data element of this research design utilized so-called ‘semi-structured 
interviews’ that involved asking interviewees a set of broad questions written in advance 
but also were flexible enough to allow interviewees the chance to make suggestions and 
to speak freely (Björkdahl, 2002:52). The interview data collection process also involved 
a number of phases in terms of how the interview data were evaluated. In the first phase, 
over eighty interviews were carried out in Japan and China, and by email 
correspondence. The second phase saw the transcription of the interview data and the 
creation of a qualitative text of sorts or ‘general text corpus.’ This was followed by a 
third phase which involved a trawling through the text for keywords, themes, trends, and 
patterns of commonality which pointed the research in a certain direction.  The fourth and 
final phase involved a comparison of these trends used by Chinese and Japanese 
interviewees respectively in order to show how domestic politics and popular sentiment 
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affected approaches to the East China Sea dispute from 2003 to 2008 (Wiener, 
2009:187).  
The interview process involved asking the interviewees a pre-set number of similar 
questions, which were altered slightly, depending on the country location and the year of 
the interviews. Examples of questions asked include ‘What do you regard to be the 
reasons for the rise in tensions over the East China Sea in recent years?’, ‘What part do 
nationalism and domestic politics in Japan and China play in these disputes?’ and ‘What 
factors led to the groundbreaking ‘principled consensus’ in June 2008?’ The open-ended 
question format was intentional and was aimed at allowing the interviewees to speak 
freely and openly about the East China Sea problems. As such, this format of questions 
permitted the interviewees to speak freely and without direction about issues, and to 
provide explanations ranging from resource motivations, strategic calculations, domestic 
politics, ideational factors etc. or a combination of two or all of these relevant ECS 
variables, without ‘forcing’ the generation of results that emphasized only one. Conscious 
of the possibility of selection bias, the broad scope and number of interviewees 
interviewed was intentional and was aimed at ensuring an unbiased and wide survey of 
views represented in both countries. These interviewees responded at random and at their 
own free will to email requests for interviews sent by the author to well over two hundred 
individuals and their institutions in Japan and China.  
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Interview Method 
 
Benefits of Interviews as a Data Source12    
Alongside the wide selection of other primary and secondary sources, the strong 
influence of domestic politics and popular sentiment in this case study can also be 
appreciated and evidenced when one sees that there is a strong trend of similarly 
expressed statements and comments by both Japanese and Chinese interviewees. 
Utilizing descriptive qualitative data such as that from a large number of person-to-
person interviews serves a useful purpose in this regard. Interviews are also highly useful 
when gathering information and tracing a process concerning phenomena such as 
ideational factors for example (Alvesson and Deetz 2000: 215-216; Checkel 2001: 565-
566). In cases such as this where official secrecy limits the available information on 
bilateral negotiations on the East China Sea, interviews provide an important complement 
to other written material on this case study. Interviews can thus shed some light on issues 
that lie behind the barrier of secrecy (Lars-Göran Stenelo, 1985). By incorporating 
interview data from elites in both states who have their ears to the ground in terms of the 
positions and perspectives of top-level decision-makers, this thesis presents an insight 
into what the thinking is like at the elite level and provides a view of the kind of 
constraints and difficulties that elites had to deal with when approaching the post-2002 
                                                          
12 The transcribed interview notes are available upon request. 
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East China Sea disputes. Hitherto unseen interview data also adds to existing data 
available on the ECS disagreements.  
 
Due to the fact that the interviewees are seen to be positioned close to both policy makers 
and their own respective societies, and have a varying influence, on how the ECS 
disputes are approached by their governments, it will be shown using their consciously 
articulated statements and comments as evidence alongside other important primary and 
secondary source data, how domestic politics and popular sentiment negatively impacted 
the ECS disputes from 2003 to 2006. This evidence alongside the fact that it derives from 
a large and random group of informed elites from a variety of vantage points as close 
observers of events also means that it is arguably not just a coincidental meeting of minds 
or individuals happening to agree on something in Japan or in China but rather is 
reflective of a small representative survey of perspectives and sentiment expressed and 
stated by their respective societies at large.  
 
The Interviewees 
The vast majority of interviewees were Chinese and Japanese scholars and experts who 
possess a solid understanding of the East China Sea disputes and who hail from diverse 
backgrounds including government officials and researchers, think-tank commentators, 
esteemed scholars from the fields of law, politics, and international relations, along with 
retired military elites, retired politicians, and journalists.  As such, the interviewees were 
for the most part representative of almost all the various fields of influence in Japanese 
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and Chinese life. The predominantly academic interviewees used in this research 
differentiate from government officials because they are independent and unelected 
individuals and do not exist to continuously please and appease their home populations or 
other elites.  
 
In locating where the interviewees might be positioned in the decision-making hierarchy, 
it is tempting to borrow from Manicom when he argues that there are three groups of 
domestic actors who influence and are influenced by ‘the ideational dimension of 
Chinese and Japanese policy towards their territorial dispute in the East China Sea.’ 
These groups are identified as: a) core policymakers (who represent the will of the 
government in power); b) peripheral policymakers; and c) popular nationalist groups. In 
the ECS, the core policymakers in Japan and China have guided policy according to three 
objectives which include actions to reinforce claims to the disputed territory, dispute 
management to prevent escalation, and actions to facilitate the exploitation of resources 
located in the disputed territories (Manicom, 2008b:378). In this thesis, the interviewees 
mentioned might arguably fall predominantly within the second category of ‘peripheral 
policymakers’ because they sit somewhere in the middle between the core policymakers 
and popular nationalist groups. They are therefore well-positioned for research purposes 
in that they are able to influence and access public discourse (Wiener, 2009:191). 
The choice and quantity of interviewees also means that the research, when combined 
with other data sources, possesses both data richness and prescriptive richness with a 
strong emphasis on primary source data from individuals speaking freely with a high 
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standard of honesty on these contentious issues. The interviewees chosen were similarly 
better placed to speak more openly and frankly about these tensions than other figures 
such as current high level political and military officials. The focus on  scholars’ views is 
thus justified by virtue of the fact that in both societies’ scholars are understood as the 
most informed, independent, and knowledgeable figures from whom a reliable and open 
evaluation of the ECS disputes can be gained.  
 
Research Constraints 
Interview Data 
The choice of predominantly academic interviewees as the primary source of interview 
data was also based not only on methodological reasons but also on research constraints. 
Such limitations included the fact that  it was very difficult to find a wide range of current 
and high level political and military figures in China and Japan who were willing to 
speak openly and honestly about these disputes and their still on-going negotiations. It is 
likewise apparent that a large scale survey of the views of hundreds of ordinary Chinese 
and Japanese people in order to reach a conclusion as to how factors such as popular 
sentiment, national identity, and domestic politics influenced approaches to these 
disagreements from 2003 to 2008 would not necessarily yield significant results. 
Utilizing well-informed Chinese and Japanese interviewees served as a more stable and 
more manageable foundation for compiling data than interviewing people on the street.  
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The usefulness of this interview data is not with its limitations however. For example, a 
researcher embarking on a preliminary attempt at examining the 2003 to 2008 ECS 
disputes can only really address that which is openly stated. A deeply theoretically 
focused approach such as a discourse analysis for example was not the objective of this 
work because it distracts from the rich empirical data that sheds more light on the facts of 
this case study. The limited resources available to a lone researcher and the considerable 
cultural and linguistic obstacles that such an analysis would represent to a non-native 
third party researcher also pushed this work away from a deep and heavily theoretical 
analysis of language and discourse. 
 
Non-Interview Data 
The utilization of a wide selection of non-interview data is also not without its limitations 
and constraints. Most notably, the requirement of fluency or at least high proficiency in 
both the Japanese and Chinese languages to present a totally comprehensive analysis of 
non-English language sources has influenced the choice of sources used.  This research is 
also arguably only one of a handful of sources on the 2003 to 2008 disputes that attempt 
to address or touch upon the possible theoretical perspectives on these disagreements. In 
this regard, a thesis that moves towards or looks at this case study from a discourse 
analysis perspective for example would feasibly be very difficult at this stage because it 
would require extensive expertise in two very different non-English languages, in terms 
of both oral and written data. It would also necessitate a deep cultural understanding of 
the nuances of Chinese and Japanese words, phrases, and terminology.  
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Primary source non-interview data in this thesis consists predominantly of directly 
translated and/or stand alone English language sources from Japan and China. Third party 
sources from newspapers and other media outlets elsewhere are also used to shed light on 
issues from within each state. The barrier of secrecy in terms of military and diplomatic 
affairs also acts as a constraint on the type of non-interview data that can be accessed.  
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Chapter Three 
Leading Up to 2003: Domestic Politics and Bilateral Relations 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter presents in greater detail the ways in which domestic political considerations 
and popular sentiment in Japan and China in the years leading up to 2003 contributed to 
the inflammatory and volatile atmosphere surrounding the East China Sea frictions after 
August 2003.  
 
As numerous interviewed Chinese and Japanese experts have argued, the quest for energy 
resources, though important, is not the over-riding factor in appreciating what contributed 
to the politicization of these disputes from the 1990s onwards and particularly from 2003 
to 2006 (Jiro Yamaguchi, 06/10/2007). One leading scholar for example places 
competition for oil and gas as ‘not leading the list’ where rivalry for energy resources 
would come in fourth or fifth in a list of factors that explain the escalation in tensions 
(Yang Bojiang, 24/09/2008). An examination of domestic political considerations and 
popular sentiment in Japan and China prior to 2003 is all the more pertinent when 
observers appreciate the fact that cool-headed and rational decision-makers in the two 
states have continuously striven to de-escalate these maritime disputes when incidents 
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arose and to prevent them from getting out of hand. Given this reality, it seems all the 
more surprising to see both states become entangled in patterns of public and sometimes 
hostile posturing to appease domestic actors and audiences such as China condemning 
Japanese behavior in relation to the Pinnacle Islands as a gross violation of Chinese 
sovereignty. These incidents tend to oscillate, peak, and recede until the next crisis comes 
along, where in private, both the Chinese and the Japanese have taken subtle measures to 
de-escalate tensions such as Beijing carefully managing and restricting anti-Japanese 
protests in the PRC, and placing key Chinese nationalist figures under house arrest 
(Downs and Saunders, 1998-1999:120). The private and public ways in which these 
disputes manifest themselves are an essential component in the dynamics of the ECS 
problems. Providing the back-drop is important for better understanding these disputes 
and the more pronounced role of these issues in making bilateral approaches more 
complicated. 
 
Chapter Outline 
The chapter is divided into two main sections, the first of them beginning by detailing the 
political and institutional framework in which the authoritarian one-party Chinese 
leadership operates, makes decisions, and assesses a policy issue. It then discusses the 
history of the PRC’s relationship with Japan with particular emphasis on the post-
Tiananmen years (1989) until 2001. This discussion will show how Japan-related issues 
have affected Chinese domestic politics since the foundation of the PRC in 1949. It will 
also show how they became increasingly more powerful as a topic in popular and elite 
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debates during the 1990s as anti-Japanese sentiment increased and as the realities of the 
country’s post-1979 reform era changes and a new international environment began to 
dig their teeth into China’s political, economic, and social life. In this context amid an 
already complex and often informal political system, the East China Sea islands and 
demarcation issues, when they escalated again in the mid-1990s, became a much more 
potent and troublesome problem for the PRC’s leaders to successfully manage and deal 
with without undermining their own standing within the Party and the country.  
 
As with the first, the second main section begins with a description of the political and 
institutional framework in which politicians in a democratic multi-party Japan operate, 
make decisions, and assess a policy issue. It then discusses the post-war history of 
Japan’s relationship with the PRC with a special focus on events and developments after 
the Tiananmen Massacre of 1989 which was regarded by many in Japan (and elsewhere) 
as a watershed incident in terms of stimulating negative Japanese perceptions of their 
rising Chinese neighbour. The 1990s are especially apt in discussions of the lead-up to 
2003 because these years also witnessed a collection of negative interactions between the 
two states within an unprecedented international context that amplified the fear of China 
in Japan. The 1990s was also a decade of major structural changes to Japan’s political 
system that complicated approaches to bilateral problems like the ECS, while Japan’s 
economic and political malaise after the confident highs of the 1980s fed calls for a more 
assertive and decisive response to security threats in areas near Japan. 
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China 
 
The Political and Institutional System 
 
The PRC’s decision-making processes and political system can be looked at on a number 
of levels. At one level, it is tempting to simply view the PRC as a state where one party, 
the CCP, unquestionably dominates political life within a rigid authoritarian and 
hierarchical structure. If Chinese politics were as straightforward as this, it might suggest 
that a level-headed leadership can deal with controversies like the ECS with relative ease 
and without serious repercussions for the elite and the regime. It might also suggest that 
the government can always positively frame the ECS disputes through its propaganda 
department without dissent or challenges from within and outside the Party. This view of 
the PRC‘s political structure, while true to an extent, is however arguably an 
oversimplification that doesn’t grant adequate respect to the complex, diffuse and often 
highly competitive nature of Chinese politics (Martin, 2010:2). As argued by Martin: 
‘The diffusion of political power between the Party and government, and to 
a lesser degree, to the NPC (the National People’s Congress) and the PLA 
(the People’s Liberation Army), can make it a difficult and complex 
proposition to determine who has authority to set and/or implement specific 
policies. The dominance of economic players, a proliferation of research 
groups and other actors in the political system, and the explosion of the 
Internet and other alternative sources of information have further 
decentralized policy and administrative processes and diffused 
power….The political story in China today is the extent to which these 
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multiple actors and changing circumstances have helped blur the 
communist regime’s lines of authority’ (Martin, 2010:2;6).  
 
The PRC’s central political framework is based on two inter-related and overlapping 
institutions. One of these is the extensive, hierarchical and multi-layered CCP with its 
sixty-six million members and three and a half million organizations. The other inter-
linked institution is the state government apparatus. The Party faces an ongoing challenge 
of maintaining its power in a very fluid and dynamic era over some thirty-four provincial-
level governments, over three hundred prefecture-level governments, close to three 
thousand county-level governments, and over forty thousand township-level governments 
(Martin, 2010:5;18) in an ethnically diverse country roughly the size of the US but with a 
population with nearly five times as many people.  
 
In accordance with the PRC’s constitution, the National People’s Congress (NPC), a 
unicameral legislative body with close to three thousand deputies13 meeting over two 
weeks just once a year, represents the top layer of a system of numerous inter-related 
People’s Congresses that exist throughout the state. The NPC is on paper the most 
representative and powerful institution in China through which policies are agreed upon 
and set, and key state leaders chosen. The reality however is that the NPC, despite its 
constitutional standing, is in fact a politically weak body that down through the decades 
has effectively rubberstamped decisions already made in secret after much maneuvering 
                                                          
13 The NPC is not made up of popularly elected deputies. Rather they are selected to serve five year terms 
in the NPC by lower level deputies and members of the PLA from other lower level ‘people’s congresses’ 
from throughout the state (Martin , 2010:9).  
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and negotiating by more senior Party members in key decision-making bodies such as the 
Politburo, the Politburo Standing Committee, and the State Council (Martin, 2010:9). On 
issues as politically sensitive as the East China Sea disputes which incorporate Japan, 
sovereignty, and territorial integrity, it is the top level individuals within these smaller 
groups and their immediate affiliate groups that hold the real power and are the final 
arbiters on government approaches and policies.  
 
For those aspiring to political office or seeking to maintain or strengthen their political 
standing within this non-democratic system, the dependency on support from below and 
within means that acquiring the support and loyalty of other political representatives is an 
essential strategy for one’s survival and progression. Within this informal, complex, 
multi-layered and blurred institutional infrastructure, personal connections play a central 
but unpredictable role in the decision-making process. This complex structure can also 
result in a lack of discipline between the various levels of the Party and the government 
resulting in often unsuccessful attempts by central government to implement policy and 
also in numerous and sometimes large scale cases of corruption that have damaged the 
regime’s legitimacy (Martin, 2010:4-7). 
 
Given these informal and intimate features of PRC politics, it is not necessarily surprising 
to learn that factional and bureaucratic politics play a powerful role in decision-making. 
The importance of behind the scenes maneuvering, manipulation, and compromise, 
particularly between the top two dozen or so elites in China also sheds some light on why 
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the decision-making process remains so dynamic, unpredictable, and enigmatic to outside 
observers. This uncertainty in the decision-making process is especially apparent during 
periods of political succession from one top leader to the next (Martin, 2010:19). This 
uncertainty surrounding leadership succession and the consolidation of power by Chinese 
leaders is particularly relevant to this thesis because of the long history of rivals 
exploiting Japan-related issues to undermine leaders, and the weight of such matters in 
the PRC’s domestic politics. This was very evident in the context of the 2003 to 2008 
period when frictions over the ECS reappeared, peaked and then were carefully stabilized 
in the midst of more favorable domestic and bilateral political circumstances. 
 
At the highest echelons of Party power is the currently twenty-five member Party 
Political Bureau (Politburo)14 and its Standing Committee (PBSC) made up of nine of the 
Party’s most powerful officials.  The PBSC is the most powerful formal decision-making 
body in the PRC. At the apex of this decision-making structure is the top political leader, 
currently the PRC President and CCP General Secretary Hu Jintao (2002 – Present) 
(Martin, 2010:4-5). The General Secretary is officially though not always actually the 
most powerful figure in China. Since the 1990s, a leader is not perceived to have fully 
consolidated his leadership unless he officially holds three positions. These are a) 
                                                          
14 Martin argues that even though the twenty-five member Politburo is officially the top decision-making 
body in Chinese politics, its cumbersome size and lack of a formalized meeting schedule has meant that the 
full body is only comprehensively involved when the political stakes are high. Examples of when the entire 
Politburo might be involved in formulating a decision include issues that require urgent attention, major 
policy shifts by the Party, or when ‘a higher level of legitimization for a particular policy’ is required and 
politically prudent (Martin, 2010:4). 
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General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, b) 
President of the PRC and c) Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC). When 
a new leader assumes his role as General Secretary, the time period needed to assume all 
the three roles can be a matter of months and years or in some cases never at all. In Hu’s 
case, the three above roles were assumed in the following order, General Secretary 
(November 2002), President (March 2003), and Chairman of the CMC (September 2004) 
(Paramount Leader, n.d.) 
 
By convention, control of the Party is formally held by the Standing Committee 
collectively. Members of the Politburo and the PBSC are selected at the National 
Congress of the Communist Party of China (referred to as the National Congress of the 
CPC or NCCPC) held every five years (this should not be confused with the National 
People’s Congress (NPC)) (Martin, 2010:4-5). These bodies comprise of powerful figures 
with their own political and ideological leanings regarding many topical issues such as 
the course and pace of political and economic reform within China and foreign policy 
approaches. These dynamics can make for a very competitive game where top leaders 
must always keep one step ahead of possible rivals within the elite.    
 
As explained by Fewsmith, the Chinese do not have a pleasant history of smooth and 
peaceful transfers of power. This was even apparent in the years of gradual succession 
from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao (in the period from 2002 to 2005) when the ECS frictions 
resurfaced in 2003, although this gradual transfer was certainly not nearly as tempestuous 
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as leadership changes in the past.  For example, the top elites earmarked to succeed Mao 
Zedong (1949 – 1976), Liu Shaoqi, Lin Biao, and Hua Goufeng all proved unsuccessful 
in securing and consolidating their power. Two General Secretaries chosen by Deng 
Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang (1982 -1987) and Zhao Ziyang (1987-1989) also fell 
ignominiously by the roadside in the midst of bitter elite power struggles. Another of 
Deng’s protégés, the comparatively less experienced Jiang Zemin (1989 – 2002) however 
confounded critics and fended off sometimes strong elite competition to hold his grip on 
power during the often tumultuous and complex post-Tiananmen years and guided China 
into the new millennium. The PRC’s current General Secretary Hu Jintao, scheduled to 
step down in 2012, has finally consolidated his position as leader of the PRC but not 
without first having to very delicately and subtly assert his power vis-à-vis the still 
influential Jiang and his protégés in the first four years after his ascension to the top 
position in China (Fewsmith, 2008: 239-40).  
 
The other side of the institutional coin, the state government apparatus, is headed by the 
PRC’s Premier, currently Wen Jiabao (2003 – Present), who also presides over the State 
Council, a type of de facto cabinet for the government which is directly elected by and 
accountable to the National People’s Congress (NPC). The State Council, comprising of 
about fifty members, meets about once a month, and is officially the top government 
administrative body. Its members consist of the Premier, Vice-Premier, the State 
Council’s secretary general, state councilors, ministers from various ministries and 
commissions, the governor of the People’s Bank of China, and the auditor general of the 
National Audit Office. The day to day administrative running of the state is dealt with by 
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a smaller group within the State Council, the State Council’s Standing Committee 
(SCSC) comprised of ten senior members who meet twice a week. According to the 
PRC’s constitution, the State Council is officially subordinate to the NPC but in reality 
both the State Council and the Politburo Standing Committee are the most powerful 
groupings in the state. The Party and State apparatuses in China have an inter-linking 
relationship, where for example Party representatives and committees work in and 
alongside government agencies, institutions, organizations, universities and foreign-
owned enterprises (Martin, 2010:2-7).  
 
Another key institution in China is the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) where 
structurally the lines between military and civilian leadership are often blurred and 
difficult at times to differentiate (Martin, 2010:2). This has created a lot of unease 
amongst China’s neighbors and the United States in terms of who exactly is in charge of 
China’s military forces and who has the final say with regards to military activities and 
maneuvers. In the ECS, the absence of positive political relations can strengthen the hand 
of military elements within the PRC’s decision-making elite who support an assertive 
approach towards Japan. According to Bush, evidence exists that ‘the PLA, which wants 
to preserve as much freedom and flexibility for the navy as possible, has been a key actor 
behind the scenes in shaping China’s tough negotiating position’ (Bush, 2009:30). The 
power of the party leaders to hold rival elements together and speak with one voice in 
influencing the PLAN is similarly a factor that has affected courses of actions in the ECS. 
During Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji’s (1998-2003) crisis in power in the summer of 2000 
for example, Zhu confessed that he was not always aware of PLAN activities in the East 
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China Sea. Similar evidence of competing interests and factions in the Chinese elite has 
likewise been discerned in Chinese policy regarding the South China Sea (Buszynski and 
Sazlan, 2007). These characteristics of the PRC’s decision-making system have lead to 
confusion and uncertainty in Japan over the possibility of a reliable, consistent and 
unified Chinese policy in the East China Sea. 
 
Responsibility for military policy and decisions is granted to two bodies, the Central 
Military Commission of the PRC (CMCPRC) which is a state body, and the Central 
Military Commission of the Communist Party (CMCCP) or CMC, a body affiliated to the 
Party. Both bodies usually consist of the same members who are nominated by the 
Politburo Standing Committee (Martin, 2010:10). These members include the Party’s top 
leaders as well as senior generals and other key representatives of the PLA’s various 
department and services (Sutter, 2008:59-60). As such, it is common to refer to the CMC 
on its own without referring to the state affiliated CMCPRC. In official terms, the 
CMCPRC is regarded as the supreme overseer of defense, military and strategic affairs 
but in actuality it is the Party-controlled CMC that controls and directs the PLA. The 
CMC is usually though not always presided over by the Party General Secretary (Martin, 
2010:10) where elevation to the position of Chairman of the CMC is seen as 
representative of a leader’s standing and political power within the state. Deng Xiaoping, 
a ‘paramount’ leader, was for example Chairman of the CMC from 1981 to 1989 even 
though he was never actually the Party General Secretary and even after he had given up 
his other party and state positions in 1987. Jiang Zemin likewise remained on as 
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Chairman of the CMC until September 2004 even though he had stepped down as 
General Secretary in November 2002 (Shambaugh, 2003).  
 
According to Sutter, there also have been reports of so-called ‘Leading Groups’ such as 
the ‘Leading Small Group on National Security’ within the PRC that overlap with the 
CMC in order to permit key government, party, and military elements within the state to 
share their opinions on important foreign policy issues. Such groups also permit the top 
leader and his circle of advisors to formulate policies that take into consideration the 
expert advice and interests of the various pillars of the state. Examples of domestic actors 
who are consulted for their advice through such bodies include the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MOFA), the Ministry of Commerce, the Xinhua News Agency, the International 
Liaison Department of the CCP, and figures within the PLA who deal with intelligence, 
military exchanges, and arms transfers (Sutter, 2008:59-60). 
 
Elite Politics and Factionalism  
The rapid and unrelenting changes that have been a hallmark of the post 1979 reform era 
and particularly in the post-Tiananmen years have meant the senior decision-makers 
within the Party have had to deal with a political system with a higher plurality of diverse 
actors and interests that influence and sometimes dictate policy (Martin, 2010:1).  This is 
within a system where despite these pluralities, the PRC’s top leader still plays a varying 
yet critical role in the informal hierarchy of decision-making elites within central 
government who shape and influence the PRC’s choices in areas such as foreign policy. 
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The PRC’s history has numerous examples of top elites who have seen their star rise or 
fall depending on how they dealt with key issues. Mao Zedong (1949-1976) (considered 
to be a first generation leader), Deng Xiaoping (1978-1992) (a second generation leader), 
Jiang Zemin (1989-2002) (a third generation leader), and now Hu Jintao (2002 – Present) 
(a fourth generation leader) have all held preeminent positions as the ‘key final decision-
maker’ for extended periods. Hu Jintao’s key position as a leader who has successfully 
navigated through the rough straits of Chinese elite politics for example is exemplified in 
his current collective role as Communist Party General Secretary, PRC President, and 
Chairman of the CMC (Sutter, 2008:59).  
 
Competition and rivalry between the PRC’s top elites and their factions have been 
features of political life in China for decades where loyalties can, alongside instrumental 
considerations, often depend on personal affiliations, historical background and 
experience, support bases, and nationalistic and ideological credentials. The formation of 
factions or political coalitions can, at different times, be based on shared perspectives and 
ideologies (though not always a given), hometowns and political bases, similar 
educational backgrounds (Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao for example are both from technical 
backgrounds), political mentorship, and the bonds created over the years. A notable 
example of a powerful faction in the PRC is the so-called ‘Shanghai Clique’, a coalition 
made up of members who had all served as senior officials in the Shanghai municipal 
government. This clique ascended to a position of great influence under the leadership of 
Jiang Zemin, who himself had risen to power as a political figure in Shanghai. Another 
characteristic of political coalitions in China is their unstable nature where rivalry and 
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alliances can shift depending on the issue at hand. According to Martin, one of the 
reasons for this instability is the informal character of decision-making which can compel 
officials to shift their loyalties or else run the risk of losing power and influence (Martin, 
2010:20).  
The informal and at times uncertain nature of power among the PRC’s top elites means 
that leaders are very sensitive to delicate issues that can easily arouse emotions at the 
popular and elite level in China. This is especially pertinent to issues that touch directly 
upon national dignity, territorial integrity, history, and sovereignty that if not tackled 
appropriately to the given situation could be used to weaken and undermine them. The 
ECS disagreements are a typical example of such an issue where the figures within the 
leadership must try to balance between the strategic need for stable relations with Japan 
and the demands and political necessity of being perceived to be defending the nation’s 
pride and territorial integrity when these are seen to be challenged.   
 
Domestic Politics and Japan-related Issues in the PRC 
 
1949 – 1989: A More Easily Manageable Relationship 
 
Ideational issues such as national identity and historical grievances in relation to Japan 
and linked topics have been a point of contention in Chinese domestic politics since the 
foundation of the state. Developments from the late 1980s onwards however have given 
them added weight and influence. Up until the 1990s, popular sentiment was also more 
easily guided by central government and was for the most part an issue that factored into 
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the rivalry for power and influence amongst elites in the CCP. The power of the Party to 
control and manipulate anti-Japanese propaganda for example was arguably best 
exemplified by the about face on Japan taken by Beijing that led to the successful 
normalization of ties with the Sino-Japanese Joint Declaration of 1972.15 This was 
followed by a mostly peaceful decade of unprecedented positive political and economic 
ties between the two neighbours. These developments in terms of public opinion should 
not be taken to suggest that Japan-related controversies only became important as a 
domestic political issue in the last twenty years or so. Indeed the theme of resisting Japan 
has been used, re-used, cultivated and exploited as a valuable card for CCP elites to 
utilise and bolster their own positions and/or to fend off opponents from the foundation of 
the PRC right through to the post-reform era and to the present day (Hughes, 2008:250-
252).  
 
Indeed, the exploitation of politically sensitive issues such as territorial disputes and so 
forth by rival elites within the Party, particularly conservative elements, has been used 
over the years to undermine top level elites and at times ultimately result in their 
downfall and replacement. The case of Liu Shaoqi, a senior cadre earmarked to 
eventually succeed Mao Zedong provides one of the earlier lessons on the pitfalls of elite 
politics in China. Liu was purged and tarred as a ‘capitalist’ traitor in the bitter 
ideological and elite struggles of the Cultural Revolution (1966 – 1976) and was 
sidelined as a result. When Mao died in 1976, his chosen successor Hua Guofeng 
                                                          
15 As observed by Shirk, in the Mao era (1949-1976), Mao had unquestioned power over foreign policy. 
The normalization of ties in 1972 also saw the Chinese leadership privately forswear any calls for Japanese 
reparations for its earlier wartime occupation of parts of China and instead sought to emphasize positive 
future ties (Shirk, 2008:158-159). 
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(Chairman from 1976 to 1981) took the leadership mantle but his anti-reform stance, 
inexperience and junior standing in the Party hierarchy proved a handicap that rivals used 
to undermine him (Fewsmith, 2008:3) in favor of Deng Xiaoping, a progressive and 
respected Party stalwart of high standing who had survived the darkest days and purges 
of the Cultural Revolution (CNN.com, 2001).   
 
With Mao’s passing and the removal of the Gang of Four, senior reformed-minded 
figures such as Deng stepped up their attempts to move away from the isolation and 
alienation of earlier years and to show more openness toward the outside world, in 
particular toward the international economic system (Austin and Harris, 2001:27). By the 
late 1970s, the new political landscape with Deng as de facto leader (ultimately 
overshadowing Hua) provided him and other supporters of reform with the opportunity to 
put their country on a path of economic change throughout the Deng era (1978 – 1992) 
and beyond that reverberates through Chinese life to this day. These reforms centered on 
so-called ‘Deng Xiaoping Theory’ with its hybrid mix of socialism and market 
economics (Deng Xiaoping Theory, 2004).  
 
In the strategic and security field, the convergence of China’s interests with the US and 
Japan in the face of a more pressing threat to China from the Soviet Union facilitated 
stronger ties with the Americans and the Japanese and saw the inclusion of an ‘anti-
hegemony’ clause within the 1978 Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship (Drifte, 
2003:23). This political and strategic context through which China viewed the outside 
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world helped to influence and shape its approach to the ECS disagreements when they 
became a bilateral issue for the first time in the late 1960s and early 1970s.  
 
The East China Sea disputes 
 
The First Wave of Protests (1968 – 1979) 
 
While the Pinnacle Islands dimension of the East China Sea disputes have their origin in 
the Japanese acquisition of the islands in 1895, shortly before the end of the First Sino-
Japanese War (1894-1895), the islands did not become an official matter of dispute 
between the two countries until decades later. These disagreements over energy and 
territory first materialized in the late 1960s and early 1970s following a 1968 United 
Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (UNECAFE) sponsored 
geological survey of the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea. This survey, carried out 
under the auspices of the Committee for Coordination of Joint Prospecting for Mineral 
Resources in Asian Offshore Areas (CCJPMRAOA) (Kien-hong Yu, 2005: 117) 
concluded that ‘the organic matter deposited by the Yellow River and the Yangtze River 
may make the continental shelf in this region one of the most prolific oil and gas reserves 
in the world’ (Heflin, 2000:2). China first claimed the islands in May 1970 but did not 
officially lay claim to them until December 30th 1971 after Japan and Taiwan had 
commenced joint-exploration negotiations for energy resources near the islands, and after 
the US had agreed to return the Okinawan Islands, together with the Pinnacle Islands, to 
Japan in 1972.  
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The year 1972 however also witnessed the PRC’s normalization of diplomatic relations 
with the US and Japan, and so in the interests of good relations, both Beijing and Tokyo 
sought to play down the islands issue while holding firm to their legal claims. This 
remained the case in 1978 with the signing of the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship 
Treaty. This scenario, according to Drifte, was problematic because even though two 
diplomatic agreements were secured (in 1972 and 1978), their price vis-à-vis the ECS 
was ‘sweeping explosive issues under the carpet by agreeing to disagree for the time 
being’ (Drifte, 2008a:3-4). Given the complexities of the Cold War, China’s 
comparatively lesser demand for oil and gas, and China’s own problems with the USSR 
over disputed territories on its western borders, there was also no urgency in the 1970s 
and 1980s for Beijing to focus too heavily on the energy and territorial issue in the ECS 
(Wei Su, 2005: 49). By the late 1970s, as a result of the failure to reach agreements on 
ownership of the disputed islands, the Chinese leadership under Deng, agreed to set aside 
the islands dispute with Deng stating that ‘It does not matter if this question is shelved for 
some time, say ten years’ (Lo, 1989).  
 
The aforementioned Peace and Friendship Treaty of October 1978 also encouraged the 
two governments not to allow the islands dispute to disrupt the wider relationship even 
though Japan tacitly rejected Beijing’s shelving proposal and instead has consistently 
denied that any dispute over the islands exists in the first place. Even so, Japanese 
nationalists displayed their ability to seriously disrupt stable ties with regards to the 
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islands, when in March 1978, powerful anti-treaty forces and parliamentarians lobbied 
top-level decision makers to make assertive declarations and to stall treaty talks until a 
guarantee on the territorial ownership of the islands could be secured. The Chinese 
responded by sending over one hundred fishing vessels in April 1978 into the territorial 
waters of the Pinnacle Islands to assert China’s claim. This was a prime example of 
domestic actors and political posturing in Japan setting off a chain of events that resulted 
in an incident of ‘near-crisis proportions’ in the East China Sea. In early 1979, when 
Japanese nationalists started to construct a helicopter landing pad on the largest of the 
Pinnacle Islands, Beijing reacted by sending fifty fishing boats into the area to re-assert 
China’s claim (Blanchard, 2006: 215-16). Despite both reactions by China representing 
military statecraft by Beijing to emphasize its resolve to defend its claim (Hagstrom, 
2005:178), the incidents fortunately did not escalate beyond this because, amongst other 
reasons, diplomacy won over force, and intervened to calm the waters.  
 
1979 – 1989: Sensible and Pragmatic Relations 
Late 1980 saw the two neighbors engage in negotiations to agree on a border in the East 
China Sea. Japan argued for a median line solution and presented its proposed median 
line to the Chinese. Beijing however argued for a boundary based on the natural 
prolongation of the continental shelf, and negotiations came to naught as a result. 
Undeterred, China drilled two exploratory wells (Longjing I and Longjing II) but kept 
activities well within its side of Japan’s median line. Despite this, Japan voiced its protest 
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so the Chinese subsequently withdrew its rigs and made efforts to convince the Japanese 
to engage in joint developments in the ECS (Blanchard, 2006: 217). 
 
Domestic Politics and Japan-related Issues in the PRC in the 1980s  
 
Despite these generally positive ties, the CCP’s top brass decided to continue to 
intermittently play the Japan card in the post-1979 period in order to bolster their 
legitimacy during this dynamic era of change and uncertainty. A cogent example of a 
Japan theme being used for political purposes in the 1980s included the manner in which 
the historical textbook revisions controversy with Japan in the summer of 1982 was 
presented to the Chinese people (Hughes, 2008:251;256). This was the first time in the 
post-war years that the issue had arisen and coincided with a Japanese trade mission to 
Taiwan. When Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone (1982-1987) visited the 
controversial Yasukuni Shrine in 1985, it hurt but did not destabilise the relationship 
(Drifte, 2003: 23-27) even though the textbook controversy and the shrine visit triggered 
student demonstrations in China in 1985. The ability of the top leaders in both states to 
successfully navigate through these incidents owed much to the deftness of Deng and 
Nakasone. Both were willing and committed to positive ties and Nakasone had the 
domestic support in which to make compromises and to formulate gentlemen’s 
agreements aimed to preventing a repetition of such incidents in the future. This was 
particularly true for a Japan riding high on a wave of economic prosperity and global 
confidence. When bilateral controversies arose, Deng used his influence and high 
standing within the Party to quietly and smoothly deal with them before they could get 
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out of hand. As explained by a Chinese policy advisor, ‘Deng kept it in control, he 
stopped the fever quickly’ (Shirk, 2008:160-161). On the security front, the early to mid-
1980s had seen a reappraisal of the strategic environment by the Chinese marked by a 
desire for a more independent and non-aligned foreign policy stance and concern over 
Japan’s defence changes in a period when Japan’s economy and global influence was at 
its peak (Drifte, 2003: 23-27) and when the Soviet threat had seemingly subsided (Austin 
and Harris, 2001:17).  
 
In the blurred hierarchy of Chinese politics where a leader’s standing, patriotic 
credentials and political resume carry great weight, Deng continued to have a major 
influence on Chinese decision-making even though he never officially held the very top 
political posts in the PRC, and even after he had formally stepped down from his formal 
positions of power. In the Deng era he was thus the well-respected yet informal 
‘paramount’ leader of the Chinese state (CNN.com, 2001). Other formal and official 
leaders such as Deng protégés Hu Yaobang (1982–1987) and Zhao Ziyang (1987-1989) 
(toppled after the Tiananmen massacre) failed to consolidate their positions or to stand in 
Deng’s shadow in terms of influence and stature (Fewsmith, 2008:3). The sequence of 
events that led to CCP General Secretary Hu Yaobang’s fall from power in early 1987 
were indicative of the weight of Japan-related issues in the elite competition within the 
CCP (Hughes, 2008:255). Hu’s Japan-friendly, liberal and reformist leanings had not 
endeared him to the more conservative and ideologically rigid elements within the Party 
(Fewsmith, 2008:171).  
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In 1984, Hu had invited three thousand young Japanese students to visit the PRC and 
even went as far as hosting Nakasone and his family in his own home during a visit by 
the Japanese PM. These took place without Hu requesting authorisation from the Party 
beforehand (Shirk, 2008:163).  His uncompromising campaign to tackle corruption in 
1986 had also unsettled powerful Party elders who did not appreciate the scrutiny and 
reprimanding of underlings that accompanied the campaign. This weakened his position 
and strengthened the calls for his ouster from within the elite (Fewsmith, 2008:171). The 
pro-democracy student protests of 1985 that developed initially on a pretext of anti-
Japanese anger occurred again in 1986 and 1987 and were also used as a stick with which 
to beat Hu and his domestic and international policies. In this context, Hu could no longer 
depend on the support of his mentor Deng, who was won over by conservative arguments 
against him. As Shirk notes, ever since the toppling of Hu, it remains the starkest lesson 
to date on the pitfalls of Chinese leaders as they attempt to manage the relationship with 
Japan (Shirk, 2008:162-163). Despite these bumps on the roads, bilateral ties from the 
late 1970s up to 1989 were for the most part pragmatic and friendly. The Tiananmen 
Square massacre of 1989 however would mark the first in a long line of incidents that 
would adversely affect relations between the two neighbours. 
 
1989 – 1995:  China after Tiananmen - A Dramatic Deterioration in Relations 
 
Given the vacuum left by the ideological failure of communism so blatantly displayed by 
the events that culminated in the tragedy of June 1989, alternative ideologies such as 
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nationalism, in particular nationalist sentiment stirred by anti-American and anti-Japanese 
attitudes, alongside a sometimes conflicting commitment to economic prosperity, served 
as an effective tool in cementing political legitimacy by appealing to values shared by 
both the rulers and the ruled in China (Downs and Saunders, 1998-1999: 118). In 
addition, it was a convenient means through which Jiang, General Secretary since shortly 
after Tiananmen, could assert his position in the early 1990s while the aging Deng 
gradually drifted away from the centre of power. Unprecedented domestic and 
international changes in this period also witnessed a shift ever since from a generally 
strong and decisive approach to foreign policy under Mao and Deng to a more cautious 
and consultative approach to Chinese foreign policy by leaders such as Jiang and later Hu 
(Sutter, 2008:59).  
 
The years after Mao’s passing in 1976 until the present day have been ones in which the 
PRC’s society, politics, culture, and economy has become far more complex and 
competitive, and inter-twined with the outside world at numerous levels. The Chinese 
economy for example has more than quadrupled in size (Fewsmith, 2008:4), and the 
once-omnipotent power of the state and its top elites, though still considerable today, has 
been challenged by an unprecedented wave of forces at home and abroad.  These realities 
have placed greater demands and constraints on the top leaders, their factions and the 
legitimacy of the Party (Martin, 2010:1-3). Such changes have made the manageability of 
sensitive issues like a territorial dispute with Japan all the more difficult.   
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The 1990s in particular saw the effect of deepening post-1979 reforms become more 
apparent to all Chinese where these years were marked by rapid economic changes, new 
thinking about the rising China, and questions about national identity in a new post-Cold 
War strategic environment that had seen clear divergences amongst the top elite and 
China’s wider society over the most appropriate strategy for driving the nation forward. 
This uncertainty and dynamism witnessed increased debate at all levels about China’s 
direction from nationalists, traditionalists, conservatives, and utopians.  A marked 
increase in debates over Chinese identity, the course of reform, and the effects of 
globalization took center stage in intellectual circles and helped to feed the development 
of a more populist, rather than just an official, strain of nationalism after the early 1990s 
(Fewsmith, 2008: 1-18;153;221).  
 
The East China Sea disputes in the early 1990s 
On September 29th 1990, the media in Japan reported that the Japanese Maritime Safety 
Agency (JMSA) was intent on recognizing a controversial lighthouse built in 1978 by 
nationalists on the main Pinnacle Island as an ‘official navigation mark’ (Kyodo, 
29/09/1990). Under intense pressure from abroad and wary of instability from within in 
the aftermath of the Tiananmen massacre in June 1989, the PRC’s leaders strove to 
balance its nationalistic credentials with its need to rebuild stable ties with its powerful 
neighbour and to prevent domestic unrest. As a result, China tempered its protests over 
the ECS in favour of its more pressing economic objectives (Downs and Saunders, 1998-
1999: 126-127). 
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In 1992 Beijing passed the ‘Law of the People's Republic of China on the Territorial Sea 
and the Contiguous Zone’, re-iterating the PRC’s claims to a broad swath of maritime 
territory in the East and South China Seas and including the Pinnacle Islands, a move that 
resulted in diplomatic protests from Tokyo. The law also emphasized the right to use 
force if Chinese sovereignty was threatened or undermined. The 1992 Law was viewed in 
Japan as China’s most explicit move to lay claim to the islands (Hagstrom, 2005:161) and 
was also seen as a worrying deviation from Deng Xiaoping’s 1978 ‘shelving’ proposal 
(Wu Xinbo (2000)). The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ (MOFA) China Division 
regarded it as a ‘clear infringement on Japan’s sovereignty’ (Hagstrom, 2005:166). 
Hagstrom however plays down the seriousness of this 1992 claim but rather sees it as 
‘Chinese statecraft’ aimed at giving greater legitimacy to China’s maritime claims. The 
more assertive elements of the 1992 law however did indicate the various more hard-line 
domestic actors that China’s more moderate leaders were pressured to consider when 
drafting it (Hagstrom, 2005:161-174). When Jiang Zemin visited Japan in April 1992, the 
Japanese PM Kiichi Miyazawa sought clarification about the 1992 Law. Jiang responded 
by referring to Deng’s 1978 ‘shelving’ statement as an indication of China’s position 
(Drifte, 2008b:33). Despite this reassurance, the 1992 Law was seen as one of a number 
of developments from the early 1990s onwards which fed Japanese concerns about 
Chinese intentions in neighbouring waters. 
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More Challenging Divisions within the Chinese Polity 
The dramatic changes wrought by the reform era and the new challenges of the post-Cold 
War era meant that by the 1990s there was a more salient difference of opinion at the 
elite and ordinary level between those who prioritized great power status and rising living 
standards through economic prosperity over other objectives versus those who 
emphasized conservative Party values and national dignity. A notable political 
competition developed between those of the Old Left in the Party who espoused Marxist 
orthodoxy and those reformers who aligned themselves with Deng. The Old Left made 
concerted efforts to win over the Chinese public and higher level elites for example 
through the dissemination of numerous publications including the ‘10,000 character 
manifestos’ (Fewsmith, 2008:14;197).  
Along with the Old Left, the period also witnessed a more intense debate in intellectual 
circles between the so called New Left or neo-conservatives, a large and disparate group 
who held critical views of both Marxist orthodoxy and Western liberalism and lobbied 
for a third way between the two approaches, and more liberal-minded reformers. This 
coincided with the rise of popular nationalism with many elite and ordinary level Chinese 
questioning the pace and direction of reform (Fewsmith, 2008:13;153;221) and the extent 
to which the government was undermining traditional values, principles, and national 
dignity in favor of economic prosperity and financial gain. As with the wider society, 
many of these contrasting political and intellectual leanings were apparent at the top layer 
of the Party and government competing with each other in influencing policy. 
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Uncertainty about the pace of change and reform was furthered by the proliferation in the 
cases of corruption involving unprecedented sums of money after the early 1990s (Saich, 
2004:330) and which illustrated a web of double-dealing between party, government and 
business figures. Throughout the 1990s, increasing public concerns were also expressed 
over issues such as higher unemployment in urban areas, and a widening wealth disparity 
between the rich and the poor and between the Chinese hinterland and the more 
prosperous coastal regions (Fewsmith, 2008:17). In this dynamic context, the East China 
Sea disputes represented a convenient proxy through which to attack members of the 
elite, through which the leadership could exhibit an ostensibly strong position or through 
which increasingly vocal popular nationalists and intellectuals could express their outrage 
at government policies. 
 
The Role of Popular Sentiment, and Public and Intellectual Opinion  
Alongside this growing awareness about the painful reform process and intensified 
divisions within the elite was a strengthened role for public opinion and popular 
sentiment in terms of how decision-makers publicly approached sensitive foreign policy 
issues such as the East China Sea disputes. In contrast to the eras of Mao and Deng where 
foreign policy issues were discussed in almost complete secrecy and debates over 
national identity were almost non-existent, the mid-1990s onwards has witnessed a very 
rigorous discussion at the popular and intellectual levels about national identity-related 
issues. At the popular level, examples included the best-selling ‘China Can Say No’ and 
other books of the same ilk, while at the intellectual level, there was a noticeable increase 
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in the number of national-identity related articles and books published by scholars in all 
fields in both scientific journals such as Dushu and Zhanlue yu guanli and journals from 
other fields (Esteban, 2006:202). These outlined developments in the PRC granted 
greater power to public opinion and ideational issues in the domestic political debates 
within China. As Fewsmith contends with regards to non-democratic states, even though 
public opinion ‘tends to have very limited repercussions on governmental policies on its 
own, its impact is much more relevant when it can be mobilized by some of the elites or 
the sub-elites in favor’ (Fewsmith, 2001). In the case of the PRC, this is particularly 
relevant because these issues alongside the more visceral dimensions of popular 
nationalism have been exploited by more conservative, hard-line, and nationalistic 
elements to increase their leverage and power, and to hinder some important yet 
controversial reforms that have been pushed by the reformist and technocratic 
government such as the drawn out fifteen year long negotiations leading to China’s 
eventual entrance into the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001 (Esteban, 
2006:202). The early to mid 1990s had thus seen a marked increase in the role of public 
opinion. Even though its influence was still limited, the CCP’s top decision makers had to 
pay greater attention than previous years to it (Yang, 2006: 136). In relation to the ECS 
tensions, this development was particularly apparent after the mid-1990s when the 1995-
1996 Taiwan Crisis and 1996 Pinnacle Islands’ landings by Japanese nationalists 
witnessed a strong critical response from popular nationalist groups and intellectuals in 
China who perceived the leadership’s position was being too soft. 
 
152 
 
The opening up of intellectual and public debates in the PRC was the product of a 
number of changes. These included a hitherto underdeveloped marketplace for ideas or a 
so-called ‘commercialization of culture’ and the existence of a mass and growing 
audience of middle class Chinese for example interested and willing to purchase books 
and other sources of information relevant to the key themes of the day, ranging from 
global events and issues, Chinese nationalism and history and so forth.  With this came a 
dramatic increase in the number of publications that dealt with once taboo subjects and 
sensitive foreign policy issues which contributed to a much more informed domestic 
audience. These publications were also utilized by their authors and other interested 
parties to compel policy-makers to reconsider their views or for policy-makers to defend 
their decisions and choices. Examples included best-sellers such as the domestically 
focused ‘Looking at China through a Third Eye’ (1994) and the publication of the 
aforementioned ‘China Can Say No’ (1996). The latter was characterized by nationalistic 
anti-Americanism that had experienced a resurgence in the early 1990s evidenced by 
public opinion polls and book sales but later boosted following the Taiwan Straits crisis 
of 1995-1996 and the American show of force in the area (Fewsmith, 2008:13-
14;148;159-161).  
 
This wave of anti-Americanism in China developed despite the obvious importance of 
strengthening economic ties with the US. By the mid-1990s, even before the Taiwan 
crisis, it was clear that many Chinese elites began to see the United States as the principal 
‘enemy’ and obstacle to the rise of their country (Sutter, 2008:70).  Anti-American 
sentiment was also fed by the rise in economic nationalism amid the PRC’s greater 
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openness and cautious embrace of globalization which saw vast amounts of foreign 
money invested in China with consequent increases in foreign ownership and fears of 
capitalist entrapment and US hegemony. Jiang and reformists within his government such 
as Vice Premier Zhu Rongji (1993-1998) and later Premier (1998 – 2003) had to be 
cautious not to be labeled as being ‘lax on bourgeois liberalization’ by more conservative 
elements in the elite such as Premier Li Peng (1988 – 1998) who was a major advocate 
against closer ties with the United States (Fewsmith, 2008:209-214).  The East China Sea 
disputes were one of a number of such sensitive sovereignty related issues that the 
Chinese leadership had to carefully juggle with and choreograph. 
 
Conflicting Legitimation Strategies 
 
As mentioned earlier, the global crisis of faith over communism hit home with the 
regime’s ruthless crushing of the pro-democracy protests of June 1989. This nadir for the 
CCP compelled them to revisit and focus harder on strategies aimed at strengthening the 
party’s weakening legitimacy amongst the Chinese people. Their response to their 
weakened legitimacy after the Tiananmen Massacre was to lure the people back in 
support of the regime through re-invigorated appeals to economic prosperity and 
nationalist sentiment. This legitimation strategy however has been a risky one for the 
Party leadership because the two issues are not always complementary as controversies 
with Japan such as the ECS disagreements have often shown. The leadership must thus 
find a delicate balance between utilizing nationalism as a card to prop up the regime and 
its leaders, moderately appeasing the demands of nationalist sentiment, and attaining 
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perceptible standards of living that require a stable and prosperous relationship with 
Japan (Downs and Saunders, 1998-1999: 118;120-21). As argued by Downs and 
Saunders:  
‘the government seeks to shore up its nationalistic credentials through 
propaganda aimed at a domestic audience while simultaneously sending 
reassuring messages about China’s desire for international co-operation to 
foreign audiences. If foreigners challenge China’s nationalistic claims, 
however, the contradictions between the two legitimation strategies can 
become evident, and the government may be forced to choose between 
satisfying popular nationalist demands and pursuing economic 
performance’ (Downs and Saunders, 1998-1999: 122).  
 
A More Concerted Exploitation of Japan-Related Issues 
1992 witnessed the commencement of the Patriotic Education Campaign which saw a 
concerted effort made by the CCP leadership to inculcate the populace with nationalist 
pride and fervour through the education system and government-directed propaganda 
campaigns that emphasized the party as the protector of the nation.  Examples included 
the promotion, proliferation and expansion of museums and exhibits that focused on 
Japanese atrocities in the period from 1931 to 1945, such as the 1937 Nanking Massacre, 
and the highly publicised marking of anniversaries from the war period aimed at rallying 
the masses behind the party (New York Times, 23/04/1996).  
In keeping with its dual strategy the Chinese leadership also saw the political utility of 
presenting themselves as the ultimate defenders of the nation by publicising details about 
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controversial history-related issues such as the comfort women issue16 and dangerous 
chemical weapons buried and abandoned by the Japanese Imperial Army during the 
Japanese occupation of China. The comfort women issue appeared on the political radar 
in 1991-1992 after Japanese historians uncovered documents from the war period that 
incontrovertibly implicated the Japanese military and state in the controversy (China 
Daily, 16/03/2007). Another sensitive controversy, this time involving stockpiles of 
abandoned chemical weapons (ACW) was awoken when the Chinese government 
presented a paper to a 1992 conference on disarmament outlining the extent of abandoned 
Japanese weapons stockpiles on Chinese territory and the need for considerable financial 
assistance from Japan to safely remove them. The paper also noted ‘the bitter grievance 
and serious concern’ among the Chinese people over the ACW controversy (Chinese 
Delegation to the Conference on Disarmament, 18/02/1992). The process of disposal of 
these munitions by the Japanese commenced for the first time in 1999 (Drifte, 2003:15) 
but controversy still surrounds this issue. 
Despite these problems in the early 1990s, the two governments seemed to be able to 
navigate through them without allowing them to seriously affect diplomatic relations. 
This was exemplified by the visit of Japanese Emperor Akihito to the PRC in October 
1992, the first such visit ever by a Japanese emperor (Wan, 2006:24). It was likewise 
apparent that even though the 1992 Law on the Territorial Sea upset a lot of people in 
Japan, it did not obstruct the attempts of Japan and China to strengthen their diplomatic 
relations in a period when China was eager to return to the fold after the diplomatic 
                                                          
16 This refers to the abduction, false imprisonment, and sexual servitude of between 50,000 to 200,000 
predominantly Korean and Chinese women (Soh, 2008:xii). The controversy elicits strong emotions 
throughout East Asia but particularly from Korea and the PRC.  
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isolation of the post-Tiananmen years. Indeed, Japan’s co-operation in organizing the 
visit amongst other endeavors in the early nineties did much to help the Chinese to pursue 
this objective. 
Within a few years however, the omens for positive bilateral ties over problems such as 
the East China Sea did not bode well. In August 1995 for example, the Chinese 
scrambled a number of their Sukhoi-27 fighter planes to confront Japanese fighter planes 
in disputed airspace above the Pinnacle Islands (Harrison, 2002:274) On the domestic 
political front, Jiang sought to consolidate his position and personal authority in the 
shadow of an aging Deng, and struggled to find the center ground between the more 
apparent competing left and right wing groups who were pushing and pulling for 
influence. This required Jiang to define a ‘new center’ between the different forces of 
reform, liberalism, conservatism, and nationalism. The Fourth Plenum (Fourth Plenary 
Session) of the Fourteenth Central Committee that gathered in Beijing on September 25th-
28th in 1994 saw the symbolic passing of the leadership torch from the Deng era to the 
‘Third Generation’ of Chinese leadership under Jiang, who was eager to secure his 
authority amongst other elites within the leadership (Fewsmith, 2008:168-69;185;187).  
In this context, Jiang launched more major public campaigns in 1995 and 1996 centred 
on patriotic education and ‘spiritual civilisation’ that emphasized popular anti-Japanese 
sentiment and national pride. 1995 witnessed a multitude of government-sponsored 
events marking the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War and a century 
since the infamous Treaty of Shimonoseki. Examples included a movie that recreated the 
Nanking massacre and public exhibitions focusing on past Japanese aggression (Farley, 
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1995; Tefft, 1995). As contended by Esteban, the product of such nationalist campaigns 
was arguably greater legitimacy and an improved standing for Jiang and his followers 
among their peers and the public without negative domestic consequences for the CCP’s 
other source of legitimacy, eudemonic legitimacy or legitimacy based on raising living 
standards (Esteban, 2006: 185). However, these largely successful efforts by the CCP to 
stir up nationalist and anti-Japanese sentiment in the years leading up to 1996, along with 
the renewed tensions over Taiwan and the Pinnacle Islands in this period served to raise 
the political stakes for domestic actors in China in terms of how they dealt with the ECS 
disagreements.  
From the Chinese perspective, Washington’s decision to permit Taiwan’s president, Lee 
Teng-hui, to make a private visit to the US in June 1995 caused deep resentment vis-à-vis 
the Taiwan issue. It also seemed to represent a reversal of policy on Taiwan by the US 
and served to discredit Jiang Zemin and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen’s policy on 
Taiwan. It may also have put military hard-liners in the PRC in a stronger position to 
argue for a more adversarial stand on the issue (Downs and Saunders, 1998-1999: 131-
32). By 1996, when the ECS and Taiwan-related disputes shook the relationship to a level 
unseen in the past, it was apparent that, unlike the 1970s when ECS protests were largely 
state-managed and controlled, the Chinese leadership had a considerably higher number 
of factors and players to consider. 
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1996 – 2001:  Navigating Tempestuous Waters 
 
Confrontation over Taiwan and the East China Sea 
Chinese animosity toward Japan was strengthened in 1996 by the upgrading of the US-
Japan alliance. From the Chinese perspective, this seemed to represent a clear shift away 
from its passive economics based post-war foreign policy to one that would allow Japan 
to play a more active security role at both a global and regional level (Downs and 
Saunders, 1998-1999: 132). Chinese concerns dramatically increased after the Clinton-
Hashimoto joint declaration on the bilateral security alliance in April 1996 saw an 
upgrading of Japan’s roles and capabilities in areas such as maritime defence (Yang, 
2001:4).  
 
Noteworthy in terms of the ECS disputes, the 1996 declaration specifically mentioned 
‘situations in areas surrounding Japan that will have an important influence on Japan’s 
peace and security’ as a setting in which the US and Japan would co-operate with each 
other in terms of supplies and services. From Beijing’s perspective, Japan’s defence 
changes meant that a once purely defensive Japan has somewhat diluted its traditional 
post-war policy against the use of force in the absence of a direct attack and were 
signalling their intention to play a more active and assertive role in regional security. 
Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF) operations, for example, would no longer focus 
solely on the defence of the Japanese home islands. In a future crisis over issues such as 
159 
 
the contested Pinnacle Islands, and energy resources, such changes would make it 
difficult for the Japan’s armed forces to delineate Japan’s defence perimeter (Katzenstein 
and Okawara, 2001-02:156-159;168).  
 
This evolution in Japanese strategy caused concern in mainland China, at both the public 
and elite level, and fed suspicions about what they saw as the real reasons behind Japan’s 
defence changes. These followed a tense crisis over Taiwan in the same period (July 25th 
1995 to March 23rd 1996). There were also landings in July 1996 by Japanese nationalists 
on the Pinnacle Islands when they constructed a lighthouse to assert Japan’s claim. The 
same period saw the disputants ratify UNCLOS and thus set in stone contested EEZ 
claims to broad maritime territory in the ECS.  The frictions surrounding the 1996 
incident represented a typical example of where the Chinese leadership had to balance 
between the two legitimating issues of nationalism and eudemonic legitimacy. The 
wound to national pride caused by Japanese nationalists laying claim to historically 
Chinese territory resulted in a strong push within China for decisive action by the CCP 
leadership and pressure on elites to choose between the two (Downs and Saunders, 1998-
1999: 126).  
 
 
Domestic Reactions and Pressures 
Relations with Japan in regard to such issues are particularly sensitive. As Austin and 
Harris note, ‘Psychologically, Chinese leaders could not let Japan, the former aggressor 
and brutal occupier, have any edge in such a territorial dispute’ where these 
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disagreements directly touch upon two of the most sensitive subjects in the PRC’s foreign 
policy, the international status of Taiwan and the war with Japan (Austin and Harris, 
2001:100). The 1996 landings controversy for example saw as many as 37,000 letters and 
petitions of in excess of 150,000 signatures being sent to the People’s Daily (Renmin 
Ribao) and to the People’s Liberation Daily (Jiefangfun Bao). All these called upon the 
government to use force to defend the PRC’s claim to the Pinnacle Islands (Lo, 1996b). 
In the same period, the major military periodicals in the country, the PLA Daily 
(Jiefangjun Bao) and the China Defence News (Zhongguo Guofang Bao) contained 
numerous articles warning that Japanese activities were indicative of a larger conspiracy 
and condemned the revival of militarism (Summary of World Broadcasts, 13/09/1996).  
 
Dissatisfaction over the Party leadership’s moderate approach to Japan was also 
demonstrated within the PLA when a group of 35 army generals reportedly submitted a 
signed letter to the Party top brass insisting on a tougher stance in the ECS to ‘resist 
Japanese militarism and recapture the Diaoyu Islands, and criticizing the government’s 
relaxed stand on the issue’ (Lo. 1996a). CCP officials and military figures also used the 
opportunity to condemn Foreign Minister Qian Qichen with one Chinese military expert 
stating that the purpose of exercises carried out by the PLA and PLAN off the Chinese 
coast near Liaoning Province in September 1996 was not only to warn Japan to be 
sensitive in the ECS but was also to send an implicit message to ‘government officials 
preoccupied with economic ties to Japan who apparently ignore the nationalist sentiments 
among soldiers’ (Hong Kong Standard, 23/09/1996).  
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In Shanghai, angry residents handed out leaflets and hung up posters that openly 
condemned the Party for its restrained approach toward the Japanese. Hand-outs entitled 
‘What should be the punishment for suppressing the patriotic campaign of protecting the 
Diaoyu Islands?’ and ‘A true Communist Party should stand by the people who are 
determined to protect the Diaoyu Islands!’ were sent to district party committees. In this 
atmosphere, Hu Sheng, President of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), 
the PRC’s largest research organisation, urged the Party leadership to exercise caution. 
Hu warned that continuing to restrain anti-Japanese sentiment and to disregard popular 
calls for a forceful approach to the Pinnacle Islands dispute could result in nationwide 
unrest with ‘greater trouble than the political turbulence of 1989’ (Lo, 1996a).  
 
By 1996, it was clear that East China Sea related frictions had reached a new level in 
which once manageable government approaches to ECS disagreements had become more 
complicated where public and intellectual opinion, though not dictating policies, had 
become more vociferous and could no longer be easily ignored. The disputes transformed 
from a bilateral issue once largely confined to diplomats and Party elites to ones where 
the Chinese public and Chinese intellectuals attached considerable emotional and 
historical importance to them. It was also apparent that the deeper and ongoing divisions 
across the political spectrum within the Chinese elite meant that re-awoken 
disagreements such as those in the ECS represented a useful indirect issue through which 
rivals could be undermined and weakened. The leadership was likewise very conscious of 
this and had to walk a tight-rope between two political interests, protecting vital 
economic relations with Japan and publicly defending the nation’s sovereignty and pride 
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in ways that allowed protesters to vent their concerns without ultimately threatening 
domestic stability.   
 
 
Balancing and Managing the Domestic Response 
Examples of the government’s attempts at suppression of public anger over the Pinnacle 
Islands issue in the interest of positive ties with Japan included a media restriction within 
the PRC on information relating to contemporaneous anti-Japan protests in Taiwan and 
Hong Kong. Authorities also clamped down on university computer systems and deleted 
messages when they learned that over two hundred messages compelling students to take 
to the streets for anti-Japan demonstrations were circulating on electronic bulletin boards 
on university campuses (Lam, 1996; Munson, 1996).  
 
Despite the threat to legitimacy posed by suppressing nationalist rage and by brushing 
aside calls for decisive action from powerful quarters such as the PLA, Party leaders 
protested assertively at first but then sought to de-escalate the crisis in the interests of 
economic ties with Japan and to prevent domestic unrest at home (Downs and Saunders, 
1998-1999:126;139). As Deans contends, the fact that top decision-makers were able to 
adopt a moderate approach to the 1996 difficulties despite significant internal pressures 
would strongly suggest that, by year’s end, the more moderate, reformist figures within 
the CCP elite who sought a more restrained approach to these difficulties were gaining 
the initiative over more hard-line elements in the ECS debate (Deans, 2000:123). This 
choice however did not come without consequences, where at home, the leadership’s 
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apparent stand-down on the July landings issue was perceived as weakness against the 
Japanese in defending the nation’s sovereignty and honour. This had a negative impact on 
the regime’s legitimacy with numerous Chinese actors accusing Jiang of being 
unpatriotic and illegitimate (Downs and Saunders, 1998-1999: 126;131).   
 
The Chinese authorities had been successful for the most part in preventing damage to 
economic ties with Japan over the incident, and in restraining large scale anti-Japanese 
protests after the 1996 landings. In areas outside the control of the CCP however such as 
Taiwan and Hong Kong, and in cities of North America where large Chinese 
communities resided, widespread anti-Japanese sentiment and anger over the 1996 
landings were evidenced in the sheer scale of the demonstrations with some 50,000 
protesters on the streets of Hong Kong and over 20,000 in Vancouver (Chang, 2001:212).  
 
By the mid-1990s, it had become apparent that one of the great paradoxes of the 
education and media initiatives begun by Jiang in early 1990s was that while they served 
to politically strengthen him, they also increasingly served to make him more vulnerable 
to attack as a result of the conflict between official and popular nationalism, and from 
Party rivals, hard-liners, grass-roots organizations and the Chinese public. The Patriotic 
Education Campaign and accompanying media campaigns for example with its very 
negative spin on what was understood to be the US quest for hegemony, and the cruelty 
of the Japanese during the War of Resistance (1931 to 1945) sowed the seeds for more 
assertive and aggressive forms of nationalism that would bear more heavily than previous 
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years on the shoulders of the CCP elite by the mid-1990s (Esteban, 2006: 185;199).  For 
Jiang, the precarious balancing act between pursuing economic development and not 
being labeled a traitor by exponents of these nationalisms and/or political rivals was 
manifested in the ambiguity shown by him in his reactions to pressures for a harder line 
from hawks within the party, the PLA, and sectors of the PRC’s urban population with 
regards to numerous incidents. These included examples such as the Taiwan Crisis of 
1995-96, the July 1996 Pinnacle Islands landings, and the later 1999 Belgrade embassy 
bombing and 2001 Hainan US spy plane incidents (Esteban, 2006: 185).  
 
Balancing and Managing the Relationship with Japan after 1996 
The economic crisis that troubled the North-east Asian region in 1997 and 1998 focused 
Chinese and Japanese leaders’ eyes and their publics even closer on their own domestic 
problems. This situation no doubt made problems with their most powerful neighbor a 
useful distraction from economic difficulties on the home front (Sutter, 2008:235). Sino-
Japanese diplomatic ties however still remained resilient in spite of the countless 
developments that severely tested them. In the security field for example, the new 
defense guidelines which incorporated Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) that Japan agreed 
to with the US in September 1997 evoked strong protests from the Chinese during Prime 
Minister Hashimoto’s trip to China in the same month. The Chinese feared that the 
Japanese might use the guidelines to strengthen their military capabilities and protect 
Taiwan under the TMD system in a security arrangement hostile to their interests. 
Despite these problems, both countries displayed their ability to overcome difficulties in 
other areas with the successful completion of a Fisheries agreement in the East China Sea 
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in November 1997. The two governments also did not allow numerous disagreements to 
obstruct the general continuation of visits by high level figures from both states for most 
of the 1990s (Wan, 2006:14-15;37).  
Such visits are arguably one of the best signs of a commitment to improving ties. By 
1998, while there was scant evidence of harmony between the two neighbors, they 
nevertheless still managed to make some progress on a number of regional and global 
security issues as the aforementioned 1997 Fisheries agreement (involving joint 
regulation and fishing zones) and the February 2001 prior notification agreement in 
relation to scientific research activities (Valencia and Amae, 2003:189). The Chinese had 
temporarily cancelled formal talks due to the difficulties caused by Japan’s defense 
upgrades but the relationship still moved in a forward trajectory with both committed to 
developing the institutional framework of their security dialogues (Austin and Harris, 
2001:116). While ties were not necessarily smooth, they did all the same exhibit a public 
willingness by the PRC to keep channels open, to strengthen ties, and to sincerely attempt 
in a spirit of good will to resolve problems like those witnessed in the East China Sea. 
These features would be severely tested in the 2003 to 2006 period. 
 
Leadership Balancing Strategy – Some High Profile Post-1996 Incidents 
 
President Jiang’s position was arguably strengthened somewhat in March 1998 when the 
conservative Li Peng was replaced as Premier by economics-focused and reform-minded 
Zhu Rongji (Fewsmith, 2008:214). A November 1998 CASS poll however showed that 
82% of Chinese people were dissatisfied with the government’s ‘weak’ policies and 
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approaches towards Japan on a number of sensitive nationalistic issues such as war 
damages, the upgraded US-Japan alliance, and the resurgent Pinnacle Islands issue 
(Fewsmith and Rosen, 2001). Given such sentiment and its potential utility by political 
opponents, Jiang was very careful when dealing with controversies in which he might be 
side-stepped politically or labeled a traitor. An ostensibly assertive stance on all issues 
related to territorial sovereignty, national pride and particularly Japan was thus a political 
must. Jiang even went as far as to commandeer many of the sensitive mid-1990s issues 
for himself in order to bolster his political position within the Party and to present himself 
as the person best suited to defend China’s dignity and pride. The most glaring example 
of this was his highly publicized behavior during his visit to Japan in November 1998. 
This was the first time ever that a PRC head of state visited Japan (Hughes, 2008:262).  
 
In what should have been a visit that represented positive ties between the two states, 
Jiang’s visit was marred by his insistence on a formal apology for Japan’s past behavior 
in China.  This followed a formal apology to South Korea by the Japanese government 
for its colonial record on the Korean peninsula.  When no such apology followed for 
China, Jiang used the visit to issue a series of harsh rebukes. On one occasion, Jiang even 
attacked Japan’s war record in front of Emperor Akihito. This received widespread 
coverage from the Japanese media and left many Japanese feeling bitter. From the 
Chinese public’s point of view, the refusal by Japan to formally apologize for the war 
during the state visit, only served to further anger and offend ordinary and elite level 
Chinese (Seig, 2008). Given criticisms on the home front over Japan and other issues, it 
could be postulated that Jiang’s assertiveness was part of a strategy aimed at bolstering 
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his domestic position and scoring a diplomatic coup by securing an apology or at least 
publicly castigating the Japanese. As observed succinctly by Shirk, ‘Jiang Zemin’s 
disastrous state visit to Japan in 1998 exemplified his domestically oriented approach’ 
(Shirk, 2008:166). As discussed later in the section on Japan, Jiang’s visit would have an 
adverse effect on those in Japan arguing for a moderate line vis-à-vis China in areas like 
the East China Sea.  
 
When US-led NATO forces accidentally bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, 
Serbia on May 7th 1999, such was the deep anger felt at all levels that the Party leadership 
had to tread very delicately, presenting a tough face publicly while not going too far to 
encourage domestic unrest or to seriously damage ties with the US.  Despite this, the 
response taken by the government to this insult to national pride was widely viewed as 
too soft and inadequate in a context where more hard-line elements were calling for a 
commercial boycott and even military retaliation. This balancing act was exemplified by 
the manner in which the government sought to carefully manage the resultant protests 
rather than suppress them entirely. In Beijing for example, the government set aside 
buses destined for the US embassy so that protesting Peking University students could 
vent their anger in a controlled manner without encountering other non-student protesters 
and marching into central Beijing as had happened in the lead-up to the Tiananmen 
protests of 1989 (Esteban, 2006: 203-205).  
 
While the government was largely successful in subduing nationalist protests, the shared 
perception of weakness by the Party leadership was latched onto by leftists to strengthen 
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their position and influence, and subsequently to undermine technocratic figures within 
the Party. One of the most notable examples was the undermining of Premier Zhu Rongji 
and the delaying of some key government policies such as the PRC’s aforementioned 
planned accession to the WTO (Fewsmith, 1999). Zhu’s association with the stalled 
WTO negotiations in April 1999 (which had been started in 1986) and then the Belgrade 
bombing a month later saw him vilified by the public as expressed through various 
outlets. Student protesters and internet articles for examples excoriated him as a ‘traitor’ 
(maiguozei). The death of Deng in February 1997 had also left Jiang and Zhu, Deng 
protégés, more vulnerable to attack from other elites. Fewsmith for example noted how 
older Party cadres were heard to draw comparisons between the government’s 
approaches to globalization with the traitor Wang Jing-wei in his role as the head of 
Japan’s puppet government in occupied China. Other elders argued that Zhu’s 
compromises with Washington during the WTO negotiations were akin to a more modern 
version of the infamous twenty-one demands in 1915 by the Japanese with which they 
aimed to reduce China to the status of a colony under their rule. The tensions wrought 
from the WTO and embassy bombing controversies marked the most serious rift in 
Chinese elite politics since Deng’s passing less than three years earlier. The volatile 
events of 1999 on the domestic political level in China were very significant for issues 
such as the East China Sea for a number of reasons. Most notably, the reaction to these 
issues was ‘extraordinary because it was the first time since 1949 that elite politics, 
bureaucratic interests, intellectual opinion, and broader (but still urban) public opinion 
came together to oppose the official position on an important foreign policy issue.’ By 
the decade’s end, the centrality of all these issues in Chinese domestic politics suggested 
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some very significant changes in the political system (Fewsmith, 2008:197-198; 219-
221).  
 
Lessons Learned by Leadership 
By the end of the decade, both the outside world and the CCP had witnessed a number of 
worrisome incidents since the mid-1990s that illustrated how the Chinese public can act 
in response to any perceived slight or humiliation by a foreign power. For fear of 
undermining regime legitimacy by being seen as aloof from the concerns of the people 
and to maintain their standing within the leadership, Party decision-makers have had to 
find an increasingly precarious balance between pragmatic foreign policy decisions, and 
making concessions to popular nationalistic sentiment (Zheng, 2006:4). China’s policy-
makers and leaders had also come to a greater appreciation of how popular rather than 
state-backed official nationalism in a more opened and pluralistic China has a greater 
destabilizing influence on leaders, domestic stability, and can distract decision-makers 
from their preferred course in the pursuit of the state’s interests. Writing in 1999, Zheng 
argued that the CCP leadership had come to understand how important it was not to allow 
popular nationalism to get in the way of foreign policy decisions or trouble domestic 
stability. Three core reasons lay at the heart of this understanding. One was that ‘the 
complicated nature of popular nationalism made it difficult for the government to predict 
potential consequences.’ For example, nationalistic protests could quickly turn into 
protests about domestic problems.  The second was that such mass protests would not fit 
into central government’s priority of political stability. Third, Beijing appreciated the 
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over-riding importance of stable bilateral ties for the PRC’s domestic development 
(Zheng, 1999:134).  
 
By the end of the 1990s then, the Party leadership came to appreciate, for domestic and 
international reasons, the importance of avoiding serious nationalistic controversies 
where possible. The 1998 Jiang visit to Japan for example convinced many Chinese elites 
that the PRC needed to put relations back on a track that prioritized co-operation with 
Tokyo on a wide range of issues. Despite Jiang’s initial intransigence to tone down his 
history-related rhetoric, by the turn of the century, members of the CCP’s ‘Leading 
Group on Foreign Affairs’ (which was headed by Jiang) had persuaded him to permit the 
Foreign Ministry to try a more pragmatic approach to Japan (Shirk, 2008:167). When 
Taiwanese opposition member Chen Shui-bian from the pro-independence Democratic 
Progressive Party (DPP) was elected President of Taiwan in 2000, it represented a 
possible nightmare scenario for China’s leaders on the home front. Beijing’s reaction 
however suggested that they had learned some valuable lessons from the 1995-1996 crisis 
over Taiwan. As Saich observes ‘while Beijing’s rhetoric was loud and harsh, its actions 
were more calculated and a ‘wait-and-see’ attitude prevailed’ (Saich, 2004:316).  
As mentioned earlier, the years prior to the resurgence of the East China Sea disputes in 
2003 had also seen some positive bilateral movement being made in terms of conflict 
prevention agreements such as the February 2001 prior notification agreement in relation 
to scientific research activities (Valencia and Amae, 2003:189) being formulated with 
limited success to minimize tensions in the area. Challenges persisted of course with 
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incidents such as downing of a USAF EP3 reconnaissance plane over Hainan Island on 
April 1st 2001 and the December 2001 sinking of a North Korean spy ship by Japan 
inside China’s EEZ (Wei Su, 2005: 45-46). These incidents also injected vitality into the 
lingering question of rights of entry in the water and in the air near coastal areas 
(Valencia and Ji, 2002:723).  
 
 
Perceived Negative Gestures from Japan 
 
When Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi assumed office in April 2001, the PRC 
leadership strove to prioritize the pursuit of economic development and avoid the type of 
controversies that had dogged ties in the 1990s. However, caution over possible charges 
of weakness or even treason from other elites and the general public should a serious 
controversy arise remained in the back of the minds of Party leaders. Despite this 
scenario for possible positive relations from China’s perspective, Wan argues that in the 
weeks just prior to Koizumi’s election as leader in April 2001, the Japanese were guilty 
of seriously affecting goodwill towards Japan in China by putting history and the Taiwan 
issue back on the bilateral agenda. Examples included the April 3rd decision by Tokyo to 
accept a controversial junior high school textbook that downplayed Japan’s wartime 
behavior, a decision that led to South Korea recalling its ambassador to Japan, and 
Beijing officially protesting against the move. April 22nd to 26th also saw the visit to 
Japan of former president to Taiwan Lee Teng-hui in spite of China’s diplomatic attempts 
to pressure the Japanese to block the visit. Beijing’s riposte to this snub was to call off the 
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scheduled visit to Japan by the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National 
People’s Congress (NPCSC) Li Peng in May. According to Wan, this cancellation was in 
fact a quite weak response when one considers the strong language used by the Chinese 
prior to the cancellation (Wan, 2006:26-27). When Koizumi made the first of a number of 
highly controversial visits to the Yasukuni shrine on August 13th 2001, the Chinese 
ambassador to Japan Wu Dawei warned the Japanese press on August 31st that bilateral 
ties were experiencing their ‘toughest situation’ since the normalization of ties in 1972 
because of the hindrance caused by the shrine visits and the history textbook issue to 
better relations (China Daily, 01/09/2001). The Chinese also suspended bilateral security 
talks after the first visit and did not resume them until March the following year (Wan, 
2006:38). This shrine visits issue would be one of the principal reasons for the 
deterioration in ties after 2001 and had an indirect but adverse effect on how the 
resurgent post-2002 ECS disagreements were approached and dealt with.  
By the onset of the Koizumi years (2001 to 2006), it was lamentable to see a relationship 
that held so much potential and offered so many opportunities descend into hitherto the 
worst relations of the post-normalization era. The 1970s and the 1980s for example had 
seen unprecedented political and economic progress in the relationship despite the 
occasional but manageable challenge. The 1990s back-drop to the nadir of the Koizumi 
years provides some telling insights into the factors that served to significantly 
complicate the ways in which the Chinese leadership for example could deal with the 
East China Sea problems. One of the most important deviations from earlier years was 
the more difficult manageability of the disputes and the greater plurality of players and 
factors which could no longer be easily ignored or set aside without potentially negative 
173 
 
consequences for the legitimacy and power of China’s decision-makers. As discussed in 
the next section, the Japanese also had to adjust to new realities and a more numerous and 
diverse set of interests after 1989 that directly impinged on how Japanese politicians 
approached the once manageable ECS disputes in the new millennium.  
 
Japan 
The Political and Institutional System 
 
Japan’s political system and constitution is modeled along the lines of a British-style 
multi-party parliamentary democracy or constitutional monarchy with the Emperor acting 
as the symbolic head of state under strict guidelines. This system consists of a national 
parliament made up of two houses which have legislative power, the lower House of 
Representatives and the upper House of Councilors. These two houses make up the 
bicameral legislature in Japan (often referred to as the National Diet) where 
parliamentarians from both houses are elected by the public at nationwide elections. 
Elected parliamentarians have the power to choose Japan’s Prime Minister (PM) through 
parliamentary vote. The Prime Minister is by convention the President of his party and as 
PM the leading political figure in Japan (Cooney, 2007:21).  
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1945 – 1993: Domestic Politics under the ‘1955 System’     
 
Since the end of the US occupation of Japan in 1952 until the early 1990s, Japanese party 
politics were characterized by the largely unrivalled dominance of the Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) of Japan (Politics of Japan, 2010). Under the so-called ‘1955 
System’, (from 1955 when the LDP was founded until 1993 when electoral reforms were 
implemented), the LDP held a safe and uncontested single majority of the parliamentary 
seats in the Diet. In this era, lobbying and political power were closely tied to an intra-
party faction (habatsu) system within the LDP which worked alongside a system of often 
informal and intimate networks and institutions (Kato, 2009). The formation and 
maintenance of powerful factions by leading LDP politicians created a highly 
decentralized party in which these factions jockeyed with each other for influence and 
power. The largest factions were instrumental in securing majority coalitions in the 
process of selecting LDP Presidents and consequently Prime Ministers. The quid pro quo 
for support often involved the largest faction securing the key LDP secretary-general 
position which meant virtual control over party affairs. This decentralization of power 
resulted in a dual power structure where politics was regularly characterized by a weak 
Prime Ministry (where PMs were often their faction’s leader) propped up by strong 
factions around them (Cooney, 2007:87). Over the decades, the factions have included 
‘mainstream’ factions positioned near the power center and peripheral ‘anti-mainstream’ 
factions who aspired to central political power.  Since the 1970s, the ‘mainstream’ 
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factions have included the most powerful Tanaka faction, and later the Takeshita, 
Obuchi, and Hashimoto factions (Green, 2003:55). 
 
One of the consequences of this decentralized system was that various Japanese PMs and 
the party found it difficult to step outside the remit of the Yoshida Doctrine with its 
emphasis on economic recovery, minimal military rearmament, and a close alliance with 
the United States, and were restricted from taking decisive steps in foreign policy or 
formulating an alternative foreign policy strategy for the future (Green, 2003:11;37). 
After the East China Sea problems arose for the first time in the late 1960s, and until the 
1990s, the ECS strategy options open to Japan under its pre-1993 system were arguably 
quite passive, manageable, consistent and predictable. Now however Japanese 
approaches while still generally consistent have become more challenging to quietly 
manage, more prone to the whims and predilections of individual leaders and politicians, 
and more assertive in dealing with Chinese vessels in the area. 
 
Before electoral reforms in 1993, the House of Representatives’ electoral system meant 
that, in order to guarantee a majority in the Diet, the dominant LDP had to secure 
multiple seats within each constituency (Kato, 2009). The existence of between three to 
five seats in each constituency meant that the LDP would select numerous candidates for 
each one. Success at elections was heavily reliant on a candidate’s faction and its 
available funds and influence (Cooney, 2007:87). The quest for political power and 
rivalry for key posts therefore was focused mostly on intra-party rather than inter-party 
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competition between factions within each of these voting districts. These factions were 
instrumental in lobbying central government for political funds and in securing important 
positions for faction members (Kato, 2009).  
 
This system contributed to a politics marked by fierce rivalry between the various 
factions but also served to stabilize the process of governing by encouraging faction 
members to conform to the dictates of central government or their own faction where 
often the two were two sides of the same coin. The faction system thus helped the LDP to 
control and co-ordinate the activities of the party as a whole. Whenever an important 
issue arose that required the support of the wider party in advance of the implementation 
of policy, negotiating and bartering with faction leaders was key strategy in order to 
ensure compliance and conformity. As long as influential faction leaders could be won 
over, they in turn would seek most if not all faction members to accept the directive and 
then matters could usually be dealt without major problems. Recalcitrant members and 
individual backbenchers could be weakened and marginalized by such a process and the 
risk of a major revolt significantly lessened. Kato cites the example of the introduction of 
consumption tax in 1989 in the face of staunch opposition from within the LDP because 
the key faction leaders worked together to see the proposals through and to fend off 
protests from the backbenches (Kato, 2009). This also would have applied to the 
manageability of government policies toward issues like the East China Sea under the 
1955-1993 system. 
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At the economic level, political, bureaucratic, and business links were maintained under 
the 1955 system through the ‘zoku’ (tribe or interest group) relationship in which 
powerful politicians who were members of these various ‘zoku’ lobbied government on 
their behalf. This ‘iron triangle’ linkage between politics, bureaucracy and business saw 
the presence of ‘zoku’ within the various ministries building close and long-term 
relationships, rubbing shoulders with bureaucrats, and generally doing their best to       
co-ordinate political with economic interests for their ‘zoku’(Kato, 2009). As discussed 
later, by the late 1990s the reform of Japan’s bureaucracy amid numerous scandals within 
the various ministries resulted in some seminal bureaucratic changes that adversely 
affected the traditional modus operandi towards China and the East China Sea 
disagreements.  
 
1993 – Present: The Demise of the ‘1955 System’ 
The bursting of Japan’s economic bubble in the late 1980s and early 1990s sparked 
public anger at these informal, secretive, and potentially corrupt systems of bureaucracy 
and politics. After decades under this arrangement and following some high profile 
corruption scandals, Japanese citizens had grown weary of the 1955 system and began to 
blame it for their economic ills, and supported calls for radical reforms that would ensure 
greater openness and formality within their political system. The opportunity for this 
arose in 1993 when Morihiro Hosokawa (1993-1994) was elected the first non-LDP 
Prime Minister of Japan since 1955 during which time he implemented political reforms 
that were to have a lasting effect on post-1993 politics in Japan (Kato, 2009). The most 
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striking product of these changes was the weakening of Japan’s faction system (Cooney, 
2007:87-88). Hosokawa’s success in ending decades of unchallenged LDP dominance 
and enacting the reform process rested in pulling together an unlikely and disparate eight-
party coalition of smaller non-LDP groups in 1993 that had had enough of empty LDP 
promises about reform (Green, 2003:18). Since the 1993 reforms and Hosokawa’s short 
reign (1993-1994), the LDP held on to power but only through coalitions with other 
parties.  
 
As Green argues, the days of single majority LDP rule are gone due to a number of 
reasons. These include the post-1993 electoral changes, new post-Cold War challenges 
that were far removed from the purely anti-communist and pro-economic growth 
strategies of earlier years, as well as the unavoidable realities of coalition politics. In 
addition, LDP dominance has been undermined by the development of a credible 
opposition with the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) which increased its seats from 
thirty-two seats to one hundred and twenty-seven in the 2000 elections. The Japanese 
bureaucracy was also shaken by numerous scandals and poor opinion ratings by both 
public and media, and the rise of a more liberal minded and affluent society has 
witnessed a more politically diverse and less passive electorate (Green, 2003:49). The 
1990s also saw the bureaucracy being targeted for change and criticism with many of the 
government’s ministries undergoing major reforms. These shifts had a negative effect on 
the co-ordination between the political and bureaucratic systems (Kato, 2009).   
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Post-1993 Japanese politics were marked by political realignment and change where even 
though many of the old ways persisted, the political factions and zoku within Japan 
suffered from a loss of cohesion and discipline and where the LDP though still powerful 
no longer had the monopoly on policymaking and policy expertise (Green, 2003:49). 
Factions remain important in terms of government stability and assigning politicians to 
key posts. Factional influence over the PM however has been watered down and the 
balance of power has thus shifted.  A key reason for this was that electoral reforms 
witnessed a change from the old multi-seat per district system to one where only one 
candidate prevails. The old system would often see constituents petition and make 
requests to the more senior and powerful LDP parliamentarians within a multi-seat 
district (Cooney, 2007:88). This ensured a hierarchy between older politicians with long-
held links to their faction and new Diet members aspiring to climb up the political ladder.  
 
Under the new single-seat system the sole representative for a district (regardless of age 
and experience) now deals with practically all of his or her constituents’ requests, and no 
longer stands below older LDP members. This more equal footing for all Diet members 
has removed the constraints on younger Diet members to criticize the Party leadership 
and Party elders. Since the 1990s, many younger parliamentarians have taken advantage 
of this to castigate older LDP members and mock their policies (Cooney, 2007:88). Since 
the mid-1990s in particular, the East China Sea has been one such issue used by both 
government and opposition politicians to criticize the Prime Minister and his cabinet or 
has been adopted by some decision-making Japanese politicians to display their patriotic 
credentials to their voting public. 
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In the days of the multi-seat system, if a younger Diet member stepped out of line, a 
powerful faction could smother such criticism by threatening to nominate and support a 
new rival candidate in elections in his or her constituency. When the post-1993 electoral 
reforms kicked in however such threats were removed from the arsenal of the factions 
and elder Party members because no LDP candidate is permitted to challenge an 
incumbent Diet member.  A notable example of this new difficulty for the Party 
leadership was in 2000 when Taro Kono (first elected as a Diet member in 1996) publicly 
condemned and demanded the resignation of a Party stalwart and secretary-general 
Hiromu Nonaka after the LDP’s loss of numerous seats in nationwide elections (Cooney, 
2007:88). Since the mid-1990s, recalcitrant LDP parliamentarians have also used the 
more virulent and diverse Japanese media to denigrate and denounce the policies of the 
Party leadership (Kato, 2009).  
 
The Japanese Media in the 1990s     
The influence of the Japanese media since the 1990s in affecting the Japanese public’s 
perceptions of China and in propelling China-related issues to the top of the political 
agenda should not be underestimated. Green for example observes that most newspapers 
within Japan’s mass media have increased their focus on both security and Asian issues. 
Daily newspapers such as the largest circulation paper, the Yomiuri Shimbun, and the 
Sankei Shimbun have always been of the conservative and pro-defense ilk. However, 
other papers such as the Asahi Shimbun, mainly one of the government’s strongest critics 
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on the Left have also been highlighting the dangers of Chinese and North Korean 
behaviour ‘often with a dose of sensationalism and nationalism’. More conservative 
newspapers such as the Sankei Shimbun have regularly played up the issue of incursions 
into Japan’s EEZ and have thus helped to amplify the impression of a belligerent China 
that had already been developing due to other negative issues such as Chinese nuclear 
testing in 1995, and Beijing’s protesting of Japanese attempts to raise its profile in the 
UN in 2004-05 (Green, 2003:69;85).  
 
Since the 1990s, some Japanese politicians and the mass media have argued that an arms 
race and unstable factors had appeared and that China was undertaking a military build-
up and territorial expansion and thus was a new threat to peace and stability in Asia. The 
Yomiuri Shimbun, for example, claimed that China’s military reinforcement constituted ‘a 
threat to the international community’ and urged China to ‘exercise restraint’ (Yang, 
2001:14). The media therefore, according to Green, has played an even greater part in 
magnifying the external shocks and pressures over problems like the East China Sea that 
the Japanese system has felt since the end of the Cold War (Green, 2003:69).  
 
By the mid-1990s on the Japanese domestic front, politicians and media commentators 
had become less optimistic about China’s intentions. Leading Japanese newspapers in 
this period were carrying expressions of new concern, with views that China is now 
undertaking a ‘military buildup’ and ‘territorial expansion’, forming a new ‘threat’ in 
Asia and that ‘China’s twenty-first century naval hegemony strategy will threaten Japan’s 
life-line for international trade’ (Yomiuri Shimbun, 15/04/1993). Due to the increasing 
182 
 
widespread public perception in Japan of a nationalistic and potentially aggressive China 
in areas like the ECS, and the resultant consequences of this, the Japanese government 
has had to carefully handle its own nationalist groups for numerous reasons. Soderberg 
highlights this link between media pressure and nationalistic pressures in Japan when she 
argues that sensitive nationalistic issues such as the rise of China are played up by the 
Japanese mass media and are being used by certain groups to pressure the government to 
make changes in Japan’s defense posture (Soderberg, 2005: 63).  
 
 
Domestic Politics and China-related Issues in the Japan 
 
1945 – 1989: Stable Management, Unrivalled Power 
 
In the post-war decades prior to the 1990s, Japan and China were largely alienated from 
each other by the ‘Bamboo Curtain’ where the relationship was irregular because 
economic relations were the norm but where limited political contact took place (Wang, 
2006:2).  From the founding of the PRC in 1949 until the normalization of ties with the 
US and Japan in the early 1970s, China’s position as a permanent member of the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) and a founding member of the United Nations (UN) 
was taken up by the US-backed post-civil war nationalist Chinese government in Taiwan. 
In this context, Japan’s approaches to the PRC were ones that tended to develop 
economic links but adhered closely to the objectives of its ally, the US, including 
obstructing diplomatic attempts to replace Taiwan with the PRC as a top player in the 
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UN. The upheaval caused by the Cultural Revolution (1966 – 1976) in the PRC also 
seemed to confirm US and Japanese preconceptions that the communist China was a state 
dogged by xenophobia, domestic instability and uncertainty (Austin and Harris, 
2001:13;27).  
 
 
Approaches to the East China Sea in the 1970s 
 
Despite this, the period also witnessed the convergence of China’s strategic interests with 
those of the US and Japan in the context of the Sino-Soviet split, particularly in the late 
1960s, which meant that both Japan’s economic and security interests with regards to the 
PRC were positioned within the same framework so no structural conflicts existed vis-à-
vis Japan and China’s strategic options (Wang, 2006:2). This convergence of interests 
was symbolized by the normalization of diplomatic ties in 1972 and then the 1978 Sino-
Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty where issues such as the Pinnacle Islands disputes 
were swept under the carpet in the interests of more pressing economic and strategic 
interests (Drifte, 2008a:3-4). 
 
While the Pinnacle Islands issue was largely put aside in 1978 in the interests of stable 
bilateral ties, Japan and South Korea had as early as 1974 drafted a demarcation 
agreement ‘concerning the Establishment of Boundary in the Northern Part of the 
Continental Shelf Adjacent to the Two Countries’ and an agreement ‘concerning the Joint 
Development of the Southern Part of the Continental Shelf Adjacent to the Two 
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Countries.’ These were agreements to which the PRC strongly objected without stating 
any specific territorial claim of its own. In response to China’s protests, Tokyo put off 
ratification of these agreements until June 1978 when it nonetheless proceeded to ratify 
them despite Beijing’s stated disapproval (Drifte, 2008a:5-6). 
 
 
Sturdy Diplomatic and Economic Ties 
 
At the time of the normalization of ties, Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka (1972-
74) set up an informal network of contacts with key Chinese elites. From the time he 
stepped down in 1974 until his death in 1993 Tanaka continued to hold a considerable 
and positive behind the scenes influence on ties through the powerful Tanaka faction, 
Japan’s largest political faction. A future Japanese Prime Minister, Noboru Takeshita 
(1987-1989) succeeded Tanaka as head of this faction and continued to exert a positive 
influence after his premiership ended up until his passing in 2000 (Self, 2002:78). This 
view is supported by Watanabe when he notes that Japanese diplomacy in the 1970s, 
1980s and even most of the 1990s was largely stable in a structural sense despite the 
dynamic atmosphere, and was led by moderate pragmatists in the form of the dominant 
Tanaka faction who were pro-China pragmatists (Tsuneo Watanabe, 27/10/2008). 
 
One of the most significant aspects of the improvement in bilateral ties in the 1970s was 
the commencement in April 1980 of Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
incorporating grant aid and technical assistance from Japan to assist in China’s growth 
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and development. The importance of this in boosting the PRC’s economic development 
should not be understated. Indeed the fact that so many Chinese appear to be unaware of 
or at least ungrateful for this assistance has been an issue that would later touch upon 
Japanese sensitivities over Beijing-backed anti-Japanese campaigns and promotions in 
the 1990s. To emphasize this, one needs to remember that for most if not all of the last 
thirty years of China’s opening up to the outside world, Japan was the largest donor to 
China representing some sixty percent of all the aid that the PRC received from other 
states. China also received more ODA than any other nation assisted by Japan where 
many of China’s large scale constructions were funded via Japanese ODA and Yen loans. 
This often unacknowledged assistance by Japan to its neighbor played an instrumental 
role in raising the living standards of millions of Chinese and in their social and 
economic development (Wu, 2008:1). 
 
Commenting on some of the key differences between earlier years and bilateral ties at the 
turn of the century, Murata notes the divergences between Japan under Prime Minister 
Yasuhiro Nakasone (1982-1987) in the 1980s and Japan under Koizumi after 2000. 
Murata argues that despite former Prime Minister Nakasone’s visits to the Yasukuni 
shrine in 1985, he enjoyed a very close relationship with the Chinese leadership in the 
1980s. The Japanese economy was also at its strongest ever at that time, the Japanese 
people were full of self-confidence, and therefore the Japanese leadership and public felt 
able to compromise over historical issues such as the Yasukuni Shrine (Koji Murata, 
12/11/2008). Nakasone was also quick in addressing China’s concerns, was very strategic 
about China, and recognised its importance to Japan’s interests. Nakasone knew that he 
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had to weigh domestic concerns with compromise with China, and this was the biggest 
difference between then and the later 2001 to 2006 ice age period in Japan-China 
relations (Yoshihide Soeya, 25/11/2008). This helped when dealing with other sensitive 
issues of the era such as the history textbook controversy (commencing in the early 
1980s), Nakasone’s aforementioned visit to the Yasukuni shrine in 1985, the Kyoto 
dormitory (Kokaryo/ Guanghualiao) legal ownership debate (from 1977 to 1987) (Drifte, 
2003) and the strategic concerns that arose in the 1980s. 
 
As argued by Wan, another key difference between earlier years and the outset of serious 
tensions during the Koizumi years for example was that the political leadership and 
government officials in both states ‘were emotionally committed to a friendly bilateral 
relationship’ and ‘skillfully managed the tensions (of earlier years) to keep relations on 
track’ (Wan, 2006:2). One of the combined effects of the domestic structural political 
changes of the 1990s and those enacted in the Koizumi era (2001 to 2006) was that 
contentious issues such as the shrine visits and the ECS disputes, which normally would 
have been dealt with by government officials, were by 2003 left without a braking 
mechanism. When the Tanaka faction was the most powerful faction in Japanese politics, 
and when some issues arose, such as PM Nakasone’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in 
1985, or a history textbook controversy, emissaries existed and became handlers in these 
affairs. The matter was thus taken away from media hype, and out of political view. A 
good example of this was the later November 1997 Fisheries rights issue in the ECS and 
how it was rather smoothly negotiated as a result of this braking mechanism (Hiroshi 
Nakanishi, 11/11/2008). 
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Approaches to the East China Sea in the 1980s 
In the period from 1980 to 1986, Japan and South Korea carried out seven explorations in 
three sites but finally abandoned these when it became clear that these fields were not 
economically viable (Drifte, 2008a:5-6). China itself had commenced explorations in the 
ECS before in the 1980s. A key difference between then and 2003 was that China had 
kept to areas far from the median line. Since 1985, Japan and China had been discussing 
the concept of joint operations in the area. Both states have tended to agree on the 
desirability of joint cooperation but have diverging views on the precise demarcation of 
the area to be developed (Yarita, 2004: 23-4). Despite these occasional disagreements, 
from the late 1970s until the late 1980s the Japanese and the Chinese had for the most 
part succeeded in setting aside the ECS disagreements (of which the islands dispute was 
the major component) and prevented the issue from destabilizing burgeoning bilateral 
ties, particularly in the economic field. 
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1989 – 1995: From the Tiananmen Massacre to the Taiwan Crisis 
 
The ruthless crushing of the Tiananmen pro-democracy demonstrations in June 1989 was 
regarded as a watershed moment that heralded the beginning of a serious downturn in 
Japanese and international perceptions of China. Diplomatically however the Japanese 
were within a few years actually on good terms with the Chinese again where Japan did 
much to rehabilitate and assist the PRC in stepping out of its post-Tiananmen purgatory 
(Green, 2003:21). 
 
A characteristic of Japanese approaches to China up until the Tiananmen massacre and 
even up to the early 1990s was the deference with which many but not all Japanese 
diplomatic elites and institutions such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) or 
Gaimusho dealt with Chinese issues. According to Drifte, this was attributable to a sense 
of guilt over past Japanese behavior in China where Japanese diplomats and officials 
often expressed remorse indirectly rather than open old wounds by tackling the 
unresolved history issue head on. Since normalization in 1972, the China School (made 
up of diplomats proficient in Chinese) within the Gaimusho had in fact been in the 
driving seat in terms of formulating Japanese policies towards China and maintaining 
day-to-day relations. These have tended to treat Chinese concerns in an often sympathetic 
and non-confrontational manner. Over the years however, Chinese authorities had 
increasingly been perceived by people in Japan to have manipulated this Japanese sense 
189 
 
of guilt and passivity in order to squeeze more economic and political concessions from 
Tokyo or to strengthen their own legitimacy at home (Drifte, 2003:17-19). 
 
The bursting of the Japanese economic bubble in the late 1980s and early 1990s damaged 
Japan’s sense of security while the first Gulf War (1990 – 1991) exposed the limitations 
of Japan’s passive checkbook diplomacy in a new post-Cold War world in which a more 
active role in foreign policy was sought after by allies such as the US (Kral, 1999). This, 
alongside the ending of decades of LDP rule in the early 1990s opened up a new era of 
Japanese foreign policy making characterized by greater pluralism and unpredictability 
(Green, 2003:78). Up until this period, the Japanese felt satisfied that their economic 
strength, still uncontested regional leadership, and various multilateral institutions could 
prevent the escalation of tensions between states in the region. The next decade however 
would witness a far more pessimistic appraisal of Japan’s security environment and a 
more realistic rather than idealistic response. A number of security-related scares 
contributed to this gloomier outlook (Roy, 2005:192).  
In addition, within a few years the Chinese had, through the launch of the Patriotic 
Education Campaign in the early 1990s, escalated their education and media campaign of 
demonizing the Japanese and moralizing against them for events half a century earlier. 
The CCP’s seemingly hypocritical behavior of constantly damning the Japanese while 
accepting their financial assistance and stamping out calls for greater reform and freedom 
from within was too much to bear for many Japanese (Self, 2002:87). The intensely bitter 
anti-Japanese hatred and anger inadvertently encouraged by the Patriotic Education 
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Campaign in China was fed to Japanese homes through the Japanese media and served to 
strengthen anti-Chinese sentiment in Japan (Roy, 2005:195;201).  
 
Changing Perceptions of the East China Sea disagreements 
Japanese anxieties over the aforementioned 1992 ‘Law of the People's Republic of China 
on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone’ which claimed sovereignty over large 
areas of the East and South China Seas reflected genuine diplomatic concerns within 
Japan and not just the rantings of right-wing groups (Green, 2003:86). In the East China 
Sea more specifically, Japanese Foreign Minister Kabun Muto publicly protested in May 
1993 that Japanese fishing boats had come under alleged attack by Chinese vessels (Wan, 
2006:36). In the same year, the PRC became a net oil importer. The Chinese dragon’s 
thirst for oil dramatically increased throughout the 1990s and into the new millennium 
with the country later becoming the second largest consumer of oil after the US in 2003 
(Drifte, 2008a:7). This escalating demand for energy resources went alongside 
improvements in exploration technology, which, as well as the discovery of potentially 
significant gas fields in the ECS, gradually compelled China to explore for oil and gas 
ever closer to Japan’s contested median line, a move viewed by many in Japan as 
evidence of a threat by a rising China to Japan’s national interests. 
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Vocal Calls for a Normal and more Assertive Japan 
Debates in Japan about the need to address the new foreign policy environment by 
amending their strictly US-enacted pacifist constitution intensified in the media and in 
political circles from the early to late 1990s with the issue finally being studied at Diet 
Committee level in both houses in 1999  (Green, 2003:25). The government of PM Kiichi 
Miyazawa (1991 – 1993) also put the thorny issue of a permanent UN Security Council 
seat for Japan on the political agenda as a declared foreign policy objective. This 
illustrated a belief in Japan that the new environment represented a suitable time in which 
Japan could attain an international political standing that was commensurate with its huge 
20% fiscal contribution to the UN (second only to the US). It was also indicative of an 
increasing desire to shake off the constitutional and legal shackles that were drawn up 
after the Second World War and classified Japan as an ‘enemy state’17 (Coulmas, 
2006:18). Such changes would also permit Japan to attain a more normal and independent 
status unlike one of a state constantly sub-ordinate to the interests of the US as was the 
case since 1945. These debates picked up steam in the 1990s with Japan increasing its 
involvement in UN peacekeeping missions, and the Kosovo crisis and subsequent NATO 
bombing of Serbia feeding the desire of Japanese politicians and diplomats for a more 
active rather than traditionally passive role for Japan in global peacekeeping affairs (Kral, 
1999). In all these endeavors, China, the beneficiary of so much Japanese funding and 
                                                          
17 See Articles 53 and 107 of the UN Charter. 
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good-will since normalization, has been unsupportive and at times a major impediment to 
Japan’s objectives. 
 
Japan’s Sense of Security and Perceptions of China 
The first of a number of missile tests in the 1990s by North Korea (highly dependent on 
the PRC for aid and diplomatic support) in 1993 and reports of the North Koreans 
building a nuclear bomb in 1994 also sent shock waves through Japan and reminded 
many Japanese of their vulnerability to attack from a politically unstable neighbour. 
These combined with public awareness through the media in 1992 of the heart-rendering 
abductees issue involving the kidnapping of unwitting Japanese citizens from Japan’s 
coastal regions by North Korean agents in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Green, 
2003:21-22). The Chinese persistence in carrying out nuclear tests in 1995 in the face of 
sustained Japanese protests, and in proceeding with events that commemorated Second 
World War and fed anti-Japanese hatred in China reinforced growing public Japanese 
fatigue over various Chinese complaints targeted at Japan, and touched upon deep 
Japanese sensitivities over its security and post-war identity (Self, 2002:78). The nuclear 
tests infuriated a broad spectrum of Japanese including the hawkish right wing and the 
anti-nuclear left wing. The reaction was an unprecedented but mostly symbolic 
suspension of up to $75 million in grant aid to the PRC (Green, 2003:21). China’s 
participation in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in September 1996 only had a 
limited effect in easing Japanese anxieties about Chinese behavior (Austin and Harris, 
2001:117). A product of such examples of Chinese reluctance to heed Japanese protests 
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was that it served to undermine the espoused softly softly strategy of China hands within 
the Gaimusho (MOFA) and the LDP.  Japanese politicians were thus less likely to react 
passively or to go out of their way to address Chinese concerns over other controversies 
such as the Pinnacle Islands disputes (as was the case up to the early 1990s) when they 
re-surfaced in 1996 (Green, 2003:85). 
 
By the mid-1990s, it was clear that the rise of China and serious concerns over North 
Korea had become Japan’s primary strategic challenges in the region. Japan confronted 
these two challenges by upgrading its military alliance with the United States while 
simultaneously pursuing a regional policy that is autonomous from its most important 
ally (Mochizuki, 2004-05: 117). As argued by Green, the willingness of the Japanese to 
upgrade their defense capabilities was very significant because it marked a major shift in 
the post-war strategy of dodging entanglement in a US-China conflict where in fact 
Tokyo was for the first time calling for a harder line than Washington. The 1995-1996 
crisis over Taiwan stemming from Beijing’s decision to carry out a series of threatening 
missile tests in waters in close proximity to Japanese territory in order to signal its 
resolve to Taiwan, its pro-independence President Lee Teng-hui and its allies in advance 
of the 1996 Presidential election was a notable development that fed the burgeoning fear 
of a China threat in Japan (Green, 2003:77-79;87). When Chinese missiles landed in 
waters close to shipping lanes vital to Japan’s well-being, it touched upon an historical 
sense of vulnerability as an island nation, and in the modern era, as one heavily 
dependent on imports for food and essential raw materials (Green, 2003:21; Austin and 
Harris, 2001:117). This was in a context where China’s quest to mark its territory and 
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address its own security and resource vulnerabilities in maritime areas such as the East 
China Sea and the South China Sea intensified concerns over non-traditional security 
issues such as rivalry for natural resources, food, and energy in a country with lingering 
memories of the oil shocks of the 1970s (Drifte, 2003:71). This added considerable 
emotional and political weight to the rise of China as a domestic political issue in Japan 
(Austin and Harris, 2001:117).  
 
Relations by the Mid-1990s – A Watershed Period 
In June 1996 Japan and China ratified UNCLOS. The months preceding ratification had 
been fraught with bilateral tensions over Taiwan and the activities of Chinese and 
Japanese vessels in contested waters. May 1995 for example had seen a PRC ship carry 
out surveys near the Pinnacle Islands only to leave after Japanese protestations. In 
August, the Japanese Air Self Defense Force (JASDF) sent planes over the islands to 
ward off Chinese planes which the Japanese believed were carrying out a patrol mission 
in the area. In December 1995 the Japanese reported that a Chinese oil drilling vessel was 
stationed in proximity to the islands and in February 1996, it was announced that a JMSA 
ship had reported a similar ship in the same area (Blanchard, 2005). 
 
Alongside the ratification of UNCLOS in mid-1996, the Pinnacle Islands issue also raised 
its head again. On July 17th 1996, in response to the ratification issue and a stronger 
perceived assertiveness by China in the ECS, seven members of the Japanese right-wing 
group the Japan Youth Federation (Nihon Seinen Sha) landed on the islands and 
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constructed a makeshift lighthouse, an act that incurred the wrath of Chinese nationalists, 
and protests from both the PRC and Taiwan. On September 26th, a very public tragedy 
unfolded when David Chan, a Hong-Kong based activist, drowned after jumping 
overboard from his protest ship in a bid to avoid arrest by the Japanese Coast Guard 
(JCG) who had been sent to intercept the group before their attempted landing on one of 
the disputed islands. This dangerous form of tit-for-tat protests was further evidenced a 
year later on May 5th 1997 when Japanese parliamentarian, Shingo Nishimura, staged a 
nationalistic religious ceremony on the islands, again drawing protests from Beijing. This 
was matched within three weeks by a protest flotilla from Taiwan which included over 
two hundred activists that was once again held off by the JCG (Reuters, 06/02/2007). 
These incidents involving the islands disputes all took place in the context of a marked 
downturn in bilateral ties in the mid to late 1990s that involved not just the ECS but 
numerous bilateral problems which included the Taiwan crisis of 1996 and PRC 
President Jiang Zemin’s controversial visit to Tokyo in 1998.  
 
The nuclear tests, the Taiwan crisis, and the rising numbers of incursions into the ECS 
since the mid-1990s fed a growing image of China as an unruly state on issues such as 
the East China Sea which was latched onto by the Japanese media, especially by right-
wing publications such as the Sankei Shimbun that amplified the China threat scare 
(Green, 2003:85). As one senior China hand in the Gaimusho noted, such newspapers are 
virtually always negative about Chinese issues. Nonetheless, Japanese politicians take 
heed of what such publications have to say and this places political pressure on the 
government (Wan, 2006:149). The Taiwan crisis was in particular regarded as a serious 
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watershed that negatively affected Japanese public opinion towards China (Drifte, 
2003:80-81). The domestic and bilateral frictions surrounding incidents relating to the 
Pinnacle Islands a few months later illustrated the extent to which domestic politics and 
China policy in Japan had been adversely influenced by a series of events since 
Tiananmen in 1989 (Green, 2003:79).  
 
A consequence of these worrying developments was that a concern grew amongst many 
Japanese that it was only a matter of time before the PRC would start pushing its weight 
and asserting Chinese interests to the detriment of Japan. From the viewpoint of Japanese 
governments throughout the 1990s, the PRC’s apparent greater assertiveness in regards to 
Japan and other neighbours of China went seemingly hand-in-hand with its increasing 
capability to enhance its conventional military forces and thus, according to Austin and 
Harris, ‘threaten Japan for the first time in six centuries’ where heightened tensions over 
numerous security and ideational issues were ‘matched by equally powerful insecurities 
in Japan about the potential size of China and its history of unpredictability’ (Austin and 
Harris, 2001:82).  
 
Of major concern in the security realm was the still ongoing dramatic rise in the PRC’s 
military and defense modernization spending where despite the expression of numerous 
protests and concerns, the Chinese remained tight-lipped about the exact scale and details 
of this spending. Since 1990, the PRC’s defense budget experienced double-digit growth, 
averaging 14.5% from 1988 to 1997, which was in marked contrast to the 1978 to 1987 
period which saw defense expenditure growth of a mere 3.5%. The fact that a significant 
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chunk of this defense spending, particularly after the 1996 Taiwan Crisis, went towards 
strengthening the PLA’s naval capabilities and defending its disputed maritime periphery 
contributed to Japanese anxieties about its future security relations with the PRC 
(Erickson, 2010). In response, the Japanese have tended to address their concerns by 
subscribing to a balance of power policy with regards to their rising neighbor (Matsuda, 
2008:78). This was in a period where in the economic realm, bilateral trade had risen 
from $18.2 billion in 1990 to $62.4 billion in 1996 and Japanese Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) increased from $438 million in 1989 to $4.5 billion in 1995. Such 
figures seemed to suggest that this had a modifying effect on the relationship and that 
both states were able to separate the political and economic fields. However they would 
also point to the fact that extraordinary economic co-operation could not completely 
protect the wider relationship from the frictions of the early to mid-1990s (Green, 
2003:77). 
 
Interlinking Politics and Nationalism in Japan 
Issues which seem to exemplify a rising threat from neighbors such as China and North 
Korea resonated well with many Japanese in the 1990s particularly those with right-wing 
leanings. This relates to the ECS disputes due to strong right-wing links to Japanese 
mainstream politics. The powerful and influential right-wing in Japan consists of three 
main sets of people. These are a) major right-wing pressure organizations, b) smaller 
activist groups, and c) right-wing intellectuals who seek to influence the larger population 
via the increasingly powerful mass media in Japan. These intellectuals are made up of 
various writers, commentators, university professors, and those involved in the mass 
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media. These are quite often involved with moderate right-wing pressure organizations 
such as the ‘Japan Conference’ (Nippon kaigi) and others who seek to push their right-
wing agenda via controversial and politically charged issues such as the historical 
textbook issue. This more moderate mainstream variant of Japanese nationalism also 
prizes symbols of traditional Japan such as the emperor, the Shinto religion, and the 
controversial Yasukuni Shrine. The right-wing, through an increasingly vocal media in 
Japan and their right-wing papers and publications, have provided these intellectuals with 
the means to influence the wider public via publications such as the daily newspaper, the 
Sankei Shimbun (Industry and Economic News), the bi-monthly Sapio, and the monthly 
magazines Shokun! and Seiron. These writers also provide inter-linked right-wing 
activists, pressure groups, and nationalistic politicians with useful data and informed 
arguments which, for example, they subsequently utilize to defend the controversial 
Yasukuni Shrine visits by Japan’s political elites, to justify criticism of China and Korea, 
and to counter the Japanese left-wing (Shibuichi, 2005:200-202). 
 
The moderate mainstream Japanese right-wing should be distinguished from the more 
extreme and marginal nationalistic Japanese groups. The moderate Japan Association of 
Bereaved Families (JABF) (Nihon izoku kai) for example, is the most powerful of the 
right-wing organizations with considerable clout (claiming as many as one million votes), 
influence, and strong relationships with the powerful right-wing Liberal Democratic 
Party (LDP) of Japan. Smaller similar right-wing groups like the Association of Shinto 
Shrines (Jinja hincho), the Military Pension Federation (Gunjin onkyu renmei), the Japan 
Conference (Nippon kaigi), and the retired military men’s Association to Commemorate 
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the Spirits of Fallen Heroes (Eirei ni kotaeru kai) have also exerted considerable pressure 
upon, and have close links with, LDP lawmakers and political factions. Other pressure 
organizations include business, religious, ideological and public service groups 
associated with the LDP. These close ties are illustrated in a number of key ways. For 
example, a number of these influential organizations have successfully and consecutively 
promoted their own members as political representatives in the National Diet, have LDP 
members of all ranks act as chairpersons, and have overlapping membership systems 
between their own local organizational branches and local LDP branches.  
 
As Shibuichi asserts, for such reasons, powerful right-wing organizations are not merely 
influential from the margins of power but are in many ways part and parcel of the 
‘catchall’ LDP and its make-up of right-wing and ‘conservative centrist’ politicians. Over 
the years, countless numbers of politicians from the LDP have exploited their ties with 
these powerful groups with the aim of furthering their own ideological convictions or to 
increase their own electoral strength by bolstering and enhancing these relationships. 
Given these domestic realities, it is apparent that various LDP Prime Ministers of Japan, 
as with political leaders all over the world, are vulnerable to ‘institutional pressures’ from 
both inside and outside the government of the day. The phenomenon of Japanese political 
elites visiting the controversial Yasukuni Shrine to appease such pressures and 
obligations or to express their own political convictions, in spite of the diplomatic 
consequences for relations with Japan’s neighbors, is arguably one of the most cogent 
examples of domestic actors exploiting domestic popular sentiment for political ends 
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with negative outcomes for foreign policy (Shibuichi, 2005:200-201). The painful effects 
of this on the East China Sea after 2002 are exhibited in the next chapter. 
 
1996 – 2001:  Domestic Constraints, Lost Opportunities 
 
Renewed Frictions in the East China Sea 
 
In June 1996, a few months after the Taiwan Crisis, both Japan and China ratified 
UNCLOS and with it formally designated their conflicting territorial claims. Japan’s 
ratification saw it assert its claim to not just the islands but also a 200-nautical mile EEZ 
around them (Taipei CAN, 22/08/1996). As mentioned earlier, the period prior to and 
after ratification was a time of heightened tensions in the ECS. On the Japanese side, 
frictions developed over the building of an improvised light-house on one of the Pinnacle 
Islands in mid-July 1996. The Japan Youth Federation (Nihon Seinen Sha) also petitioned 
the government through the Japanese MSA to have the lighthouse recognized as an 
official beacon. When Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto became the first 
Japanese leader to visit the controversial Yasukuni shrine in over ten years on July 29th, 
the tensions between the two countries were further exacerbated. On August 18th, another 
smaller Japanese nationalist group, the Small Islands Defense Association planted a 
wooden Japanese flag beside one of a number of controversial lighthouses on the ECS 
islands (Taipei CAN, 22/08/1996).  
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Japanese Foreign Minister Yukihiko Ikeda’s publicised comment to Hong Kong officials 
on August 28th that the Pinnacle Islands ‘have always been Japan’s territory; Japan 
already effectively governs the islands, so the territorial issue does not exist’ (Po,1996) 
poured salt on wounds. It also resulted in very stern protests from Beijing that were in 
marked contrast to tamer statements made after earlier ECS incidents such as in 1990 
when China, in the months following Tiananmen, was in a weaker position to protest 
(Downs and Saunders, 1998-1999: 133). High profile incidents such as the drowning of 
David Chan on September 26th, and the May 5th 1997 landing by the Japanese nationalist 
politician Shingo Nishimura (and the reaction it caused) also did not bode well for 
constructive approaches to these maritime disputes. The possibility of positive movement 
on the islands and demarcation issues was however displayed a few months later when in 
September 1997, during a trip to Beijing by PM Hashimoto, both sides announced a 
Fisheries agreement that placed the ownership issue to the side and instead focused on a 
200-mile-wide ‘joint management zone’ for fishing by vessels from both states and the 
co-ordination of resource utilization (Green, 2003:87). From the Japanese perspective, 
the cautious optimism that followed this agreement was soon undermined however when 
Japanese defense papers reported that the activities of PRC research and naval vessels 
had actually increased in spite of numerous requests by the JMSA to leave the area 
(Heisei 11-nendo Bouei Hakusho (1999 Defense White Paper)). 
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The China Card and Calls for a Harder Line 
 
A collection of negative incidents involving China-related issues meant that by the tail-
end of the mid-1990s, the rise of China was already, for both elite and ordinary level 
Japanese, a major topic of discussion and concern on the domestic political scene. In this 
context, Japanese leaders began to appreciate how an ostensibly and necessarily assertive 
stance vis-à-vis China could reap political benefits. After Hashimoto (1996-1998) stood 
down as Japanese Prime Minister in 1998, the new leader Keizo Obuchi (1998-2000) 
adopted a more uncompromising position than previous Japanese leaders in his dealings 
with the Chinese government (Self, 2002:79).   
 
When North Korea recklessly test-fired an advanced long range ballistic missile that, for 
the first time, violated Japanese airspace, overflew Japan, and landed in nearby waters in 
August 1998 (Guardian, 01/09/1998) the Japanese hoped that China, Pyongyang’s most 
powerful ally, would stand alongside the international community in seeking to sanction 
them for the test. The consistent refusal of China’s leaders to publicly condemn the North 
Koreans or to agree to UN-backed sanctions or Japanese sponsored resolutions at the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) aimed at penalizing Pyongyang for its serious 
indiscretions throughout the 1990s served to further erode Japanese trust in China’s 
commitment to peaceful and harmonious regional relations. The PRC’s insufficient 
response to the 1998 tests, as Japan saw it, and the tests themselves also did little to 
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convince the Japanese to compromise on Chinese concerns with regards to the tense 
Theater Missile Defense (TMD) debates that had commenced in the mid-1990s (Green, 
2003:92-93;105).  
 
In spite of these challenges however, Tokyo and Beijing continued in their attempts to 
improve the security relationship. PM Hashimoto for example had actively encouraged 
confidence-building measures between the military wings of both states and to that end 
suggested in 1997 that Tokyo should invite PLA officers to Japan to carry out symbolic 
military exchanges and inspections within the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (Kyodo, 
02/09/1997). The year 1998 saw the resumption of bilateral defense minister visits after a 
hiatus of ten years when Chi Haotian, the PRC Minister of National Defense visited 
Japan to hold high level and constructive talks with political and military leaders, and 
visits to several of the top military and naval bases in Japan. Plans were also laid for more 
enhanced security talks and military exchanges including unprecedented reciprocal visits 
by warships (China News Digest, 5 Feb 1998). This positive move was complemented in 
the same year when the Japanese Minister of Defense, Fumio Kyuma visited the PRC. 
Following this, the two states discussed plans to follow this up with more high level 
exchanges and disarmament talks (Kyodo, 08/08/1998). 
 
Unfortunately for bilateral ties, the years following 1998 (until 2006) would see very 
little or no positive movement in terms of high level military exchanges. This downturn 
was arguably a consequence of increasingly negative relations over a number of issues 
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that upset ties from 1998 onwards. When Jiang Zemin demanded that the Japanese issue 
a written apology for their past war crimes or a Clinton-type ‘Three Nos’ declaration on 
Taiwan, in advance of his historic state visit in November 1998, Tokyo flatly refused 
(Self, 2002:79). Jiang’s behavior during the visit and particularly his highly publicized 
castigation of Japan in the presence of Emperor Akihito was regarded by many Japanese 
as yet another watershed moment in terms of the growing fatigue, insecurity, and fear 
within Japan with regards to their rising Chinese neighbor (Deans, 2000:125). 
Revelations in the Japanese press that Jiang was encouraging anti-Japanese sentiment in 
the PRC while the summit was still ongoing by continuously warning about the dangers 
of Japanese militarization in statements to the Chinese media only exacerbated negative 
feelings towards China (Green, 2003:95). Such incidents also meant that many influential 
elite-level Japanese were less sympathetic to Chinese arguments regarding the East China 
Sea.  
 
China’s Rise and Japanese Insecurities 
Noting the impact of the rise of China on the Japanese psyche in the late 1990s, retired 
JASDF Major General Ikuo Kayahara has asserted that the daunting image of ‘the great 
revival of Chinese civilisation (Zheng Bijian)’ conjured up in many Japanese minds, a 
picture of a mighty Chinese nation that is likely to become a hegemon leaving ordinary 
Japanese feeling ‘bewildered by an emerging China that was once a world factory but 
now is growing into a center of economic growth in the world’ (Kayahara, 2006:3). This 
fear of China developed at a time when unfortunately for Japan, its own economic 
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strength and prowess had weakened in relation to China. Tokyo’s main leverage in terms 
of its economic power, ODA, although still considerable, was also gradually decreased 
due to budget cuts. In 2001, Japan was replaced by the US as the world’s top ODA donor 
and has since 1997 seen funds set aside for ODA slashed by as much as 30% (Nihon 
Keizai Shimbun, 18/04/2004).  A product of such economic changes is that it has affected 
somewhat, Japan’s ability to lever concessions out of the Chinese while also undermining 
Japanese confidence in the power of economics in persuading Beijing to behave in ways 
favorable to Japan’s interests.  
 
Closer to home, at the street level, the effect of China’s rise became more palpable to the 
ordinary Japanese citizen. This could be felt on a whole number of issues that were 
covered extensively by the Japanese media. These ranged from the environmental impact, 
higher levels of mostly Chinese illegal immigration (up to 90% from the PRC), a sharp 
rise in the number of sometimes very gruesome crimes in Japan by foreigners including 
Chinese after the early 1990s (Drifte, 2003:71-73). By 2000 for example, 54.2% of all 
foreign crimes in Japan were committed by PRC citizens and 38% of all foreign prisoners 
were from China. By the turn of the new century, domestic debates about a subsequent 
threat to Japanese homogeneity, identity, and national security, and a possible refugee 
crisis if the Chinese economy should collapse were prevalent within numerous published 
books and articles on these issues (Asahi Shimbun, 17/11/2001;Mainichi Daily News 
23/03/2001).  
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Numerous examples of weak political leadership and internecine political factionalism in 
Japan in the mid to late 1990s also contributed to a heightened sense of uncertainty and 
insecurity. Crisis management became a cause of particular concern as a result of the 
poor response by politicians to a number of highly publicised events which included the 
Great Hanshin earthquake (1995), the Aum Shinrikyo terror gas attacks (1995), the 
Japanese embassy hostage crisis in Peru (1996-97) and the 1997 oil spill in the Sea of 
Japan where ‘in each instance, the national leader of the moment was heavily criticized 
for failing to take timely, decisive, and appropriate action’ (Shinoda, 2007:63).  
 
The 1990s was also a decade bereft of sustained political leadership with as many as nine 
different Prime Ministers attempting to tackle an unprecedented and complex array of 
problems. These were Toshiki Kaifu (LDP) (1989-91), Kiichi Miyazawa (LDP) (1991-
93), Morihiro Hosokawa (Japan New Party) (1993-1994), Tsutomu Hata (Japan Renewal 
Party) (April 1994 – June 1994), Tomiichi Murayama (Social Democratic Party) (1994-
1996), Ryutaro Hashimoto (LDP) (1996-1998), Keizo Obuchi (LDP) (1998-2000), and 
Yoshiro Mori (LDP) (2000-01) (Wan, 2006:145). This constant changing of leadership 
affected the Chinese ability to believe that the Japanese would remain loyal in the long 
term to promises and commitments made in talks and discussions over issues like the 
ECS. It also arguably contributed to the oscillating pattern of approaches in relation to 
these maritime disagreements. 
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More Difficult to Adopt a Moderate Line 
After Jiang’s 1998 visit to Japan, it became much more difficult for Japanese diplomats 
and bureaucrats to speak positively on China’s behalf (Wan, 2006:149). As explained 
succinctly by one China scholar at the time, ‘the traditional pro-China school has been 
eradicated by China’s behavior’ (Green, 2003:98). The election of a controversial far-
right nationalist, Shintaro Ishihara, as the mayor of Tokyo in April 1999 also pointed to a 
sizeable constituency within Japan that was becoming more sympathetic to more hard-
line nationalist arguments in the midst of unprecedented post-war economic malaise and 
relative decline in the 1990s, and a heightened disillusionment with traditional post-war 
Japanese politics (Deans, 2000:125).  
 
As Nakanishi explains, before the cumulative effects of numerous negative interactions 
on sensitive issues took effect, the China school within the Japanese Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MOFA) was exclusive. After the late 1990s however, the Japanese government 
tried to mix individuals so that people did not become too associated with the China 
school. The main factor in this change was the right wing media’s attacks on such 
individuals. From the late 1990s, an image of pro-China people in the MOFA was created 
where such figures were portrayed as people who were happy to see Japan as a secondary 
power to China while receiving financial gain from China’s economic growth. Attitudes 
towards China changed significantly as the political atmosphere became more openly 
anti-China and moved against so-called pro-China Japanese. Right wing publications 
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such as the Sankei Shimbun, while not having a wide readership, nonetheless carried loud 
front covers for all to see, and furthered the influence of right-wing views of China upon 
ordinary Japanese people and officials (Hiroshi Nakanishi, 11/11/2008).  
 
 
Matters were also not helped by the structural changes in terms of personnel and attitudes 
within the MOFA. These were particularly personnel and generational shifts where once 
older influential and more sober-minded China hands who had built diplomatic bridges 
and channels in the post-normalization years and who held an in-depth and more 
experienced understanding of the dynamics of Chinese domestic politics retired or passed 
away. Their influence on soothing tensions thus waned. These individuals were 
progressively replaced by younger specialists and North American area specialists who 
tended to hold more alarmist views of China (Roy, 2005:200). These shifts meant that in 
the years immediately prior to the resurgence of the ECS disputes in 2003 that ‘few vocal 
advocates of compromise’ existed within the Japanese Foreign Ministry. As of 2002 for 
example, the aging Hiromu Nonaka remained the most prominent China-friendly Tanaka 
faction advocate of positive ties with China. However, Nonaka’s most likely successor at 
the time, Makoto Koga, held significantly less power and influence with Chinese 
counterparts in comparison to Nonaka (Self, 2002:78).  
 
On a positive note, Makiko Tanaka, a daughter of Tanaka faction founder PM Kakuei 
Tanaka, was appointed Japanese Foreign Minister in April 2001 (until being removed 
from her position in January 2002 following criticism of Koizumi). This alongside the 
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fact that Tang Jiaxuan (March 1998 – March 2003), a Japan specialist in the PRC, was 
serving as China’s Foreign Minister since 1998 instilled a short-lived and cautious 
optimism that ties were about to enter a period of stability. As Wan notes however, the 
year 2001 would witness some serious difficulties within the relationship. Many of these 
were reflective of the changed domestic political circumstances in both countries where 
the two foreign ministers despite their best efforts only had a limited ability in shaping 
relations and preventing problems. Tanaka failed to deliver on Chinese expectations that 
she could talk Koizumi out of visiting the Yasukuni shrine in August 2001. Following 
this visit and a marked deterioration in Chinese attitudes toward Japan, Tang was very 
careful not to appear overly pro-Japanese because he knew that his ‘Japan school’ 
background could be used against him to weaken his position (Wan, 2006:149). 
Unfortunately the events of 2001 were to set the tone for an unprecedented downturn in 
relations even in the context of a gradual deterioration since the 1990s. This negative 
slide made the task of strengthening ties over a whole raft of complex bilateral issues 
including the ECS frictions all the more difficult, particularly for the PRC’s decision-
makers. 
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Disagreements from the late 1990s until 2001 
 
In November 1998, the PRC commenced full operations of its first oil and natural gas 
field in the Pinghu field, in an area about seventy kilometers from the median line on the 
Chinese side. Up until 2001, the Japanese did not publicly protest the PRC’s exploration 
activities in the ECS and had even financially assisted the Chinese in this regard. Proof of 
Tokyo’s initial tolerance since the 1970s of China’s exploration activities in the ECS was 
evidenced when Japan co-financed in 1997 through to 2001 – via the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB) and the ExportImport Bank (renamed the Japan Bank of International Co-
operation (JBIC) in 1999) – the two oil and gas pipelines that connected the Pinghu field 
to the Chinese mainland. Such support would later be severely criticized in Japan during 
the serious downturn in relations under Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi (2001 to 2006). 
In October 1999, the Chinese discovered gas in the Chunxiao field, a mere 4.8 km from 
the median line (Drifte, 2008a:10). 
 
The intensification of the PRC’s exploration activities corresponded with an apparent rise 
in the frequency of alleged incursions by Chinese vessels into what are considered to be 
Japanese waters. For example, in the period from January 1998 through to August 2000, 
16 ships entered into areas on the Japanese side on 12 separate occasions. Then in July of 
2001, a Beijing-sponsored Norwegian seismic survey ship, the ‘Nordic Explorer’ showed 
up within Japan’s maritime territory and stayed for two months. Tokyo’s reply was to 
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allege that China had unlawfully intruded into Japan’s EEZ. Beijing countered by 
claiming that the sea’s boundaries still remained unsettled (Wei Su, 2005: 45-46).  
 
The Chinese themselves have also grown uneasy about Japan’s apparent greater 
assertiveness in defending its maritime territory. A notable example was when a Japanese 
coast guard ship chased after and sank a suspected North Korean spy ship close to 
China’s coast and inside China’s EEZ in December 2001 using deadly force for the first 
time since the Second World War. Beijing responded to this by reprimanding Japan for 
the incident, and denounced it as a violation of China’s sovereignty (Wei Su, 2005: 45-
46). Despite such incidents, the years prior to 2003 had seen some positive bilateral 
movement in terms of the ECS with conflict prevention agreements such as the 1997 
Fisheries agreement (involving joint regulation and fishing zones) and the 2001 prior 
notification agreement in relation to scientific research activities (Valencia and Amae, 
2003:189) being formulated with limited success to minimize tensions in the area.  
 
In the wider context of uncertainty and change, Chinese actions in the ECS however 
tended to be seen as denigrating to Japan’s EEZ and sovereignty, and exacerbated fears 
that China was testing the Japanese response to incursions into its maritime territory 
(Hiroshi Nakanishi, 11/11/2008). This fear of the Chinese expanding at the cost of 
Japan’s sovereignty and interests was illustrated by notable conservative scholars such as 
Shigeo Hiramatsu who has consistently warned of the PRC’s ‘objectives.’ Examples 
include articles such as a Japan Times article in 2001 entitled ‘Slyly, China extends its 
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reach’ (Hiramatsu, 2001) and Hiramatsu’s 2006 book ‘China’s annexation of Japan’ 
(Chugoku wa Nihon o heigosuru).  
 
Despite these pressures, consecutive Japanese governments have been eager not to 
escalate problems over issues like the Pinnacle Islands while standing firm to their claim. 
Increasingly however Japanese decision-makers have often been attacked as too 
‘cowardly’ on the issue. Up until 2005 for example, Tokyo refrained from even 
discussing the possibility of Japan drilling for resources in disputed areas of the ECS, 
with the Maritime Safety Agency (MSA) approaching all ECS related matters very 
delicately (Hagstrom, 2005:170). As discussed in the next chapter, by the renewal of 
tensions over maritime territory and energy resources in 2003, Japanese confidence in its 
passive approach to bear dividends had worn thin. 
 
 
Chapter Summary 
 
In covering some of the most pertinent major events and shifts in bilateral relations in the 
post-war era, the chapter also provided a lead-up to the resurgence of the ECS disputes in 
2003. This in turn offered an understanding of how in particular elite political rivalry in 
the case of the PRC, the China card as an electoral issue in Japan, changes on the 
domestic political scene in both states, and negative perceptions in general affected how 
the two countries dealt with controversial issues. 
 
213 
 
By the time the ECS disputes developed for the first time in the late 1960s and early 
1970s during the Mao era (1949-1976) it was apparent that such bilateral foreign policy 
issues involving Japan though trying at times were much more manageable than in later 
years. This was in a situation where Japan generally subscribed to the Yoshida Doctrine 
of focusing on economic growth and minimal defense activity while Chinese leaders 
understood the over-riding importance of positive ties with Japan in the face of a Soviet 
threat and crucially had an almost absolute control over foreign policy issues and how 
they were framed and presented to the Chinese people. The convergent economic and 
security interests of both states persisted into the 1980s while the strong leadership of 
figures such as Deng and Nakasone (during years of unprecedented Japanese prosperity 
and confidence) proved pivotal in navigating the relationship through some turbulent 
incidents and disputes.  
 
The 1990s post-Tiananmen era however witnessed some decisive domestic and 
international changes with more numerous and complex factors and players entering the 
stage between and within the two countries. In China, divisions over these challenges 
factored into deeper divisions within the elite while the period also saw concerted state-
led efforts by Jiang Zemin and the CCP to bolster their legitimacy by appealing to base 
anti-Japanese and anti-American sentiment in the PRC. This occurred alongside the 
inadvertent development of more assertive and less manageable popular nationalism 
which pressed hard on the government to defend the nation’s pride and territorial 
integrity. All these changes meant that by the mid to late 1990s, the Chinese leadership 
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had now to tread very carefully in their approaches to the sensitive and history-related 
ECS disagreements when they re-emerged as a potentially conflictual problem.   
 
In Japan, the confidence of the 1980s was soon replaced by a decade of weak leadership, 
economic decline and uncertainty that hit the Japanese sense of security hard. The 1993 
electoral reforms gradually did away with many of the old ways of doing political 
business in Japan but did not leave a strong and decisive political structure in their place. 
A sequence of political, security, and ideational related controversies commencing with 
Tiananmen in 1989 fed some very negative perceptions of China and meant that by 2001, 
the Japanese public were demanding strong and assertive leadership on issues such as the 
East China Sea disputes. As a consequence of these collective changes, once manageable 
disputes were considerably more complicated in a context where the China card had 
unquestionably acquired considerable domestic political value on the Japanese political 
scene. This was the setting leading up to 2003, in which both countries walked toward the 
most serious downturn in the ECS problems since the frictions of 1996.  
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Chapter Four   
Lows and Highs: August 2003 to June 2008 
 
Introduction 
As now shown, the developments and incidents leading up to the Koizumi years (2001 to 
2006) contributed to an atmosphere in which Sino-Japanese ties sunk to their lowest level 
since normalization in 1972. Much of the unprecedented negative sentiment and failed 
diplomacy in the 1990s had its origins in the machinations of domestic politics and the 
marked uncertainty and insecurities which the 1990s wrought. This background provided 
the bonfire on which bilateral issues such as the East China Sea disputes burned. 2003 
would see them re-emerge as a source of potential conflict between the two states and yet 
another public symbol of one of the many seemingly intractable problems within one of 
the world’s most important relationships.  
 
Here, the 2001 to 2008 period is examined, divided into two main sections which in turn 
are chronologically presented. The main sections deal with China and Japan respectively. 
The first part of the main section addresses the period from 2001 to 2003 in the PRC. 
This was a time when the shrine visits controversy and a more assertive Japanese Prime 
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Minister, Junichiro Koizumi, entered the political stage. It was also a time when the 
gradual leadership succession from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao placed considerable 
constraints on the flexibility of the Chinese leadership in their dealings with the ECS 
disputes after 2003. This is followed by a discussion of the years from 2004 to 2006, in 
particular Hu’s eventual consolidation of power by the spring of 2005 and how this 
sowed the seeds for quiet yet positive behind the scenes diplomacy. This section then 
covers the comparatively positive 2006 to 2008 years when Koizumi stepped down as 
PM and when Hu had finally consolidated his control over the Party. It concludes with a 
sample survey of the thoughts and opinions of some key middle elites in China.  
 
The second main section of the chapter looks at the 2001 to 2008 years in Japan and their 
relationship to the East China Sea tensions. This period was marked by Koizumi’s 
ascension to the role of PM and with it a markedly more assertive and uncompromising 
public face towards China. It discusses the 2001 to 2003 period and looks at the context 
in which Japan reacted to the PRC’s decision to commence production activities at the 
Chunxiao in August 2003. The section after this looks at the role of domestic politics and 
intensified animosity in Japan and their relationship to the critical 2004 to 2006 years. 
The 2006 to 2008 years follow, and reasons examined as to why largely positive 
developments on the domestic political scene in Japan helped to explain why the Tokyo 
government was able to reach a ‘principled consensus’ with the Chinese in June 2008. 
The final sub-section then provides a sample survey from some Japanese middle elites in 
which they discuss Japanese perspectives on the ECS disputes after they re-emerged in 
2003.   
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China 
Context for the Re-emergence of the ECS Disputes, 2001 – 2003  
The 2001 to 2003 period in the PRC is important because it sets the domestic political 
and bilateral context in which the ECS disagreements re-emerged in 2003. Discussing the 
complex domestic considerations that the Chinese leaders had to balance and manage in 
this period provides the reader with some useful insights into where the ECS disputes 
were positioned in terms of the wider relationship with Japan, and how these 
disagreements were affected by popular sentiment, political circumstances, and events 
and developments within the PRC in the months and years leading up to August 2003.  
 
In China the negative sentiment towards Japan that had seen a gradual increase since the 
1990s reached its worst levels in decades after 2000. This was largely as a result of a 
second wave of anti-Japanese nationalism that was fed to a large extent by the Koizumi’s 
government approach to China-related issues, and in particular because of the new 
Japanese PM’s repeated visits to the Yasukuni shrine and the effects these had on 
Chinese opinion within the Party elite and on the street. The Chinese state was also 
guilty, arguably to a lesser extent than previously, of feeding anti-Japanese sentiment via 
the media and the education system. In 2001 for example, the state’s Ministry of 
Education revised its high school textbooks for the first time since the early 1980s. While 
anti-Americanism was toned down, Japan was treated more unfavorably with lurid and 
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emotional accounts of atrocities during the occupation ensuring that public animosity 
towards the Japanese was maintained rather than cooled (Shirk, 2008:170). 
 
When Koizumi first visited the Yasukuni shrine as PM on August 13th 2001, the Chinese 
Foreign Ministry publicly declared their ‘strong dissatisfaction and indignation’ over the 
visit and declared it to be a violation of ‘the series of solemn statements and 
commitments made by the Japanese government on the history issue’ (Wan, 2006:241). 
The gravity of this shrine issue as an obstacle to the type of high-level official exchanges 
needed to address difficult issues like the ECS was later exemplified on October 14th 
2003, when a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson stated that China sincerely desired 
to continue high-level exchanges with the Japanese but that the two governments had to 
make efforts to bring about ‘favourable conditions’ for high-level exchanges and that 
Tokyo’s position on the Yasukuni problem was difficult for Beijing to understand 
(‘Chinese Foreign Ministry Press Conference’, 14/10/2003).  
 
The even steeper downward trend in Chinese attitudes toward the Japanese after 2000 
was also evidenced in a succession of opinion polls highlighted by the Asahi Shimbun 
newspaper in Japan and the CASS in China. In 1997 for example, some 40% of Chinese 
questioned, responded with the view that bilateral ties were good whereas 29% said they 
were bad. By 2002 however, as many as 50% believed that relations were ‘not good’ 
compared with 22% who viewed ties as good (Genron-NPO.net, 2005).  
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Gradual Power Transfer 
It is apparent that public Chinese diplomatic approaches toward Japan on issues such as 
the ECS after 2000 were most troubled in a symbolic sense by Koizumi’s visits to the 
Yasukuni shrine in August 2001 and afterwards, alongside other controversies discussed 
below. However it would be an over-simplification to suggest that the shrine visits alone 
or the actions of one man were the sole contributory factor in the worsening atmosphere 
surrounding the ECS frictions after 2002. The dynamics of the PRC’s domestic political 
situation in these years also played an important role in appreciating how the ECS 
problems were allowed to fester and why the recently nominated General Secretary Hu 
Jintao (since November 2002) was constrained in how he could deal with these frictions 
until later when he had more comprehensively consolidated his leadership position.  
In a state with a long history of complicated leadership successions, the gradual transfer 
of power from one leader to another was never going to be easy and straightforward. The 
succession from Jiang, who was formally stepping down as General Secretary in 2002, to 
Hu, who was formally succeeding him, was to have a restrictive influence on how the 
Chinese leadership could publicly approach the ECS disputes when they re-emerged as a 
serious bilateral issue in August 2003 amid already deteriorating relations. As a result, 
aside from the obvious heightened tensions with Japan at the time, Hu’s first term (2002 
to 2007) was characterised by the gradual transference of actual rather than just formal 
power from Jiang to Hu. A central component in this formal and informal transference of 
power was the subtle rivalry for power between Jiang’s desire to maintain an informal 
220 
 
influence at the highest level through his protégés, and Hu’s desire to consolidate his 
power and avoid the role of a lame-duck leader unable to step into Jiang’s shoes. Hu was 
formally designated as General Secretary at the 16th Party Congress in early November 
2002 and assumed the Presidency in March 2003 (Fewsmith, 2008: 238-240).  
 
Complex Considerations within the Elite 
 
The make-up of the key members of the leadership of the CCP following the 16th Party 
Congress indicated the informal influence of retired or soon to retire cadres on selections 
to some of the top posts. For example, Zhu Rongji, Premier until March 2003, had 
secured his choice of Wen Jiabao to replace him. Li Peng, former Premier (1988 – 1998) 
and Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPCSC)18 
until March 2003, had earmarked Luo Gan to the important Politburo Standing 
Committee (PSBC) position of head of the Political and Legal Affairs Committee.  
 
The outgoing General Secretary Jiang Zemin had used his influence to ensure that five or 
six of his closest political associates would find their way onto the PSBC.  As Fewsmith 
argues, formally Hu Jintao was the new General Secretary but the manoeuvring of Jiang 
allies and protégés to positions of power on the PBSC was clear evidence of a desire by 
Jiang to indirectly preserve some authority via his allies and disciples. Hu’s top role was 
                                                          
18 This is one of the key positions within the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC). 
221 
 
also complicated by the fact Jiang would remain in the powerful and symbolic role of 
Chairman of the Central Military Council (CMC) (until September 2004 (CPCCMC) and 
March 2005 (PRCCMC)) which suggested Jiang hoped for a Deng-like gradual 
withdrawal from political power. A consequence of this however in the earlier chapters of 
Hu’s succession was a duality in the centres of power at the top tiers of the CCP 
(Fewsmith, 2008:241). Aside from the obvious wider frictions with Japan, these domestic 
political realities also made addressing a Japan-related problem as divisive as the East 
China Sea all the more difficult for the new General Secretary. 
 
Hu’s Difficult Position 
In a political system where clear divergences exist between formal and informal power, 
Jiang hoped, that in his wake, his favourites such as protégés like the Shanghai faction’s 
Zeng Qinghong (designated Vice-President of the PRC in March 2003) could eventually 
assume the leadership mantle. Jiang and his allies’ main competitors were Hu and 
Premier Wen Jiabao, both of whom had a technocratic background and had strong links 
with and experience of the Chinese interior. Hu and Wen’s power base centred on the 
Communist Youth League faction of which Hu was once the Secretary General. This is 
not to suggest that Jiang did not consent to Hu’s top role but rather that he was never 
entirely comfortable with it.19 The scenario of being originally approved by Deng, and of 
                                                          
19 Fewsmith cautions against seeing Hu and Jiang’s competition for influence as a classic power struggle. 
There was tension between the two camps particularly as Jiang attempted to maneuver his allies into key 
positions. However Hu was very clever and subtle in consolidating his position and at all times was 
publicly respectful toward the former General Secretary (Fewsmith, 2008: 248). 
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being in a situation where he was seemingly preferred to Zeng by numerous Politburo 
colleagues seemed to bode well for Hu in his first year, as long as he did not commit any 
visible or serious errors in office that could be used to undermine him (Fewsmith, 2008: 
238-240;277). The East China Sea was one such issue in which Hu had to thread very 
carefully. 
 
In this context of consolidating power and keeping one step ahead of potential rivals 
during his first term (2002 – 2007), Hu had to pursue two conflicting objectives. One was 
to maintain his credentials as a loyal Party stalwart while the other was to strengthen his 
own independent authority by cleverly and gradually positioning allies to strategically 
important posts, establishing coalitions, and promoting his own policy preferences  
(Fewsmith, 2008: 238;242). As observed by Drifte, in Chinese politics some of the most 
serious divisions within the top elite are often most apparent during a power changeover 
when the possibilities of a cohesive and strong approach to challenging issues by the 
central leadership is weakest (Drifte, 2008b:19). This should remind observers of the 
difficulties and possible risks posed by an initially weak leadership under Hu trying to 
consolidate its grip on power while dealing with the ECS disputes after August 2003 and 
also attempting to avoid being seen to be weak by both rival elites and the public at 
home. This is very pertinent to Chinese approaches to the re-emergent ECS disputes after 
2002 because positive progress later on (after 2006) arguably co-related with a stronger 
leadership position for Hu which went hand in hand with more favourable domestic 
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developments in Tokyo and more helpful diplomatic gestures by the Japanese. These 
circumstances and gestures were unfortunately absent in the 2001 to 2006 years.  
 
More directly in terms of the East China Sea problems, the new Japanese government 
irked the Chinese in April 2002 by leasing three of the disputed Pinnacle Islands from 
their private Japanese owner. This lease was later extended in April 2004 (Roy, 
2005:199). This action put all the islands under the direct control of the Japanese 
government. From Tokyo’s perspective, this would help to potentially ease tensions over 
the islands’ issue in two clear ways. One was to strengthen Tokyo’s hand in preventing 
and limiting access to Japanese and Chinese nationalists who sought to land on the 
islands. The other was that it prevented the sale of the islands to Japanese nationalists 
who could and probably would politicize the islands’ disputes, sour relations with China, 
and goad Chinese nationalists to respond (Fravel, 2010:152). Beijing however did not 
read it as such and strongly protested against what they saw as evidence of Japanese 
expansionism. 
 
Despite the challenges posed to relations by testing bilateral challenges such as the shrine 
visits, history textbook controversy, the Pinnacle Islands and so forth during the 
leadership transition period, Hu would have been very conscious of the potential political 
problems posed should anti-Japanese sentiment be encouraged and exploited as a card to 
undermine him in elite political rivalry during the gradual succession from Jiang to Hu. 
His experiences as a student during the Cultural Revolution and as an underling of Hu 
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Yaobang would have reinforced this sense of caution. The new General Secretary 
counteracted against the possibility of such a fate befalling him through careful power 
balancing within the Chinese elite and diplomatic corps so that the chances of Hu and 
members of his faction being blamed for policy failures in areas like the ECS were 
lessened and could not be laid squarely at his door alone. This strategy also served to 
weaken the incentives for elite competitors to exploit the burgeoning anti-Japanese 
movement in this period as a form of political capital against him (Hughes, 2008:265-
267). 
 
Hu’s clever balancing strategy was apparent in the manner in which he maintained a 
degree of continuity with the Jiang era by conceding to the appointment of six key figures 
from the Shanghai gang to the new Politburo after the 16th Congress. This was even 
though Hu understood that this would more than likely delay his consolidation of power 
or possibly weaken him if he fell victim to an internal revolt. Zeng Qinghong was one of 
a number of Shanghai faction members who were appointed to the PBSC. In spite of his 
political affiliations, Zeng was a figure who was very sensitive with regards to Japan-
related issues and like Hu understood how they could be nefariously exploited. The 
younger Zeng’s memories of the treatment of his father Zeng Shan and his own earlier 
experiences in the 1980s no doubt left a bitter taste in his mouth in relation to the 
unashamed exploitation of the Japan issue to topple high level cadres (Hughes, 2008:265-
267). For these reasons, Zeng’s position on the Politburo, while potentially troublesome 
for Hu Jintao should he be undermined, was in terms of Japan-related affairs a positive 
benefit. This was because it arguably reduced but did not eradicate the possibility of a 
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Japan issue being used against Hu as long as he dealt wisely and sensitively with such 
issues. Hu also appreciated that keeping private channels open with the Japanese would 
be crucial to maintaining and repairing relations on controversies such as the East China 
Sea even though publicly relations were very bad and where at all levels there was a 
palpable sense of anger over the behaviour of the other side. 
 
A Resurgence in Popular anti-Japanese Sentiment 
Hu’s attempts to gradually consolidate his power since his succession in November 2002 
coincided with a ‘second wave’ of largely popular and internet-influenced Chinese 
nationalism as well as re-invigorated debates within the state about how the country 
should deal with Japan. Alongside the deterioration in ties that followed Koizumi’s first 
visit to the Yasukuni shrine in August 2001, the second wave was preceded by two events 
that stirred popular and intellectual domestic debates within the PRC about the direction 
of Chinese nationalism. The first was the September 2001 to December 2001 Zhao Wei 
controversy when the Chinese public reacted angrily to a photo of Chinese actress and 
model Zhao Wei in the state-run Shizhuang (Fashion) magazine wearing an American 
designed short dress with a large imperial Japanese flag imprinted on it during a photo 
shoot in New York. The second was the summer of 2002 Jiang Wen controversy when it 
was revealed that Chinese actor and director Jiang Wen had, in an interview with a 
Japanese newspaper, openly disclosed the fact that he had visited the controversial 
Yasukuni shrine on several occasions (Gries, 2005: 832-836;848).  
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With the Zhao Wei case, she was to become a nation-wide target for condemnation by the 
media and nationalists with internet forums being particularly vitriolic in their attacks and 
demanding an apology. The editor of the magazine in question was also forced to resign. 
By early December, as many of 6,000 messages, most of them condemning Zhao, had 
been posted on the popular Sina.com website (Japan Economic Newswire, 11/12/2001). 
Zhao’s house in Wuhu city in Anhui province was also attacked by brick and bottle 
throwing protesters (Straits Times, 11/12/2001). Zhao issued a public apology for the 
photo on national television and on the internet on December 10th.  In spite of the 
apology, public outrage continued to linger in some quarters. On December 28th, an irate 
audience member ran on to the stage, pushed Zhao and smeared excrement on her dress 
during an event in Changsha. On the internet, while some reveled in Zhao’s misfortune, 
others began to question whether or not increasingly internet-led popular Chinese 
nationalism was getting out of hand (Gries, 2005: 832-834).  
 
Disclosures that Jiang Wen had visited the Yasukuni shrine came at the time when old 
wounds were being picked at by PM Koizumi’s visit to the shrine in August 2001. 
Koizumi had also made clear his intention to continue with the visits for the duration of 
his tenure. Jiang defended the visits by insisting that he had done so for film research 
purposes rather than for any form of reverence or worship. While some, particularly in 
China’s cultural elite accepted Jiang’s reasons, others viewed the controversy in the same 
light as the Zhao Wei case (Tianjin Daily, 31/07/2002). Both the Zhao Wei and Jiang 
Wen controversies ignited debates within the PRC about how Chinese nationalism 
manifested itself and revealed divisions in relation to the official state nationalism, 
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cultural and academic elites, the Old Left, the New Left, reform-minded liberals, popular 
nationalism, internet nationalism and so forth.  It also begged the question over what was 
acceptable and what was not, and whether or not people like Zhao and Jiang as well as 
the nationalists who condemned them had gone too far (Gries, 2005:834-836). The 
incidents also arguably reflected the depth of feeling in China towards Japan-related 
controversies such as the East China Sea disputes, and how such incidents touched upon 
Chinese sensitivities and dignity, and could snowball into much bigger problems for the 
Chinese leadership. This second largely internet-based wave of nationalism also reflected 
how the Party had to manage controversies in a much more careful way than before. 
 
The reform-minded Ma Licheng (a liberal intellectual at the People’s Daily newspaper) 
saw such controversies as an opportunity to call on Chinese people to reappraise their 
relationship with Japan and to move on from the history controversy and from the narrow 
and increasingly assertive nationalist sentiment expressed towards the Japanese. Ma had 
developed a reputation since the 1990s for criticizing and taking on the Old Left in their 
attempts to impede reform and also the New Left who he felt had cultivated the more 
populist parochial strain of Chinese nationalism (Gries, 2005: 832-837). Ma was also 
utilized by moderate reformists within the Party elite to fly trial balloons by publishing 
articles aimed at gauging sentiment towards more pragmatic approaches vis-à-vis Japan 
(Shirk, 2008:177).  
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Ma’s provocative article ‘New thinking on relations with Japan’, published in late 2002 
set off a vigorous debate within China in 2003. Heated discussions regarding the state’s 
policies towards Japan intensified and the period was characterized by strongly worded 
debates between academics and internet nationalists. Greater pressure was also placed on 
the government for a tougher approach towards the Japanese (Gries, 2005:831-832). 
Unfortunately for liberal reformers such as Ma, the ‘new thinking’ debate did not proceed 
as they would have hoped. For Ma himself, the risk he took in publishing his 2002 article 
would have a detrimental effect on his career and reputation. Internet forums were awash 
with messages castigating Ma as a ‘traitor’ and as a Japanese ‘ass kisser’. His address and 
personal details were also published on the internet alongside messages urging people to 
burn down his house (Liu, 2003). The writer also received death threats. Within a matter 
of months, the personal toll on Ma was too much. In mid-2003, he applied for early 
retirement from his job at the People’s Daily, left Beijing, and started a new job with 
Phoenix TV in Hong Kong (Gries, 2005:838-839). This outcome suggested that the more 
assertive strain of Chinese nationalism had won the debate, at least temporarily. Taken 
alongside serious strains within the bilateral ties, particularly since 2001, the debate also 
illustrated the difficulty posed to anyone who might propose a more moderate approach 
to controversies like the ECS disagreements.  
 
In early 2003, Shi Yinhong, a scholar from the People’s University in Beijing, had made 
a qualified defense of Ma in an article for Strategy and Management which argued how 
China’s best interests, particularly its security interests and its balancing against the US, 
lay in an improved relationship with Japan. Both Shi’s piece and Ma’s article collectively 
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kicked off a tense debate with numerous ripostes which ranged from moderate criticism, 
to middle ground proposals, to comments that poured bitter scorn on their views (Gries, 
2005:831-832). Shi endured some fierce attacks and hurtful comments that cast doubts on 
his patriotism. A People’s Daily writer, Lin Zhibo for example ridiculed Shi’s core 
arguments in paper articles and through online essays via websites such as People’s Net 
(Renmin Wang). Referring to Shi’s views on the history controversies, Lin angrily 
contended that such views are ‘irresponsible’ because they suggest that the Chinese 
government should remain ‘tolerant and magnaminous’ while the Japanese engage in 
‘ugly behaviours’ (Lin, 2003).  
 
Citing examples of such behavior, Lin pointed to Prime Minister Koizumi’s visits to the 
Yasukuni shrine and a statement by Koizumi during a stay at US President Bush’s 
Crawford Ranch in May 2003 when he said ‘if China will not compromise on the islands 
issue, Japan will make China regret it.’ In response, Lin claimed that ‘These are the 
threats of a thief or a hoodlum. Spoken at his master’s ranch…they are like a dog barking 
and biting’ (Lin, 2003). The abuse meted out to intellectuals such as Ma and Shi 
reminded China’s political class of the explosive potential of Japan and nationalist-
related issues to undermine or even ultimately destroy those who were viewed as soft on 
Japan or who moved too fast to promote new approaches. Instead of being persuaded by 
the ‘New Thinking’ debates of 2003 and 2004 as Ma and Shi might have hoped, the 
PRC’s political elite viewed it as a liability and moved to distance themselves from it 
(Gries, 2005: 843). The tight-rope that elites had to walk was not just in relation to Japan-
related controversies but rather a core set of issues that factored into all debates on the 
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nation and sovereignty. The conflicting tensions at the domestic political level between 
rational foreign policies and the emotions stirred by nationalistic discourses were also 
illustrated in the elite-level politicking and disagreements over the usage of the term 
‘peaceful rise’ which coincided with a period of intensifying anti-Japanese sentiment and 
activities in the summer of 2003 (Medeiros, 2004).  
 
Pressure from the New Media  
At the popular level, according to Gries, the power of the largely internet-based Japan-
centred ‘second wave’ of Chinese nationalism was evidenced by the internet petitions of 
2003 and 2004 which garnered the participation of well over a million ‘netizens’ (Gries, 
2005:849). While it is true that internet nationalism had become another and more 
powerful medium through which greater pressure could be placed on the government, it 
arguably would be an over-simplification to say that the internet has only served to make 
life harder for the regime. As Martin observes, the introduction and proliferation of new 
faster and easier forms of communications such as the internet (websites like YouTube or 
its Chinese version, YouKu), mobile phones (with camera and video facilities), blogs, 
text messaging, and even faxing (since the mid to late 1990s) have provided people with 
more instruments through which the government can be questioned and possibly 
challenged. One reason for this is that problems are much more difficult to cover up. 
They have also served as a means in which popular discontent is channeled via instant 
messaging, the detailing of corruption, viral campaigns and so forth. However these 
conduits have also given the Party new instruments of political control. For example, 
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some Party officials pay close attention to internet content and text messages to indirectly 
monitor other lower level local officials in order to keep them in line and if necessary 
stamp out corruption and abuses early. The government has also formally and informally 
utilized the internet through various chat rooms and blogs etc. to propagate the Party’s 
stance and interpretation of events and topical issues (Martin, 2010: 20). 
 
The tremendous expansion of the media in the PRC however has also contributed to more 
vocal and potentially destabilizing expressions of public outrage and consequently greater 
pressure from below. In 1978 for example, there were a mere 186 newspapers and only a 
few magazine and broadcast outlets in the PRC. Present-day China however has over 
2,200 newspapers, 9,000 magazines, 1,000 radio stations and 420 TV stations along with 
an increasing number of cable TV stations (Yang, 2007:271). The majority of these 
media organizations depend on advertising revenue in order to survive and prosper. As 
argued by Liu, playing upon China’s so-called ‘victim culture’ or ‘sense of sadness’ 
(beiqing yishi) that was a consequence of China’s ‘Century of Humiliation’, these groups 
recognize the business merits of ‘publishing jingoistic, anti-foreign articles that pander to 
national sensitivities that always simmer with obvious benefits for the bottom line’(Liu, 
2005). Yinan He also contends that the rapid but still limited ‘recent opening up of 
Chinese society and its mass media has created more public space for bottom-up 
emotional venting and policy advocacy’. This bottom-up factor could ‘aggravate China’s 
political tensions with Japan by preventing Beijing from taking a moderate position or 
compromising on key sovereignty issues (such as the ECS disputes) in its diplomacy 
towards Japan’ (He, 2007:3).   
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This, however, is not to suggest that the Chinese government was entirely at the mercy of 
public opinion in the 2001 to 2008 period. It would be fairer to say that public opinion is 
certainly a more powerful consideration in foreign policy approaches than in the past. As 
briefly mentioned, the authorities are also able to exploit such media outlets to help stamp 
out demonstrations and portray government policies in a favorable light. Evidence of this 
was the manner in which the government’s Propaganda Department was able to use its 
considerable power to positively frame and influence the public’s perception via the 
internet and the media of the military’s response to the Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome (SARS) epidemic from November 2002 to July 2003. This was particularly 
interesting since the reality was that the military’s response was actually slow and 
delayed (Fewsmith, 2008: 245-248).  
 
Other challenges to a decisive response 
 
The initial sluggishness and dishonesty in which the PRC authorities chose to deal with 
the SARS crisis was also arguably reflective of the uncertainty caused by the top level 
divisions within the Politburo between the Jiang and Hu camp. The crisis also occurred at 
a time when Hu was awaiting Jiang’s formal stepping down as President during the 
annual NPC meeting in March 2003. Jiang had retired as General Secretary in November 
2002 but was also still seated in the powerful position of Central Military Council (CMC) 
Chairman. Hu’s ally, Wen Jiabao, was formally assigned the role of Premier at the same 
March meeting and this arguably strengthened Hu’s position. The following month, Hu 
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made the first concrete efforts to publicly and comprehensively deal with the SARS 
crisis. Hu’s successful management of the crisis and the Party’s appeal to patriotism and 
unity in addressing SARS won him and the Party applause and bolstered his standing 
among Party colleagues and the general public whose approval could be discerned on the 
internet even if the Party was responsible for some but not all aspects of this positive spin 
in relations to the crisis. In contrast, Jiang was perceived as aloof, as being absent from 
Beijing, and as having run away from the issue (Fewsmith, 2008: 245-248). Hu’s astute 
tackling of the SARS debacle was arguably reflective of his subtle political tactics but 
also of the strides that could be made on difficult issues such as the East China Sea if 
favourable political conditions arose. 
 
Despite this success, Hu knew that as long as Jiang remained as Chairman of the CMC 
that a cloud of doubt might descend over his own leadership and prevent him from 
defining his administration and stamping his own authority on policies. As Fewsmith 
observed, ‘if Hu Jintao did not assume it (Chairmanship of the CMC) then soon the 
rumor mill would start and sow doubts about Hu Jintao’s power and longevity as leader.’ 
Without this there would remain two centres of power in the PRC and the transfer of 
power would remain incomplete. The powerful military had also been seen to express 
‘very vocal, very public, and very inappropriate support’ for Jiang in 2003 even though 
significant rumblings among military circles were heard at the March 2003 NPC meeting 
about the problematic duality of power. The powerful precedent set by Deng of stepping 
down from the CMC partly in order to allow Jiang to consolidate his own role placed 
further pressure on Jiang to follow his example (Fewsmith, 2008: 254-255). The question 
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however was still when this would happen, and until Jiang formally stepped down, Hu’s 
position would remain uncertain and he would need to hold back before he would have 
the necessary power and leeway in which stamp his own mark on government policies. 
 
A Period of Discontent 
This dynamic period of gradual leadership transference coincided with the resurgence of 
the sensitive East China Sea disputes when the Chinese began exploration activities at the 
Chunxiao field in August 2003. It also ran alongside the aforementioned ‘new thinking’ 
debate at both popular and elite levels as well as the more elite confined ‘peaceful rise’ 
discourse that came in the context of a dramatic flurry in anti-Japanese activities and 
sentiment during that summer. June 23rd saw the first ever internet organised trip to 
attempt a landing on the Pinnacle Islands from mainland China. This ultimately 
unsuccessful adventure set off from a port in Zhejiang province and involved a mere 
thirteen people (ten mainlanders and three from Hong Kong), only to be hampered by the 
Japanese Coast Guard but not before the activists publicly burned a Japanese flag before 
turning back. Beijing’s public response to the incident was to assert that ‘Chinese 
sovereignty over the Islands is indisputable’ (Lai, 2003). Tokyo publicly responded in 
similar fashion (Gries, 2005:844).  
 
In July, savvy internet nationalists campaigned against the contracting of a $12 billion 
Beijing to Shanghai high-speed rail link to Japanese companies. Central to this campaign 
was an internet petition which collected as many as 90,000 signatures within a few weeks 
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and which they hoped would force the government to back down. This was a convincing 
example of the strength of anti-Japanese sentiment at the time and of the use of the 
internet to promote it. It also served as a warning to the government to be sensitive about 
public opinion. The rail link petition was handed in to the Ministry of Railways in Beijing 
on July 29th. One of the petition logos used contained a clenched fist and aroused appeals 
to socialist propaganda declaring that ‘Heaven and Earth will not tolerate traitors. We 
don’t want the Japanese bullet train. We refuse the use of Japanese products for the 
Beijing-Shanghai line’ (Deng, 2003). Within a matter of weeks, it was apparent that the 
petition and its surrounding campaign had sufficiently concerned Party officials and elites 
to persuade them to avoid any public cozying up with the Japanese. When the Japanese 
Minister of Transport Chikage Ogi visited the Chinese capital in early August, the 
reception she experienced was at best cool. Premier Wen Jiabao and railway ministry 
officials were not available to meet her, the Chinese and Japanese medias reported it as a 
snub (Kahn, 2003), and the once promising rail link deal was put off for the foreseeable 
future. This occurred at a time when the two neighbors should have been commemorating 
the twenty-fifth anniversary of the 1978 Peace and Friendship Treaty (Gries, 2005:844).  
 
On August 4th 2003, a toxic gas leak occurred when construction workers accidentally 
dug up mustard gas barrels left behind by the Japanese Imperial Army in World War Two 
resulting in the death of one worker and injured forty-two others in the north-eastern 
Chinese city of Qiqihar (China Daily, 19/10/2003).This incident set off a wave of public 
revulsion and anger on the street and on the internet with photos of the victims and their 
burns published in the papers (Gries, 2005:845), and was a bitter reminder of the 
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lingering effects of Japan’s dark history in China. It also spurred the organization of a 
petition calling for compensation and a definitive commitment by Japan to resolve the 
abandoned chemical weapons issue which resulted in the collection of over a million 
signatures (Roy, 2005:203).  
 
August 19th 2003 represented the real opening salvos in the resurgent ECS tensions, when 
Beijing finalized exploration contracts with major energy firms in both China and abroad 
including Shell and the US giant UNOCAL permitting them to engage in billion dollar 
exploration and production gas projects in the contested sea, particularly in the Chunxiao 
field area (Takahashi, 2004: 1-4). The field first seriously factored into Beijing’s energy 
objectives in 2000 when a fifth test well in the area showed enough potential reserves to 
justify exploration and production. The ultimate decision to extract gas from the said field 
also complemented Beijing’s stated aim of diversifying its energy supplies to major urban 
and industrial centers along its eastern coastline (Zha, 2008). In a context of numerous 
negative diplomatic and public gesturing during what was arguably the nadir of post-
normalization ties, the Chinese exploration decision could not have come at a worse time. 
The unwillingness of Beijing to step back from this decision may arguably have been fed 
by frustration over Tokyo’s stubborn refusal to respect the Chinese point of view on 
issues such as the Yasukuni shrine. 
 
In September, the Abandoned Chemical Weapons (ACW) petition organizers submitted 
their appeals to the Japanese Embassy in Beijing. Over the next two months, the two 
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governments agreed to a financial settlement to deal with the lingering issue of 
abandoned chemical weapons in China (Roy, 2005:203) but this did little to cool the fires 
of Chinese anger in the context of the deep hurt felt by PM Koizumi’s repeated shrine 
visits since 2001. As well as the ACW issue, the media also revealed that the police were 
investigating a three day orgy (from September 16th to 18th) involving nearly 400 Osaka 
businessmen and several hundred Chinese prostitutes at a prestigious hotel in the 
southern Chinese city of Zhuhai. To add insult to injury, the orgy coincided with the 72nd 
anniversary of Japan’s invasion of North-east China in 1931 (China Daily, 18/11/2003). 
As with earlier incidents, the Zhuhai scandal received nation-wide media and internet 
attention with many chat-rooms peppered with hateful anti-Japanese posts (Gries, 
2005:844). On the diplomatic front, an official from the Chinese Foreign Ministry 
described the incident as ‘odious’ and that it had ‘harmed the feelings of Chinese people 
and also seriously harmed Japan’s international image’(Sydney Morning Herald Online, 
01/10/2003).  
 
When a small group of Japanese exchange students and their Japanese teacher performed 
an ill-judged, silly, and sexually suggestive dance on stage as part of a party piece at a 
university cultural festival in Xian in late October, it sparked protest marches of up to 
1,000 people, elicited widespread condemnation, violence against other Japanese students 
and residents, and attacks on Japan-related property in surrounding areas. The police had 
to be called in to restore order and protect foreign students on campus while the Chinese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned a Japanese embassy official to air the 
government’s protests. The Japanese at the center of the incident later published an 
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apology for their actions (Takahara, 2008:14-17;Roy, 2005:203; Watts, 2003). In 
December, the Japanese car maker Toyota was forced to make an apology after angry 
protests from the public over two seemingly innocuous car ads that were published in a 
Chinese car magazine. The ads were widely interpreted as implying Japanese superiority 
over China and as having alluded to Japan’s occupation (Roy, 2005:204). As one Chinese 
newspaper saw it, by late 2003, ‘Chinese feelings of hatred for the Japanese are rising 
without interruption’ (Sing Pao Daily (Hong Kong) 01/11/2003) in an atmosphere where 
frequent anti-Japanese incidents were occurring in almost every corner of the country 
(Gries, 2005:843-844). Such Chinese ill-feeling extended to most if not all issues 
involving Japan including the renewed East China Sea tensions. 
 
 
Worsening Relations: 2004 and 2005 
 
 
Beijing’s strong protests against the shrine visits persisted into 2004 with PRC vice 
foreign minister Wang Yi requesting an immediate meeting with Japan’s charge d’affairs 
ad interim Chikahito Harada to lodge a complaint against Koizumi’s fourth visit in as 
many years to the shrine on New Year’s Day 2004.  The meeting was broadly covered by 
China’s major news outlets such as Xinhua News Agency where Wang was reported to 
have told Harada that the controversial shrine hosts the spirits of Class A war criminals 
‘whose hands were stained with the blood of Chinese and Asian peoples’ and that the 
Japanese PM’s persistent visits encouraged the further deterioration of the political 
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foundations of friendship between the two countries. Wang continued by protesting that 
‘Chinese people absolutely cannot accept this type of betrayal.’ The same Xinhua issue 
included an editorial castigating Koizumi’s behavior as evidence of his government’s real 
attitude towards Japan’s history and stated that Koizumi’s claimed contemplation of his 
country’s past was a ‘phony introspection on lips only’ (Xinhua, 01/01/2004). 
 
This ill-feeling extended to the East China Sea with a failed attempt on January 15th by 
Chinese nationalists on two vessels to land on the Pinnacle Islands with the intention of 
erecting a monument emphasizing China’s claim (Blanchard, 2006: 220). JMSDF patrol 
boats allegedly had to ram the two Chinese fishing boats involved in order to hold them 
off (SinoDefence.com, 2009) Such endeavours ultimately bore fruit two months later 
when seven activists landed on the main island, forcing the Japanese immigration police 
to detain them for illegally entering Japanese territory. In keeping with normal practice, 
Beijing responded angrily while on the streets the incident elicited three days of small 
scale protests in the Chinese capital (Blanchard, 2006: 221). In April, Tokyo decided to 
respond to such incidents by positioning two Japan Coast Guard (JCG) vessels near the 
disputed islands so as to block attempts by activists seeking to land on them (Fravel, 
2010:152). When Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi visited Beijing in early 
April 2004, Premier Wen Jiabao used the occasion to reiterate China’s claims to the 
islands (Blanchard, 2006: 220-1). During bilateral talks a few weeks later, in a reflection 
perhaps of Chinese concerns over what they saw as increased Japanese expansionism, 
PRC diplomats stated that they would not recognise Japan’s EEZ around the 
Okinotorishima atoll on the grounds that it was not an islet as claimed by the Japanese 
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but rather just a collection of rocks (Yoshikawa, 2005:52). On April 23rd, a bus belonging 
to a Japanese nationalist group rammed into the Chinese consulate in Osaka, Japan to 
protest China’s claims to the ECS islands (SinoDefence.com, 2009). The Abandoned 
Chemical Weapons (ACW) issue also raised its head again in May when eight Chinese 
construction workers in Qiqihar were injured after accidentally disturbing buried 
canisters. This renewed demands for Tokyo to comprehensively deal the disposal of such 
munitions (Roy, 2005:203). 
 
In June, there were frictions over the ECS demarcation issue surrounding China’s 
construction of a new drilling facility in the Chunxiao field close to the median line. The 
Japanese requested geological data in order to ease their suspicions that the Chinese 
might be siphoning resources from under the median line. On June 29th, Japan’s Ministry 
of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) headed by the nationalistic minister Shoichi 
Nakagawa declared to the media that Japanese vessels would commence exploration 
activities in areas east of the median line but including areas claimed by the PRC 
(Przystup, 2004:9). The PRC’s Foreign Ministry reiterated its rejection of Japan’s median 
line and warned that this unprecedented decision by the Japanese was from their 
perspective an intolerable violation of its sovereignty, and was provocative and 
dangerous (Blanchard, 2006: 221). On June 30th, Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs 
Chen Guofeng summoned the Japanese ambassador to the PRC to protest Japan’s 
undersea survey plans (Przystup, 2004:9). Tokyo for its part re-emphasized the worrying 
frequency of PLAN survey ships and marine research vessels in sensitive areas of the 
East China Sea (Blanchard, 2006: 221). Throughout all these rising tensions and negative 
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incidents, the Chinese leadership sought to quietly manage public anger over the ECS 
problems in a controlled way. For example, on July 19th, authorities in Fujian province in 
southern China prevented ten members of the ‘China Federation for Defending the 
Diaoyu Islands’ from setting out to land on the Pinnacle Islands (SinoDefence.com, 2009) 
on the grounds that they were using Chinese fishing vessels for non-commercial purposes 
(Fravel, 2010:153).   
 
When the Tokyo metropolitan government’s board of education gave its approval in 
August to a controversial textbook by the right-wing ‘Japanese Society for History 
Textbook Reform’ which downplayed the scale of the Nanking Massacre, it was widely 
condemned by the Chinese (Roy, 2005:202). Virulent anti-Japanese sentiment was 
evident at the Asian Cup soccer tournament in early August 2004 when Chinese 
supporters in Beijing, Chongqing and Jinan subjected the Japanese team to a barrage of 
insults and unsavoury behaviour such as attacking the team bus with bottles. During the 
televised final between Japan and China, in which the Japanese ultimately prevailed on a 
score-line of 3-1, the home fans were alleged to have chanted ‘Kill!Kill!Kill!’ and ‘May a 
big sword decapitate the Japanese!’ (New York Times, 09/08/2004). When the Ministry of 
Railways attempted to revitalize the dormant rail link issue in late August by granting the 
contract to a collection of predominantly Japanese companies, the decision was attacked 
within 24 hours by a group called the ‘Patriot Alliance Web’ (www.1931–9–18.org) who 
had in the same short period gathered up to 69,000 online signatures demanding a 
reversal of the agreement. Rather than defer the deal again and further jeopardize a 
project essential to China’s development, the government instead chose the risky option 
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of closing down the website (Cai, 2004). In September, Tokyo repeated its request from 
China for hard data on its exploration activities in the ECS. Beijing responded with the 
expected refusal but offered some hope by proposing that the two countries begin talks on 
possible joint exploration (Blanchard, 2006: 221).  
 
During the first round of a series of bilateral negotiations over the ECS on October 19th 
the Chinese government also announced that it would engage in bilateral discussions to 
discuss conflicting claims over exploration activities in the ECS (SinoDefence.com, 
2009). Shortly afterwards, the Japanese requested emergency discussions with Beijing 
following intelligence reports that the Chinese had stepped up its exploration activities in 
areas disputed by Japan (Blanchard, 2006: 221). Amid these frictions, Royal-Dutch Shell 
and Unocal pulled out of an agreed ECS project with China, citing a lower than expected 
value assessment of the project. It was believed however that Japanese protests over the 
exploration activities might also have contributed to the decision to withdraw (Zha, 
2008). In the same month the People’s Daily expressed concerns that the Japanese 
military was intent on setting up a sophisticated detection system in the East China Sea 
and also noted that ‘Since the Chinese-Japan dispute over resources of East China 
surfaced, Japan has enhanced all kinds of military deployment in this sea area’ (People’s 
Daily Online, 09/11/2004). By the end of the following month, the two sides participated 
in talks again with the only forward progress being a commitment to continue talking 
(Blanchard, 2006: 221). When Hu and Koizumi met up with each other during a mini-
summit on the sidelines of APEC summit in Chile on November 21st 2004, Hu claimed 
that the shrine visits were the principal cause of the frozen bilateral relationship and drew 
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attention to the fact that 2005 would be a very sensitive year for such historical issues 
because it marked the sixtieth anniversary of the CCP’s victory over fascism (Asahi 
Shimbun, 22/11/2004). Despite such strong public and official protests against the visits 
by the Chinese, Koizumi’s continued visits to the shrine inevitably led to a freeze in high-
level visits to Japan and China by the leaders of each country. This freeze served as a 
major symbol of high-level tensions between the two neighbors (Wan, 2006:17).  In this 
distrustful and negative bilateral context, the ability of the Chinese leadership to adopt a 
publicly moderate or innovative approach to the ECS challenges was all the more 
constrained.  
 
Hu’s balancing act 
This public reality thus made public positive and constructive approaches towards Japan 
all the more difficult for leaders such as Hu as they attempted to gradually consolidate 
their leadership. In order to avoid a disastrous severance of ties with Japan which could 
reflect badly on his diplomatic skills, Hu had to balance public gesturing with private 
maneuvering which arguably exemplified the tight-rope between two legimating 
strategies that Chinese elites must walk. The appointment of Li Zhaoxing to the post of 
Foreign Minister at the 16th National Congress in 2003 (after he had defected from the 
Shanghai Faction) was another notable example of Hu’s strategic balancing in terms of 
personnel (Lam, 2006). This appointment permitted Hu to assign blame on Li for the 
worsening ties with Japan at a time with the anti-Japanese movement was in the 
ascendancy, and as Jiang’s star gradually began to wane. Li was also the public face who 
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had the unenviable role of banning continuing anti-Japanese demonstrations and warning 
the public not to get involved (Hughes, 2008:267).  
 
While this was the public face of bilateral ties, Hu utilised his own trusted protégés to 
engage in quiet behind the scenes diplomacy to maintain vital and at least cordial 
relations with Tokyo. For example, in the summer of 2004, Hu positioned a Japan hand 
and fluent Japanese speaker, Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi, as the PRC’s ambassador 
to Japan. Another positive move was permitted after this with the ‘mini summit’ on the 
sidelines of the APEC summit in Chile in November 2004 between the two countries’ 
leaders (Lam, 2006). Hu’s aforementioned public gesturing on the shrine issue while 
striving to repair top-level diplomatic links in private arguably reflected his dual strategy 
toward Japan and his domestic audience.  
 
2005 – the Nadir of Bilateral Ties  
2005 would come to represent the worst year in the bilateral relationship since the 
normalization of ties in 1972. In January, the People’s Daily ran an opinion piece that 
poured scorn on reports of Japan’s plans to deal with a possible invasion by a ‘foreign’ 
force of Japan’s southern islands in the ECS and areas near it (People’s Daily, 
18/01/2005). On February 4th, the Chinese Foreign Ministry reiterated its call for Sino-
Japanese disagreements in the East China Sea to be resolved through negotiation and 
dialogue (People’s Daily, 04/02/2005). On February 9th however, renewed ECS tensions 
developed after the Japanese government decided to place a lighthouse which had been 
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constructed by Japanese nationalists on the main Pinnacle Island in 1988 under ‘state 
control.’ In protest the Chinese Foreign Ministry declared the act a severe violation of 
Chinese territory. There was also a small demonstration in front of the Japanese embassy 
in Beijing (Blanchard, 2006: 222).  
 
February 2005 also saw a very serious development from the Chinese perspective with 
the ‘Joint Statement of the US-Japan Consultative Committee.’ This joint statement 
formulated by the top foreign affairs and defence officials in Japan and the US caused 
consternation by stating that the ‘peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan 
Strait’ was a ‘common strategic objective.’ This move further raised the stakes in the 
ECS disputes because as Roy notes, ‘now and through the medium term, China’s greatest 
Japan-related strategic concern is the possibility of Japanese involvement in the defense 
of Taiwan’ (Roy, 2005:199). Unsurprisingly, the immediate riposte by the Chinese was to 
angrily protest that the Japanese were directly intruding into China’s domestic affairs 
(Bishop, 2004). The Chinese sense of injustice vis-à-vis Japan on strategic and historical 
issues also seemed to be justified by similar territorial and historical problems with Japan 
involving Russia and South Korea that caught the headlines in early 2005. As one scholar 
asserted ‘From a Chinese perspective, Japan’s failure to reflect on its aggression in the 
past is the root problem of Japan’s recent assertiveness vis-à-vis its neighbours’ (Wan, 
2006:258). In early April, the Japanese government granted exploration rights to 
Japanese companies to commence activities in disputed areas of the ECS. This decision 
followed the PRC’s refusal to cease its own activities after official Japanese requests.  
Beijing’s response was to repeat its oft stated line that it had never recognized the median 
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line and declared that the Japanese decision was a major provocation. It also warned the 
Japanese to desist from further activities in the ECS that could exacerbate the disputes 
and repeated its call for Tokyo to shelf the demarcation issue and instead focus on joint 
development (Blanchard, 2006: 222).  
 
During the lowest point of bilateral ties in April 2005, the China Youth Daily’s Tokyo 
Correspondent offered a very insightful view on the significance of the disputes, stating 
‘The conflict over East China Sea resources will cause the contradictions and opposition 
in Sino-Japanese relations to continue to escalate, and they have already reached a 
dangerous state of direct resistance.’ The People’s Daily proclaimed that ‘The key to 
breaking out of historical difficulty and opening up the future is in Japan’s hands’ (BBC 
News, 16/04/2005). Chinese Vice Foreign Ministry Wu Dawei also declared that the 
relationship had reached its lowest point since the normalization of ties in 1972 (BBC 
News, 18/04/2005).  
 
In this context, Hu had to deal with pressure at home not to publicly give an inch to the 
Japanese on any issue, not least the ECS disputes. With the sensitive Yasukuni issue still 
hanging over the relationship, there was tremendous support for a strong posture against 
the Japanese where crucially even those who appreciated the importance of amicable ties 
with Japan for China supported a tough approach on the issue (Xinhua, 26/11/2004). 
Surveys carried out by both Japanese and Chinese organizations in this period also 
reported the fact that a mere 11% of Chinese people viewed Sino-Japanese ties as good or 
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very good with 55% stating that relations were bad or very bad with a high 53% claiming 
that they had no affinity for Japan (with only 12% claiming they had) (Genron-NPO.net, 
2005). 
 
By the first half of 2005, Hu’s political position had been strengthened by the manner in 
which Jiang was gradually sidelined and subtly ushered away from the centre of power.  
In September 2004, Jiang stepped down from the powerfully symbolic position of head of 
the Party’s Central Military Commission (CMC). This was followed in March 2005 when 
he formally retired as head of the state’s CMC. Both positions were filled by Hu thus 
placing him in the top three roles of General Secretary, President, and Chairman of the 
CMC and represented a key stage in the leadership transition (Hughes, 2008:265;268). 
The more assertive action taken by the Chinese authorities to stamp out anti-Japanese 
protests after mid-April was arguably indicative of Hu’s stronger position. These moves 
came following initially unsuccessful attempts by the authorities to place curbs on 
escalating anti-Japan demonstrations since mid-March which had arisen in protest of 
Tokyo’s call for a UNSC seat and its approval of a controversial history textbook. The 
Party leadership of course maintained its own public criticism of Japan throughout the 
extended period of protests. The regular pattern in March-April 2005 was of the Chinese 
authorities permitting protesters to let off steam and then quietly taking preventive 
measures to reduce the chances of mass expressions of anti-Japanese sentiments from 
seriously hurting the relationship or morphing into anti-government protests (Roy, 
2005:191).  
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On April 6th for example, the Party’s Propaganda Department placed a comprehensive 
media blackout (websites, TV stations, and newspapers) in advance of the planned April 
9th protests in Beijing. Despite these measures, by the third weekend of demonstrations, 
protests were taking place in 25 cities throughout the state and it was apparent that a 
stronger response would be necessary (Cheng Ming, (Hong Kong), May 2005).  By the 
third week, it had also become clear that protests were starting to get out of control, were 
starting to deal with non-Japan related issues, and were threatening the stability of the 
regime. In the south-east for example upwards of 30,000 townspeople had violently 
clashed with officials and the police over pollution problems in the area (South China 
Morning Post, 12/04/2005). In Shenzhen, over 10,000 workers went on strike at a 
Japanese-owned factory to demand trade union rights (Washington Post, 26/04/2005). In 
Beijing, some 2000 retired military personnel from throughout China held a pensions-
related sit-down outside the PLA’s headquarters in Beijing (Reuters, 15/04/2005). By 
April 16th the government knew that something decisive had to be done to halt the tide of 
anger (Shirk, 2008:175). In this context, Hu took more assertive action to restore order. 
The events of March-April 2005 must have served as a reminder to Party elites as to the 
danger of initially anti-Japanese rallies transforming into anti-government riots and 
demonstrations. They may also have been seen as a timely warning with regards to the 
risks to stability posed by those, at the political and public level, who encouraged and 
promoted anti-Japanese sentiment and protests. In addition, Hu’s successful response in 
forcefully calming anti-Japanese protests after mid-April highlighted the co-relation 
between a stronger leadership position and more favourable approaches to Japan-related 
controversies of which the East China Sea problems were just one. Another illustration of 
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this decisiveness from Hu was the ability of the authorities to clamp down assertively on 
any planned protests surrounding the anniversary of the May 4th movement when 
students demonstrated in 1919 against a post-First World War treaty that granted 
formerly German territories in China to Japan. In 2005, this involved closing off 
Tiananmen Square and holding a coming-of-age ceremony there instead to head off any 
potential protests (Shirk, 2008:144). 
 
On the public diplomatic front, the link between sensitive nationalistic controversies and 
their public effect on relations was clearly illustrated by the sudden cancellation of a high 
profile visit in May 2005 to Japan by Chinese Vice Premier Wu Yi, ostensibly due to 
other unspecified ‘domestic duties’ (BBC News, 18/04/2005;23/05/2005). The scheduled 
visit was aimed at visibly stabilising bilateral ties after the anti-Japanese demonstrations 
that erupted throughout China in April 2005. Wu, who was reluctant to make the trip in 
the first place due to the potential political consequences for her reputation, also hoped to 
persuade Japanese business leaders to convince their Prime Minister to cease his trips to 
Yasukuni. In reality, the mid-trip cancellation was a protest by Wu against troublesome 
remarks made about Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. Wu also used the 
cancellation to demonstrate against the Japanese government’s handling of other 
historically sensitive issues (Wan, 2006:17) such as Taiwan and the history textbook 
issue to name but a few which added to the negative interactions between the two 
capitals. Shirk provides some interesting and telling insights into this episode and 
arguably the difficulties posed for Hu as long as Koizumi continued with his shrine visits, 
amongst other unhelpful diplomatic gestures. Shirk describes how Wu, the PRC’s 
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highest-ranking female leader, made the most of the situation by public grandstanding 
and posturing against the Japanese after the PM had defended his right to visit the shrine. 
Even though Wu’s unsanctioned cancellation was a clear breach of diplomatic protocol 
which privately angered Hu, it won her many plaudits in China and bolstered her image 
amongst the Chinese public. On the ‘Strong Nation’ website for example, one netizen 
commented ‘Every single patriotic Chinese should applaud Wu Yi’s ‘disrespectful’ 
cancellation… without it Japanese leaders’ evil characters would not be exposed.’ A head 
of a major think-tank in the PRC noted that the General Secretary could have and should 
have fired her for the breach but to have done so would have been political suicide for Hu 
(Shirk, 2008:175). 
 
Trouble at Sea 
In this context, it was not necessarily surprising to witness little or no substantial progress 
being made with regards to the East China Sea disagreements. In June 2005, trouble 
flared up again when the Koizumi government proclaimed that 18 Japanese citizens had 
officially indicated the Pinnacle Islands as their place of residence in the citizens’ 
registry. A spokesperson for the PRC’s foreign ministry asserted that they would never 
accept unilateral Japanese activities to strengthen their claim and emphasized that the 
islands were Chinese (Blanchard, 2006: 222). In July, Ishigaki island assembly members 
in Okinawa prefecture (of which the Pinnacle Islands are a part) submitted a motion 
calling on the mayor and assembly members to inspect the islands. Beijing again 
protested and angrily declared in the People’s Daily that Japan ‘not only connives at the 
right-wing groups provocative activities, but also goes back on its promise of not taking 
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unilateral actions and tries in vain to capture the Diaoyu Islands as so-called Japanese 
territory by inter alia starting to rent the islands in 2002 and passing resolutions.’ The 
article continued by cautioning that ‘If Japan continues to take unilateral actions time and 
again to challenge China’s territorial sovereignty, it can only worsen China-Japan 
relations’ (People’s Daily Online, 21/06/2005). Less than a day later, China’s Foreign 
Ministry attacked the manner in which the Japanese Coast Guard had dealt with Chinese 
fishing vessels and their crews which had been fishing in contested waters. It also 
complained that the median line had been drawn without consultation with the PRC and 
that Japan had turned down Beijing’s suggestions for joint development (People’s Daily 
Online, 22/06/2005).  
 
Arguably the most serious development in the post-2002 ECS disagreements was the July 
2005 decision announced by Japan’s nationalistic METI Minister Shoichi Nakagawa that 
the Japanese government had for the first time given test drilling rights in the East China 
Sea to a Japanese company, Teikoku (Imperial) Oil. As noted by Blanchard, what was 
ominous about this decision was that the Japanese granted these rights in a very sensitive 
area where PRC exploration activities were already taking place. The Chinese position 
was summed up by a Foreign Ministry spokesperson who advised the media that ‘If 
Japan persists in granting drilling rights to companies in disputed waters, it will cause a 
serious infringement of China’s sovereign rights’ (BBC News, 14/07/2005; People’s 
Daily, 14/07/2005). On July 21st, the People’s Daily ran a lengthy opinion piece which 
denounced the Teikoku decision by Japan as well as its decision to assign Japanese 
names to what the PRC saw as Chinese oil and gas fields in the ECS in order to emphasis 
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its claims (People’s Daily Online, 21/07/2005). The oil and gas fields in question were 
Chunxiao (Shirakaba), Duanqiao (Kusunoki), and Leng Quan (Kikyo), Longqing 
(Asunaro), and Tianwaitian (Kashi) (Drifte. 2008a:13). The piece warned that such 
actions by Japan would ‘make the ECS the most dangerous area for possible eruption of 
conflicts between the two countries’ and called attention to the fact that the Chinese 
government had protested Japanese activities on numerous occasions in the past. The 
article also declared that the PRC’s Embassy in Japan had notified the Japanese Foreign 
Ministry that the Chinese Coast Guard (MSA) would persist in patrolling ‘China’s’ EEZ 
(People’s Daily, 21/07/2005).  
 
Such negative views could also be seen in a July 2005 article in the Xinhua newspaper 
when it cautioned that ‘Giving Teikoku the go-ahead to test drill is a move which makes 
conflict between the two nations inevitable, though what form this clash will take is hard 
to tell.’ The broadsheet continued by asserting that the Teikoku move ‘is not simply 
about new sources of energy’ but that, ‘It reveals plainly the country’s intention to take 
the China Diaoyu islets for good’ and warned that ‘With the issue inconclusive, the nod 
from today’s Japanese leaders will only serve to fan the flames of trouble’ (Xinhua, 
16/07/2005). 
 
Less than six hours after ‘Sina.com’, the PRC’s internet news portal, had announced the 
decision by the Tokyo government, some 2400 people had posted messages of ‘strong 
indignation and condemnation’ such as ‘it is an encroachment of China’s foremost 
interest’ and ‘Japan intends to hinder China’s development by the act.’ The official 
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Xinhua news agency also reported these angry internet postings, which according to 
Shirk, ensured that senior Chinese officials could not ignore them (Shirk, 2008:147). 
Xinhua also publicized the views of a Zhejiang University professor who proclaimed 
‘Japan’s ambition of seizing oil and gas resources on the continental shelf of the ECS is a 
new form of its expansionist and invading ideology during World War Two’ (Xinhua, 
18/07/2005). 
 
Similarly angry sentiments about the July 2005 licensing decision by Tokyo were 
likewise shared by Ji when he wrote in 2006 that for China, any unilateral developments 
by a foreign state on any part of the continental shelf are regarded as a violation of the 
PRC’s territory and sovereignty.  According to Ji, the decision by the Koizumi 
government in July 2005 for example to grant Teikoku Oil Company permission to carry 
out experimental drilling in areas just east of the median line represented a dangerous 
escalation because Beijing views any actual and unilateral drilling in disputed areas on 
the continental shelf as an encroachment into its maritime territory, and ‘an infringement 
of China’s rights and interests.’ This move by Tokyo in 2005 could be attributed to 
‘growing pressure in Japan for the government to seek a tougher negotiation approach by 
using the test-drilling option as leverage’ but Ji warned less than a year later that ‘if the 
test-drilling takes place, the possibility of armed confrontation is not to be excluded’(Ji, 
2006:1). Despite what they viewed as provocation by the Koizumi government, the 
PRC’s leaders still sought to manage the disputes in a way that prevented Chinese 
nationalist groups from hijacking and complicating the issue. In the same month as the 
Teikoku move for example, Chinese authorities raided the offices of the ‘China 
254 
 
Federation for Defending the Diaoyu Islands’ in response to the organization’s activities 
during the mass anti-Japan demonstrations in April 2005 (Fravel, 2010:153). At the 
public diplomatic level however, there was little or no substantial progress in addressing 
the ECS disagreements throughout 2005.   
 
In September, Nakagawa announced to the media that the Chinese had in spite of 
Japanese objections started production activities at the Tianwaitian (Kashi) field in an 
area close to Japan’s EEZ (Onishi and French, 2005). September had also seen one of the 
most dangerous incidents ever with regards to the East China Sea disputes. When a 
Japanese exploration expedition approached the Chunxiao field area, it was countered by 
a fleet of five PLAN vessels, including the advanced Sovermenny guided missile 
destroyer (Manicom, 2008a). The ships were observed by a Japanese patrol plane near 
the Chunxiao gas field. Worryingly, this was the first time that People’s Liberation Army 
Navy (PLAN) warships were present in that area of the ECS with some reports stating 
that a Chinese navy vessel allegedly pointed its anti-aircraft cannon at a JMSDF’s P3-C 
surveillance plane flying near the Chunxiao gas rig (Onishi and French, 2005;Curtain, 
2005). 
 
The seriousness of the September incident and the swift deterioration in approaches to the 
ECS disputes in the previous two years convinced decision-makers in both states of the 
urgency of stabilising the disagreements. At the end of September, the two governments 
renewed their attempts to iron out their ECS problems through diplomacy (People’s 
Daily, 21/09/2005). The third round of bilateral ECS negotiations (the first in October 
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2004 and the second in May 2005) held from September 30th to October 1st took place 
amid an appreciation by both sides that the East China Sea was an issue which needed to 
be urgently addressed. A day before these discussions began however, the Chinese 
announced that they had set up a ‘reserve vessel squadron’ in the ECS (AFP, 
29/09/2005). Beijing also declared that this squadron had the ability to fight wars and 
eliminate any possible obstacles at sea (Valencia, 2006:1). One of the sticking points of 
the late September/early October discussions was the Japanese request for geological data 
from China to ease their anxieties about possible siphoning. They also asked that Beijing 
order a halt of production and related activities in contested areas. In addition, Japan 
voiced its concerns about the activities of PLAN vessels but on a positive note, submitted 
a joint development proposal. While the data request was turned down, the Chinese 
agreed to carefully consider Japan’s joint development ideas (Japan Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 01/10/2005; Curtain, 2005).  
 
A prolonged problem with the joint development concept has been the scope and exact 
location of such projects. During the October talks for example, Japan argued that joint 
development should include areas where the PRC believes it has incontrovertible rights 
such as the Chunxiao field which lies behind the controversial median line. Beijing 
suspected that the Japanese were attempting to corner the Chinese into indirectly 
accepting this dividing line by confining negotiations to Chunxiao and its environs 
without discussing demarcation vis-à-vis the Pinnacle Islands. China tried to counter this 
by arguing that any joint projects should be only confined to areas between the median 
line and the axis of the continental shelf (Beijing Review, 30/03/2006). Japan however 
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refused this out of hand on the grounds that they believed that Chunxiao or at least parts 
of it was certainly within Japan’s EEZ and as such joint projects should also be 
considered in areas on the PRC’s side of the median line (Pan, 2009:140). The lack of 
progress in negotiations and the sequence of events that resulted in the near miss of 
September may arguably have convinced Koizumi and his cabinet to replace the hawkish 
Nakagawa with a more China friendly politician, Toshihiro Nikai (Drifte, 2008b: 3). This 
was certainly a shrewd move with eventual positive consequences for the ECS problems. 
This was not to become apparent however until later with problems still persisting in the 
weeks immediately after Nikai’s appointment.  
 
Despite the obvious appreciation by the two neighbors in October 2005 of the urgent 
need to deal with or least manage the East China Sea disputes, the Chinese were 
dismayed by the stubbornness of the Japanese leadership with regards to dealing 
sensitively with the relationship and refraining from what they saw as harmful 
provocations. When Koizumi went to the Yasukuni shrine again on October 17th 2005, 
the Chinese Foreign Ministry suggested a few days later that there was little hope of a 
meeting between Japanese and Chinese leaders on the sidelines of the APEC summit in 
Pusan on November 18th-19th 2005 (China News Agency, 25/10/2005). The appointment 
of the notoriously hawkish Taro Aso as Foreign Minister (October 2005 – August 2007) 
in late October may also have been interpreted by the Chinese leadership as a move 
which represented an unwillingness by Tokyo to sincerely repair bilateral relations or to 
carefully choreograph ties. This seemed to be confirmed by a number of offensive 
diplomatic gestures by Aso over the following months. For example, in December the 
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new Foreign Minister publicly declared that the PRC’s military build-up was a threat to 
the security of the nation (Japan Times, 23/12/2005). In February 2006, Aso publicly 
recommended that Emperor Akihito should visit the Yasukuni shrine. He also contended 
that Taiwan’s high educational achievements were a product of Japan’s 50-year control 
of the island (1895-1945) and the ‘enlightened’ policies of the Japanese occupiers (New 
York Times, 13/02/2006). In terms of the ECS, Aso seemed to up the ante when he 
allegedly stated that ‘Japan will never accept China’s latest suggestion of jointly 
exploring the ECS resources and Japan might possibly take measures to confront China if 
it conducts gas and oil exploration in the ECS’ (BBC News, 16/03/2006). By late 2005 
and early 2006, while ties were not as bad as they had been from April to September 
2005, diplomatic relations were still troubled by unfavorable political circumstances in 
each state, public outrage over the behavior of the other side, and lingering distrust and 
anger. These factors contributed to an atmosphere which was not conducive to reaching a 
conflict-prevention agreement or otherwise on the ECS anytime soon.  
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The Road to ‘Principled Consensus’: 2006 to 2008 
 
The New Year of 2006 saw some glimmers of hope on the horizon even though negative 
diplomatic gestures in the late 2005 and early 2006 period may not have indicated this. 
The aforementioned replacement of the nationalistic Nakagawa by a more cool-headed 
Toshihiro Nikai as METI minister on October 31st 2005 had a positive influence on 
calming the ECS frictions after the lows of 2005. One of Nikai’s first helpful moves in 
his new position was to terminate East China Sea exploration applications by Japanese 
energy companies and push for a negotiated approach. His visit to Beijing in February 
2006 (February 22nd to 23rd) also pointed to a cautious attempt, particularly by China, to 
repair relations with regards to cases such as the ECS. It also symbolised an improvement 
because Nikai’s visit was the first by a senior high-level Japanese figure since Koizumi 
met Premier Wen Jiabao at a trilateral state meeting in Vientiane, Laos in November 
2004 (Asahi Shimbun, 23/02/2006; Zaobao, 25/02/2006). The Chinese leadership 
acknowledged Japan’s positive gesture by ordering a halt in activities at the controversial 
Chunxiao gas field, which lay at the heart of the post-2002 disagreements (Interfax, 
02/06/2006; Zaobao, 23/02/2006).  
 
The ongoing shrine visits however meant that a more public rapprochement would have 
been more difficult to sell. This was evidenced on March 7th when the PRC’s Foreign 
Minister Li Zhaoxing stated that the ‘continued visits by Japanese leaders to the war-
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related Yasukuni Shrine were the top cause for Japan’s strained political ties with the 
PRC’ (Kyodo, 07/03/2006). On the more subtle diplomatic front however, considerable 
progress on the ECS was made in May when the two governments agreed to shelve their 
disagreements over the sea’s demarcation because this would require too much time 
before being resolved to everyone’s satisfaction. Instead, the two sides chose to negotiate 
the possibility of joint development (Sankei Shimbun 31/05/2006).  Hu’s strengthened 
position within the Party elite as Chinese leader also arguably favored a more 
constructive tackling of the points of contention in the East China Sea. It also permitted 
the General Secretary to guide the relationship and manage anti-Japanese sentiment in a 
more positive direction that would eventually see the ‘new starting point’ in relations 
after Koizumi stepped down as PM in September 2006 to be replaced by Shinzo Abe. 
Such subtle moves by Hu were illustrated in the summer and autumn period of 2006. His 
anti-corruption campaign of June would inadvertently result in outcomes that also 
reinforced his position. Hu’s earlier elevation to the chairmanship of the CMC in March 
2005 followed by his later promotion of ten senior officers to the rank of full general 
meant that his relationship with the military was further reinforced in the summer and 
autumn months of 2006 (Fewsmith, 2008: 270).  
 
Behind the scenes, Hu’s diplomatic manoeuvrings helped him to lead the country toward 
a new chapter in bilateral relations. His appointment of Vice Foreign Minister Dai 
Bingguo as director of the CCP Central Office for Foreign Affairs allowed him to quietly 
set in motion a sequence of events with the Japanese Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs 
Yachi Shotaro which resulted in Abe’s symbolic trip to China in late 2006 and arguably 
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gradually paved the way for a more constructive management of frictions related to the 
ECS. Dai’s role was politically weightier than Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing who 
assumed the public and less flexible and posturing face of Chinese diplomacy toward 
Japan (Hughes, 2008:267-268). Hu’s manoeuvres were in a period when the next 
People’s Congress (the 17th People’s Congress) in the autumn of 2007 was beginning to 
emerge on the horizon. In this context Hu was eager to consolidate his position and begin 
to implement his policies in advance of a congress which would arguably define his 
leadership. This however would require Hu subtly asserting his authority more directly 
over the Jiang aligned Shanghai clique whose members still held powerful positions 
within the Party elite and continued to effectively run principal areas in the state, 
including the economically vital Shanghai region (Fewsmith, 2008: 269-270). With the 
Shanghai faction still a potential threat to his position, especially if he mishandled a key 
issue such as ECS-related controversies, Hu would have been very cautious about 
moving too quickly or making concessions to the Japanese in terms of an ECS resolution. 
 
Hu’s position within the elite vis-à-vis the Shanghai clique was assisted by the public 
disclosure in July 2006 of serious corruption over pension fraud within the city’s Social 
Security Bureau. This revelation would snowball into a major political scandal. 
Subsequent investigations would result in the arrest, trial and sentencing of Chen Liangyu 
on September 24th, a Jiang favourite, faction top man, and a Politburo member since 
November 2002. The downfall of Chen, a perennial hindrance to Hu and Wen’s 
directives, represented a major blow to the influence and standing of the faction within 
the Party. His fall was also seen as evidence that Jiang’s influence within the elite was 
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dwindling (Fewsmith, 2008: 270-71). Hu’s tighter grip on power vis-à-vis the Shanghai 
clique therefore stepped up a gear after Chen’s removal. This move and Hu’s later 
political reshuffling at the 17th party congress in October 2007 went a long way to 
resolving a long-running power struggle between the two most powerful political 
groupings within the CCP , the Shanghai gang under ex-president Jiang Zemin and the 
Communist Youth League (CYL) faction under Hu (Lam, 2008).  
 
The New Starting Point 
Alongside this more favorable political situation for Hu and Wen, the repairing of 
bilateral ties and consequently more constructive approaches to the ECS problems was 
also greatly assisted by the end of Koizumi’s reign as Japanese PM on September 26th. 
The situation was also helped by the new PM Abe’s assurance to Hu, despite his 
nationalistic credentials, during a visit to China in early October, that he would handle the 
Yasukuni Shrine issue ‘appropriately’ (Japan Times, 09/10/2006). Even in advance of 
this reassurance, Hu was keen to assert his authority on the CCP’s Japan policy. This was 
illustrated in the timing of his symbolic meeting with Abe during the PM’s first summit 
visit to China literally hours after he had met with Party officials during the opening day 
of the 6th Plenary session of the CCP’s 16th Central Committee on October 8th. Coverage 
of the Abe trip coincided with the much publicized arrest of Chen Liangyu in late 
September, a case which dominated debates within the elite and ordinary public. In this 
context, Abe’s visit symbolized a ‘new starting point’ in China-Japan ties and the 
successful end of the power transition and power balancing from Jiang to Hu. In this 
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more favorable context, the General Secretary also utilized the state media to cleverly 
portray Abe’s visit in a positive light, and to minimise and even ignore reporting of any 
news or controversies from Japan that could inflame passions in China (Hughes, 
2008:268). Hu’s new approach may have assisted in reducing the potential volatility of 
Japan-related issues such as the East China Sea disputes in terms of the anti-Japanese 
demonstrations that often followed them.  
 
The ending of Koizumi’s reign in September 2006, the successful establishment of a 
more firm power base by Hu Jintao, and the ‘new starting point’ in the same period was 
complemented by a gradual but noticeable reduction in the level of tensions surrounding 
the ECS disputes. This consequently had a knock-on effect in terms of the progress of 
negotiations and the manageability of problems. Further progress was made in November 
2006 when Hu and Abe met on the sidelines of the fourteenth Economic Leaders' 
Meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) held in Hanoi, Vietnam. On 
that occasion, the leaders agreed on a five point proposal aimed at ‘creating a new 
situation’ (Consulate General PRC/San Francisco, 19/11/2006). 
 
Despite the evident upturn in relations by late 2006, ECS issues nonetheless remained on 
the radar but noticeably did not shake the relationship as violently as before. On October 
27th for example, a group of Hong Kong activists attempted to land on the Pinnacle 
Islands but were prevented by the Japanese Coast Guard (JCG) (International Herald 
Tribune, 26/10/2006). A few days later, the PLAN carried out naval exercises in the ECS 
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(Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 05/11/2006). The PRC also received complaints from Japan 
about a PRC vessel ‘intruding’ without notification near the Pinnacle Islands in February 
2007. The Chinese Foreign Ministry retorted by saying that the ‘Chinese ship’s normal 
marine research in the waters near Diaoyu Island is an exercise of China’s legitimate 
sovereignty and has nothing to do with the informing mechanism’ (Jiang Yu, Foreign 
Ministry Spokeswoman, 07/02/2007).  
 
The relatively swift improvement in public diplomatic ties since October 2006 however 
continued into 2007, and was best illustrated by Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to Japan in 
April. This was the first visit by a Chinese leader to Japan in almost seven years 
(Guardian, 11/04/2007). The political reshuffling which took place at the CCP’s 
seventeenth Party Congress (October 15th-21st 2007) also meant that Hu’s power base 
was in 2007 even more firmly established and consequently, the Chinese President, as 
contended by Swanstrom and Kokubun ‘could afford to react positively to the advent to a 
more pro-China leadership in Japan’ with the start of Yasuo Fukuda’s reign as Prime 
Minister in September 2007 (until September 2008) (Swanstrom and Kokubun, 2008: 2).   
 
Hu’s firmer power base also arguably permitted him to take a harder line with regards to 
troublesome visits by Chinese nationalists to the Pinnacle Islands (Asahi Shimbun, 
13/12/2007). In October for example, four members of the ‘China Federation for 
Defending the Diaoyu Islands’ who had unsuccessfully attempted to land on the islands 
were placed under house arrest by Chinese authorities after they returned to China 
(Fravel, 2010:153).  Alongside these quiet behind the scenes endeavours to calm possible 
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ECS frictions, at the public level the visual optics of an improved and positive 
relationship continued apace. On November 28th 2007, a PLAN warship, the ‘Shenzhen’ 
became the first PRC vessel to visit Japan in the post-war era. The goodwill visit also 
served to show how defense exchanges were back on the bilateral agenda after a hiatus of 
nearly ten years (Guardian, 28/11/2007). In late December, Fukuda, with a family history 
of warm ties with China, and acknowledged as a sincere advocate of constructive 
relations, visited the PRC for a four-day trip. At the end of the trip Japanese diplomats 
commented that the two sides’ positions had “narrowed considerably” with some 
progress being made on the East China Sea (AsiaNews.It, 28/12/2007). Relations were 
now so improved that, in keeping with this upward trend, good relations persisted into 
2008 with Hu Jintao making his first ever visit to Japan in May. The summit saw the two 
leaders, Hu and Fukuda, sign the ‘Joint Statement between the Government of Japan and 
the Government of the PRC on Comprehensive Promotion of a Mutually Beneficial 
Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests.’ The strides made in the relationship 
from the depths of 2005 were shown in the successful signing of this document, only the 
fourth such agreement between the two neighbours since 1972 (BBC News, 07/05/2008). 
The devastating May 12th 2008 Sichuan earthquake had also witnessed a very generous 
response from Tokyo, and the search and rescue mission sent from Japan was also well 
received amongst ordinary and elite level Chinese (Li Xiushi, 03/09/2008).  
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The Signing of the ‘Principled Consensus’ on the East China Sea 
On June 18th, in what could be described as the apex of relations following the nadir of 
2005 and co-related lows in the East China Sea, China and Japan agreed to a ‘principled 
consensus’ that would see the joint and co-operative development of part of the natural 
gas fields in the East China Sea (Zhou, 2008). On the day of the agreement, the two 
governments released a ‘Japan-China Joint Press Statement’ relating to co-operation in 
the ECS which read as follows: 
‘In order to make the East China Sea, where the sea boundary between 
Japan and China has not been delimitated, a ‘Sea of Peace, Co-operation 
and Friendship,’ Japan and China have agreed, through serious 
consultations based on the common understanding between leaders of the 
two countries achieved in April 2007 as well as their new common 
understanding achieved in December 2007, that the two countries co-
operate with each other without prejudice to the legal positions of both 
countries during the transitional period pending agreement on the 
delimitation and taken the first step to this end. Both countries will 
continue consultations further’ (Sakamoto, 2008: 115).   
 
The statement promised that the two governments would continue their discussions with 
the aim of achieving joint development in other areas of the ECS as soon as possible. The 
second section outlined some of the details of the landmark agreement regarding the 
Chunxiao gas field and stated:  
‘Chinese enterprises welcome that Japanese corporation(s) will 
participate, in accordance with Chinese laws regarding co-operation with 
foreign enterprises in the exploration and exploitation of off-shore 
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petroleum resources, in the development of the existing Shirakaba20 
(Chunxiao) oil and gas field’ (Sakamoto, 2008:115).21 
 
The June 2008 agreement is a provisional measure without a detailed explanation 
regarding the specifics where the ‘main purpose is to prevent contradictions arising from 
delimitation from being intensified’ (Yu, 2007: 8). The importance of the symbolism of 
the agreement rather than its specifics was similarly not lost in newspapers like the Japan 
Times who noted the words of Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura when he stated that 
‘The agreement is a favourable example showing that the two countries can solve any 
difficulty through dialogue’ but also noted that ‘Japan and China have different stances, 
and negotiations will be extremely long (before a conclusion is reached)’ (Japan Times, 
19/06/2008). 
 
Less than a week after the signing of the ‘principled consensus’, the November 2007 
PRC ship visit to Japan was reciprocated by the landmark visit of the Japanese warship 
‘Sazanami’ on June 24th 2008, the first such visit by a Japanese warship in the history of 
Japan-PRC relations (Li Xiushi, 03/09/2008). In a display of how much bilateral ties had 
progressed since hitting rock bottom in 2005, China’s Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei 
declared at a press conference in June 2008 that as (and if) relations improve then ‘some 
sensitive issues can be easily resolved’ where he expressed his belief that ‘a breakthrough 
on the East China Sea issue’ would open up the door to addressing ‘other complex and 
                                                          
20 The Japanese name for the Chunxiao oil and gas field is used here because the above statement on the 
June 18th 2008 ‘principled consensus’ is the Japanese version as used by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs.  See http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/china/higashi_shina/press.html 
21This is Sakamoto’s translation into English of the Japanese version of the statement. See Sakamoto, 2008. 
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sensitive issues between the two nations.’ Observing the impact of post-2006 interactions 
on Beijing-Tokyo ties, Wu also commented in a report covered by Xinhua News in the 
aftermath of the June 2008 ‘principled consensus’, that ‘the stalemate in Sino-Japanese 
relations was broken in October 2006, and leaders of the two countries exchanged ‘ice-
breaking’, ‘ice-thawing’, ‘spring-herald’ and ‘warm spring’ visits in succession.’ In the 
same article, Wu stressed that ‘the settlement of sensitive issues is a very important 
precondition to foster relations between nations’ and that ‘some historical issues like 
sovereignty dispute between China and Japan over the Diaoyu Islands should be 
addressed step by step, warning that any rush toward a resolution without mature 
consideration would damage the relationship’ (China View, 19/06/2008). 
 
Despite the healing process that took gradual effect in late 2006 with the departure of 
Koizumi and Hu’s firmer grip of power, Cai notes the sensitive nationalist reaction in 
China following the ECS agreement of June 2008. Even though the atmosphere had 
improved, there were still many people in powerful positions who put pressure on Hu 
with regards to his approach to the ECS, particularly because the agreement envisioned 
joint and co-operative development work west of the median line. Numerous people used 
the issue for their own political objectives, and not only for nationalistic reasons, with 
some senior conservatives and ‘special quarters’ sending some critical and personal 
reports directly to the central government. According to Cai, the agreement of June 2008 
to allow co-operative development inside an undisputable Chinese area is a problem for 
many Chinese. Nationalist feeling is still very strong he argues, and conflicting ideas 
exist on how to deal with Japan. Many complaints were conveyed via the internet by 
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nationalists upset at what they viewed as China granting too many concessions to the 
Japanese. The CCP responded with its own campaign on the internet and via the People’s 
Daily challenging accusations of a sell-out by vehemently denying any concessions, and 
foreign ministry officials stating ‘We still keep our legal claim to that area’ (Cai 
Penghong, 05/09/2008). In the days after the East China Sea agreement, Hu also made an 
unprecedented appearance on the internet which lasted twenty minutes with the General 
Secretary stating ‘I hope to better understand the opinions and suggestions internet users 
have of the party and government’s work’ (BBC News, 20/06/2008).  
 
The successful negotiation of the largely symbolic ‘principled consensus’ was certainly 
indicative of the changed domestic political circumstances in the two countries. In China 
in particular, Hu’s consolidated power after mid to late 2006 gave him the leeway to 
guide the relationship in a more constructive direction. This eventually helped to create 
an atmosphere where the formulation of a bilateral consensus on the ECS that 
complimented the PRC’s rational strategy towards Japan was made politically feasible. It 
also illustrated the extent to which ties could be symbolically improved and repaired if 
willing political leaders and positive diplomatic gestures were evident. The Chinese 
government’s campaign to sell the June 2008 agreement to its people and to the PRC’s 
political circles however was indicative of its recognition of the depth of feeling 
surrounding nationalistic themes such as Japan in the PRC and also of the fact that public 
opinion and popular sentiment at all levels could not be ignored and needed to be 
addressed and guided in a favorable direction. In the month of the agreement for 
example, the Japan Times noted that ‘For Chinese and Japanese diplomats … one 
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lingering concern is how the Chinese public will react to the apparent concessions made 
by their government’ and where even top Foreign Ministry officials in Japan had claimed 
that ‘the Chinese side is apparently worried about how China’s various interest groups 
will react if the government is perceived as having conceded too much to Japan on the 
EEZ issue’ (Japan Times, 19/06/2008). 
 
 
 
Summary Survey of Perspectives and Opinions in China 
 
 
The following is a summary survey of personal perspectives from a varied field of middle 
elites in the PRC. The opinions expressed suggest that the resurgence of the East China 
Sea tensions from 2003 to 2008 cannot be viewed in isolation but rather must be viewed 
in the context of the health of the wider Sino-Japanese relationship.  
 Jin Xide, Deputy Director, Institute of Japanese Studies, Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences (CASS) on 20/11/2007.  
These tensions are all about the bilateral relationship, and are first and foremost a 
political and not an economic issue where a key problem is ‘not oil and gas but rather a 
mentality’ where in particular the Japanese have a mentality that cannot accept China’s 
rise. According to Jin, the shift in Japanese attitudes towards China can be linked to the 
relative decline in the Japanese economy and the simultaneous rise of China. In the 1980s 
for example, Jin states that Japan was eager to help China to develop, especially in the 
field of energy. The situation has totally changed however in recent years where ‘the 
Japanese mind cannot accept the reality of over passing by China.’ For Jin, the Japanese 
reaction to China’s exploration activities in the ECS in 2003 and beyond and the ‘bad 
political relationship between Japan and China’ says a lot about how Japan perceives 
China. Providing examples, Jin cites notable contributions to the politicisation of these 
maritime disagreements, including ‘Japanese politicians and news reporters reporting 
and distorting the facts’ where for example Japanese people are not aware that Chinese 
developments are taking place within ‘an area of no dispute’ and that accusations of 
siphoning have no foundation (Jin Xide, 20/11/2007). 
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Cai Penghong, Senior Fellow and Professor, Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, 
Shanghai Academy of Social Studies (SASS) on 04/12/2007.  
Cai Penghong contends that many Chinese are concerned about Japan’s desire to be a 
normal nation where there is a fear that if Japan develops militarily then it will try to 
contain China because ‘right-wingers in Japanese politics want to contain China.’ At 
present there is not containment of China by Japan but in the ECS, Cai claims, ‘Japan is 
trying to claim what is not theirs.’ Cai also states that relations were not good under 
Koizumi, and ‘in such circumstances, small things can start a big spark’ particularly 
when Chinese perceptions of Japan as still being aggressive seemed true as a result of a 
host of controversial issues (Cai Penghong, 04/12/2007).  
 
 
Xue Chen, Research Fellow, Department of Strategic Studies, Shanghai Institute for 
International Studies, on 03/09/2008. 
 
Xue Chen likewise expressed prevailing views in China by stating that Japanese people 
are also easily moved by right-wing political leaders in Japan who want to argue that 
China wants to dominate the region. Such scare-mongering, he claims, assists some 
Japanese in shaking off its ‘defeated nation complex’, and makes calls for a ‘normal 
state’ and an upgrading of military capabilities more compelling. In this regard, Chen 
argues that Japan has a defeated nation complex due to a post-1945 mentality and the US 
military’s presence in Japan. However recent Japanese attempts to shake off this complex 
unnerves the Chinese, particularly Japan’s quest to be a normal state, manifested by its 
desire for a UNSC seat, the upgrading of the JSDF, and a move towards a more 
independent and assertive defense posture. These worrying strategic moves by Japan 
since the mid-1990s were matched by a heightened awareness among Chinese citizens of 
Japan’s denial of its aggression in the past, most notably denials concerning the notorious 
Nanking massacre of 1937. In Chen’s opinion, ‘the Japanese public know what really 
happened but they deny it’ and this in part, explains why the Japanese have a complex 
over China’s rise. He claims therefore that national identities and historical animosity 
play a very important role in indirectly influencing the ECS disputes, and do a lot to 
explain the reasons why Tokyo and Beijing do not want to be perceived to be yielding 
national interests to the other side (Xue Chen, 03/09/2008).  
 
Cheng Xiaohe, Professor, School of International Studies, Renmin University of 
China, on 19/09/2008. 
Cheng Xiaohe’s corresponding views of the role of identities on the disputes is similarly 
telling with regards to predominant Chinese views. Before the 1990s, he states that Japan 
was used to a weak, poor and sometimes divided China. As a result, the PRC tolerated 
and froze sensitive issues because it needed Japan. In the 1990s and early 21st century, 
the situation changed substantially however, particularly in the economic field. Relations 
therefore between Japan and China experienced a significant change. In a relatively short 
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time, Cheng argues that roles changed or were at least threatened, and suddenly both 
sides were not comfortable with the new situation. From the Japanese viewpoint, ‘China 
was no longer weak and pliant.’ From the Chinese perspective, concerns were created by 
Japan’s desire for power through normality. For the first time in one hundred and fifty 
years of relations, both countries faced a new unprecedented situation that they were not 
familiar with. The bilateral approach to territorial disputes is just one aspect of this 
change which Cheng refers to as a ‘transitional period.’ The ECS disputes are, as a 
result, tied to history and prevailing attitudes towards the other state and remain ‘a big 
emotional issue.’ The protests and demonstrations that were a hallmark of 1996 and 2005 
evidenced the salience of historical grievances to a whole range of issues of which the 
East China Sea was just one. Cheng supports the view that the June 2008 pact was a very 
public statement that relations were back on track after the deterioration caused during 
Koizumi’s reign, a situation that was not in the interests of Japan or China. The 
agreement was a product of developments begun as soon as Koizumi left office, with 
Cheng noting that Hu Jintao sent a personal envoy secretly to Japan to restart positive 
relations with Abe in the weeks after Koizumi’s departure in September 2006. Cheng 
attributes this to the fact that when historical and ideational factors are not allowed to 
disrupt the diplomatic relationship then attitudes and approaches tend to be positive. 
There is also an understanding by both states of the practical benefits of co-operation 
where both realise the need to resolve a problem in which the Chinese and Japanese 
‘have a convergent interest.’ While the June 2008 agreement has not completely resolved 
the disputes and has only partially dealt with issues, its significance, Cheng argues, lies in 
the fact that it symbolises a much needed improvement, as illustrated by the joint 
statements made and that it has paved the way for future progress on a once seemingly 
intractable issue (Cheng Xiaohe, 19/09/2008).  
 
Zhu Feng, Deputy Director, Professor, School of International Studies, Center for 
International and Strategic Studies, Peking University on 22/09/2008. 
Zhu Feng notes the import of a positive atmosphere when seeking forward movement in 
these disputes, observing that the ice age period of 2001 to 2006 was seen as a very 
unstable time in the relationship, and where the ECS disputes became like a ‘symbol of 
competition’ between the two countries and this was largely due to ideational factors such 
as national identity and intensified historical animosity. While not arguing (in 2008) that 
the bilateral relationship will turn back to the bad old days, Zhu sees a ‘lingering 
problem’ in the relationship that slows its progress, a characteristic that has ‘much to do 
with the psychological and cognitive’ aspects of how both peoples understand each other.  
Controversial issues, he contends, are often treated with an air of panic and it is not easy 
to get the relationship on a steady course. Both countries are very similar but at the same 
time very different where even though social contact between the two is extensive, 
hatred, mistrust and bias is still very strong. Koizumi was also seen as a stubborn trouble-
maker who persisted in visiting the Yasukuni shrine, and was, in Zhu’s opinion, a 
maverick populist who appealed to nationalist groups and used the visits for his own 
domestic political benefits by exploiting nationalist feelings and sentiments to bolster 
support and defeat his political opponents. In this aim, he was successful but it was 
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problematic because its price was a serious deterioration in relations with China. On the 
road to the June agreement, symbolic events and positive interactions had served to clear 
the air and to improve public attitudes, particularly in the case of Chinese attitudes 
towards Japan. Koizumi’s successor, Shinzo Abe, realised he was not able to attract the 
kind of support that his predecessor enjoyed so he modified Koizumi’s policy. Abe 
quickly tried to stabilise relations and he succeeded to some extent by initiating the so-
called process of ‘icebreaking’ between the two nations. This provided both sides with 
the opportunity to find an agreement of some sort to stabilise the relationship again. The 
Chinese government was also anxious to improve relations because ‘a deterioration 
would undermine China’s foreign policy and global strategy.’ Due to this improvement, 
Hu Jintao could afford to be less emotional about issues, and Abe, and later Fukuda, in 
particular, proved to be more pragmatic about relations. The two years prior to the June 
2008 agreement have therefore seen a returning to a more normal relationship between 
the two Asian powers (Zhu Feng, 22/09/2008).  
 
 Sun Xuefeng, Associate Professor, Department of International Relations, Tsinghua 
University, on 17/09/2008. 
 
According to Sun Xuefeng, the emotions stirred by the East China Sea disputes with 
Japan stimulate Chinese nationalism and this might explain why Beijing adopts an 
assertive official policy in its government and public statements. This assertiveness is 
welcomed by Japanese elites and conservatives who use it to cite Chinese aggression and 
to support Japan’s quest and need to be a normal state with sufficient defence flexibility 
to deal with China. This strategy of stimulating China, Sun argues, does a lot to explain 
why Koizumi visited the Yasukuni shrine (Sun Xuefeng, 17/09/2008).  
 
Yang Bojiang, Professor, Director, Institute of Japanese Studies, China Institute of 
Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), on 24/09/2008. 
Yang Bojiang weighs in on the issue of domestic pressures. During the worst periods of 
the ECS tensions, he claims that there was a conflict of sorts between the two states’ 
nationalisms, a fact that some scholars avoid talking about. At the worst point of the ECS 
disputes in 2005, there was an obvious overlap of several conflicting factors including the 
Yasukuni shrine issue since 2001, the history textbook issue, anti-Japanese 
demonstrations, and Japan’s call for a permanent UNSC seat in 2005. There was real 
anger in both countries towards the other side, and the ECS tensions, Yang argues, were 
one piece in a jigsaw of bilateral tensions and problems. A conflict of interests over oil 
and gas deposits, were, of course, factors but they did not top the list in understanding the 
extent of these frictions. In fact, in terms of tensions, energy competition in the ECS is 
perhaps at the bottom of the list of causes, standing maybe in fourth or fifth place. Rather, 
Yang’s contention is that domestic political considerations in both states played a major 
role in contributing positively or negatively to the maritime disagreements. Yang 
continues by accepting that one could argue that domestic politics have a significant 
influence on all inter-state relations including those with the US and South-east Asia. For 
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China however, relations with Japan ‘are something special.’ He also states that even 
though Japanese people often wonder why people in China are so sensitive about Japan, 
one must appreciate that ‘the invasion and occupation of China by Japan was harsh, 
broad and long’ so any disagreement or disputes with Japan is regarded as a very 
sensitive matter for ordinary Chinese citizens. Yang asserts that Japan and Taiwan are 
two issues that can easily stir Chinese emotions, and any domestic political decisions 
taken on sensitive issues must bear this strongly in mind (Yang Bojiang, 24/09/2008). 
 
 
Ji Guoxing, Professor, Center of RimPac Studies, School of International and Public 
Affairs, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, on 05/12/2007.  
 
Ji Guoxing reiterated a commonly held belief amongst scholars in China by claiming that 
ultra-nationalists in Japan are ‘pushing their media stories’ concerning China, where 
nationalistic groups, along with persons of influence including politicians can play ‘a 
determined role in manipulating Japanese public opinion’ and seek to ‘mislead the 
innocent public.’ The accusations of siphoning of Japanese resources by the PRC are a 
cogent example of this. Ji states that he personally checked the possibility of this with 
geologists who argued that it was impossible beyond 100 meters. The siphoning story 
therefore ‘is pure propaganda and has no substance to it’ (Ji Guoxing, 05/12/2007).   
 
 
 
Yu Tienjun, General Secretary, Associate Professor, School of International Studies 
(SIS), Center for International and Strategic Studies, Peking University on 
22/09/2008. 
 
Noting the gradual improvement in relations under Japanese Prime Ministers Abe, and 
Fukuda in particular, Yu Tienjun states that the visits to the Yasukuni shrine by Koizumi 
were viewed as an insult and as unacceptable to most Chinese and ‘under such 
circumstances, it was hard to tackle specific issues.’ Yasuo Fukuda, Prime Minister 
Shinzo Abe’s successor in September 2007 was very different however in his approach to 
China. Fukuda was well-liked in China, made a determined effort not to offend Chinese 
feelings, and was very pragmatic in his dealings with Beijing. He was, according to Yu, 
‘old-fashioned in dealing with China’, and was not a performer for the Japanese public 
and media.  Koizumi however ‘liked the mass media and liked a performance.’ The 2001 
to 2006 era also marked a shift away from diplomatic practices of past decades by Tokyo 
and Beijing. Under Abe and Fukuda, there was a tangible improvement in relations and 
as such, specific and often complicated issues could be talked about again. The broader 
context of the relationship therefore linked directly to the approach to specific and 
sensitive issues such as in the ECS where Yu asserted that ‘if the general context is bad 
then crisis management to deal with ‘incursions’, near-miss incidents, research ships etc. 
is also poor and thus the danger of trouble is more likely’ (Yu Tienjun, 22/09/2008). 
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Joint interview: Wang Hanling, Professor, Director, Research Base for Ocean 
Affairs and the Law of the Sea (BOALOS), Center for International Law and the 
National Institute of Law, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), and Liu 
Nanlai,, Professor,  Center for International Law and the National Institute of Law, 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) on 16/09/2008. 
Despite the challenges evident within the relationship, Wang Hanling and Liu Nanlai  
nonetheless maintain that ‘allowing the Japanese to jointly develop the Chunxiao oil field 
shows the good faith of the Chinese side, and shows that it wants to settle the final 
boundaries of the East China Sea’ and while ‘China has compromised, it has done so in 
a manner that does not jeopardise the Chinese position overall’ (Wang Hanling, 
16/09/2008; Liu Nanlai, 16/09/2008).   
 
 
Summary 
 
 
This sample survey of a number of influential elites from a wide variety of fields 
exemplifies the depth of feeling in the PRC vis-à-vis Japan-related and sovereignty-
related issues such as the East China Sea. It also reflects broad themes and commonalities 
between the interviewees, and their perceptions of who and what was responsible for the 
aggravation of tensions in the ECS. In the context of the August 19th 2003 to June 18th 
2008 period, the survey also reveals how factors such as historical controversies and 
national identity, when considered alongside discussed domestic politics, electoral 
strategizing in Japan, elite competition within the PRC, and so forth influenced popular 
sentiment and the manner in which public and elite level Chinese interpreted the 
statements and actions of the Japanese in the ECS.   
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Japan        
Unfavourable Conditions: 2001 – 2003  
Koizumi enters the stage 
When Junichiro Koizumi commenced his tenure as Prime Minister of Japan in April 
2001, he had to address a strong desire amongst the Japanese public for robust and 
decisive leadership and for a more assertive defense of Japan’s interests after a decade of 
perceived Japanese weakness and indecision on the foreign and domestic front. At the 
forefront of Koizumi’s objectives was a more determined streamlining of the decision-
making process and the untangling of the restrictions placed on effective governance by 
loyalty to political factions. In this regard, the new PM wanted to properly complete the 
reform process begun in 1993 so that Japan would no longer be weakened by a crippled 
and divided leadership. The public’s support for Koizumi and his political goals was 
highlighted in the days after he set up his first cabinet with opinion polls by Japan’s 
major broadsheets displaying a high level support for the new PM (Asahi Shimbun, 27-
28/04/2001; 30/04/2001). 
 
The new PM was post-war Japan’s first political leader and party president to be chosen 
who was independent of the traditional factional power struggles, having been elected by 
the vast majority of the LDP’s local branches, bypassing faction leaders. This 
overwhelming show of support provided Koizumi with the necessary political leverage to 
choose his own senior party leaders and cabinet. He was also seen as a kind of outsider 
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maverick who could possibly cure Japan’s ills after a decade of relative decline in every 
field with comparisons being made with Yasuhiro Nakasone, Prime Minister from 1982 
to 1987 during the height of Japan’s post-war power and prestige. His relationship with 
the Japanese bureaucracy was similarly weak so relying heavily on public support for 
decision-making was an essential element of his political calculations (Shinoda, 2007:89-
90).  
 
His elevation to the post of PM was also heavily influenced by the earlier 1993-1994 
electoral reforms. Political pundits expected that Ryutaro Hashimoto, a former PM, 
would assume the Presidency of the Party (and consequently become PM) in April 2001 
because of his strong power base. However, the post-1993 single-seat system within 
constituencies encouraged often younger LDP parliamentarians to demand a more 
democratic system when choosing the Party’s President. These calls bore fruit with 
reforms in 2001 and played a major part in contributing to Koizumi’s election as 
President over the heads of more powerful factional figures such as Hashimoto (Cooney, 
2007:87). In the absence of strong factional support for his candidacy, Koizumi relied on 
more popular support from individual parliamentarians and Party members. This meant 
that the new Prime Minister was not severely constrained by factional politics in Japan at 
a time when the traditional opposition, the Japanese left wing, was also in a relatively 
weak state in terms of parliamentary representation. This arguably permitted a populist 
and domestically orientated approach which affected relations with China because it saw 
the Japanese leadership frequently embrace populist themes which, even if unintentional, 
damaged bilateral relations (Shibuichi, 2005:210). 
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Shibuichi for example contends that Koizumi appreciated how valuable the support of the 
rightist pressure group, the Japan Association of Bereaved Families (JABF), could prove 
to be as PM. Given his pre-election cost-cutting reform pledges aimed at shaking up the 
under-performing Japanese economy, the new PM realized that his strategies would upset 
numerous other powerful LDP-friendly groups in construction, postal services, finance, 
and so forth within the country. As such, if he played his cards right, Koizumi knew that 
the highly influential JABF might be one of the few such domestic organizations whose 
support he could depend on.  As with Nakasone in the 1980s, he also understood the 
political utility of symbolic gestures and slogans to pull disparate groups and the 
Japanese public behind him. Examples of the very popular Koizumi appealing to slogans 
rather than policy details included ‘I visit the Yasukuni Shrine regardless of what 
happens’,  ‘Our enemies are the vested interest groups within’ (teiko-seiryoku), and 
‘Reform the structure of the Japanese economy’ (kozo-kaikaku) (Shibuichi, 2005:210). 
This extended to his decision to visit the Yasukuni shrine for the domestic political 
dividends to be gained in spite of the injury the visits caused to bilateral ties with China.  
 
The controversy had a negative impact on approaches to the East China Sea problems, 
and stemmed largely from Koizumi’s stubborn refusal to cease his continuing visits to the 
nationalistic shrine. As Shirk notes, when the Japanese PM paid his official respects at 
the shrine for a second time in the spring of 2002, ‘no amount of back-stage managing by 
Chinese diplomats could stem the media and internet backlash.’ Jiang Zemin, after 
suggesting to his colleagues in the elite that he had received an assurance from Koizumi 
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that he would not visit Yasukuni again, was also humiliated by the second shrine trip 
(Kyodo, 29/04/2002). Following this, the Japanese PM was never invited to the PRC 
again (Shirk, 2008:169). 
 
Following the normalization of China-Japan relations in 1972 the so-called ‘Tanaka 
faction’ became the LDP’s ‘most Beijing-friendly’ grouping, and played a very powerful 
role in LDP intra-party decision making. Koizumi’s consolidation of power after 2001 
however meant an even further weakening of this faction’s influence since the reforms of 
the early 1990s. It also permitted Koizumi to adopt a more assertive stand against China 
on a number of specific issues while simultaneously strengthening the US-Japan alliance 
(Taniguchi, 2005:445), a move, alongside other negative approaches to sensitive Japan-
China issues, which served to further undermine Beijing’s confidence in Tokyo’s 
sincerity. As highlighted by a Japanese scholar, the Tanaka faction, a faction that had 
always had a more conciliatory approach towards the Chinese government, was 
subsequently broken up and former members were obliged to follow Koizumi’s policies 
or else retire or remove themselves from the center of power. The basis of the Tanaka 
faction’s China policy was the improvement of economic ties. Koizumi was not satisfied 
with previous more conciliatory approaches to China and called for a more assertive 
stand (Hiroshi Nakanishi, 11/11/2008). 
 
It would be wrong nonetheless to explain the ice age in relations from 2001 to 2006 or 
the post-2002 East China Sea frictions as a consequence of the policies and actions of one 
person. As Li asserts, Koizumi’s domestic and foreign policy moves merely ‘deepened 
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the already latent mistrust.’ There were for example a combination of factors involved in 
understanding the bilateral tensions that contributed to a deterioration in the ECS disputes 
including ‘the unprecedented upgrade in Japan-Taiwan relations, Japan’s lobbying for a 
UNSC seat in 2004-05, the Yasukuni shrine visits, the ‘nationalisation’ of the Diaoyu 
Islands with the arrest of Chinese ‘civil’ demonstrators on the islands, and defensive 
JMSDF military manoeuvres near the islands. These were all ‘major factors that 
deteriorated the Sino-Japanese relationship’ where from the Chinese perspective, much 
could be explained by Japan being unaccustomed to China’s rise (Li Xiushi, 03/09/2008). 
Despite not being solely responsible for all these actions, Koizumi’s own stances on key 
issues such as Taiwan, history, and Japan’s security policy indicated to the PRC 
leadership that he was comfortable and willing to offend the Chinese if the demands of 
domestic politics required it (Self, 2002:80). This perception extended to the East China 
Sea disagreements. 
 
On the bureaucratic front, Japan’s China policy was until the second half of the 1990s 
under the guardianship of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), a ministry ‘keen to 
protect the increasingly fragile relationship from several negative domestic influences 
over which it had no control’ (Drifte, 2008b:18).  These included the history textbook 
issue and similar other sensitive issues that related to how Japan addressed its past in 
ways that were seen as unacceptable to Japan’s neighbors (Drifte, 2008b:18). By 2001 
and in years immediately following it however, the MOFA’s influence in formulating 
security planning had been gradually undermined by political and bureaucratic 
competition where a number of highly publicized corruption scandals and in-fighting 
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between ministers and officials hurt public confidence in the MOFA. The most prominent 
of these scandals involved the former Foreign Minister Makiko Tanaka (April 2001 – 
January 2002), a Beijing-friendly politician, and daughter of former PM Kakuei Tanaka 
(Berkofsky, 2002). 
 
A consequence of all these scandals was that the MOFA, bureaucratically strong but 
‘traditionally weak in the political system’ was ‘pilloried by the media and political 
parties, lost key personnel’, and was often ‘left debilitated by the policy-making process.’ 
The ministry was also heavily criticized and perceived as weak publicly after allegations 
in the late 1990s and early 2000s surfaced that it had appeased North Korea with regards 
to the abductions issue, where DPRK agents had kidnapped numerous Japanese civilians 
from 1977 to 1983 (Hughes, 2004:60). Under Koizumi, the MOFA, so used to 
dominating national security discussions for decades, witnessed a considerable erosion of 
its influence on government policy. From 2001 therefore, there was a ‘power shift from 
the MOFA to the Kantei (a metonym for the PM’s office) in the area of foreign and 
defense affairs.’ This change meant that it was now easier for a Japanese Prime Minister 
to follow a foreign policy approach that complemented his particular political needs and 
interests (Shinoda, 2007:85;134;143). Another negative change for bilateral ties at the 
turn of the new millennium was that one could not now openly take action against the 
more powerful and younger generation anti-China faction in government. Long held 
connections were also weakened as Chinese old guards simultaneously lost their 
influence, and a new ‘much more severe’ type of media evolved in Japan (Hiroshi 
Nakanishi, 11/11/2008). Koizumi’s post-2000 reforms further helped to upset an already 
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fragile domestic political arrangement in the post-normalisation modus operandi between 
the two capitals. This complicated the choreography and manageability of approaches to 
the East China Sea. 
 
Observing the consequences of these above changes and the weakening of the MOFA’s 
influence, Kokubun noted, ‘Gone are the days when Foreign Ministry bureaucrats and 
special envoys alone could quickly resolve sensitive incidents’ (Kokubun, 2005). For 
example, when the Yasukuni shrine issue arose again in 2001 under Koizumi after a 
hiatus of five years, Beijing presumed that quiet behind the scenes diplomacy would 
resolve it as in the case of Prime Ministers Nakasone (in 1985) and Ryutaro Hashimoto 
(in 1996) when they visited the shrine but this would not be the case, to the detriment of 
bilateral relations between 2001 and 2006 (Yoshi Nakai, 23/10/2008).  
 
These above factors, along with the various negative interactions leading up to 2005 all 
served to support, from the Chinese perspective, the views of those in China who 
believed Japan to be a threat to China’s interests in the ECS. Appreciating the harmful 
impact of the shrine visits on relations for example, Wan writing in 2006 asserted that 
Koizumi’s repeated annual visits since 2001 ‘challenged what the Chinese government 
considers to be a core political understanding between the two nations’, where crucially, 
the visits ‘also eroded the ability of those Chinese analysts and officials who have openly 
advocated a softer line on Japan’ (Wan, 2006:261). One observer commented that the 
ECS tensions reached their most difficult stage in 2005 and were ‘sometimes even hot’ 
because Koizumi operated more to the very idea of political strategy rather than the 
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national benefit. His visits to the Yasukuni shrine did not affect ECS negotiations directly 
per se, but they did seem to reflect Koizumi’s public attitude towards China.  The impact 
of this on the Chinese mindset towards maritime discussions was that it convinced many 
Chinese that Koizumi’s political stand on the Yasukuni shrine visits for example would 
also be mirrored by his political strategy towards Beijing. This would mean a unilateral 
and idealistic pursuit of Japanese interests in the ECS rather than the pragmatic and 
realistic strategy based on compromise (Zheng Donghui, 18/09/2008).  
 
Popular and Elite level Sentiment toward China 
 
In attempting to place the shrine visits from the perspective of many Japanese after 2000, 
one Japanese scholar argued that the Prime Minister utilised a strong posture towards 
China as a political tool to garner support where the Yasukuni issue was seen by ordinary 
Japanese as a strong attitude towards a rising China. Many experts in Japan agreed that 
Koizumi’s primary motivation regarding the shrine were based on personal convictions 
and political promises rather than any anti-Chinese sentiment on his part. Nonetheless, 
the issue was evidence of a perceived need by right-wing Japanese to tackle frustration 
about Japan’s position and decline. Japanese people are also more concerned about an 
increase in militarily assertive behaviour by the PRC in the ECS and beyond in places 
like the South China Sea. This prevailing perception influenced the mood among 
numerous lawmakers and bureaucrats who asked themselves ‘why should Japan make 
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any concessions to a militarily assertive but non-transparent China?’ (Aki Mori, 
12/11/2008).  
 
This was also in a context where since the 1990s, numerous LDP politicians began to 
embrace nationalist agendas such as constitutional revision, a UN Security Council seat, 
territorial sovereignty, and the revival of Japan’s national economy to stimulate political 
and voter support (Zheng, 2006:6). According to Green, special interest groups exerted 
themselves more forcefully and decisively as the traditional groups began to lose their 
ability to discipline them. Such groups ‘skewed’ Japan’s relations with neighbours like 
China and North Korea in ways that the LDP and the MOFA could not control. 
Consequently, ‘Tokyo’s foreign policy process is less hierarchical, less predictable, more 
entrepreneurial, and more driven by a mass media which has resulted in the fact that 
unpopular foreign policy is much harder to promote within Japan.’ Japanese prime 
ministers and leading politicians are therefore more constrained by domestic pressures in 
their foreign policy negotiations over issues such as the ECS disputes because they are 
less able to take unpopular stands on foreign policy issues and are more vulnerable to 
special interest pressure and media criticism (Green, 2003:74). 
 
On the Japanese home front, the first years of the new millennium did not point to an 
atmosphere that was conducive to constructive engagement with the Chinese. A 2002 
public opinion survey by Japan’s largest newspaper, the Yomiuri Shimbun, suggested 
even stronger support for an assertive stance by Koizumi toward China. The poll’s results 
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noted that only 37.3% of the correspondents believed that Japan could trust its large 
neighbour. This was the first time that such results fell below 50% (Yomiuri Shimbun, 
11/09/2002). Increasingly negative public sentiments extended to Japanese political 
circles with naked expressions of anti-Chinese feelings sentiment becoming mainstream 
and manifesting themselves in vocal and physical support for the shrine visits, advocacy 
for a stronger line on Taiwan, calls for tough defense measures against China, and 
arguments in favor of more severe ODA cuts  (Self, 2002:80). 
 
The Shenyang Incident in May 2002, when Chinese police entered the grounds of the 
Japanese consulate to intercept fleeing North Korean refugees, was yet another episode in 
a long list of incidents since the 1990s that seemed to confirm Japanese concerns over the 
Chinese ‘disrespect’ for what is, in diplomatic terms, sovereign Japanese territory. This 
was, in the words of Nakanishi, ‘another epoch making incident’ because China did not 
follow international practice in respecting the rights of the Japanese General Consul and 
some Japanese officials were seen to be too weak in their responses to China. From that 
point onwards, China-friendly Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) officials or 
the so-called ‘China school’ were seen as weak and pathetic, and became a target of 
denunciation by the Japanese right-wing and media. Groups such as the China school 
became much more observed and could not function freely as a result. This was mainly 
due to often serious media attacks at the time against pro-China groups and individuals 
who were ‘openly attacked as an enemy within.’ Security-orientated officials were thus 
not so comfortable with such groups but still they functioned together. Views became 
more severe after incidents such as that in Shenyang. In the wider sense, according to 
285 
 
Nakanishi, this was set in the midst of a perception change of China in Japan that had 
considerably worsened with Jiang Zemin’s controversial visit to Japan in 1998. In the 
Koizumi years however, tensions which may have been averted or dealt with privately 
were allowed to worsen or left to fester like a very public open wound (Hiroshi 
Nakanishi, 11/11/2008).  
 
 
The East China Sea disputes re-surface 
 
When the ECS tensions flared-up in 2003, matters were much more complex than in 
previous decades, most notably because of the intermingling of a number of sensitive 
issues and unfavourable political circumstances which, as previously discussed, had 
placed a considerable strain on the relationship. At the public and political level in Japan, 
conditions were not optimal for understanding China’s perspectives on the ECS, and for 
de-politicising otherwise technical disputes. Indeed, such was the predominance of 
negative perceptions of China in Japan, almost any action by the PRC in the East China 
Sea, was construed as a threat or an act that endangered Japan’s interests and sovereignty 
(Xue Chen, 03/09/2008). 
 
The reawakened shrine visits controversy alongside a collection of negative diplomatic 
gestures in the political and security fields served to undermine the possibility of positive 
relations even more. Koizumi also insisted that he would continue to visit the shrine at a 
time when historical atrocities by Japan were being watered down in some school 
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textbooks. These interactions, according to Tsunekawa, meant that the ECS issue 
‘became bigger than it really was.’ Japanese newspapers for example were awash with 
reports of secret extractions from Japan’s EEZ, and of China monopolising the sea’s 
resources. ‘Japanese people were stunned’ as a result of these reports and the disputes 
became ‘excessively politicised on both sides.’ As a consequence of this action-reaction 
pattern between China and Japan during this ice age period, the ECS dispute attracted 
more attention than usual (Keiichi Tsunekawa, 15/10/2008).  
 
In 2003 the PRC began to develop the Chunxiao field, with Japan responding by making 
a fanfare in the mass media with newspapers declaring that China was encroaching upon 
Japan’s EEZ (Ji Guoxing, 05/12/2007). Highly publicized ECS incidents included the 
unsuccessful June 23rd attempt by 13 Chinese activists to land on the Pinnacle Islands 
after being prevented by the JCG. This was followed two months later by a successful 
Japanese landing by members of the Nihon Seisensha (Japan Youth Federation) group 
(Blanchard, 2006: 220). Despite the very public tensions surrounding the ECS, the 
Japanese government took decisive measures to prevent a recurrence of such incidents by 
taking the islands out of private ownership and into state control. 2003 thus marked the 
last year in which Japanese nationalists were able to successfully land on the islands. The 
Chinese however perceived the move differently and viewed it in a context of seeming 
insensitivity by the Japanese government to their interests and concerns (Fravel, 
2010:152-53).  
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From the Japanese perspective, the PRC’s decision to jointly develop the Chunxiao field 
(near the median line) and other ECS fields with major oil and gas companies Royal-
Dutch Shell and Unocal on August 19th represented a major escalation in the ECS 
problems (Zha, 2008) because the Japanese saw the move as a violation of international 
law and a worrying deviation from the usual exploration activities in the East China Sea. 
The Japanese and their media also responded with concern to reports in November 2003 
that a surfaced PLAN Ming-class submarine with flag hoisted had sailed through the 
Osumi Strait between Kyushu and Tanegashima in southern Japan (SinoDefence.com, 
2009). 
 
 
The Relationship Hits Rock-Bottom: 2004 – 2005 
 
Japan Runs Out of Patience 
 
Other incidents in maritime areas in the early New Year of 2004 such as the ramming of 
two Chinese fishing vessels by the JMSDF on January 15th near the Pinnacle Islands 
(SinoDefence.com, 2009) and an illegal landing by seven Chinese activists in March 
(Yomiuri Shimbun, 05/10/2004) exacerbated Japanese fears regarding Chinese intentions 
in the area. Tokyo must also have felt snubbed by Beijing’s apparent lack of appreciation 
for the fact that the Japanese had merely deported the March activists when it would have 
been within their rights to charge them (Roy, 2005:199).The following month, Tokyo 
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stationed two JCG boats near the islands in order to strengthen their ability to prevent 
landings by both Chinese and Japanese nationalists (Fravel, 2010:152). 
 
On April 23rd, a bus belonging to a Japanese nationalist group rammed into the Chinese 
consulate in Osaka to protest China’s claims to the ECS islands (SinoDefence.com, 
2009). In a paper on the ECS in May 2006, Ji, identifying the period after April 2004 as 
particularly significant, stated that ‘the present jurisdictional delimitation dispute in the 
East China Sea between China and Japan has been much politicized and sensationalised.’ 
This has been especially the case since late May 2004 when the Japanese mass media’s 
reaction to reports and updates concerning the Chunxiao gas field ‘spread like wild fire’ 
with newspapers in Japan publishing articles which argued that the PRC’s exploitation of 
this field ‘oversteps the median line’, ‘encroaches upon Japan’s maritime rights and 
interests in its exclusive economic zone’, and ‘siphons off resources that may lie under 
Japan-claimed waters’ (Ji, 2006:1). Evidence suggests that influential Japanese 
nationalists made the most of this frenzied tide of ECS related emotion in Japan. For 
example, in May, the well-known Japanese nationalist scholar Shigeo Hiramatsu flew 
over the Chunxiao gas field and wrote a highly publicised article on the construction of a 
natural gas extraction rig in the area (Tokyo Shimbun, 28/05/2004). A month later, METI 
Minister Shoichi Nakagawa, in what China regarded as an escalatory development, told 
reporters that Japan would survey undersea resources in the East China Sea. The next 
day, on June 30th, the Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs Chen Guofeng summoned 
the Japanese ambassador to the PRC to protest Japanese undersea survey plans (Przystup, 
2004:9). 
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On July 6th, a JASDF plane spotted a Chinese maritime research ship operating without 
prior notification in Japan’s EEZ compelling the Japanese Embassy in Beijing to ask the 
Chinese authorities for an explanation. The following day, the Japanese commenced 
survey activities in the ECS within what they saw as Japan’s EEZ (Przystup, 2004:9). 
This involved the chartering of a Norwegian research vessel to map the sea bed. The 
move elicited strong protests from the Chinese side who viewed it as violation of their 
EEZ (Asahi Shimbun, 08/07/2004). By August, PRC workers were making progress in 
the construction of an undersea pipeline to gas fields in an area contested by Japan with 
Chief Cabinet Hiroyuki Hosoda declaring that Tokyo had ‘grave concerns’ over China’s 
activities in the ECS (Latelinenews.com, 28/08/2004). 
 
Concurrently, the visceral anti-Japanese sentiment expressed at the Asian Cup in the 
same month (discussed earlier) and aired via television into Japanese homes, outraged 
Japanese opinion. Koizumi publicly condemned the behavior of the Chinese fans 
involved. This, according to Gries, was a ‘striking role reversal’ when compared to the 
strong condemnation meted out by the Chinese Foreign Ministry to the Japanese 
following the Zhu Hai orgy scandal of September 2003 (Gries, 2005:843-846). The left 
wing and normally moderate Asahi Shimbun ran an editorial in August which poured 
scorn on the ‘ugly and revolting’ treatment meted out to Japanese citizens in China 
during the tournament and the raw hatred on display. The piece even went as far as 
likening it to the blind mob rule of the Red Guards witnessed in the darkest days of the 
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Cultural Revolution (Roy, 2005:204). A tendency by some Japanese right-wingers to play 
up the threat in the ECS and in some cases, speak without any tangible evidence was 
illustrated on October 17th when Nakagawa told a Fuji TV Sunday morning political talk 
show that Japan had information that China had granted exploration rights to Chinese 
companies on Japan’s side of the median line. He went on to argue that China’s ‘ignoring 
the EEZ is an unfriendly move’ and warned that ‘Japan could be disadvantaged if it 
refrains from saying what should be said’ (Przystup, 2005a:2). In this tense bilateral 
relationship, both sides made their first attempts on October 25th 2004 to negotiate a 
settlement to their maritime disputes. Viewing Japan’s requests as unacceptable and 
unreasonable, the discussions soon came to naught with the Japanese flatly rejecting the 
PRC’s joint development idea and the Chinese refusing to provide technical data 
regarding Chunxiao or to cease its operations in the ECS (Pan, 2009:140). A day later, 
the hawkish Nakagawa declared ‘I don’t know why these discussions were even held …. 
I don’t plan to get involved in further talks that end without resolution’ (Watkins, 2004). 
 
The alarmist claims made by figures such as Nakagawa, though made without hard 
evidence, were nonetheless plausible in the eyes of some Japanese politicians and their 
public who, since the 1990s, had become accustomed to what they saw as increasingly 
threatening behavior by the PRC in areas near Japan. A cogent example of a growing fear 
within Japanese security circles of a Chinese threat was the publication of an article in the 
Tokyo Shimbun on November 8th 2004 where it stated that the Japan Defense Agency 
(JDA) had recently concluded that there were three possible scenarios where the PRC 
might attack Japan. These were a conflict over maritime resources, the ownership of the 
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Pinnacle Islands, and the knock-on effects of a China-Taiwan conflict (Tokyo Shimbun, 
08/11/2004).  
An air of panic also surrounded an incident on November 10th 2004 when a submerged 
Chinese nuclear submarine navigated through the territorial waters of Japan. The incident 
prompted the JMSDF to go on alert for only the second time since the end of World War 
Two and resulted in the Japanese pursuing the submarine by sea and air back to Chinese 
waters. China later stated it had strayed into Japan’s waters due to a technical fault 
(SinoDefence.com, 2009). Chinese Vice Foreign Ministry Wu Dawei for example 
apologetically asserted that the incident was the result of a mistake and professed his 
hope, somewhat forlornly, that the submarine incident would not hurt the wider 
relationship (Channel NewsAsia, 16/11/2004). China’s reassurances did little to soothe 
Japan’s unending anxieties about the possible security implications of its neighbor’s rise.  
The fact that the Japanese Diet voted by large majorities for as many of ten national 
emergency bills in the period from June 2003 and June 2004 seemed to confirm this. For 
the first time since the end of the war, Japan also set up ‘a comprehensive framework to 
strengthen Japanese government and JSDF domestic authority to respond to a direct 
attack upon Japan’ (Hughes, 2004:10). As one year yielded to another, the animosity 
between the two states and the political circumstances in each country did not point to a 
resolution or stabilization of the ECS frictions taking place any time soon. 
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2005 – Hitting an All-Time Low 
 
In February 2005, the Japanese government finally ceded to the demands of the 
nationalistic Japan Youth Federation (Nihon Seinen Sha) and took control of a lighthouse 
and its maintenance on the largest of the Pinnacle Islands (Kaijo Hoan Repoto, 2007). 
Fravel suggests that this move was part of Tokyo’s process since 2002 of consolidated 
control over the islands primarily so as to prevent trouble from Japanese nationalists 
where such actions by Tokyo helped to remove ‘the greatest irritant in the dispute.’ The 
moves nonetheless resulted in strong protests from Beijing and Taipei because they ‘were 
viewed as unilateral assertions of sovereignty over contested territory and the 
consolidation of Japanese control’ (Fravel, 2010:152). In the same month, an interim 
report by Tokyo concluded that the Chunxiao and Duanqiao geological structures were 
linked with those on the Japanese side of the median line. This was later confirmed as 
‘definite’ by the Japanese in April (Yomiuri Shimbun, 02/04/2005). During discussions 
with a Chinese negotiator in March, Nakagawa dropped two straws in a glass of orange 
juice and complained that China was about to ‘suck out Japan’s resources with a straw’ 
(Brooke, 2005).   
 
On April 13th, Tokyo announced that it would accept applications from oil and gas 
companies to test-drill in areas on the eastern side of the median line. Beijing declared 
that this development was a serious provocation and reiterated its right to respond 
(SinoDefence.com, 2009). This was in an atmosphere of the worst relations since 
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normalization in 1972 with mid-April seeing mass anti-Japanese protests taking place 
throughout the major urban centers of China. The demonstrations were largely fed by 
Chinese anger over a re-emergent Japan’s history textbook controversy and Japan’s call 
for a UNSC seat. The protests also focused on the Yasukuni shrine issue, the East China 
Sea disputes, and other controversies (Shirk, 2008:140-147). The political and public 
reaction to the mass demonstrations of April 2005 in Japan was one of shock and disgust 
at the raw anti-Japanese hatred on display with the authorities being seen to stand by as 
Japanese property and symbols were damaged and desecrated by baying mobs (Shirk, 
2008:141). To add insult to injury, Tokyo was offended when its request for an official 
apology and compensation for the damage caused to Japanese business was thrown back 
in their face by Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing (Khan, 2005).  
 
Not surprisingly in the tit-for-tat of bilateral relations, Chinese anger on the street was 
met by a comparatively more subdued yet worrying rage in Japan with right-wing 
elements seeking revenge by vandalizing businesses and buildings associated with the 
Chinese community and making threats (Asahi Shimbun, 20/04/2005). Shiraishi states 
that the Japanese public has a tendency to get quite excited over issues particularly those 
involving China, and the ECS tensions during their worst periods ‘looked like a game’ 
between the Chinese and the Japanese, with the public asking who is winning and who is 
losing? The Japanese mass media’s treatment of this ‘game’ allowed it to become 
politicised with the Japanese public understanding a very general and biased view of the 
disputes. This certainly had a considerable influence on how Japanese politicians 
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commented on the problem and how it was dealt with in the public realm (Takashi 
Shiraishi, 22/10/2008).  
 
Negative actions on the Chinese side after 2003 were what Takahara referred to as a 
‘surge of antagonism’ which included the ‘anti-Japanese jeering and violence inside and 
outside the stadiums at the 2004 Asian Cup Soccer games and (later) violent anti-
Japanese demonstrations in 2005, which have in turn aroused anti-Chinese and 
nationalistic sentiments in Japan’ (Takahara, 2008:2). The patterns of behaviour and 
diplomatic gesturing between the two states arguably exhibited the co-relation between 
negative interactions, domestic political circumstances, and an upgrading of the perceived 
threat level in each state regarding theatres such as the ECS, particularly in Japan. During 
the April 2005 protests, Japan’s largest daily, the Yomiuri Shimbun, stated that anti-
Japanese demonstrations had triggered ‘anger and bewilderment’ in both Japan’s ruling 
and opposition parties, and caused some officials to reschedule visits to China. The Nihon 
Keizai Shimbun also stated that it was ‘absurd’ for the PRC’s Foreign Ministry’s 
spokesperson Qing Gang to state that the blame for the deterioration in Sino-Japanese 
relations lay at Japan’s door (BBC News, 16/04/2005).  
 
When the ECS disputes assumed a more serious character after the spring of 2004, the 
frictions escalated in parallel to numerous other negative interactions and developments. 
These included tensions over Taiwan following Chen Shui-bian’s (a candidate not 
favoured by Beijing) election in March 2004, highly publicized maritime surveys by 
Chinese vessels, the new Japanese National Defense Programme Guidelines (NDPG) 
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expressing increased anxiety about China’s intentions, the US-Japan alliance’s 
declaration of common strategic objectives in February 2005, and the PRC’s anti-
secession law in March 2005 (Bush, 2009:19). These went alongside the aforementioned 
ongoing strained relations caused by the Yasukuni controversy, Japan’s bid for a UNSC 
seat, anti-Japanese riots and demonstrations in April 2005, and a whole raft of otherwise 
minor yet emotional incidents that poisoned the atmosphere between the two countries. 
The salience of the major Yasukuni issue to the politicization of the ECS tensions and the 
difficulty of either side being seen to concede during their nadir in mid to late 2005 was 
evidenced in May 2005. During the second round of talks on the ECS for example 
China’s Foreign Ministry’s spokesperson Kong Quan commented that ‘The talks have 
become the centre of attention as the Sino-Japanese relations sour because of the 
Japanese leader’s remarks on the visit to Yasukuni’ (PRC Embassy/Australia, 
27/05/2005).  
 
The impact of all these negative interactions in affecting the interpretation of incidents in 
the ECS could also be seen in the language used by Nakagawa, when in advance of 
working level bilateral talks on the ECS, he spoke of Japan’s weak negotiating position 
by comparing it to the PRC’s exploring and drilling while talking at the same time which 
he stated was like ‘shaking hands with someone with the right hand and striking with the 
left’ (Przystup, 2005a). Nonetheless, following the heated April 2005 demonstrations, the 
leadership in both countries began to appreciate that the relationship was headed down a 
dangerous road and that issues such as the delimitation of the ECS needed to be 
addressed more seriously in order to avert further problems. Efforts to this end 
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recommenced during the second round of ECS talks from May 30th to May 31st but again 
with little tangible progress made. Relations over the ECS mirrored the wider negative 
bilateral trend with Tokyo reporting in June that the Chinese had begun constructing a 
drilling facility just inside the PRC’s EEZ and worryingly close (about 4 kilometers) to 
the median line recognized by Japan (Takahashi, 2004: 1-4).  
 
The once manageable disputes took on a far more ominous character on July 14th when 
Nakagawa’s ministry gave Japanese names to the ECS’ oil and gas fields and granted 
permission to the Japanese oil giant Teikoku (Imperial) Oil to start exploratory drilling 
(Manicom, 2008a). According to Drifte, the Koizumi government was compelled to react 
to the PRC explorations by public pressure stemming from mounting concerns that the 
Chinese were about to extract oil and gas reserves in fields that straddled the median line 
where ‘at a time when nationalist politicians were riding high in Japan, developments 
seemed to get out of hand by tit-for-tat reactions, such as the Japanese name-giving to the 
Chinese oil and gas fields, or the licensing of a Japanese company to test drill in the 
disputed area’ (Drifte, 2008b:3). This unprecedented assertive response in the ECS by the 
Tokyo government was arguably heavily influenced by Diet members and a media 
demanding action and exerting sustained pressure for a strong response. This decision 
however significantly turned up the tensions in the ECS and added a military dimension 
to the exploration activities because either side would now require their armed forces to 
physically defend their rival claims in areas such as the Chunxiao field.  
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As one scholar put it, for the Japanese government, the effect of any possible siphoning 
by China of Japan’s resources is arguably ‘not so enormous’ in an economic or energy 
sense. Rather, the distrust and ill-feeling in Japan relating to the PRC’s actions in the 
ECS gave strength to individuals such as Nakagawa, who had consistently called for a 
‘tough attitude towards China’, a view which manifested itself in the granting of 
exploration licenses. This was a very dangerous move since Beijing had previously made 
it very clear that any unilateral exploration by the Japanese within the continental shelf 
area would be viewed as a serious provocation that would be met with force (Shigeki 
Sakamoto,27/10/2007). Initial official objections to Nakagawa’s policy decisions from 
Beijing included those of Foreign Ministry spokesperson Kong Quan when he said ‘We 
think Japan’s practices constitute a provocation to China’s rights and norms of 
international relations’ and then warned ‘We have lodged a protest to Japan and reserve 
the right of taking further action’ (PRC Embassy/Australia, 27/05/2005). In August, 
Nakagawa was again warning the Japanese and international media that the PRC was 
laying down pipelines in the East China Sea and that the Chinese government had 
repeatedly ignored Japanese protestations over its activities (BBC News, 10/08/2005). 
Another incident in the same month, this time related to the islands dispute, seemed to 
reflect the level of tensions between the two neighbours. For the first time ever, Tokyo 
announced that US and Japanese forces would carry out joint exercises in January 2006 
aimed at the defense of Japan’s outlying islands (Drifte, 2008b:16).  
 
The influence of individual actors in exacerbating these maritime frictions was arguably 
well illustrated by key players such as Nakagawa. This was exemplified by the 
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nationalistic minister’s ‘two straws and one glass’ siphoning demonstration. He also 
stepped harder on this sensitive issue by claiming without any evidence that China was 
surreptitiously sucking Japan’s resources from under the median line, and arguing that 
the Chinese were threatening Japan’s national territory. Such right-wingers in Japan were 
therefore culpable for their part in politicising a very technical and complicated dispute, 
and causing it to be viewed by many Japanese as a simple black and white issue, in a 
country where territorial disputes are in the minds of its people but knowledge of the 
specifics of the disputes themselves tend to be limited. In this regard Nakai indicates that 
prior to this politicization by the mass media and some politicians, the East China Sea 
was not on the radar screen of the Japanese public (Yoshi Nakai, 23/10/2008).  A cogent 
example of this media sensationalization and the pressure placed on leaders could be seen 
in the right-wing Sankei Shimbun when it ran an editorial on September 25th 2005 
arguing that ‘China is trying to turn the ECS into the ‘Chinese sea’ against the 
background of its military power. The gas field issue is a matter of Japan’s national 
sovereignty that cannot be measured by profitability alone’ (Reuters, 01/10/2005). From 
the Japanese viewpoint, the sense of danger was made worse by the absence of a reliable 
and tested crisis management system between Japan and China, a fact clearly illustrated 
in the ECS where China has tended to call on its navy to deal with any problems with 
Japan (Matsuda, 2008:90).  
 
In September 2005 the tensions in the ECS entered one of their most dangerous phases, 
and during this time a Chinese navy vessel allegedly pointed its anti-aircraft cannon at a 
JMSDF’s P3-C surveillance plane flying near the Chunxiao (Shirakaba in Japanese) gas 
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rig (Curtain, 2005). Chinese actions were matched with more assertive statements from 
the Chinese side. Huang Xingyuan, chief spokesman for the Chinese embassy in Tokyo, 
for example, warned in October 2005 that any drilling or survey activities by Japan in the 
contested field would be regarded ‘as an invasion of Chinese territory’ and ‘a highly 
provocative act’ (Manicom, 2008a). Huang countered Japanese claims regarding Chinese 
drilling by asserting, ‘It is of no importance to the Japanese because the area is 
completely within Chinese waters and we are within our rights to operate there’ and that 
‘They know perfectly well the location of Chinese operations’ and they are ‘not within 
areas claimed by Japan’ (Faiola, 2005).  
 
The PRC’s argument defending their activities near the median line nonetheless fell on 
deaf ears in an increasingly alarmed Japan. The Washington Post ran a story on October 
21st 2005 stating that the Koizumi government had sent two envoys to Washington ‘to 
brief Bush administration and State Department on what authorities (in Tokyo) described 
as a ‘major threat to Japanese sovereignty.’ The determination of some influential 
Japanese politicians to continue to engage in brinkmanship during this tense stand-off 
was demonstrated by Katsuei Hirasawa, an energy and oil committee member and 
parliamentarian in Japan’s lower house, when he entreated ‘We need to take proper 
measures even at the risk of making the situation more volatile’ and ‘We need to remind 
China that we are ready and willing to defend our territory and interests’ (Faiola, 2005). 
 
The combination of negative public opinion towards China, speculative yet extensive 
media coverage, and nationalistic politicians in power in a reform government who 
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viewed a rising China as a threat all served to put pressure on the Koizumi government to 
act to defend Japan’s interests in the ECS. As noted by Drifte, ‘The METI, notably under 
its very outspoken and right-wing minister Shoichi Nakagawa, tried to present itself as 
the true defender of Japanese interests in comparison with the MOFA, which had gained 
a reputation of being ‘soft’ on China’ (Drifte, 2008b:3-4.) This internecine competition to 
present a tough stance against the Chinese manifested itself in physical terms with 
Nakagawa’s decision to allow Japanese oil companies to apply for exploration licenses in 
the ECS and to confer Japanese names upon the various gas fields in the overlapping area 
in July 2005. As a result of this and China’s reaction, what was once a political and 
economic dispute now acquired a potentially dangerous dimension with the military 
component being added to the mix for the first time.  
 
Needless to say the September incident discussed earlier at the very least convinced both 
sides of the urgency of stabilizing and properly managing the disputes even though 
negotiations to this end would not begin to bear fruit until some months later. Both sides 
also remained stuck in terms of forward movement on lingering issues such as shared 
geological data, the cessation of production activities, ship movements in sensitive areas 
and so forth. Some progress was made nonetheless, after Nakagawa’s replacement, on the 
once intractable issue of joint development even though the specifics of where exactly 
this could take place still remained elusive by early 2006. Persistent ill-feeling towards 
China in Japan however was evidenced by a public opinion poll carried out by the 
Yomiuri Shimbun and Gallup in November 2005 which revealed that 72% of Japanese 
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people felt that they ‘cannot trust China,’ and 76% ‘feel threatened’ by China (Yomiuri 
Shimbun, 15/12/2005). 
 
Cooler Heads Prevail 
 
As mentioned previously, a chain of events directly affecting the ECS from July 2005 
until September-October 2005 nearly resulted in skirmishes or an outbreak of conflict 
over exploration activities near the median line. It was noted however that ‘cooler heads’ 
had helped to draw the two neighbours away from dangerously hostile actions. The 
appointment of a more China-friendly politician Toshihiro Nikai, in Nakagawa’s stead, in 
October 2005 for example arguably reflected a desire by Tokyo to repair ties and 
facilitated a stepping back from the type of brinkmanship witnessed in September. The 
Chinese for their part maintained the view that any drilling or exploration activities in the 
ECS by the Japanese were intolerable and found it hard to accept Tokyo’s more assertive 
posture after so many years of Japanese passivity (Drifte, 2008b:3-4).  
 
Nikai’s visit to Beijing in late February and his decision to terminate applications from 
Japanese companies to extract oil and gas in the ECS did a great deal to de-escalate the 
level of friction between the two sides and to re-focus bilateral efforts on negotiations. 
The spring meeting between Taro Aso and his PRC counterpart Foreign Minister Li 
Zhaoxing on the margins of the Asia economic conference in Doha, Qatar, after lengthy 
talks and speculation, also pointed to a more constructive approach from both sides. This 
had been the first foreign minister-level discussion in over a year between the two states 
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(Jiang, 2007:18). The Chinese also contributed to a less fractious relationship over the 
ECS amid otherwise negative public bilateral relations over issues such as the ongoing 
Yasukuni shrine visits by ordering a delay in production activities at Chunxiao (Interfax, 
02/06/2006; Zaobao, 23/02/2006). On March 7th, for example, Li declared the ‘continued 
visits by Japanese leaders to the war-related Yasukuni Shrine were the top cause for 
Japan’s strained political ties with the PRC’ (Kyodo, 07/03/2006). In spite of this obvious 
retreat from the brink of a confrontation in late 2005, hawkish elements in Tokyo 
remained vigilant about Chinese actions in the ECS. According to a March 2006 article in 
the Asahi Shimbun, Aso, as  Foreign Minister since October 2005, insinuated that Japan 
would adopt a ‘more hard line approach’ involving ‘unspecified countermeasures’ if the 
Chinese commenced production activities at the Chunxiao gas field (Asahi Shimbun, 
20/03/2006). The nadir of bilateral ties in 2005 nonetheless compelled Tokyo and Beijing 
to work harder to repair ties even if circumstances were not optimal for compromise. 
 
The Path to ‘Principled Consensus’: 2006-2008  
 
Even with occasional unfortunate remarks and the continued Prime Ministerial visits 
(until September 2006) to the Yasukuni shrine, the lessons learned in the ECS in the latter 
half of 2005 served to remind both sides of the potentially volatile nature of the various 
challenges that the two states had to deal with. The ability in May 2006 of the two sides 
to make significant progress in the East China Sea by agreeing to put the demarcation 
issue to the side and attempt to find consensus on joint development (Sankei Shimbun 
31/05/2006) was perhaps a reflection of this, but also of the improvement in relations 
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over the ECS since February. Another step forward was the decision in July by Tokyo to 
resume ODA loan aid to the tune of 74 billion yen ($650 million) to China. This had been 
frozen in fiscal year 2005 due to the 2005 impasse over the East China Sea negotiations. 
Recognizing in the summer of 2006 that the numerous rounds of maritime talks might be 
long and often inconclusive, the two states also sought to emphasis renewed co-operation 
in other areas, most notably in the fields of energy efficiency, energy conservation, and 
environmental protection (Jiang, 2007:18-19;22). 
 
The public face of bilateral ties and the lingering Chinese resentment of Koizumi 
however were clearly illustrated in July 2006 in the aftermath of seven missile tests by 
North Korea. On this issue as well, the two sides found it difficult to talk, let alone 
seriously discuss, possible approaches to the problem. As pointed out by Shirk, while 
both Hu and Koizumi were happy to consult about such issues with other world leaders, 
they did not discuss it with each other either by phone or in person, remarkable for the 
two most powerful states in the region (Shirk, 2008:150). In the East China Sea, the 
PRC’s largest energy company, CNOOC created confusion when it gave notice on its 
website on August 7th that it had commenced full-scale production at the 
Shirakaba/Chunxiao field (Kyodo, 07/08/2006). The Japanese warned that they would 
take countermeasures possibly involving exploration activities near the median line 
(Interfax, 07/08/2006). Shortly afterwards, the Chinese removed the information from the 
website and declared that CNOOC still had not started full production at the field. In late 
August, Tokyo complained loudly when it learned of the PRC’s development plans for a 
new gas field, Bajiatong, in an area viewed by the Japanese as part of their EEZ (Manalo, 
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2006). Beijing responded by accusing Japan of ‘making new trouble’ and defended its 
Bajiatong activities (Xinhua, 02/09/2006). 
 
Despite such occasional challenges, events after September 2006 in both states produced 
a more favorable environment in which to deal with difficult bilateral controversies such 
as the East China Sea. Beijing’s determined endeavours to re-vitalise bilateral ties after 
Koizumi’s exit in 2006 for example permitted the now more established Hu to rebuild a 
relationship with Japan more in line with its rational interests which valued a sturdy 
relationship as one that served the country’s interests the best. From the Japanese 
standpoint, the decision by new Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (Sept.2006 – Sept.2007) to 
make the PRC the state that he would first visit as PM likewise reflected the new 
Japanese government’s resolve to get relations back on track (Yang, 2007:250;263). His 
inference that he would not visit the Yasukuni shrine did much to assist Hu in rebuilding 
ties. Hu’s behind the scenes diplomatic skills in acquiring this non-committal assurance 
from the new PM over previous months was also regarded as a ‘foreign policy coup.’ 
Many PRC officials admired the way Hu had helped to clean up a long-standing mess left 
behind by previous leaders such as Jiang and Koizumi (Shirk, 2008:178).  
 
Evidence also points to the fact that Abe was under considerable domestic pressure from 
leading Japanese business and media figures to repair Japan’s relationship with its 
neighbors. Many of them had become weary of the regional alienation caused by the 
previous PM’s actions (Yomiuri Shimbun, 04/06/2005; Asahi Shimbun, 05/06/2005). The 
Japanese public had also begun to look increasingly unfavorably at the shrine visits in the 
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summer of 2006 after the media revealed that the late Emperor Hirohito himself had 
sought to avoid visiting the shrine after the souls of war criminals were interned there in 
accordance with Shinto rituals and beliefs in the late 1970s (Asahi Shimbun, 25/07/2006). 
Like the business community, they had also become concerned about the economic 
implications of prolonged and deteriorating ties with China. Toward the end of 
Koizumi’s tenure, as many as seven former PMs had contacted him to persuade him to 
end the visits (Jiang, 2007:20-21). 
 
Beijing’s acceptance of Abe’s proposal to visit China in the absence of any definite 
assurance yet not to visit the controversial Yasukuni shrine also highlighted the desire of 
the Chinese not to allow ideational issues to trouble or dominate relations again and to 
guide the bilateral relationship back onto the right track (Yang, 2007:250). The 
improvement in ties was to have a noticeable effect on security concerns in the East 
China Sea. One, for example, should compare the frequency in which JASDF planes 
scrambled to counter possible ‘incursions’ from neighboring states into Japan’s territorial 
airspace. Calculated according to a fiscal year ending on March 31st, the number rose 
dramatically, from 141 in 2005 to 229 in 2006, when ECS frictions were at their worst. 
According to a Ministry of Defense publication, the ‘increase was mainly attributed to 
more scrambles against Chinese jet fighters.’ This number increased marginally to 239 in 
Fiscal Year 2007 (until March 31st 2007) (Japan Ministry of Defense, October 2006; 
Japan Air Self-Defense Force, 12/07/2007) but on the positive side, with the exception of 
these scrambles, ‘there was no more activity of a military sort throughout 2006’ 
(Przystup, 2006b).  
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The ‘2007 Japan Diplomatic Blue Book’, in its evaluation of security issues vis-à-vis 
China, toned down its threat assessment, a change that resulted from a reduction in 
tensions after new PM Shinzo Abe’s visit to Beijing in October 2006 (Bush, 2009:8). 
This more positive outcome was a result of the fact that ‘cooler heads in both countries 
saw the looming danger and worked to manage the issue politically’, and to the fact that 
‘when Abe Shinzo replaced Koizumi as prime minister in September, the opportunity 
emerged to put the relationship on a more positive basis.’ Japanese concern about a 
possible ‘fait accompli’ in the ECS however, ‘was slow to fade’ (Przystup, 2006a). A 
change of leadership in Japan alongside Hu’s more consolidated position as Chinese 
leader provided favorable grounds on which to rebuild relations after the severe chill of 
2001 to 2006. This had a positive knock-on effect in terms of how the two states 
approached the East China Sea problem. 
 
 
 
The occasional incident or protest continued to take place regarding the ECS such as in 
October when nationalists from Hong Kong tried but failed to land on the Pinnacle 
Islands after interception by the JCG. On November 8th, the Japanese protested against 
PRC production activities at the Pinghu field (Yamamura and Sato, 2006). Despite these, 
top level relations were generally favorable with an emphasis on pragmatic relations and 
rational interests even though Abe and his foreign minister, Taro Aso, with their hawkish 
and sometimes anti-China reputations, were not exactly individuals who instilled a lot of 
trust amongst ordinary and elite level Chinese. Repairing relations however was the goal 
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of both governments with positive movements further evidenced by Abe’s meeting with 
his Chinese counterpart Hu on the margins of the APEC conference on November 18th.  
When Premier Wen Jiabao became the first PRC leader to pay a visit to Japan in seven 
years in the following April, the trip spoke volumes in terms of the strides made in the 
relationship. It also must have been viewed as a foreign policy success by Abe, a leader 
who was eager to stamp his own domestic and international political legacy, and to that 
end was willing to show a more moderate yet vigilant line toward the Chinese. This 
‘double movement’ strategy was reflected in his decision to visit the PRC and South 
Korea shortly after assuming office to symbolize the reparation of ties damaged in the 
past five years. The success of this strategy for Abe was arguably best illustrated by the 
‘new starting point’ with the Chinese after September 2006 (Jiang, 2007:1;15-16;27). 
 
As with so many other Japanese Prime Ministers however, with the exception of 
Nakasone and Koizumi, Abe’s time in office was to be short-lived. He resigned 
unexpectedly in September 2007 citing health concerns brought on by the stress of the 
job (BBC News, 12/09/2007).This shift in leadership however was to have a fortuitous 
impact on bilateral ties because it heralded the beginning of Prime Minister Yasuo 
Fukuda’s short-lived yet effective time in office in terms of the ECS disputes. Together 
with Hu’s much stronger position in the PRC, the combination of Fukuda’s pro-China 
familial credentials and his warmer approach meant that the situation was even more 
favorable for progress on the East China Sea. This window of opportunity came after 
years in which maritime negotiations were often held hostage to the vagaries of domestic 
politics and negative popular sentiment. These circumstances on the Japanese side 
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arguably favored Hu and made it easier for him to restrict groups like the ‘China 
Federation for Defending the Diaoyu Islands.’ This included placing members of the 
organization under house arrest in October after an unsuccessful landing attempt (Fravel, 
2010:153). The background and resume of the new Japanese leader would also have no 
doubt helped in convincing the PLAN to acquiesce in the first-ever visit of a PRC 
warship, the ‘Shenzhen’ to Japan in November, a move which also showed that defence 
exchanges were back on track after nearly a decade (Gurtov, 2008).  
 
Fukuda also visited the PRC a month later in December, a trip which kept the ball rolling 
for Hu’s first every visit to Japan as China’s top leader in May, the first such visit by a 
PRC leader since Jiang’s disastrous trip in 1998. In this context of dramatically improved 
relations over a number of months, Hu and Fukuda were able and willing to formulate an 
agreement on the East China Sea. The push for a consensus or some form of symbolic 
progress on the disputes may also have been due to Hu’s desire to secure sturdy ties with 
the Japanese in advance of the August 2008 Olympics Games when the eyes of the world 
would be on China. For Fukuda, he must have realised that a foreign policy success 
might help to raise his low approval ratings (Japan Times, 21/06/2008). Taken together, 
all the right cards were on the table to secure some very symbolic diplomatic coups such 
as the June 18th ‘principled consensus’ on the East China Sea (Zhou, 2008) and the first 
ever visit of a Japanese naval vessel, the ‘Sazanami’, to the PRC on June 24th (Japan 
Defense Focus, 2008).  These achievements revealed the progress which could be made 
on issues such as the East China Sea in a relatively short time if the circumstances 
permitted it.  
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Summary Survey of Perspectives and Opinions in Japan    
 
This next section provides a brief sample survey of personal perspectives from a broad 
and varied field of middle elites in Japan. This helps to illustrate how changing 
perceptions of a rising China in Japan influenced how issues such as the resurgent ECS 
disputes were interpreted, and who many Japanese blamed for the renewed frictions 
surrounding these maritime disagreements. It also displays an understanding among some 
informed Japanese elites of the difficulties posed to the PRC leadership by the behaviour 
of the Koizumi regime in the 2001 to 2006 period. 
 
 
Aki Mori, (doctoral candidate), Doshisha University, Kyoto, on 12/11/2008.  
 
Aki Mori believes that the climax of the Yasukuni Shrine controversy, amongst others, in 
2005, was amongst many Chinese, ‘interpreted as a backlash of Imperial Japanese 
militarism in China’, a development that made it very difficult for Hu’s administration to 
pursue a moderate foreign policy toward Japan. Domestic debates in China about a new 
approach or a ‘new thinking’ policy toward Japan also met a setback as a result. 
According to Mori, some of Japan’s lawmakers do not appreciate this factor in Beijing’s 
decision-making calculations, and do not pay attention to these domestic Chinese 
political considerations. This has the effect of creating a negative impact on the Chinese 
people’s image of Japan (Aki Mori, 12/11/2008). 
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Takashi Shiraishi, Vice President and Professor, National Graduate Institute of 
Policy Studies (GRIPS) on 22/10/2008.  
 
Takashi Shiraishi similarly does not take for granted the considerable pressures placed on 
Chinese decision-makers by elite rivalry and popular sentiment, or the fact that the 
worsening bilateral relationship made discussing these maritime disputes very difficult, 
even with mid-ranking Chinese officials. To illustrate this point, Shiraishi recalled a 
Track Two meeting during the years of the severe chill in relations (2001 to 2006) where 
the PRC officials present were very conscious in their discussions of the possible reaction 
to the talks back home in China (Takashi Shiraishi, 22/10/2008).  
 
 
Fumio Ota, Vice Admiral (Retired), (Director of the Center for Security and Crisis 
Management Education, National Defense Academy, Japan and former Director of 
Defense Intelligence Headquarters at the Japan Defense Agency).   
Some of the most alarmist comments which reflect how numerous incidents since the 
1990s have affected Japanese perceptions of China and its rise come from former high-
ranking military personnel in Japan. Fumio Ota, a retired Vice Admiral in the JMSDF for 
example, argued that the PRC’s maritime disagreements with Japan could be linked to the 
oft stated quest for hegemony by the Chinese where ‘China wants not only to control 
Taiwan but also to become the regional hegemon and finally to become a world power 
beyond Taiwan.’ This, he claims, can be discerned from an apparent encounter involving 
US Pacific Commander Admiral Keating when he visited the PRC in June 2007 and was 
told ‘with a serious face’ by high ranking Chinese military personnel: ‘You (the US) take 
care of the Eastern Pacific; we (China) will take care of the Western Pacific’ (Ota, 
2009:7).  
Ota also views Beijing’s claims to desire peace and not hegemony as disingenuous and 
deceptive. Recalling the annual Shangri-La Conference in Singapore on June 1st, 2008, 
when a PLA deputy chief of general staff claimed that ‘China is a peace-loving country 
and its people are a peace-loving people’, the retired Japanese Vice Admiral stated that 
many Japanese nonetheless distrust China because of the ‘discrepancies between what 
she said and what she has actually done.’ In terms of a threat, Ota argues that one should 
remember that since the founding of the PRC in 1949, it has used force frequently, where 
‘on average, China has used military power every several years.’ Ota uses an illustration 
(see appendices) to defend his view that ‘in all cases, except in its support of North 
Vietnam’s war against South Vietnam, China has used force pre-emptively (after careful 
preparation).’ While history is important he contends, it is more important to ‘judge a 
country by its current actions.’ Ota for example draws parallels between PRC behaviour 
in the South China Sea since the 1990s and that in the East China Sea where worryingly 
‘the threshold for Chinese use of force is very low.’ Beijing’s tactics in maritime areas 
likewise involve a ‘highly developed use of deception in its strategy.’ Ota expands on this 
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by quoting the most famous Chinese strategist of old, Sun Tzu, who stated over two 
thousand six hundred years ago that ‘War is based on deception.’ Deception, Ota argues, 
is a core element of Chinese military thinking where a controversial example includes the 
‘use of disguised maritime militia (fishermen, protesters etc.) as a military resource.’ 
This tactic, he claims, was utilised in 1974 when China spearheaded the gradual 
occupation of the Paracel Islands using ‘disguised fishing boats.’  
In 1978, this strategy could be again seen when ‘over one hundred Chinese armed fishing 
boats surrounded the Senkaku Islands.’ Hypothetically, Ota ponders the scenario if China 
should, in present times, invade the ‘Senkaku’ Islands, ‘she will use those maritime 
militias as a spearhead’ and if the JMSDF should kill someone in defence by accident or 
otherwise then ‘it should be expected that China will issue propaganda that the JMSDF 
killed innocent civilians.’ Ota likewise positions the PRC’s actions and statements 
regarding maritime areas by China to ‘a pattern in its maritime expansion.’ This pattern 
is exemplified by the fact that the PRC always appears to fill ‘the power vacuum created 
by a retreating superpower.’ Examples include its advancement upon the Paracel Islands 
in 1974 when the US was disengaging from Vietnam, in 1987/88 when China approached 
the west of the Spratly Islands following a reduction in USSR naval ships in Vietnam’s 
Cam Ranh Bay in 1984, and in 1991 when the US withdrawal from Clark Air Force Base 
and Subic Naval Base in the Philippines eventually saw the PRC move in areas east of 
the Spratlys to eventually occupy the Philippines-claimed Mischief Reef in 1994. From 
these precedents, ‘it should be expected that China will invade the Senkaku Islands if the 
US retreats from Okinawa.’ This ‘tactical pattern’ of ‘maritime territorial 
encroachment’, according to Ota, contains within it four stages. In the first stage, the 
Chinese declare territorial rights in an area. A notable example includes ‘the Territorial 
Water Law of 1992’ which China used it to claim the ‘Senkaku’ Islands as her territory, 
along with Taiwan and areas of the South China Sea, and also the Anti-Secession Law 
over Taiwan in March 2005 which re-iterated the PRC’s right to use force in the event of 
a Taiwanese declaration of independence. The next phase sees PRC ships conducting 
‘maritime surveillance in the area where she declared her territorial rights.’ In the third 
stage, ‘China makes its presence known by dispatching naval forces/combatants.’ The 
coup de grace is when ‘China makes its final de facto occupation.’ Ota warns that ‘China 
followed this pattern in the South China Sea’ and ‘has already advanced to the third step’ 
in the East China Sea (Ota, 2009: 1-2;12-14). 
 
Ikuo Kayahara, Major General (Retired), Professor, Takushoku University 
As with the increasing number of maritime surveys in the ECS, retired JASDF Major 
General Ikuo Kayahara states that ‘China’s claims over the Senkaku Islands seem to be of 
recent origin’, and that China never made any protests when the US used the islands as a 
firing range during the US ownership of the islands (along with the Okinawan Islands) 
from 1945 to 1972. According to Kayahara, it is also an ‘undeniable fact’ that the 
Chinese never once expressed opposition at the time when the islands were eventually 
‘returned’ to Japan in 1972 as accompanying islands of Okinawa. The ‘Senkaku’ Islands 
were, he claims, similarly nowhere to be found in the text of the PRC’s ‘Declaration on 
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Territorial Waters’ which was adopted by the National People’s Congress (NPC) on 
September 4th 1958; a text written years prior to the ‘Territorial Waters Law’ of 1992. 
Kayahara notes how ‘To Japan’s embarrassment (sic), China abruptly included its claim 
over the ‘Diaoyu’ Islands in the law of 1992’ where ‘these one-sided claims over, and 
erratic announcements of, territorial rights have helped create distrust and a sense of 
caution against China among the Japanese populace.’ These suspicions, he contends, 
have been reinforced by fears over the PRC’s past behaviour at sea where for example 
‘China advanced to the South China Sea, with eyes set on the Malacca Straits, a potential 
chokepoint for marine traffic of the Chinese fleets’, actions that resulted in the occupation 
of the Paracel Islands in 1974 and then the Spratly Islands in 1988 where the PLAN 
drove away ‘the Vietnamese garrison troops by military force, and made the occupation 
a fait accompli’ (Kayahara, 2006: 6). 
 
 
    Akihito Kazumine, Rear Admiral, JMSDF Retired, and Senior Research Fellow, 
Policy Research Department, Ocean Policy Research Foundation (OPRF), Tokyo on 
21/09/2007.  
 
Akihito Kazumine, a retired JMSDF Rear Admiral based at Tokyo’s Ocean Policy 
Research Foundation (OPRF) in similar fashion claims that China has two reasons for its 
actions in the contested East China Sea where one reason is the pursuit of energy 
resources while the other is the quest for hegemony.  For evidence of China’s quest for 
hegemony in such areas, he claims that one need only look at the pattern of Chinese 
history where ‘As in the past, as China became stronger, so greater claims by China’ 
became stronger. As a result of these interpretations of a threat, Japan currently 
recognizes China as one of two threats to its interests in the ECS. These threats include 
maritime terrorism and Chinese expansionism where China’s hegemonic ambitions in the 
sea are both short term and long term. The short term ambitions manifest themselves he 
claims, in the increased demand and push for energy reserves. As China gets stronger 
however, Kazumine believes that its demands will increase and its hegemonic objectives 
will become more apparent as was the case at time of the Ming (1368-1644) and Qing 
dynasties (1644-1911) in Chinese history (Akimoto Kazumine, 21/09/2007).   
 
 
 
    Hisahiko Okazaki, Director, The Okazaki Institute, Tokyo, on 04/11/2008.  
Hiroshi Okazaki asserts that in the course of its modern history, China did not have an 
interest in the ECS until the findings of the UNICAFE report were published in the late 
1960s. Similarly, he contends that it was not until the passing of the PRC’s 1992 Law of 
the Territorial Sea that the Chinese ‘decided that the Senkaku Islands were Chinese 
territory.’  Indeed, it was not until the 1980s that China made claims beyond its territorial 
waters for the first time. According to Okazaki, one need only look at developments in 
the South China Sea since the late 1980s for evidence of China’s quest for an expansion 
of power and an extension of its sphere of influence. In the early 1990s, China claimed 
practically all of the South China Sea as the Chinese sphere of influence.  Prior to this, he 
states, the Chinese did not care to come out to the ocean. For Okazaki, reading intentions 
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is really a question of guessing. Observers should instead look at the chronology of 
China’s actions in maritime areas for more telling evidence of a gradual expansion of 
China’s interests (Hisahiko Okazaki, 04/11/2008). 
 
    Shigeki Sakamoto, Professor of International Law, Graduate School of Law, 
Kobe University, on 27/10/2007.  
 
Noting the unprecedented military dimension to the ECS disputes, Japanese maritime 
disputes expert, Shigeki Sakamoto, points to the fact that military considerations in the 
East China Sea are also more important now because China aspires to build a blue-water 
navy over the next ten years and beyond. The disputed ECS islands are strategically 
significant in this regard. In negotiations, he contends, China talks about joint-
development but tends to focus on joint development around these islands. This focus 
concerns and worries the Japanese government and its people who prefer to focus on 
joint-development in the overlapping areas near the median line (Shigeki Sakamoto, 
27/10/2007).   
 
 
 
    Takahiro Ninomiya, (JMSDF Retired Major General Retired), Acting President, 
Executive Director, Secretary General, at the Japan Forum For Strategic Studies 
(JFSS), on 17/12/2008. 
 
For retired Major General Takahiro Ninomiya, the rise in tensions over the ECS is ‘a 
matter of war over materials and territory where China desires the whole continental 
shelf and beyond.’ The Chinese, he argues, are strategic tacticians, and Japan needs to be 
vigilant about ‘China sucking out Japan’s resources’ where ‘The Chinese think that the 
area is theirs and act like it.’ In an indication of how some influential Japanese (and 
Chinese) assume a more aggressive stance in the security realm by the other side when an 
assertive stance is seen in relation to domestic politics and historical grievances, 
Ninomiya cites the behaviour of China towards Japan, and that of Jiang Zemin towards 
the Japanese Emperor in 1998 as being ‘very arrogant’ where Jiang was viewed as being 
very anti-Japanese and was also very tough with regards to the ECS (Takahiro Ninomiya, 
17/12/2008).  
 
 
    Toshiyuki Shikata, Professor of Law, Teikyo University, Counselor to the 
Governor of Tokyo, former Lieutenant General of the JSDF, on 05/11/2007. 
 
With regards to the issue of intrusions into Japan’s EEZ in the ECS for example, it is 
apparent that such actions create anxiety and unease in Japan and beg the questions: to 
what extent is China ‘sneaking’ into Japan’s sovereign area?, and why does China persist 
in drilling when it knows Japan’s stance? Such moves confuse Japan as to China’s 
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attitude, and create the impression that the PRC is ‘pushing’ to achieve its economic and 
political objectives. This has a dangerous effect on the Japanese public where ex-military 
men such as Toshiyuki Shikata, a former Lieutenant General of the JMSDF and 
counselor to the Governor of Tokyo, warns China not to ‘make a fire in the soul of the 
Japanese people’ because ‘if this happens, then it’s very dangerous’ (Toshiyuki Shikata, 
05/11/2007). 
 
 
Summary 
 
The above sample survey of a number of Japanese middle elites from a wide variety of 
fields ranging from academics to former diplomats and military officers provides an 
insight into some prevailing perceptions in Japan with regards to the ECS disputes after 
2002. The survey also displays some shared opinions and commonalities about who and 
what was to blame for the extent of the bilateral frictions over the East China Sea when 
serious disagreements resurfaced in 2003. To a lesser extent the survey also showed a 
recognition by informed sources of the challenges created for the Chinese leadership by 
the unfavorable behavior of the Koizumi government (2001 to 2006). In the context of 
the August 19th 2003 to June 18th 2008 period, the survey also reveals how a change in 
perceptions about China’s rise developed and was fed by a collection of negative 
interactions since the 1990s, China’s behaviour in the East China Sea and the South 
China Sea, its military spending and so forth. When appreciated alongside the discussed 
domestic political developments in Japan, pressures from within for a more assertive 
defense posture, and the emergence of the China card in Japanese vote-winning 
strategies, this survey sheds some light on how the Japanese public perceived these 
maritime disagreements and how they interpreted the statements and actions of the 
Chinese in the East China Sea. 
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Chapter Summary     
In August 2003 when these disagreements resurfaced following Beijing’s decision to 
commence production activities in the Chunxiao field, it is apparent that bilateral 
relations and the overall background were ripe for a hostile and potentially 
confrontational outcome over the points of issue in the ECS.  The years leading up to and 
including the discussed period (i.e. 2001 to 2008) witnessed the proliferation of, and a 
more powerful voice for, actors and groups calling for a stronger response on matters like 
the East China Sea.  
The same period was also an unfavourable time in terms of domestic political shifts and 
circumstances in each country, and in terms of how the two neighbours dealt with each 
other. These, amongst other issues, included for example a leadership transition, Hu’s 
unconsolidated power, and a divided elite in the PRC. In Japan, influential politicians 
increasingly pandered to nationalist sentiment and media pressures. At the decision-
making and bureaucratic level, there was also a break-away from the more traditional 
modus operandi between Beijing and Tokyo, which had served to quietly deal with 
sensitive issues in the past. These factors along with the worst popular sentiment towards 
the other side in the post-normalization era, all contributed to an excessive politicisation 
of, and less than ideal approach toward, these maritime disputes in the tense 2003 to 2006 
period.   
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The manner in which the outlined actors and groups at the domestic level in each state, 
who seeing the opportunity to make political capital amid rising public concern and 
outrage, impinged upon the East China Sea disputes arguably conforms to many of the 
tenets of actor-centred constructivist liberalism.   The depth of feeling in both countries 
toward their neighbour was arguably displayed in the sample survey of views from 
interviewees who illustrated how negative popular sentiment was affected by unsavoury 
developments and gestures since the 1990s. It also arguably reflected the extent to which 
Chinese and Japanese people were influenced by the way the other side was portrayed in 
the media in the case of Japan, and both the media and the education system in the case 
of China. While not providing detailed information on how domestic politics and 
domestic structures impacted upon how the ECS was addressed, the survey nonetheless 
provided a more comprehensive grasp of the dual interplay between internal politics and 
popular sentiment and consequently how they related to the East China Sea disputes in 
the 2001 to 2008 period. This perspective too makes up an important component of the 
actor-centred constructivist liberal viewpoint. 
 
The 2001 to 2008 years vis-à-vis the East China Sea problems could be distinguished in 
particular by two periods i.e. the strained 2003 to 2006 period and then the more 
constructive 2006 to 2008 period. The latter were years when a key actor in further 
upsetting already fractious ties, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi assumed the 
leadership mantle and with his cabinet severely tested the relationship by bowing to 
pressures from powerful nationalist groups in Japan, visiting the controversial Yasukuni 
shrine, and pursuing a tougher line with China on a number of sensitive issues including a 
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more assertive response to Beijing’s production activities in the ECS after August 2003. 
In the PRC, Hu Jintao’s still unconsolidated leadership position in the very early years of 
his tenure, and the public and elite outrage surrounding Japanese actions on matters 
considered dear to all Chinese, alongside the threat of possible exploitation of these 
issues by rival elite actors if dealt with badly, meant that the PRC leadership was 
constrained in terms of how it could publicly and privately address the ECS 
disagreements after 2002.  
 
By late 2006, the ending of Koizumi’s time in office as well as a stronger leadership role 
for Hu (which he had gradually consolidated over the course of a few years) meant that 
the relationship, and consequently approaches to the ECS, could be managed in a more 
favourable manner. The General Secretary’s more definite and confirmed position by late 
2006 also meant that his rivals were in a weaker state to undermine him. This also helped 
Hu to guide the relationship in a more positive way, for example via the state media and 
through tighter controls on nationalist groups who could, as shown in the past, 
significantly trouble ties with Japan vis-à-vis the East China Sea. This, alongside the 
advent of a more China-friendly leadership in Japan under Fukuda in particular, and 
lessons learned following the nadir of 2005, had a favourable influence on the 
negotiations and atmosphere surrounding these maritime disputes. Such developments 
were instrumental in permitting the two governments to make great strides in repairing 
relations after September 2006 and in concluding the ‘Principled Consensus’ on June 18th 
2008. 
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Chapter Five  
 Conclusion: Beyond Principled Consensus    
 
Summary of Thesis 
The topic of Japan and China’s problematic relations over the East China Sea has been 
discussed over the years by regional experts and others who are concerned with bilateral 
relations between the two states. These discussions most often were purely empirical and 
analytical in substance, but were not based on any specified theoretical approach. In 
addition, within existing discussions the importance of domestic politics and popular 
sentiment to how the disputes manifest themselves did not seem to warrant as much 
attention as perhaps they deserve. Theoretical approaches which stress an actor-centred, 
constructivist liberal viewpoint, however, suggest there is considerable significance to 
both these factors and as such, they deserved to be examined.  
 
To this end, the deep bilateral tensions surrounding the East China Sea disagreements 
between Japan and China in the years leading up to and including the period from August 
19th 2003 to June 18th 2008 were considered from an actor-centred constructivist liberal 
viewpoint. In particular, there was a focus on the problem of why and when small 
incidents in the East China Sea tended to blow up into a much larger confrontation. This 
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was all the more pressing a question due to both Japan and China’s mutually desire for, 
and convergent interest in, stable and co-operative relations with each other.  
 
Despite the apparent material and strategic value of the Pinnacle Islands and untapped 
resources in the East China Sea, both states have tended to successfully manage these 
disputes while holding firm to their claims and taking measures to check and balance 
against the activities of the other side. An examination of the ECS disputes exhibited the 
challenges to this normally peaceful management that domestic politics and negative 
popular sentiment can have on these disagreements. The research was aimed at tackling 
this puzzle while also illustrating the ways in which conflicting legal positions often 
compelled each state to behave in ways which forced a response from the other side and 
resulted in situations which threatened relations between the two countries.   
 
Four central contributory factors in the resurgence of these maritime disputes since the 
1990s were identified. They are: 1) the bilateral security structure, along with its weak 
conflict prevention system; 2) the increased value of the Sea Lines of Communication 
(SLOCs) and the greater strategic, material, and geographical importance of the ECS; 3) 
the complex and conflicting interpretations of the ambiguous UN Convention on the Law 
of the Sea (UNCLOS) which do not point to a permanent resolution; and, important to the 
aim of this thesis, 4) the influence of domestic politics and popular sentiment on 
approaches to these disputes. In the PRC, the domestic political interests of the 
communist regime, popular shared sentiment toward Japan, and rivalries between top-
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level elites and constituencies to present themselves as the best defender of the nation 
played a significant contributory role in how the 2003 to 2008 disputes could be 
addressed and in how public approaches by Beijing to the ECS problems manifested 
themselves. In Japan, the emergence of China-related and nationalistic issues as a much 
more salient electoral card and sensitive issue placed the ECS disputes on a higher and 
more public political plain and contributed to more assertive public stand by Japanese 
politicians with regards to these disagreements. 
 
This last factor in particular has served to intensify frictions between the disputants as 
well as acting as an obstacle to the creation of bilateral regimes and dispute mechanisms 
for the ECS. While the economic and nationalist pillars of legitimacy, along with elite 
competition and popular sentiment in the PRC, provide telling insights into approaches to 
the ECS from 2003 to 2008, popular sentiment, electoral strategizing, and political 
posturing in Japan also significantly impacted upon the post-2002 East China Sea 
disputes. Approaching the 2003 to 2008 East China Sea disputes from an actor-centred 
constructivist liberal perspective provided a useful viewpoint in which to examine how 
the actual and potential exploitation of popular sentiment over issues such as the ECS by 
various individuals, constituencies, and groups in both countries constrained approaches 
to these maritime disagreements. From this perspective, the extent of the post-2002 East 
China Sea tensions over the islands and the sea’s delimitation are appropriately 
understood by emphasizing their symbolism and the instrumental utility of these issues 
for domestic politics in both countries. 
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This problem of popular sentiment and domestic politicking and their influence on the 
ECS disputes is an ongoing problem that can cause bilateral approaches to the disputes to 
wax and wane. This is particularly the case in the PRC and goes a long way in explaining 
the reasons why Chinese reactions to publicized incidents in the ECS can be so dramatic 
and emotive. These factors are strongly linked to the question of why the maritime 
frictions were so tense and why no substantial movement in confidence building could be 
seen in the period from 2003 to 2006. These outlined issues negatively influenced the 
political atmosphere surrounding the East China Sea disputes, and consequently the 
progress of the ECS negotiations in the same period. Historical animosity and prejudices 
and negative popular sentiment are related to domestic politics in each state, and it is 
apparent that there is a nexus between the two, and thus their inter-linkage rather than the 
exclusive ‘either or’ of either top-down or bottom-up perspectives significantly 
influenced approaches to the 2003 to 2008 ECS disputes and how they manifested 
themselves.   
 
It is clear that there are legal, strategic, historical, geographical, and political contexts 
which can shed light on the resurgent East China Sea disputes and the complexities 
inherent in them. Domestic politics and increased popular animosity toward the other 
side, particularly since the 1990s, however have added a much more troublesome 
political element to these disagreements than in previous years, and have significantly 
complicated their manageability by the two governments.  These sub-national domestic 
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and ideational issues are worth looking at via the lens of actor-centered constructivist 
liberalism. This approach served to illustrate how and why a variety of actors and the 
historical, domestic political, and institutional contexts in which they operate could wield 
such an influence on approaches to the East China Sea.  
 
In order to substantiate its claims, this research set out to achieve the following 
objectives. Firstly, to argue that, through both the utilisation of over eighty interview 
notes and other primary sources, when interspersed with effective secondary sources, the 
domestic political circumstances and context, and popular sentiment in each state played 
a very significant role in worsening and amplifying the ECS disputes in the 2003 to 2006 
period. Secondly, to illustrate how the above two factors can influence the bilateral 
relationship in such a way as to prevent or effectively freeze positive approaches and 
substantial movement regarding the ECS disputes. This is despite the fact that both China 
and Japan appreciate that stable and close economic and political ties are in both their 
best respective interests. Thirdly the data presented aimed to show that the most suitable 
approach to these disputes involves a sturdy and consistent bilaterally negotiated modus 
operandi which is not hostage to the fluctuating waves of domestic politics and popular 
sentiment, and which would serve to prevent conflict and troublesome incidents between 
the two states.  
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Applying an Actor-Centered Constructivist Liberal Approach 
 
The application of actor-centred constructivist liberalism was a new applicable theoretical 
roadmap through which to examine the inter-relationship between domestic actors, 
domestic politics, popular sentiment, controversies related to history and identity, and the 
bilateral approaches to the East China Sea disagreements from 2003 to 2008. The central 
hallmarks of this theoretical viewpoint include the following: a) that domestic actors and 
domestic structures have a very considerable influence on a state’s identities and interests 
and thus on a state’s foreign policy behaviour;  b) a particular emphasis is placed on the 
over-riding importance of internal actors on external foreign policy outcomes; c) that 
interests can change and shift depending on the time and policy issue where interests are 
in the first place shaped by the identities, beliefs and interests of domestic actors; and d)  
that both the interest and ideational components of internal actors and groups matter and 
are interlinked. The way that this interlinkage manifests itself can bear heavily on 
decision-makers and influence policy interests (Panke and Risse, 2007:89-93). The 
constructivist variant of an actor-centred liberal approach compliments these hallmarks 
well in the context of a China-Japan related case study in that constructivist liberalism 
does not over-emphasize the manner of socialization between the two countries (as liberal 
constructivism might) but argues rather that communication and ideas matter when they 
intersect with already existent internal values and institutions (Moravcsik, 1997:540). The 
weight of historical and ideational related controversies when blended in with rational 
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concerns and objectives in the domestic political field in both states arguably made this 
theoretical viewpoint a useful approach through which to explore and discuss the factors 
which can cause these disputes to wax and wane. 
 
 
The cross-over between the material, rational and ideational permitted by actor-centered 
constructivist liberalism arguably gives it a greater explanatory power in appreciating the 
diverse domestic interests and actors that states such as Japan and China have and must 
consider. This is particularly apt when considering an issue as strategically, politically, 
and historically sensitive as the East China Sea disputes. As such, it allows for a more 
comprehensive examination of how domestic actors and considerations impact upon 
these maritime disagreements. Rational interests for example arguably should not be 
detached from their context or from the issue around which they exist. Actor-centered 
constructivist liberalism’s arguments on how both the rational and ideational are inter-
related when placed alongside the ECS problems helps to better illustrate the relationship 
between issues such as internal actors, domestic politics, energy resources, territory, 
history, and popular sentiment. Examples of internal or domestic actors discussed via this 
actor-centered variant included individuals and groups such as governing and opposition 
political factions, branches of the military, individual decision-makers and politicians, 
nationalist actors and groups, media outlets, business groups, and the general public. 
From the 1990s onwards, these actors played a more combined and influential role in the 
two states and created challenges to the traditional manageability of these disputes by the 
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Japanese and Chinese leadership. This theoretical framework provided a very useful 
platform in which to illustrate how these pressures influenced the ECS disagreements in 
the context of the 2001 to 2008 period.  
 
 
Keeping in mind the key traits of actor-centered constructivist liberalism as outlined 
above, this was applied by empirically focusing on inter-related actor, and liberal and 
constructivist-related themes such as internal actors, domestic politics, historical 
animosity, popular sentiment, and the inter-relationship between the internal rational and 
ideational concerns that both states held vis-à-vis the ECS disputes in the lead-up to and 
during the 2003 to 2008 period  A key factor in understanding the nature of the ECS 
tensions in the strained 2003 to 2006 period was the influence of these numerous outlined 
domestic groups and considerations, and how they placed constraints and pressures on 
their governments to behave toward foreign policy issues according to their preferences, 
at least in terms of public and official actions. The strength of feeling toward the other 
side in the two countries, especially since the 1990s, alongside mounting concerns about 
who was winning and who was losing out in the ECS disputes had also given the issue a 
great deal more leverage domestically as a potential card in elite political competition in 
the PRC, as an electoral card in Japan, and as a point of contention that more easily 
stirred the blood of ordinary Chinese and Japanese citizens.   
These domestic pressures tied in with shifts in the traditional diplomatic modus operandi 
between Beijing and Tokyo after the late 1990s. Political restructuring in Japan and 
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unprecedented societal changes in the PRC which empowered more internal actors, and a 
dramatic rise in shared negative attitudes towards the other side resulting from domestic 
campaigns such as educational drives and calls for foreign policy shifts as well as 
numerous negative interactions, had also contributed to a heightened level of tension and 
the dramatic politicisation of the East China Sea disputes by the time the shrine visiting 
Koizumi entered the scene in 2001. Anxieties in Japan had already developed over the 
PRC’s exponential defence spending, and its seemingly aggressive and inconsiderate 
behaviour in maritime areas including and beyond the ECS, such as the South China Sea. 
Japan’s sensitivity was also fed by its own insecurities regarding its identity and status in 
the ‘lost decade’ of the 1990s where China’s rise seemed to confirm the inevitable demise 
of Japan’s pre-eminent position as Asia’s number one power. In the PRC, nationalistic 
themes had become increasingly more powerful as a topic in popular and elite debates 
during the 1990s as anti-Japanese sentiment increased and was indirectly encouraged, and 
as the realities of the country’s post-1979 reform era changes and a new international 
environment began to dig their teeth into China’s political, economic, and social life. 
 
In both countries, political elites had been shown to draw upon these sentiments and 
speak though not always act in ways that resonated well with the ideas and identities of 
their home populations. This stemmed arguably from genuine personal convictions but 
also coincided with the need to fend off possible criticism from political challengers and 
opponents, or represented an opportunity to bolster their own positions. During the deep 
freeze in Sino-Japanese relations from 2001 to 2006 and the ongoing shrine visits for 
example, very negative shared perceptions of Japan made any public and even symbolic 
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movement on the ECS very risky for the Chinese leadership, due to the constraints of 
public opinion and the make-up of the political elite at that time. This context also 
arguably prevented PRC elites from promoting more constructive and flexible strategies 
during the nadir of the maritime frictions. When viewed through the lens of actor-centred 
constructivist liberalism, these observations regarding the weight of domestic actors and 
their context,  and the interplay of rational and ideational factors in the 2001 to 2008 East 
China Sea disputes point to some noteworthy policy suggestions and implications for 
future approaches to these disagreements. They also point to a number of areas that merit 
future research.  
 
Policy Implications, and Future Research Opportunities 
 
ECS Disputes since June 200822.       
 
It is unfortunate to all too often see the East China Sea disputes remaining hostage to the 
vagaries of domestic politics and diplomatic failings, to the self-interests of nationalistic 
actors and groups or to pressure for assertive action stemming from negative elite and 
popular sentiment. Only through a strengthening of conflict-prevention mechanisms and 
a maritime code of conduct, as well as other institutional ties that minimise the dangers of 
                                                          
22 For a detailed index of ECS-related incidents since June 2008, see the chronology.  
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a repeat of a late 2005 near conflict scenario or later serious incidents in September 
201023 for example, can a peaceful management of these disagreements be realised.  
 
The complexities and ambiguities of current maritime laws such as the UNCLOS have 
also shown however that managing these disputes in a peaceful way while also refraining 
from weakening one’s side territorial claims will be a perennial challenge for the 
diplomats on both sides even if the bilateral relationship is experiencing a positive spell. 
It also strongly suggests that the ECS disputes can no longer depend on being constantly 
put off until another day or on ‘gentlemen’s agreements’ which, as illustrated in 
September 2010, can be suddenly violated, depending on the make-up and demands of 
domestic political actors in each state. The 2003 to 2008 period and the ECS’ ups and 
downs in these years displayed how unfavourable domestic political circumstances and 
popular sentiment can effectively put the brakes on confidence-building and conflict 
prevention measures. It was also clear that while the disputes are intricately complex, and 
a permanent resolution remote; significant strides can be made when the political will and 
opportunity exists to move forward. The ways and means, in terms of maritime 
guidelines and codes of practice, through which the two governments can consistently 
and successively deal with these disputes in the future without being intermittently held 
                                                          
23 The serious deterioration in ties that followed the September 7th 2010 interception of a Chinese fishing 
boat, Minjinyu 5179, and the arrest of its captain in waters near the Pinnacle Islands served as a stark 
reminder of the lingering vulnerabilities evident in bilateral approaches to East China Sea problems and in 
the diplomatic failings between the two neighbours. The effects of the now resolved incident are arguably 
still being felt to this day despite the public improvement in relations since then.  For a detailed account of 
the September 7th 2010 incident and its aftermath, see Wada, 2010. For other interesting articles see  
npr.org, 19/10/2010, and Taipei Times, 20/10/2010.  Also see the chronology.  
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hostage by domestic politics and popular sentiment is a puzzle which merits attention and 
deserves further study by researchers. It is apparent that this objective is a most pressing 
one if Japan and China hope to peacefully manage ECS incidents in the months and years 
ahead. 
 
In this regard, it is important to set down points to bear in mind when considering future 
approaches to the ECS problems. High profile incidents such as those that flared up in 
September 2010 should remind all of the importance of appreciating why the two 
countries tend to intermittently come to blows over the ECS, and why incidents remain 
vulnerable to destabilising escalations. It also displays the urgency for Japan and China to 
address ways to prevent such incidents sooner rather than later. In addition, there are 
some future considerations that Beijing and Tokyo need to contend with when 
implementing and formulating policies that deal not just with the ECS but 
comprehensively with the inter-related wider relationship. Central to such aspirations is 
the building of strong and positive institutional ties at the wider level which increases the 
opportunities for a mutually agreed modus operandi aimed at conflict prevention in the 
East China Sea. 
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Bilateral Challenges 
 
Incidents such as those witnessed during and after September 2010 would suggest that 
despite the tangible post-2006 improvement in ties, domestic politics, political 
uncertainty, and public distrust, continue to impede stronger political and institutional 
ties, and optimal approaches to the ECS. This is not just a Chinese challenge but can also 
be seen with regards to Japanese fears and concerns about its rising neighbor. A Genron 
NPO and China Daily bilateral survey carried out back in June and July 2008, for 
example indicated that some 80 percent of Chinese were optimistic about future ties with 
Japan but that only 32 percent of Japanese felt likewise. This was in the context of the 
June 2008 ‘principled consensus’ which seemed to symbolize the progress made in 
relations since the deep chill of 2001 to 2006. Even during the high point of post-
Koizumi rapprochement following the bilateral May summits of 2008, these meetings 
were viewed by an impressive 79 percent of Chinese as a good improvement in ties while 
only a much lower 21.5 percent of Japanese agreed (Hongo, 2008).  
 
The lingering post-2006 distrust felt by the two peoples remains one of a number of key 
obstacles to a necessarily compromising and constructive approach which possibly could 
reap rewarding dividends for Japan and China. Why this distrust persists in the post-2008 
years and how the two governments can sincerely address it in the interests of positive 
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ties for issues such as the ECS is a key question which deserves to be looked at if 
comprehensively favourable approaches to these disputes are to be understood.  
 
As illustrated by the events of late last year, it is apparent that even under the current, 
ostensibly more China-friendly Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) leadership, Japan is still 
as determined as ever to remain unyielding in the ECS, and to vigilantly observe and 
track the behaviour of Chinese vessels in and around disputed areas. The numerous near-
misses and other incidents in this disputed sea since 2008 suggests that the manner in 
which JMSDF vessels patrol and pursue Chinese boats, and the Chinese reactions to these 
remain a constant threat to the stability and manageability of these disagreements.  
 
The historical controversies that troubled ECS approaches from 2001 to 2006 are no 
longer as decisive now because they have been handled more sensitively since 2006. 
Japan-China relations have clearly returned to a more respectful level in spite of the 
September 2010 fiasco, where the sidelining and more sensitive treatment of these 
controversial issues has improved the chances of more positive bilateral approaches to 
these maritime disagreements. This does not mean however that the two states are any 
closer to agreeing on the issues of demarcation or the Pinnacle Islands.  The PRC’s 
recurring frictions with states such as Vietnam and the Philippines over maritime territory 
in the South China Sea have also strengthened the arguments of those in Japan calling for 
a vigilant and unrelenting position vis-à-vis the East China Sea.  
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These realities serve to remind people that the immediate focus in the midst of improved 
relations must be on the stabilisation and management of potential problems rather an 
outright and final resolution. The domestic political costs of and lessons learned from the 
September 2010 humiliation for Japan however worryingly suggests the possibility of 
any future Japanese administration adopting a hard-line vis-à-vis Beijing yet not stepping 
back from a crisis like Prime Minister Kan did in the interests of wider relations. One of 
the lessons of Japanese domestic politics in the last fifteen years has also arguably been 
one where adopting a tough stance against the Chinese is seen as paying domestic 
political dividends. This may tempt Japanese politicians to repeat the mistakes of 
predecessors such as Koizumi for their own political ends (Park, 2010). It is of grave 
concern to imagine what the outcome would be should such an episode unfold and further 
supports the need for an agreed and honoured code of practice in maritime areas which 
can withstand turbulent times and political changes between the two neighbours. The 
Koizumi years displayed the ways in which politicians and hard-liners can negatively 
harm bilateral ties on matters like the ECS and spurs the call for a rigid and closely 
observed modus vivendi aimed at peacefully settling maritime incidents regardless of the 
atmosphere elsewhere in the relationship. How exactly any future ECS accord could 
stand firm in the face of calls for a tougher line from hard-liners and nationalists in the 
two states is a difficult question to answer but one certainly worthy of investigation by 
scholars of China-Japan affairs. 
 
This necessity is all the more urgent when one considers present and future challenges 
such as the inevitable rise in PLAN activities as it increases its presence in waters leading 
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out to the Pacific, US-Japanese countermeasures to address these, and difficulties arising 
from the still unresolved Taiwan issue. These problems serve to emphasize even more the 
importance of a positive atmosphere and strong leadership vis-à-vis the ECS disputes in 
order to appropriately deal with them without avoidable frictions that heighten the 
possibility of misunderstanding or miscalculation (Drifte, 2008a:21-22). As China 
continues to rise and its military capabilities expand, these above challenges are likely to 
become more pronounced. These future realities make the call for a realistically 
attainable resolution on issues such as joint development or ship movements which could 
possibly see Japan and China peacefully managing the occasional incident without 
weakening their own legal claims all the more pressing.  
 
As the 2001 to 2006 period illustrated, the conclusion of any confidence-building or 
conflict-prevention initiatives is very much dependent on a favorable domestic political 
situation and a favorable atmosphere between the two neighbors. This is a given in terms 
of the wider relationship which policy makers must consider in their endeavors to find a 
peaceful bilateral strategy in the disputed sea. While some progress has been made in the 
past amid less than optimal ties, as seen in the commendable 1997 Fisheries agreement 
and the less successful 2001 pre-notification ECS accord, it is apparent that the 
combination of political will, political opportunity, and ideally favorable popular 
sentiment can make a deal at least more possible even if the outcomes are less than ideal. 
The possible legal framework for a modus operandi in the ECS in which peace is 
maintained and claims not diminished would make for interesting reading and merits 
exploration by scholars in the legal and political fields.    
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Domestic Political Challenges       
As shown by a number of high profile incidents since the ‘principled consensus’ of June 
2008, these disputes still remain vulnerable to the policies, prejudices, and domestic 
political circumstances of each state. In terms of Japan, the worrisome September 2010 
incident and the serious fall-out in ties which resulted from it serves as a reminder of the 
fact that the 2008 consensus and its commitment to joint development is some three years 
later still threatened by the politics and strategies of frequently changing Japanese 
politicians and administrations that follow it (Peterson, 2010:442). In the PRC, the 
turbulence and uncertainties surrounding elite politics and unregulated and informal 
leadership transitions place understandable doubts on the ability of Chinese leaders to 
consistently and reliably manage the relationship with Japan and subsequently the East 
China Sea disputes. The lessons from the Jiang Zemin years are, for one, a stark reminder 
of a potentially vulnerable Chinese leader exploiting the Japan card to bolster his own 
position. The ending of Hu Jintao’s time in office as General Secretary in 2012 may also 
see another leadership transition that might not necessarily be smooth particularly as a 
new generation of elites seek to assert themselves in Hu’s wake. In Japan, short-term 
governments and top leaders arguably make it more difficult for Beijing to trust Japanese 
commitments, and to instead adopt a non-binding wait and see approach in terms of ECS 
negotiations. 
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As in the 2003 to 2006 years, this scenario may restrict the ability of a new Chinese 
leadership to compromise with the Japanese or follow through on agreements made vis-à-
vis the East China Sea. Here again the future obstacles to a comprehensive treaty on the 
ECS are evident with their progress possibly being held hostage to domestic political 
circumstances. This possible outcome feeds the call for an agreed code of conduct that 
does not attenuate the legal claims of either side or significantly undermine the leaders 
who helped to negotiate it and see it through.  While consensus on ship movements or 
defence manoeuvres aimed at preventing incidents might be found, an agreement on joint 
development carries greater political risk because it invariably requires some form of 
compromise on sensitive issues which can easily stir the emotions. Note for example the 
difficulties which a consolidated Hu Jintao had in selling the June 2008 ‘principled 
consensus’ on the ECS to disgruntled Party officials and selected nationalist groups in an 
otherwise positive atmosphere of significantly improved relations in the months prior to 
the Beijing Olympics.   
 
From the Japanese perspective, while having favourable impressions of Xi Jinping, the 
man earmarked to succeed Hu, there is uncertainty about whether he may be tempted to 
exploit anti-Japanese sentiment and assume an assertive posture in the ECS should the 
necessity arise. A slowdown in or threat to China’s economic rise might also make the 
exploitation of the nationalist element of the CCP’s legitimating strategy more attractive 
despite its dangers to stability within the PRC. Xi’s position as the lead contender for the 
top posts in China (expected to become General Secretary in 2012 and President in 2013) 
was solidified in March 2008 when he became Vice-President of the PRC and then the 
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vice chairman of the key Central Military Commission (CMC) in October 2010. 
According to one source, Xi’s successful nomination came with the backing of powerful 
elements within the military and Jiang-aligned and old Shanghai clique allies amid still 
tense relations with Japan over the September 7th ship incident and calls from the PLAN 
for the leadership to maintain a tough stance. Citing diplomatic sources in Beijing, the 
Asahi Shimbun newspaper claimed that Japan is worried due to the bolstering of hard-
liners after September 2010 that in the future Xi could find it necessary to be tougher 
against Japan than his predecessor. The expected ‘intense tug-of-war’ between Xi and the 
Hu favored Li Keqiang (who is expected to become Premier) as Hu gradually withdraws 
from the scene as leader and as Chairman of the CMC, over appointments to key posts, 
will also no doubt complicate the leadership’s flexibility in dealing with the East China 
Sea (Asahi Shimbun, 20/10/2010). In this context, the ongoing bilateral negotiations over 
their shared sea will arguably be curtailed and restrained due to a fear of being labeled as 
diplomatically weak during the period of leadership transition (Japan Times, 
21/10/2010). Any potential exploitation of the ECS and other nationalist related themes 
for domestic political ends could, as in the past, result in misunderstandings over Chinese 
intentions in the area and in a harder line from the Japanese in the defense realm.  
 
Only through a consistent faithfulness to a devised bilateral pact on how to deal with ship 
movements, defense exercises, island landings and so forth can Japan and China hope to 
peacefully manage these disputes in the future. A key challenge to agreeing to such a 
modus operandi will be the aforementioned problem of not weakening their respective 
claims. In spite of these challenges, progress however must not merely stop at an agreed 
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code of conduct in the ECS. If agreements are to be honored and obeyed by both sides, 
the Chinese and the Japanese must do more in terms of transparency and confidence-
building in the wider defense realm so that their respective fears of Chinese expansionism 
and US-Japanese containment are at least mitigated, and where the behavior of each side 
in the East China Sea is properly understood and explained. 
 
 
Maritime Practice and Legal Ambiguities 
 
The problems caused by the ambiguities of current maritime laws in areas like the East 
China Sea might also force a more determined debate regarding the available legal 
approaches open to disputant states and hopefully the creation of more effective and 
workable regimes and systems to deal with complex disagreements in often resource rich 
areas (Ramos-Mrosovsky, 2008:907). The ambiguous legalities surrounding such cases 
inhibit the ability of either case to make any substantive compromises which would go a 
long way to improving ties over the East China Sea. They also arguably explain one of 
the reasons why the disputes tend to fluctuate or reach an impasse every few years.  
 
The expansion, and increased activities, of the PLAN as it travels back and forth through 
the ECS similarly beckons both states to work harder to address near-misses and close 
calls because these incidents are arguably the greatest immediate threat to stability in the 
ECS. It is interesting to note however how the Chinese reaction to Japanese protests over 
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ship movements in what are seen to be Japanese, and international, waters differ to how 
the Japanese understand such movements. A helicopter incident in the ECS in mid-April 
2010 clearly illustrated this dichotomy. The Japanese for example made statements 
suggesting Chinese recklessness and a lack of central command over behavior by PLAN 
ships which were not violating any international rules and sailing within acknowledged 
international waters. The Chinese for their part witnessed the reaction in Japan as an oft-
stated example by the PRC of a Japanese unwillingness to treat China as an equal and of 
Tokyo’s attempts to frustrate the ‘rightful’ movements of PRC vessels in undisputed 
areas (CNS News, 28/04/2010). How the Japanese come to terms with the increased 
activity of the PLAN in peripheral waters and how the Chinese come to terms with the 
ongoing US-Japan relationship in these areas, and find some middle ground regarding 
military activities in the near future is thus a key question which will have a huge bearing 
for bilateral approaches to the ECS. Proposals by international relations and legal 
researchers for possible ways in which to deal with this dilemma would help to assist 
policy-makers in formulating agreements or at least shed some light on the realistic and 
workable options open to the concerned players. 
 
Consternation about different bilateral interpretations of the legal details of the June 2008 
agreement has also created problems between Tokyo and Beijing. Japan for example 
feels that the Chinese should cease unilateral exploration activities altogether in the 
overlapping area until a resolution is finalized, and that joint development would mean a 
more proactive and inclusive role for Japan in fields such as Chunxiao. For China 
however, there is no question that they should not be permitted to operate in an area that 
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is unquestionably Chinese as they see it, even if one recognizes the controversial median 
line. Beijing also holds different views on what is meant by joint development in the 
Chunxiao field where their emphasis seems to currently focus more on the issue of       
co-operative development i.e. Japanese investment only, rather than joint-development 
alone. This conflict of opinion regarding the ‘principled consensus’ remains to this day 
one of the key points of contention in their disputed sea with Japan often up in arms 
whenever it suspects the Chinese of carrying out production activities near the median 
line area. Japan rejects the Chinese interpretation of the accord and attributes related 
tensions in the East China Sea to the PRC not observing the agreement in good faith, as 
they see it, and for not delaying its exploration activities until more comprehensive 
negotiations have been finalized. The June 2008 ‘principled consensus’ is thus still 
symbolic rather than substantive. As such, its actual implementation remains uncertain 
and much depends on the political will and skills of future Japanese and Chinese leaders. 
Whether or not such legal complexities surrounding the ECS problems can be calmly 
dealt with regardless of domestic political changes in China and Japan will be a 
significant test for bilateral approaches to these disputes.  It is clear however that a 
successful management of the East China Sea disputes will serve as a model for the 
management of disputes elsewhere in the region, and bolster Japan and China’s sought-
after reputations as responsible and peaceful leading powers in East Asia and beyond. 
This may spur Beijing and Tokyo to deal with conflict-prevention negotiations in a more 
urgent and sincere manner. 
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Closing Thoughts    
Finding a solution that would see a revised median line or a diminution of Japan’s claims 
in the ECS is in the near future extremely unlikely and improbable, even if one accepts 
the view that both states have often tended to behave in counter-intuitive ways. In terms 
of the wider relationship, bilateral ties are also still characterized and are likely to 
continue to be characterized by a blend of co-operation, mostly due to convergent 
economic interests, and confrontation, mostly due to conflicting security and political 
interests. The East China Sea in particular remains a thorn in the side of the relationship 
even though diplomatic relations have improved since September of last year. The 
adoption of an actor-centered constructivist liberal approach helped to shed light on some 
of the key actors and issues which can serve to effectively stall any progress in managing 
or temporarily resolving these disputes, raise the level of tension, and increase the 
possibility of conflict.  Such an approach was a fruitful exercise in that it illustrated how 
bilateral negotiations related to, and the atmosphere surrounding, the ECS can be at the 
mercy of domestic political circumstances and negative popular sentiment in each state. 
Their influence goes a long way in understanding the difficulties experienced by policy 
makers in managing the disputes since the new millennium.  The lessons learned from the 
worrying lows of 2005 and 2010 in the East China Sea place an onus on the two 
governments to work hard to improve wider bilateral ties through strengthened 
institutions and more positive portrayals of the other side. Beijing and Tokyo must also 
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appreciate at this stage that if they are to avoid a repetition of the close-call of late 2005 
and later incidents in 2010 in the East China Sea, the next most pressing necessity in the 
bilateral relationship is to speed up once-stagnant efforts to deal with crisis management. 
This situation is thus the most pressing weakness which the improved relationship must 
seriously address in the near future. 
 
Central to the reasons for this absence of conflict-prevention mechanisms is the profound 
distrust that still lingers within the relationship, and to a context where tangible defense 
and security exchanges were largely off the agenda since 1998. A failure to abide by the 
details of agreements such as the 2001 notification accord has also served as an obstacle 
to a reliable and accountable system aimed at dealing with thorny ECS issues such as 
incursions, the scope of exploration activities, and so forth. Now that the relationship has 
returned to a more cordial and respectful level however, even in the aftermath of 
September 2010, both sides recognise that a crisis management system is a top of the 
agenda objective, where without it, the ECS will remain a source of worry and 
uncertainty for both countries’ military forces and decision-makers.  The setting up of 
effective crisis management systems for ECS contingencies is thus of paramount 
importance in the stabilisation and management of problems or miscalculations between 
military and coast guard forces in the area. The building of such systems is also a much 
more realistic and immediate objective than the much-vaunted demarcation solution. Key 
to conflict prevention in the ECS is thus a code of maritime practice as that would 
encompass how people and vessels are treated, freedom of navigation and over-flight, 
resource exploration and exploitation activities, scientific research, marine and aerial 
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‘spying’ and military activities in disputed areas etc. Such a code would incorporate 
declarations that abiding by its regulations do not prejudice the rights and claims of any 
signatory in any way while committing to a peaceful resolution of disagreements (Japan 
Times, 06/10/2010).  
 
The East China Sea challenge is all the more urgent because, as the approach taken by 
this thesis showed, when unfavourable domestic politics and negative popular sentiment 
combine, then it makes for a volatile mix that has a troublesome influence over the one 
issue where China and Japan could conceivably come to physical blows. Simply shelving 
or putting off the disputes for a future generation in the absence of any conflict-
prevention mechanism is no longer practical or realistic. Now is the time for the Chinese 
and the Japanese to close a door on the past and step up their efforts to turn their words 
about the East China Sea into actions. As arguably the most obvious barometer for the 
state of the relationship, a comprehensive and workable understanding and modus 
operandi on the central issues that have caused so much trouble since the 1990s would 
make a powerful statement about the future direction for the two neighbours and might 
by its example even spur positive developments for the stabilisation and management of 
similar maritime disputes elsewhere in the region.  
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Chronology of Key Events in the East China Sea Disputes 
1895 – China is defeated by Japan in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-95). Under the 
subsequent Shimonoseki (Maguan) Treaty, China cedes Taiwan and its appending islands 
(including the Pinnacle (Senkaku/Diaoyu) Islands) to Japan. This is the explanation 
claimed by China but contested by Japan (SinoDefence.com, 2009). Japan has always 
maintained that the islands were unclaimed ‘terra nullius’ (vacant territory) and therefore 
undisputed. 
  
1945 – Japan is defeated in World War Two. Under the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations, 
it is agreed that all territories taken by Japan since 1895 would be returned to China. The 
Republic of China assumes that this would include the Pinnacle (Senkaku/Diaoyu) 
Islands and did not raise the issue of sovereignty over them immediately after 1945. The 
islands come under the control of the US as part of their post-war occupation of Okinawa 
until 1972 (SinoDefence.com, 2009). 
 
1968 – A United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (UNECAFE) 
sponsored geological survey of the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea concludes that 
‘the organic matter deposited by the Yellow River and the Yangtze River may make the 
continental shelf in this region one of the most prolific oil and gas reserves in the world’ 
(Kien-hong Yu, 2005: 117;Heflin, 2000:2). 
 
1970 – Detailed negotiations between Japan and the US concerning the return of the 
Okinawan Islands to Japan begin. 
 
May 1970 – The PRC makes its first unofficial claims to the Pinnacle (Senkaku/Diaoyu) 
Islands (Drifte, 2008a:3-4). This followed an earlier claim by Taiwan to the islands. This 
is in advance of Okinawa’s planned return to Japanese control in 1972. 
 
1971 – Japan and Taiwan begin joint-exploration talks over energy resources near the 
Pinnacle (Senkaku/Diaoyu) Islands (Drifte, 2008a:3-4). 
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December 30th 1971 – The PRC makes its first official claims to the Pinnacle 
(Senkaku/Diaoyu) Islands (Drifte, 2008a:3-4). 
 
1972 - The Okinawan Islands (including the Pinnacle (Senkaku/Diaoyu) Islands) are 
returned to Japan (Drifte, 2008a:3-4). 
 
1972 – On the occasion of bilateral negotiations leading to the normalization of Sino-
Japanese relations, Tokyo raises the issue of the Pinnacle (Senkaku/Diaoyu) Islands. 
China suggests that both sides shelve the issue and the Japanese seem to acquiesce with 
this request (Drifte, 2008b:4). 
 
1974 – Japan and South Korea reach a consensus on the delimitation of the ECS and 
discuss the exploitation of hydrocarbon resources in the northern area of the ECS. The 
PRC is not consulted and makes strong protests (Drifte, 2008a:5-6; 20). 
 
1974 – China’s exploration activities in the ECS start. 
 
1978 – A Japanese right-wing group land on one of the Pinnacle (Senkaku/Diaoyu) 
Islands (SinoDefence.com, 2009). 
 
1978 – A government-approved protest fleet of 200 fishing vessels from the Chinese 
mainland enters the waters around the islands (Drifte, 2008b:10). 
 
1978 - Tokyo again raises the issue of the Pinnacle (Senkaku/Diaoyu) Islands and again 
China suggests that both sides shelve the issue and the Japanese seem to acquiesce with 
this request (Drifte, 2008b:4).  
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1978 – Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping asks that Japan and China agree to disagree by 
shelving the islands dispute for a future generation to deal with, and to focus on 
strengthening wider bilateral relations (Lo, 1989). 
 
1979 – Japan’s starts to construct a helicopter landing pad on the largest of the Pinnacle 
Islands. The PRC protests by dispatching fifty fishing vessels to the waters around the 
disputed islands (Blanchard, 2006: 216). 
 
1980 – In late 1980, the two governments make efforts to agree on a maritime border in 
the ECS. China insists on the natural prolongation principle while Japan pushes for a 
median line solution. The two sides fail to reach an agreement. The PRC drills two 
exploratory wells (Longjing I and Longjing II) well within its side of the unrecognised 
Japanese median line. Japan expresses its concern with the move and the Chinese respond 
by removing the rigs and calling for joint development talks with Japan (Blanchard, 
2006: 217). 
 
1980 – 1986 – Following ratification of earlier ECS agreements, Japan and South Korea 
carry out seven explorations in three sites but finally abandoned these when it became 
clear that these fields were not economically viable (Drifte, 2008a:5-6).  
 
December 1982 – UNCLOS is signed and sets out new updated guidelines for 
demarcating EEZs between states. 
 
1988 – On the tenth anniversary of the construction of ‘Number One Lighthouse’ on one 
of the Pinnacle Islands, the Japanese nationalist group ‘Nihon Seinensha’ spends three 
million yen replacing the original structure with an aluminium one (Blanchard, 2006: 
217). 
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September 1990 – Reports surface in the Japanese media that the government is 
preparing to recognise the controversial lighthouse as an ‘official navigation mark.’ The 
PRC and Taiwan protest the development (Pan, 2009:138). 
 
1992 – Chunxiao is a number of offshore areas in the ECS that China seeks to develop by 
inviting the co-operation of foreign investors (Zha, 2008). 
 
February 1992 – Beijing passes the ‘Law of the PRC on the Territorial Sea and 
Contiguous Zone’ laying claim to islands and territory in the East China Sea and the 
South China Sea, and reserving the right to exercise its sovereignty in these areas. Tokyo 
protests. The 1992 law is viewed in Japan as a worrying move away from earlier Chinese 
arguments that the Pinnacle Islands’ disputes should be shelved (Wu Xinbo (2000)). 
 
March 1992 – Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) declares that ‘it is not 
possible to “shelve” the problem’ and states that there is no evidence that Japan ever 
agreed to such a policy (Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), 05/03/1992; 
18/03/1992). 
 
April 1992 – Jiang Zemin visits Japan. Japanese PM Kiichi Miyazawa seeks clarification 
about the 1992 Law, and Jiang refers to Deng’s 1978 ‘shelving’ statement as an 
indication of China’s position (Drifte, 2008b:33). 
 
May 1995 – A PRC vessels conducts survey activities near the Pinnacle Islands but 
eventually leaves after official Japanese protests (Blanchard, 2006: 218). 
 
August 1995 – JASDF planes are scrambled to ward off PRC planes suspected of 
carrying out a patrol mission over the Pinnacle Islands (Blanchard, 2006: 218). 
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December 1995 – Japan reports that a Chinese drilling vessel is anchored close to the 
islands (Blanchard, 2006: 218). 
 
February 1996 – Japan reports that one of its Japanese Maritime Safety Agency (JMSA) 
ships had spotted a Chinese drilling vessel near the islands (Blanchard, 2006: 218). The 
delineation of the East China Sea becomes a much more divisive issue in the same month 
when almost simultaneously Japan and South Korea declare their claimed Exclusive 
Economic Zones (EEZs) (Valencia, 2007: 148). China also ratifies UNCLOS in 1996. 
 
1996 - UNCLOS is ratified. States involved in maritime disputes are asked to refrain 
from activities that could cause trouble on the path to a final agreement (Drifte, 2009: 
61).  Tokyo declares its EEZ in June 1996 and outlines a median line in the ECS based on 
what it views as an ‘equitable’ solution as discussed in Article 74(1) of UNCLOS (Liao, 
2008: 61). 
 
July 14th - 17th 1996 – Seven members of the nationalistic Japan Youth Federation 
(Nihon Seinen Sha) land on the Pinnacle (Senkaku/Diaoyu) Islands to construct a 
makeshift lighthouse and petition the government to recognize it as an official beacon. 
The incident infuriates nationalists in China, and draws protests from Beijing and Taipei 
(Downs and Saunders, 1998-1999:133; Reuters, 06/02/2007). At a subsequent press 
conference, Tokyo expressed concerns over the lighthouse but did not remove it. It also 
declared that ‘Japan clearly holds the ownership of the Senkaku Islands’ and that the 
construction of the lighthouse was legitimate (Blanchard, 2006: 218-19). The PRC 
angrily protests and asserts that the ‘erecting a lighthouse on the island is a serious 
encroachment upon China’s territorial sovereignty’ and demands that Tokyo deals 
appropriately with the incident (People’s Daily, 30/08/1996). 
 
July 29th 1996 – Bilateral tensions increase after Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro 
Hashimoto becomes the first Japanese leader to visit the controversial Yasukuni shrine in 
over ten years (Downs and Saunders, 1998-1999: 133). 
 
August 18th 1996 – A small Japanese nationalist group, the ‘Small Islands Defense 
Association’ plants a wooden Japanese flag beside one of the controversial lighthouses 
(Downs and Saunders, 1998-1999: 133). 
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August 1996 – The People’s Daily runs an article declaring that ‘No Chinese will 
surrender the country’s territory and sovereignty to anyone. If anybody dares to do so, he 
will be cursed for centuries.’ Beijing also allowed a Chinese nationalist group to present a 
petition to Jiang Zemin calling on the government to use the navy to dismantle the 
lighthouse (Blanchard, 2006: 218-19). 
 
September 26th 1996 - A Hong Kong protester, David Chan, drowns after jumping 
overboard from his protest ship in a bid to avoid arrest by the Japanese Coast Guard 
(JCG) who had been sent to intercept the group before their attempted landing on one of 
the disputed islands (Reuters, 06/02/2007). 
 
 
May 5th 1997 – Japanese politician Shingo Nishimura stages a nationalistic religious 
ceremony on the islands. Beijing protests against the incident (Reuters, 06/02/2007). 
 
Late May 1997 - A protest flotilla from Taiwan including over two hundred activists and 
heading towards the islands is held off by the Japanese Coast Guard (Reuters, 
06/02/2007). 
 
November 1997 – China and Japan finalize a fishing agreement by establishing ‘joint 
fishing areas’ and sidelining the EEZ and sovereignty issues for the purposes of an 
agreement in this regard (Drifte 2008b:13). 
 
April 1998 – A PRC marine research vessels twice enters the territorial waters of the 
Pinnacle Islands while surveying the ocean floor within Japan’s EEZ. 
June 1998 – The PRC commences energy exploitation activities at the Pinghu oil field. 
In the same month, five boats with up to sixty protesters from Taiwan and Hong Kong 
come into confrontation with JCG boats as they attempt to land on the disputed islands 
(Valencia and Amae, 2003:200).  
1998 – China officially outlines its EEZ claims in the ECS according to the principle of 
‘natural prolongation of the continental shelf’ as stated in Article 76 of UNCLOS (Liao, 
2008:61). 
September 1998 – A Chinese protesters’ boat is sunk after a collision with the Japanese 
Coast Guard (SinoDefence.com, 2009). 
November 1998 – PRC leader Jiang Zemin visits Japan on a trip later regarded as a 
diplomatic failure due to the Chinese President’s disrespectful behavior, and his 
insistence on a formal apology for Japan’s wartime record in China (Seig, 2008). 
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1999 – China’s development of the Pinghu field receives support from Japan in the form 
of a $250 million loan from the Japan-chaired Asian Development Bank (ADB) (Zha, 
2008). This financial assistance also passed through the ADB’s ExportImport Bank 
(renamed the Japan Bank of International Co-operation (JBIC) in 1999). The first pay-out 
occurred in February 1997 and the final one occurred in November 2001 (Drifte, 
2008b:17).   
2000 – A fifth test in the Chunxiao area produces yields significant enough for 
commercial exploration (Zha, 2008). 
April 2000 – Members of the Japanese nationalist group ‘Nihon Seisensha’ land on one 
of the Pinnacle Islands and build a small shrine (Blanchard, 2006: 219). 
February 2001 – Both states agree to a two month prior notification agreement to deal 
with vessels entering disputed waters (Takahashi, 2004: 1-4).  
April 26th 2001 – Junichiro Koizumi becomes Prime Minister of Japan (2001-2006). The 
Koizumi government’s handling of sensitive historical issues such as the Yasukuni 
shrine, history textbooks, and Taiwan, along with general approaches toward China was 
to have a very negative effect on Chinese attitudes and approaches toward Japan until 
2006. 
July 2001 - a Beijing-sponsored Norwegian seismic survey ship, the ‘Nordic Explorer’ 
showed up within Japan’s maritime territory and stayed for two months. Tokyo’s reply 
was to allege that China had unlawfully intruded into Japan’s EEZ. Beijing countered by 
claiming that the sea’s boundaries still remained unsettled.  
December 2001 - A Japanese coast guard ship chases after and sinks a suspected North 
Korean spy ship close to China’s coast and inside China’s EEZ, using deadly force for 
the first time since the Second World War. Beijing responds to this by reprimanding 
Japan for the incident, and denouncing it as a violation of China’s sovereignty (Wei Su, 
2005: 45-46).  
April 2002 – Tokyo takes ownership of the lease of the remaining three Pinnacle Islands 
that had hitherto been under private ownership. This action thus put all the islands under 
the direct control of the Japanese government (Fravel, 2010:152). 
 June 22nd 2003 – Protesters from China and Hong Kong unsuccessfully attempt to land 
on the Pinnacle Islands (SinoDefence.com, 2009). 
August 19th 2003 – The current oil and gas field dimension of the ECS disputes begins in 
earnest. Major oil and gas companies Royal-Dutch Shell and Unocal agree to join two 
Chinese companies in developing the Chunxiao field (near the median line) and other 
fields in the ECS (Zha, 2008). 
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November 2003 – A surfaced Ming-class submarine with its flag hoisted sails through 
the Osumi Strait between Kyushu and Tanegashima in southern Japan (SinoDefence.com, 
2009). 
2003 – 2003 marks the last year in which Japanese nationalists successfully landed on the 
Pinnacle Islands (Fravel, 2010:152-53). 
January 15th 2004 – JMSDF patrol boats allegedly ram two Chinese fishing boats near 
the ECS islands (SinoDefence.com, 2009). 
March 2004 – Seven Chinese activists land on the largest of the Pinnacle Islands 
(Yomiuri Shimbun, 05/10/2004). 
April 2004 – In response to events in the previous month, Tokyo decides to position two 
Japan Coast Guard (JCG) vessels near the disputed islands so as to block attempts by 
activists seeking to land on them (Fravel, 2010:152). 
April 23rd 2004 – A bus belonging to a Japanese nationalist group rams into the Chinese 
consulate in Osaka, Japan in a protest against China’s claims in the ECS 
(SinoDefence.com, 2009). 
May 2004 – A Japanese nationalist scholar, Shigeo Hiramatsu, flies over the Chunxiao 
gas field and writes a well-publicized article on the construction of a natural gas 
extraction rig in the area (Tokyo Shimbun, 28/05/2004). 
June 29th 2004 – METI Minister Shoichi Nakagawa tells reporters that Japan will survey 
undersea resources in the East China Sea (Przystup, 2004:9). 
June 30th 2004 – Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs Chen Guofeng summons the 
Japanese ambassador to the PRC to protest Japanese undersea survey plans (Przystup, 
2004:9). 
July 6th 2004 – Japanese aircraft spot a Chinese maritime research ship, operating 
without prior notification in Japan’s EEZ. The Japanese Embassy in Beijing asks for an 
explanation (Przystup, 2004:9). 
July 7th 2004 – Japanese survey activities begin in Japan’s EEZ (Przystup, 2004:9). 
July 19th 2004 – PRC authorities in Fujian in southern China prevent ten people from 
setting out to land on the Pinnacle Islands (SinoDefence.com, 2009). The ten were 
members of the ‘China Federation for Defending the Diaoyu Islands’ and were prevented 
from sailing on the grounds that they were using Chinese fishing vessels for non-
commercial purposes (Fravel, 2010:153). 
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Oct. 17th 2004 – METI Minister Shoichi Nakagawa tells a Fuji TV Sunday morning 
political talk show that Japan has information that China has granted exploration rights to 
Chinese companies on Japan’s side of the median line (Przystup, 2005a:2). 
October 19th 2004 – The first round of a series of bilateral negotiations over the ECS 
begin after Beijing announces that it will engage in bilateral discussions to discuss 
conflicting claims over exploration activities in the ECS (SinoDefence.com, 2009). 
October 2004 - Royal-Dutch Shell and Unocal pull out of an agreed ECS project with 
China, citing a lower than expected value assessment of the project. It is believed that 
Japanese protests over the exploration activities might also have contributed to the 
decision to withdraw (Zha, 2008). 
November 10th 2004 – A submerged Chinese nuclear submarine navigates in the 
territorial waters of Japan. The incident prompted the JMSDF to go on alert for only the 
second time since the end of WWII and pursue the submarine by sea and air back to 
Chinese waters. China later stated it had strayed into Japan’s waters due to a technical 
fault (SinoDefence.com, 2009). 
February 2005 – the Japanese government finally cedes to the demands of the 
nationalistic Japan Youth Federation (Nihon Seinen Sha) and takes control of the Uotsuri 
lighthouse and its maintenance on one of the Pinnacle Islands (Kaijo Hoan Repoto, 
2007).  
February 2005 – An interim report by Tokyo concludes that the Chunxiao and Duanqiao 
geological structures are linked with those on the Japanese side of the median line. This 
was confirmed as ‘definite’ by the Japanese in April 2005 (Yomiuri Shimbun, 
02/04/2005). 
March 2005  - During discussions with a Chinese negotiator, METI Minister Shoichi 
Nakagawa dropped two straws in a glass of orange juice and complained that China was 
about to ‘suck out Japan’s resources with a straw’ (Brooke, 2005). 
Mid-April 2005 – Mass anti-Japanese protests take place throughout the major urban 
centers of China. The demonstrations are largely fed by Chinese anger over Japan’s 
history textbook controversy and Japan’s call for a UNSC seat. The protests also focus on 
the Yasukuni shrine issue, the East China Sea disputes, and other controversies. 
April 13th 2005 – Tokyo announces that it will accept applications from oil and gas 
companies to test-drill in areas on the eastern side of the median line. Beijing views the 
act as a sincere provocation and declares its right to react (SinoDefence.com, 2009). 
May 30th to 31st 2005 – The second important round of discussions on the East China 
Sea are held in Beijing. 
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June 2005 - Tokyo reports that the Chinese have begun constructing a drilling facility 
just inside the PRC’s EEZ and worryingly close (about 4 kilometers) to the median line 
recognized by Japan (Takahashi, 2004: 1-4). 
July 2005 - Japanese oil giant Teikoku (Imperial) Oil is granted permission to start 
exploratory drilling in the East China Sea. 
 
July 2005 – Tokyo gives Japanese names to Chinese oil and gas fields in the ECS. 
(Chunxiao = Shirakaba, Longqing = Asunaro, Duanqiao = Kusunoki, Tianwaijian = 
Kashi, Lengquan = Kikyo) (Drifte. 2008a:13) 
 
July 2005 - Ishigaki island assembly members in Okinawa prefecture submit a motion 
calling on the mayor and assembly members to inspect the islands. Beijing protests and 
angrily declares through one of its mouthpieces, the People’s Daily, that Japan ‘not only 
connives at the right-wing groups’ provocative activities, but also goes back on its 
promise of not taking unilateral actions and tries in vain to capture the Diaoyu Islands as 
so-called ‘Japanese territory’ by inter alia starting to rent the islands in 2002 and passing 
resolutions” (People’s Daily Online, 21/06/2005).  
 
July 2005 – Beijing warns that it would consider test drilling by Japan in the ECS as 
serious and as a threat to its sovereignty, confirming its view that the PRC’s EEZ extends 
to the Okinawa Trough (Financial Times, 14/07/2005). 
 
July 2005 – Chinese authorities raid the offices of the ‘China Federation for Defending 
the Diaoyu Islands’ in response to the organization’s activities during the mass anti-Japan 
demonstrations in April 2005 (Fravel, 2010:153).  
 
August 2005 – Tokyo announces that US and Japanese forces will carry out joint 
exercises in January 2006 for the defence of Japan’s outlying islands. This is the first 
time ever for such a joint exercise (Drifte, 2008b:16). 
 
September 2005 – When a Japanese expedition approaches the Chunxiao field area, the 
Chinese counter them with a fleet of five PLAN vessels, including the advanced 
Sovremenny guided missile destroyer (Manicom, 2008a). The ships were observed by a 
Japanese patrol plane near the Chunxiao gas field. This is the first time that PLAN 
warships are present in that area of the ECS (Onishi and French, 2005). A Chinese navy 
vessel allegedly points its anti-aircraft cannon at a JMSDF’s P3-C surveillance plane 
flying near the Chunxiao gas rig (Curtain, 2005).  
 
September 2005 - A day before negotiations on the ECS are scheduled to resume, 
Beijing confirms that it has set up a ‘reserve vessel squadron’ in the East China Sea 
(AFP, 29/09/2005). They also declare that the squadron is capable of ‘fighting during 
wars’ and was equipped to ‘eliminate obstacles at sea’ (Valencia, 2006:22-27).  
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October 2005 – Nationalistic METI Minister Shoichi Nakagawa is replaced by a more 
China friendly politician, Toshihiro Nikai. (Drifte, 2008b: 3)  
February 22nd-23rd 2006 – ECS frictions between the two states persist until early 2006, 
when Japan’s new METI Minister, Toshihiro Nikai, pays a visit to Beijing. After 
becoming METI Minister, Nikai puts an end to applications by Japanese oil companies to 
explore in the ECS, and chooses to solve the dispute through negotiation (Asahi Shimbun, 
23/02/2006; Zaobao, 25/02/2006). Beijing reciprocates by ordering a delay in production 
activities at the Chunxiao gas field (Interfax, 02/06/2006; Zaobao, 23/02/2006).  
March 7th 2006 – Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing claims that the ‘continued visits 
by Japanese leaders to the war-related Yasukuni Shrine were the top cause for Japan’s 
strained political ties with the PRC’ (Kyodo, 07/03/2006).  
May 2006 – Tokyo and Beijing make a significant step forward by agreeing to shelve the 
demarcation issue because it would take too long to resolve, and opt to focus on joint-
development instead (Sankei Shimbun 31/05/2006). 
September 25th 2006 – President Hu Jintao’s tighter grip on power vis-à-vis the rival 
Shanghai faction steps up a gear after he disposes the former Shanghai party secretary 
Chen Liangyu (Lam, 2008). 
Oct. 8th 2006 – Japan’s new Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (since Sept. 26th) visits Beijing, 
meets President Hu Jintao, and declares that he would handle the Yasukuni Shrine issue 
‘appropriately’ (Japan Times, 09/10/2006). 
Oct.27th 2006 – A group of Hong Kong activists attempt to land on the Pinnacle Islands 
but are blocked by the Japanese Coast Guard (JCG) (International Herald Tribune, 
26/10/2006). 
November 2006 – The PLAN carry out a naval exercise in the East China Sea (Nihon 
Keizai Shimbun, 05/11/2006). 
Nov. 18th 2006 – Hu and Abe meet on the sidelines of an APEC conference in Hanoi, 
Vietnam. 
December 2006 – More than one hundred ships from the US and Japanese navies take 
part in a joint exercise aimed at preparing for various contingencies in the event of a 
possible naval conflict with the PRC over the Pinnacle Islands (Japan Times, 
30/12/2006).  
April 2007 – PRC Premier Wen Jiabao visits Japan.  It is the first visit by a Chinese 
leader to Japan in almost seven years.  
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October 2007 – Four members of the ‘China Federation for Defending the Diaoyu 
Islands’ who had unsuccessfully attempted to land on the Pinnacle Islands are placed 
under house arrest by Chinese authorities after they return to China (Fravel, 2010:153).  
November 2007 – The Chinese warship ‘Shenzen’ makes a goodwill visit to Japan.  The 
goodwill visit was the first by a Chinese naval vessel in the post-war era and also served 
to show how defense exchanges were back on the bilateral agenda after a hiatus of nearly 
ten years. 
December 2007 – Japan’s new Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda visits China. 
May 2008 – Hu Jintao visits Japan. 
June 18th 2008 – China and Japan agree to a ‘principled consensus’ that would see the 
joint and co-operative development of part of the natural gas fields in the East China Sea 
(Zhou, 2008). 
June 24th 2008 – The Japanese destroyer ‘Sazanami’ becomes the first Japanese naval 
vessel to visit China in six decades.  
December 8th 2008 – Two PRC surveillance ships are spotted by a Japanese Coast Guard 
(JCG) patrol about 6km south-east of the Pinnacle Islands. The vessels remained in the 
area for up to nine hours. In response to Japanese protests, a spokesperson for the 
Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed that China had the right to patrol the waters 
of the islands since ‘the islands have always been a part of China’s territory’ 
(SinoDefence.com, 2009). 
January 17th 2010 – Japan warns China that it would take ‘certain action’ such as 
starting its own developments in the disputed area if Beijing starts unilateral gas 
production in the Chunxiao field area (Reuters, 17/01/2010). 
April 10th 2010 – JMSDF spot a surfaced flotilla of two Chinese submarines and eight 
destroyers sailing in international waters toward the Pacific (later seen near the disputed 
Okinotorishima area) in an area about 140 kms south of the Okinawan islands in the East 
China Sea.  A few days later, Japan’s Defense Minister, Toshimi Kitazawa, states ‘We 
will investigate whether (China) has any intention against our nation’ (Japan Times, 
14/04/2010). The Japanese however accepted that the Chinese were not acting against 
any international laws.  
April 21st 2010 – In a separate incident, in an area 500km south of Okinawa, a Chinese 
carrier-borne helicopter takes photos of, and comes within 90 meters of, a Japanese 
destroyer on alert in the area to track PRC vessels (Japan Today, 22/04/2010). A similar 
incident occurred a few weeks earlier. 
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April 23rd 2010 – The PRC’s Ministry of National Defense spokesperson Huang 
Xueping responds to Japanese complaints by arguing that China did not violate any 
international laws and as with other states’ navies, the PLAN was engaged in ‘normal 
routine’ practice on the high seas and that ‘countries concerned should not track down or 
disrupt the activities of Chinese military vessels engaged in normal defense 
exercises’(Cheng, 2010). This frustration by China was likewise illustrated by the PRC’s 
ambassador to Japan, Cheng Younghua, when he said ‘How would the Japanese people 
feel if there was a Japanese drill and the Japanese left port and was then annoyingly 
chased by Chinese destroyers?’ and where such behaviour by Japan ‘breaches the spirit 
of mutual understanding and mutual trust’ (Goodenough, 2010). 
April 27th 2010 – Concerns are expressed in China about an apparent proposed Japanese 
plan to unilaterally explore the seabed around the Pinnacle Islands for rare metals. A 
researcher at CIIS, Jin Linbo, argues that ‘Tokyo should communicate with Beijing 
before taking any unilateral action’ because such actions could be ‘misinterpreted’ by the 
Chinese (China Economic Net, 27/04/2010).  
May 6th 2010 – Tokyo complains that the PRC violated its sovereign rights in the ECS 
after a PLAN ship approaches and disturbs a Japanese survey vessel carrying out surveys 
in a ‘Japanese’ EEZ area on the Japanese side of the median line. Beijing responds that 
the ‘law-enforcement activities’ were ‘totally legitimate’ (Reuters, 06/05/2010). 
May 11th 2010 – The PRC’s ambassador to Japan, Cheng Yonghua, defends China’s 
recent actions in the ECS and responds to questions about the April ‘helicopter’ incidents 
by stating the PLAN reacted to the fact that the JMSDF was in close proximity and was 
‘following around the Chinese navy’ while it was on a legitimate training mission (Ito, 
2010a).  
May 13th 2010 – The Japan Times reports that Beijing has been calling on the Japanese 
to ‘supervise’ its domestic media’s coverage of the exploration aspects of the ECS 
disputes so as to prevent inaccurate reporting which damages bilateral approaches to the 
disagreements. They cite in particular the difference in meaning between ‘joint 
development’ and ‘co-operative development’ in the Chunxiao field as stipulated in the 
June 2008 ‘principled consensus’ (Japan Times, 13/05/2010). 
May 15th 2010 - Beijing and Tokyo agree ‘on the need to step up efforts toward 
establishing a hot-line mechanism involving both countries’ defense authorities to avoid 
problems in disputed areas, following friction over China’s recent activities in waters off 
Japan’ (Japan Today, 16/05/2010). 
May 31st 2010 - Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama and Chinese Premier Wen 
Jiabao agree to begin bilateral negotiations on implementing the June 2008 treaty over 
gas fields in the East China Sea during Wen’s visit to Japan (May 29th – June 1st). Wen 
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was particularly interested in setting up ‘a crisis-management mechanism to prevent 
incidents that could trigger bilateral friction, including accidental contact involving 
military ships’ (Ito, 2010b). 
June 2nd 2010 – After months of low opinion poll ratings, and having failed to honor an 
election promise to relocate the Futenma US air force base in Okinawa, Yukio Hatoyama, 
Japan’s Prime Minister since September 2009, resigns (Hongo, 2010).  
September 7th and 8th 2010 – A Chinese fishing boat ‘Minjinyu 5179’ rams into JCG 
vessels sent to monitor it after the ship’s captain refused to obey orders to leave waters 
surrounding the Pinnacle Islands. The ship and its crew are later detained and papers are 
drawn up to charge them with offences against domestic Japanese law such as interfering 
with JCG officials conducting their duties (Wada, 2010). 
September 13th 2010 – The fourteen remaining crew members of the Chinese fishing 
boat are permitted to return to China after questioning by the Japanese Coast Guard. The 
captain, Zhan Qixiong, is however kept in detention in preparation for charges to be 
drawn against him (Japan Today, 26/09/2010). 
September 14th 2010 – A tightly contested and distracting leadership election takes 
places within the ruling Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). Naoto Kan survives as leader 
while the nationalistic China hawk Seiji Maehara is named as the new Foreign Minister 
(Wada, 2010). 
September 17th 2010 – The new Japanese cabinet convenes for the first time since the 
incident. Japanese Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport (at the time of the 
incident) and Foreign Minister (after the leadership election) Seiji Maehara, states that it 
is appropriate for the Chinese captain’s case to be dealt with under the Japanese legal 
system because the Pinnacle Islands are an ‘integral part of Japanese territory’ and that 
‘territorial issues do not exist in this region’ (New York Times, 20/09/2010). 
September 18th 2010 – Chinese authorities take pro-active steps to manage and control 
growing anti-Japanese protests within the PRC (Asahi Shimbun, 20/10/2010). 
September 19th 2010 – Ishigaki Summary Court in Japan’s southern Okinawa prefecture 
announces that the detention of Zhan would be extended by another ten days until 
September 29th, thus signaling their intention to bring him to trial (Wada, 2010; Japan 
Today, 26/09/2010). 
September 19th 2010 – Following the decision to extend the detention period of Zhan 
Qixiong, the Chinese step up their diplomatic pressure against Japan over the coming 
days. The Japanese Ambassador to the PRC, Uichirō Niwa, is repeatedly summoned at all 
hours throughout the week by China’s State Councillor Dai Bingguo (Wada, 2010). 
Beijing suspends all ministerial and higher-level exchanges (as well as cultural 
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exchanges) with Japan, and cancels talks on increasing air routes and coal usage between 
the two neighbors (Japan Times, 20/09/2010; Japan Today, 26/09/2010; New York Times 
20/09/2010.) The Chinese also warn that they will take ‘strong countermeasures’ if the 
Japanese persist in detaining the fishing boat captain. Beijing suspends negotiations on a 
possible treaty over joint development in the ECS and also warns that Chinese tourists 
will be discouraged from visiting Japan. PRC Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Jiang Yu 
confirms that PRC marine surveillance vessels have been dispatched to the area ‘to 
strengthen law-enforcement activities in our relevant waters to safeguard China’s 
maritime rights and interests’ (Japan Today, 26/09/2010). The Chinese authorities also 
apparently slowed the flow of Japan-related goods into and out of the PRC by carrying 
out more rigorous customs inspections (Japan Today, 28/09/2010). 
September 20th 2010 – Four Japanese employees of the ‘Fujita’ company, tasked with 
removing abandoned chemical weapons are arrested on suspicion of entering a restricted 
military zone (Wada, 2010). 
September 20th 2010 – Prime Minister Naoto Kan mentions specifics ‘countermeasures’ 
in the East China Sea in the event that China should start drilling activities at the 
Chunxiao gas field (Japan Times, 20/09/2010). 
September 23rd 2010 – Unconfirmed reports surface that Beijing had allegedly ordered 
the suspension of exports of economically vital rare earth materials to Japan (Wada, 
2010). 
September 24th 2010 – After a week of sustained and escalating diplomatic pressure, and 
citing the importance of the wider relationship, the Kan leadership requests that the 
charges against the Chinese trawler captain be dropped. The Naha District Public 
Prosecutor’s Office concedes to the request (Wada, 2010).  
September 26th 2010 – A Japanese man is arrested for firing a flare at the Chinese 
Consulate in Fukuoka, a city in southern Japan. Another man is arrested for a similar 
incident at the PRC Consulate in Nagasaki (Japan Times, 30/09/2010). 
October 1st 2010 – Despite the ending of the stand-off, anger over the September 
incident persists in both countries. In Japan, the government’s ‘appeasement’ of China 
elicits widespread public indignation. Numerous newspapers condemn the Kan 
leadership, and media commentators such as Yoshiko Sakurai warn that ‘If Japan gives in 
on the Senkakus, China will come and grab Okinawa next’. The nationalistic Governor of 
Tokyo, Shintaro Ishihara cautions ‘What China’s doing is no different from gangsters. If 
Japan does nothing, it will suffer the same fate as Tibet’(McCormack,2011). 
October 4th 2010 – Wen Jiabao and Naoto Kan meet during a meeting in Brussels 
(Reuters, 21/10/2010). 
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October 5th 2010 – The Mayor and city assembly of Ishigaki city in Okinawa Prefecture 
call on the Tokyo government to strengthen surveillance and security activities near the 
Pinnacle Islands (Japan Times, 05/10/2010). 
October 5th 2010 – During an emotionally charged soccer game between China and 
Japan, a man runs onto the pitch and snatches the Japanese flag (Japan Today, 
11/10/2010). 
October 8th 2010 - Members of the Taiwan-based ‘Chinese Tiaoyutai Defense 
Association’ unsuccessfully attempt to land on one of the Pinnacle Islands (Japan Times, 
10/10/2010). 
October 9th 2010 – Four nationalistic members of the Japanese parliament, including a 
former Cabinet member, Kazuhiro Haraguchi, inspect the Pinnacle Islands from the air 
(Japan Times, 10/10/2010).  
October 11th 2010 – Japan and China hold their first ministerial-level meeting since the 
September incident when Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa and his Chinese 
counterpart Liang Guanglie meet in Hanoi (Japan Times, 11/10/2010). 
October 11th 2010 – The last of the Japanese Fujita employees to be detained on 
suspicion of entering a restricted military zone returns to Japan (Japan Times, 
11/10/2010). 
October 14th 2010 – Japanese Foreign Minister Seiji Maehara, responding to 
conservative opposition complaints, calls on Internet search engine Google to remove 
Chinese language references to the Pinnacle Islands on its map services (China Post, 
15/10/2010). 
October 16th 2010 – More than 2,000 Japanese protesters march to the Chinese Embassy 
in Tokyo, waving Japanese flags and shouting slogans opposing the PRC’s claims to the 
Pinnacle Islands (Reuters, 21/10/2010). 
October 17th 2010 – The Chinese leadership calls for ‘rational patriotism’ after mass 
anti-Japanese protests sometimes numbering up to 10,000 people break out with damage 
to Japan-related property in regions such as Sichuan Province (Japan Times, 18/10/2010). 
October 18th 2010 – PRC Vice President Xi Jinping is appointed vice chairman of the 
Chinese Communist Party's Central Military Commission during the Fifth Plenary 
Session of the 17th CCP's Central Committee. The move puts Xi in line to succeed Hu 
Jintao in 2013 (Japan Times, 21/10/2010). 
October 21st 2010 – China cancels an earlier invitation extended to Osaka Governor 
Toru Hashimoto to address a Shanghai World Expo-related event. It was suspected that 
the cancellation took place as a result of the delicate domestic situation at the time. 
Scheduled nationwide performances in Japan by the ‘China Disabled People’s 
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Performing Art Troupe’ were also cancelled by the group’s management team (Japan 
Times, 21/10/2010).  
October 20th 2010 – The Japanese Ministry of Defense announced that it will increase its 
Maritime Self-Defense submarine fleet from 16 to 22 as part of the fiscal 2011-15 basic 
defense program (Japan Times, 21/10/2010). 
October 26th 2010 - Tokyo lodges a protest with Beijing over the movement of PRC 
fisheries patrol vessels near the Pinnacle Islands. The Chinese Embassy in Tokyo also 
receives a bullet and a threatening protest letter in the post for the second time in a month 
(Japan Times, 26/10/2010).   
October 27th 2010 – Chinese journalists reveal that the Party leadership has been placing 
strict controls on how local media outlets report on anti-Japan demonstrations and other 
Japan-related information in an effort to curtail further protests (Japan Today, 
27/10/2010). 
October 30th 2010 – International media outlets declare that the PRC’s unofficial 
embargo on exports of rare earth minerals has ended (Japan Times, 30/10/2010). 
November 5th 2010 – A video of the September 7th incident is secretly posted on to 
YouTube by a member of the Japanese Coast Guard who had witnessed it. The hitherto 
unseen footage of the Chinese ship ramming JCG vessels causes uproar in Japan, feeds 
calls for a more forceful response in the ECS, and makes the Kan leadership look weak 
for having called for charges to be dropped against the Chinese captain.   
November 5th 2010 – The Japanese media report that suspicious liquids have been sent 
to the Chinese Embassy and five other PRC diplomatic establishments in Japan (Japan 
Today, 05/11/2010). 
November 8th 2010 – The state-run Chinese newspaper ‘Global Times’ blames the 
behavior of Japan’s ‘hawkish’, ‘political extremist’ Foreign Minister Seiji Maehara for 
the cancellation of planned talks between the premiers of China and Japan in the previous 
week on the sidelines of ASEAN regional meetings in Hanoi (Japan Today, 08/11/2010). 
November 14th 2010  –  Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi tells Japanese diplomats 
during a meeting in Yokohama that a suitable environment is necessary before talks on 
the East China Sea could re-open (Reuters, 14/11/2010). 
November 17th 2010 – A public opinion survey conducted by the Asahi Shimbun 
newspaper reveals that public approval for Prime Minister Kan and his cabinet has fallen 
to 27%. The survey revealed that the government’s poor handling of foreign policy issues 
such as the East China Sea was the most significant factor in the low approval rate. 
Opposition-led no confidence motions are also submitted against Chief Cabinet Secretary 
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Yoshito Sengoku and Transport Minister Sumio Mabuchi. The motion is defeated by 
Japan’s Lower House (Asahi Shimbun, 17/11/2010). 
November 28th 2010 – The Japanese media reports that the state’s Defense Ministry is 
considering doubling the number of ground troops deployed in Okinawa and its 
surrounding islands (Japan Today, 28/11/2010). 
November 28th 2010 – Two PRC fishery patrol vessels are spotted off the Pinnacle 
Islands and are warned by the JCG not to enter Japanese waters (Japan Times, 
29/11/2010). 
December 17th 2010 – China protests when two Japanese local assembly members land 
on one of the Pinnacle Islands the day before, and states that the action seriously 
infringed China’s territorial sovereignty (Japan Today, 17/12/2010). 
December 18th 2010 – China protests the decision by politicians in the city of Ishigaki, 
Okinawa Prefecture, to establish a ‘Pioneering Day’ on January 14th honoring the 1895 
territorial integration of the Senkaku Islands (Japan Times, 18/12/2010). 
December 18th 2010 – Government polls reveal that positive Japanese sentiments 
towards China are at an all-time low. The survey found that 78 percent of Japanese did 
not feel friendly toward the PRC, a jump of 19 points from the previous year (AFP, 
18/12/2010). 
December 20th 2010 – Beijing condemns Japan’s adoption of revised National Defense 
Program Guidelines and its comments that China's military rise and other actions are a 
‘matter of concern for the region and the international community’ (UPI.com, 
20/12/2010). 
January 21st 2011 – Japanese prosecutors announce that they will formally drop charges 
against the Chinese trawler captain at the centre of the alleged boat ramming incident 
near the Pinnacle Islands in September. The Japanese ex-coast guard officer who 
admitted leaking a classified video of the incident on the internet is also informed that he 
will not face charges (BBC News, 21/01/2011).  
February 1st 2011 – Diplomatic sources reveal that the two governments are considering 
holding a vice-ministerial meeting in late February to discuss ways to prevent a re-
occurrence of incidents in maritime areas such as witnessed in September 2010. They 
also plan to discuss frictions on the Korean Peninsula, Japan’s new defense guidelines, 
and stalled talks on possible joint development in the East China Sea. The discussions 
will mark the first bilateral strategic dialogue since June 2009 (Japan Today, 
02/02/2011).  
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March 3rd 2011 – Tokyo states that it will not lodge a complaint against Beijing for 
dispatching two military aircraft near the Pinnacle Islands but outside of Japanese 
airspace. JASDF fighter planes were scrambled in response to the incident. Despite not 
submitting a formal complaint, the Japanese express concern about Chinese behavior in 
the area (Sify.com, 05/03/2011). 
March 7th 2011 – Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi calls on Japan to take ‘credible steps’ to 
prevent maritime incidents near the Pinnacle Islands. He also declares that the two 
countries should pursue joint efforts to make sure that no one single issue will hurt the 
wider interests of the Japan and China relationship (Japan Times, 08/03/2011). 
March 9th 2011 – Tokyo expresses regret over reports that the Chinese were engaged in 
oil production at a disputed gas field in the East China Sea. Senior Chinese figures 
apparently refuted the claim by stating that the energy company concerned was merely 
engaged in maintenance and repair activities (MonstersandCritics, 09/03/2011).  
March 9th 2011 – Seiji Maehara resigns as Japan’s Foreign Minister after a political 
donations scandal. His replacement, Takeaki Matsumoto, promises to help repair the 
relationship with China while simultaneously expressing concerns over the PRC’s 
expanding maritime and military activities in the East China Sea and elsewhere (Sify.com, 
11/03/2011). 
March 11th 2011 – Japan suffers its worst domestic crisis since the end of the Second 
World War when the country’s north-eastern coast is ravaged by a combined earthquake 
and tsunami disaster. 
March 31st 2011 – The PRC dismisses claims and complaints by Japan that a Chinese 
helicopter had flown too close to a JMSDF destroyer in the East China Sea on the 
previous Saturday. Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu declares that the helicopter 
was carrying out regular patrols and that it had maintained the necessary safe distance 
from the Japanese vessel. The media in Japan claims that the incident was ‘extremely 
deplorable’ at a time when Japan was concentrating on recovery efforts following the 
March 11th disaster (Xinhua, 31/03/2011). 
June 4th 2011 – During bilateral talks held on the sidelines of an Asian security forum in 
Singapore, the defense ministers of Japan and China agree to resume full-fledged 
bilateral defense talks following the disruption caused by the September 7th incident. 
They also promise to speed up working level talks on a communication system to deal 
with maritime incidents (Daily Yomiuri, 06/06/2011). 
June 29th 2011 – Beijing reprimands Tokyo following a confrontation between 
Taiwanese nationalists in fishing boats, and vessels from the Japanese Coast Guard (JCG) 
(China Post, 04/07/2011). 
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July 4th 2011 – Led by the disgraced former JASDF chief and nationalist Toshio 
Tamogami, a group of Japanese activists in a fleet of nine fishing vessels go fishing in 
waters near the Pinnacle Islands in order to emphasize their country’s claim. China 
lodges a protest about the incident (China Post, 04/07/2011). 
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Maps, Figures, Illustrations, Surveys and Photos 
 
 
 
Source: ‘East China Sea’, Energy Information Administration – Official Energy Statistics from the US 
Government, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/East_China_Sea/Background.html. Accessed on 
28/06/2009. 
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(‘Hypothetical Median Line’ and ‘Okinawa’ are shown (blurred) on the right).Source: Harrison (2005) . 
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A Japanese map highlighting the Pinnacle (Sneak/Diary) Islands. Source: The author wishes to thank Professor Yasuji 
Ishigaki of Tokai University, Japan for this (see Interview No. 15 for details). 
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Source: Valencia and Amae, (2003). 
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Source: Valencia and Amae, (2003).  
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Source: Valencia and Amae, (2003).  
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Document used by Jinsong Liu (First Secretary for Political and Regional Affairs, the Embassy of the 
People’s Republic of China in Japan) to outline China’s points of view on the East China Sea disputes at a 
discussion entitled ‘Japan’s Territorial Disputes with China and South Korea: Co-operation or Conflict’, at 
the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan held in Tokyo on June 7th 2006. Sentences from UNCLOS 
supporting China’s position are intentionally highlighted in bold black print by Jinsong Liu. The author 
wishes to thank Sam Jameson for these (see Interview No.2 details). 
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Document used by Jinsong Liu (First Secretary for Political and Regional Affairs, the Embassy of the 
People’s Republic of China in Japan) to outline China’s points of view on the East China Sea disputes at a 
discussion entitled ‘Japan’s Territorial Disputes with China and South Korea: Co-operation or Conflict’, at 
the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan held in Tokyo on 07/06/2006. Sentences from UNCLOS 
supporting China’s position are intentionally highlighted in bold black print by Jinsong Liu. The author 
wishes to thank Sam Jameson for these (see Interview No.2 details). 
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Document used by Jinsong Liu (First Secretary for Political and Regional Affairs, the Embassy of the 
People’s Republic of China in Japan) to outline China’s points of view on the East China Sea disputes at a 
discussion entitled ‘Japan’s Territorial Disputes with China and South Korea: Co-operation or Conflict’, at 
the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan held in Tokyo on 07/06/2006. Sentences from UNCLOS 
supporting China’s position are intentionally highlighted in bold black print by Jinsong Liu. The author 
wishes to thank Sam Jameson for these (see Interview No.2 details). 
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Illustrations used by Jinsong Liu (First Secretary for Political and Regional Affairs, the Embassy of the 
People’s Republic of China in Japan) to outline China’s points of view on the East China Sea disputes at a 
discussion entitled ‘Japan’s Territorial Disputes with China and South Korea: Co-operation or Conflict’, at 
the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan held in Tokyo on 07/06/2006. The figure with the crescent-
shaped head represents Japan. The author wishes to thank Sam Jameson for these (see Interview No.2 for 
details). 
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When shown this illustration (Number 3), Professor Liu Nanlai of CASS (Beijing), a leading scholar of 
China’s maritime disputes, argued that that it was ‘completely right’ in terms of China’s point of view 
regarding the East China Sea disputes. See Interview No.45 for details. The author wishes to thank Sam 
Jameson for these (see Interview No.2 for details). 
 
Illustrations used by Jinsong Liu (First Secretary for Political and Regional Affairs, the Embassy of the 
People’s Republic of China in Japan) to outline China’s points of view on the East China Sea disputes at a 
discussion entitled ‘Japan’s Territorial Disputes with China and South Korea: Co-operation or Conflict’, at 
the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan held in Tokyo on 07/06/2006. The figure with the crescent-
shaped head represents Japan. The author wishes to thank Sam Jameson for these (see Interview No.2 for 
details). 
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Illustrations used by Jinsong Liu (First Secretary for Political and Regional Affairs, the Embassy of the 
People’s Republic of China in Japan) to outline China’s points of view on the East China Sea disputes at a 
discussion entitled ‘Japan’s Territorial Disputes with China and South Korea: Co-operation or Conflict’, at 
the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan held in Tokyo on 07/06/2006. The figure with the crescent-
shaped head represents Japan.  The author wishes to thank Sam Jameson (see Interview No.2 for details). 
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       Source: (Drifte, 2008a:15). 
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Caption: A photo showing the arrest of some Chinese protesters (in orange jackets) who landed on the 
Japanese administered Pinnacle (Senkaku/Diaoyu) Islands in March 2004. The protesters (seven in total) 
were charged with illegal entry of a foreign state and were later sent back to China after questioning. The 
arrests prompted a small scale protest outside the Japanese Embassy in Beijing with protesters burning 
Japanese flags and chanting ‘The Chinese people cannot be insulted.’ Source: Taipei Times, 26/03/2004. 
 
 
Caption: A bus belonging to a Japanese right-wing group crashed into the front gate of the Chinese 
consulate in Osaka, western Japan, April 23, 2004. The man ramming the bus into the consulate has been 
arrested by Japanese police. Japanese cabinet secretary apologized for this.                                          
Source: People’s Daily, 25/06/2004.  
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Caption: Chinese demonstrators clashed with the police Sunday in Guangzhou in front of a Japanese-
owned store. Source: New York Times, 11/04/ 2005. 
 
 
 
Anti-Japan Protesters in China, April 2005. Source: Voice of America, 13/04/2005.  
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Caption: Protesters marched in Hong Kong today to denounce Japan, as anger at Japan's record in World 
War II spilled over from mainland China. Source: New York Times, 18/04/2005. 
 
 
Caption: Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, ignoring criticism from both home and abroad, visits 
the Yasukuni Shrine which honors Japan's 14 notorious class-A war criminals of World War II, in Tokyo, 
capital of Japan, Aug.15, 2006. Source: Xinhua, 16/08/2006.  
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Caption: Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing (1st R) talks with Japanese Ambassador to China 
Miyamoto Yuji in Beijing, China, on Aug. 15, 2006. Li Zhaoxing lodged serious and solemn 
representations, and strong protests against Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's sixth visit to the 
war criminals-honoring Yasukuni Shrine. Source: Xinhua, 16/08/2006. 
 
Caption: Japan Coast Guard video handout image of a Chinese boat carrying some 25 Hong Kong 
protesters approaching the disputed Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, Friday 27 October 2006. The 
protesters were repelled from the islands by a Japanese Coast Guard ship (in background) after being 
sprayed with water. The islands are disputed by Japan, China and Taiwan. Source: Military Photos.net, 
2006. 
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Illustration used by Vice Admiral (Ret.) Fumio Ota (Japan) to highlight his views regarding the Chinese 
military’s use of force since 1949.  Source: Ota, Fumio (2009). 
 
 
Illustration used by Vice Admiral (Ret.) Fumio Ota (Japan) to augment his view that China is 
surreptitiously siphoning resources from Japan’s EEZ. Source: Ota, Fumio (2009). 
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Photograph of a Chinese PLAN ship patrolling near a Chinese rig in the East China Sea.                     
Source: Ota, Fumio (2009). 
 
Source: China Daily, 07/05/2008.  
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Source: Kunimi, 2006. 
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Source: Kunimi, 2006. 
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Caption: Well-wishers wave Chinese and Japanese national flags as China's missile destroyer ‘Shenzhen’ 
leaves Tokyo's Harumi wharf, December 1, 2007, concluding the PLA's first-ever warship visit to Japan. 
Source: Sina English, 03/12/2007.  
 
Source: China Daily, 19/12/2007.  
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Caption: Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda speaks during an interview with Xinhua and other 
Chinese media at the prime minister's office in Tokyo, Japan, Dec. 25, 2007.  Source: Xinhua, 26/12/2007.  
 
Caption: ‘Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao (L) plays baseball with his Japanese counterpart Yasuo Fukuda at 
the Diaoyutai State Guest House in Beijing Saturday morning, December 29, 2007.’ Professor Akio 
Takahara of Tokyo University claimed that the dissemination of such photos in China and Japan by 
Beijing’s propaganda department, showing normally reserved and staid politicians in baseball attire, was 
aimed at proving that the CCP is serious about improving relations with Japan (see Interview No.66 for 
details). Source: Xinhua, 29/12/2007.  
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Caption: Chinese President Hu Jintao (C) has an interview with Japanese journalists at the Great Hall of the 
People in Beijing, capital of China, May 4, 2008. Source: Xinhua, 04/05/2008.  
 
Caption: ‘Japanese rescue members [in the aftermath of the Sichuan earthquake of May 2008] 
pay respects to the bodies of the female victim Song Aimei and her 70-day-old baby after 16 hours of 
searching through the debris in Qingchuan County, Sichuan Province.’ According to Professor Ryosei 
Kokubun of Keio University (Japan), the CCP allowed the publication of this photo via media sources 
throughout the PRC in the hope of creating a more positive image of Japan amongst ordinary Chinese 
people after a previously cold chill in Sino-Japanese relations (see Interview No.65 for details).          
Source: China Daily, 21/05/2008.  
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Map showing details of the June 2008 East China Sea ‘principled consensus.’ Shirakaba is the Japanese 
name for the Chunxiao (Chinese name) gas field. Source: Japan Times, 19/06/2008.  
 
Caption: A girl waves Chinese and Japanese national flags to welcome the visiting Japanese destroyer 
Sazanami in Zhanjiang, South China's Guangdong Province June 24, 2008. Source: Xinhua, 28/06/2008.  
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Caption: A crewmember from the Japanese destroyer Sazanami signs autographs for Chinese students in 
Zhanjiang, Guangdong province, on Friday, during the vessel's five-day stay in China. It was the first time 
for a Japanese naval ship to visit China in six decades. Source: China Daily, 30/06/2008. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
389 
 
 
 
List of Interviewees 
 
Background 
Chinese experts interviewed (directly or by email) = 36. 
Chinese experts interviewed by email only = 3. 
Japanese experts interviewed (directly or by email) = 44. 
Japanese experts interviewed by email only = 3. 
Third parties interviewed = 6. 
Third party interviewed by email only = 1. 
Total number of interviews = 88. (2 experts were interviewed twice (in 2007 and 2008)). 
Total number of different people interviewed = 86. 
Total number of interviews as indicated by the following list = 83. One interview was a 
group interview (discussion format) which included six people; this was marked as one 
interview. Therefore, with six people designated as one interview, then five from the total 
number of interviews carried out was excluded.  
 
 
Interview No. 1: Sean J Curtain, Japan Scholar. Lecturer, School of Oriental and Asian 
Studies (SOAS) and the University of Westminster on 20/08/2006. 
Interview No. 2: Sam Jameson, journalist, Visiting Fellow, Institute for International 
Policy Studies, Yomiuri Research Institute, former Tokyo Bureau Chief, Chicago 
Tribune (1963-1971), former Tokyo Bureau Chief, Los Angeles Times (1971-1996), on 
26/08/2006. 
Interview No. 3: Tsuyoshi Ike, Manager, Information Analysis and Research 
Department, International Affairs Group. Sumitomo Shoji Research Institute, Inc. on 
28/08/2006.  
Interview No. 4: Tsutomu Toichi, Senior Managing Director and COO, Chief Executive 
Researcher, The Institute of Energy Economics (IEEJ) Tokyo, on 29/08/2006.  
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Interview No. 5: Sumihiko Kawamura, Rear Admiral Japan Maritime Self-Defense 
Forces (JMSDF) Retired, Deputy Director, Okazaki Institute on 29/08/2006. 
Interview No. 6: Robert Dujarric, Visiting Research Fellow, The Japan Institute of 
International Affairs (JIIA) on 31/08/2006.  
Interview No. 7: Aaron Sheldrick, Reporter, Bloomberg (Tokyo Office) on 06/09/2006.  
Interview No. 8: Masahiro Miyoshi, Professor of International Law, Director, the 
Institute of International Affairs, Aichi University, General Editor, The Asian Yearbook 
of International Law on 08/09/2006. 
Interview No. 9: Kenji Sasaki, Deputy General Manager, Policy Research Committee, 
the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) on 13/09/2006. 
Interview No. 10: Hisane Masaki, Journalist, Commentator, and Scholar on International 
Politics and Economy, on 16/09/2006.  
 
Interview No.11: Wataru Hiraizumi, President of the Kajima Institute of International 
Peace, former state minister, and senior advisor to the Japan Institute of International 
Affairs (JIIA), on 14/09/2007. 
Interview No. 12: Kazumine Akimoto, Rear Admiral, JMSDF Retired, and Senior 
Research Fellow, Policy Research Department, Ocean Policy Research Foundation 
(OPRF), Tokyo on 21/09/2007.  
 
Interview No. 13: (Anonymous) Legal expert at the School of Law, Waseda University, 
Tokyo on 26/09/2007.  
Interview No. 14: Noboru Hatakeyama, Chairman and CEO, Japan Economic 
Foundation, on 27/09/2007.  
Interview No. 15: Yasuji Ishigaki, Professor, Tokai University Law School, Special 
Assistant to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Former Japanese ambassador to Finland,  
Delegate for Japan to AALCO: Asian and African Legal Consultative Organization, on 
03/10/2007.  
Interview No. 16:  Jiro Yamaguchi, Professor of Political Science, Faculty of Law, 
Hokkaido University, on 06/10/2007.  
 
Interview No. 17:  (First of Two Interviews) Akio Takahara, Professor, Graduate School 
of Law and Politics, the University of Tokyo, on 12/10/2007.  
 
Interview No. 18: Yukio Satoh, President, The Japan Institute of International Affairs 
(JIIA), on 16/10/2007. 
Interview No. 19: Sogo Ikeda, Professor, Dean, Graduate School of Political Science, 
Kokushikan University on 17/10/2007.  
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Interview No. 20:  Makoto Iokibe, Professor, President of the National Defense 
Academy, Japan on 23/10/2007.  
 
Interview No. 21:  Chiyuki Mizukami, Professor, Faculty of Law, Meiji Gakuin 
University, on 24/10/2007.  
 
Interview No. 22:  Shigeki Sakamoto, Professor of International Law, Graduate School 
of Law, Kobe University, on 27/10/2007.  
 
Interview No. 23:  Toshiyuki Shikata, Professor of Law, Teikyo University, Counselor 
to the Governor of Tokyo, former Lieutenant General of the JSDF, on 05/11/2007.  
Interview No.24: Jin Xide, Deputy Director, Institute of Japanese Studies, Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) on 20/11/2007.  
Interview No.25: (Via interpreter) Zhu Fenglan, scholar, Institute of Asia-Pacific 
Studies, Center for Regional Security Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
(CASS) on 21/11/2007. 
Interview No.26: (Via interpreter) Xia Yishan, Senior Research Fellow, Director, Center 
for Energy Strategy Studies, China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) on 
23/11/2007. 
 
Interview No.27: (Conducted in Japanese) Chongyang Xin, Associate Professor of Law, 
Associate Dean, School of Juris Master in China University of Political Science and Law 
on 27/11/2007. 
Interview No.28: Zhang Xinjun, Lecturer in International Law, School of Law, Tsinghua 
University, Beijing, on 30/11/2007. 
Interview No.29: Pan Rui, Professor, Center for American Studies, Fudan University, 
Shanghai on 04/12/2007. 
Interview No.30:  (First Interview of Two) Cai Penghong, Senior Fellow and Professor, 
Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Shanghai Academy of Social Studies (SASS) on 
04/12/2007.  
Interview No.31: Shu Biquan, SASS scholar, Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Shanghai 
Academy of Social Sciences on 04/12/2007. 
Interview No.32: (Via Interpreter) Jin Yongming, Associate Research Fellow, Institute 
of Law, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, on 04/12/2007. 
Interview No.33: Xu Xiaobing, Professor, Lecturer of Law, Shanghai Jiaotong 
University on 04/12/2007. 
Interview No.34: Ji Guoxing, Professor, Center of RimPac Studies, School of 
International and Public Affairs, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, on 05/12/2007.  
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Interview No.35: Ni Shixiong, Professor, School of International Relations and Public 
Affair, Fudan University, Member, Committee of Social Sciences, Ministry of Education, 
on 06/12/2007.  
Interview No.36:  Hideaki Kaneda, retired Vice-Admiral (JMSDF), Director, Special 
Advisor, The Okazaki Institute, Tokyo on 13/12/2007. 
 
Interview No.37:Gao Lan, Associate Professor, Institute of Asian-Pacific Studies, 
Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (SASS), Research Fellow, Japan Studies Center of 
Fudan University on 02/09/2008. 
Interview No.38: Li Xiushi, Professor, Director of Japanese Studies, Shanghai Institute 
for International Studies (SIIS), on 03/09/2008. 
Interview No.39: Xue Chen, Research Fellow, Department of Strategic Studies, 
Shanghai Institute for International Studies, on 03/09/2008. 
 
Interview No.40: Su Changhe, Dean and Professor, School of International and 
Diplomatic Affairs (SIDA), Shanghai International Studies University on 03/09/2008.  
 
Interview No.41: (Second of Two Interviews) Cai Penghong, Senior Fellow and 
Professor, Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Shanghai Academy of Social Studies (SASS) 
on 05/09/2008. 
Interview No.42: Guo Dingping, Professor of Political Science, School of International 
Relations and Public Affairs, Fudan University on 05/09/2008. 
 
Interview No.43: Ding Li Shen, Professor of International Studies; Executive Dean, 
Institute of International Studies, Director, Center for American Studies, Fudan 
University, on 10/09/2008. 
Interview No.44: Wang Hanling, Professor, Director, Research Base for Ocean Affairs 
and the Law of the Sea (BOALOS), Center for International Law and the National 
Institute of Law, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) on 16/09/2008. 
Interview No.45:  (Via interpreter) Liu Nanlai,, Professor,  Center for International Law 
and the National Institute of Law, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) on 
16/09/2008. 
 
Interview No.46: Su Hao, Professor, Director, Center for Asia-Pacific Studies, Deputy 
Director, Center for International Security, China Foreign Affairs University (CFAU) on 
17/09/2008.  
Interview No.47: Sun Xuefeng, Associate Professor, Department of International 
Relations, Tsinghua University, on 17/09/2008.  
 
Interview No.48: Chris Buckley, Senior Correspondent, Reuters, on 18/09/2008.  
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Interview No.49:  (Via interpreter) Zheng Donghui, researcher, China Institute of 
International Studies (CIIS) on 18/09/2008.  
 
Interview No.50: Cheng Xiaohe, Professor, School of International Studies, Renmin 
University of China, on 19/09/2008. 
 
Interview No.51: Zhu Feng, Deputy Director, Professor, School of International Studies, 
Center for International and Strategic Studies, Peking University on 22/09/2008. 
 
Interview No.52: Yu Tienjun, General Secretary, Associate Professor, School of 
International Studies (SIS), Center for International and Strategic Studies, Peking 
University on 22/09/2008. 
 
Interview No.53: (Anonymous) A group of six scholars from the State Oceanic 
Administration (SOA), China Institute for Marine Affairs (CIMA), Beijing, on 
23/09/2008.   
 
Interview No.54:Yang Bojiang, Professor, Director, Institute of Japanese Studies, China 
Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), on 24/09/2008. 
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